Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s14: XXIV Ethics
Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s14
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XXIV Ethics
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The Nyāya thinkers do not draw a hard and fast line of distinction between will and intellect. Intellect is no more a passive agent receiving or reflecting objects presented to it than will is a mysterious power which comes into operation after the intellect presents objects to it. All knowledge is purposive and even as we cognise objects we like or dislike them, try to obtain or avoid them. When we think an object, we at the same time value it and adopt a definite practical attitude to it. Ethics deals with the practical side of man's life, more especially with voluntary activities.
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A psychological analysis of the nature of volition is given in some Nyāya treatises. Viśvanātha¹ mentions a number of conditions of icchā or desire. We do not desire impossible things. Only children cry for the moon. As a rule we desire things which seem to be within our reach.² Again, the objects willed are recognised to be desirable, as conductive to the good of the agent.³ Even when we will to commit suicide, or drive a thorn into our flesh, it is because we believe in the value of these objects. Nothing has value except in relation to a subject, though the subject may look upon suicide and such other courses of conduct as conducive to his welfare, in an abnormal state of mind.¹ Whatever other judgment may be passed on it later, at the time of the volition the object must be regarded as desirable. In determining the desirability of a plan of action, we take into account all its consequences and make sure that its adoption will not be accompanied by greater evil.² When an object threatens to yield more harm, we do not care to pursue it. This condition involves a careful survey of the consequences of the proposed course of action.
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¹ Siddhāntamuktāvali, 146-150.
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² Kṛtisādhyatājñāna.
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³ Iṣṭasādhanatājñāna.
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¹ Rogadūṣitacittaḥ.
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² Balavad aniṣṭa ananubandhitvajñāna. This is ambiguous, and may mean either the consciousness of the absence of evil (aniṣṭa ajanakatvajñāna) or the absence of the consciousness of any evil (aniṣṭajanakatvajñānābhāva). Viśvanātha inclines to the latter view.
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Voluntary activities which are instinctive³ and automatic, where the operation of will (svecchādhīnatva) is absent, are not, strictly speaking, the objects of moral judgment. The soul is not the victim of desires and aversions which flood upon it from outward sources. If the soul were by itself an unconscious entity, then its aversions and the preferences may be regarded as the destiny which drags the soul along in its train. The Nyāya assumes a power of initiative, selection and choice, implying thereby that the nature of the soul is spiritual freedom. Vātsyāyana combats the view which traces all events to the direct intervention of God, providing no room for human effort (puruṣakāra).⁴ The human will is efficient enough, though it works under the control of God. Vātsyāyana refutes the notion that the will works without any cause.⁵
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³ Jīvanayonipūrvaka.
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⁴ N.B., iv. I. 19–21.
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⁵ N.B., iv. I. 22–24.
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All acts have for their motive (prayojana)⁶ the desire to obtain pleasure (sukhaprāpti) and avoid pain (duḥkhaparihāra). Pain, the cause of uneasiness,⁷ is the sign that the soul is not at rest with itself. The highest good is deliverance from pain and not the enjoyment of pleasure, for pleasure is always mixed up with pain.⁸ Saṃsāra is of the nature of suffering, though it may seem on occasions to be pleasant. To escape from saṃsāra is to attain the highest good. "Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions: on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it."¹ Pain (duḥkha) is the result of birth (janma), which is the result of activity (pravṛtti). All activity, good or bad, binds us to the chain of saṃsāra and leads to some kind of birth, high or low. The Naiyāyika blushes that he has a body, and declares with Novalis that "life is a disease of the spirit, an activity excited by passion." The activity is due to the defects of aversion (dveṣa), attachment (rāga) and stupidity (moha). Aversion includes anger, envy, malignity, hatred and implacability. Attachment includes lust, avarice, avidity and covetousness. Stupidity includes misapprehension, suspicion, conceit and carelessness. Stupidity is the worst since it breeds aversion and attachment.² Through these defects, we forget that there is nothing agreeable or disagreeable to the soul and come to like and dislike objects. The cause of these defects is false knowledge (mithyājñāna) about the nature of the soul, pain, pleasure, etc. To attain the timeless condition of freedom, which is the only real value, we must put an end to the chain which begins with false notions and ends with pain. When false knowledge disappears, faults pass away. With their disappearance, activity has no raison d'être, and so there is no chance of birth. Cessation of birth means abolition of pain, which is another name for final bliss.³
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⁶ N.B. and N.V., i. I. 24, on it; also N.B., iii. 2. 32–37.
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⁷ i. I. 21.
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⁸ S.D.S., xi. Uddyotakara somewhat modifies the view. "If there were no pleasure, merit would be entirely useless. . . . Nor will it be right to regard the mere negation of pain as the result of merit, since then the result of merit will be a merely negative entity. In ordinary life we find a twofold activity among men. One acts with a view to obtain something
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¹ N.S., i. 1. 2; iv. 1. 68. Cp. with this the Buddhist chain of causation (Visuddhimagga, xix).
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² iv. 1. 3-9.
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³ N.B., iii. 2. 67; iv. 1. 6; iv. 2. 1.
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So long as we act, we are under the sway of attachment and aversion and cannot attain the highest good. The hatred of pain is still hatred and the attachment to pleasure is still desirable, while another acts with a view to avoid the undesirable; and if there were nothing desirable, this twofold activity would not be possible. Again (if there were no pleasure), there could be no such advice, as that pleasure should be looked upon as pain; lastly, there could be no attachment, since no one is ever attached to pain" (N.V., i. 1. 21). Śrīdhara does not agree with the view that pleasure is the mere absence of pain in view of the positive experience of bliss and the twofold activities of men (Nyāyakandalī, p. 260).
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attachment and, so long as these are operative, the highest good is beyond our reach.
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The Naiyāyika asks us to suppress all sense of separateness, for he allows that the activities of one whose defects are overcome do not tend to rebirth.¹ Those who are saved in this life go on performing work as long as they are in body, and this work does not bind them. So long as we cling to individuality and accumulate virtue to become Indra or Brahmā, we are bound to the circuit, for even the states of Indra and Brahmā have an end. The highest good consists in freedom from all sense of separateness.
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¹ N.S., iv. 1 64.
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The realisation of true knowledge does not mean an immediate escape from saṃsāra. The desert which is the basis of the connection between the soul and the body must be completely exhausted, thus destroying every chance of a revival of connection between the two.²
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² N.S., iv. 1. 19-21.
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While the only good is thus freedom from individuality, all courses of conduct which tend to this are said to be good, and those which lead in the opposite direction bad. Activities are distinguished into those of speech, mind and body, and each of them is divided into good and bad.³ The essence of moral evil lies in the conscious choice of the evil in preference to the good. Under the influence of strong passion (utkaṭa-rāga), we misconceive the painful effects of sin and fall a prey to the attractions of pleasure.
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³ i. 1. 17. Charity, protection and service are good bodily activities, while murder, theft and adultery are bad. Speaking the true, the useful and the pleasant and study of sacred books are good activities relating to speech, while lying, using harsh language, and slandering and indulging in frivolous talk are bad. Compassion, generosity and devotion are good activities of the mind, while those of malice, covetousness and scepticism are bad.
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The adoption of virtuous activities will enable one to discriminate the soul from the body and the senses. True knowledge, so much insisted on, is not a matter of mere intellectual opinion, but a kind of general attitude. False knowledge and selfish attitude go together.⁴ True knowledge and unselfishness are organically related. This true knowledge cannot be acquired from books, but only through meditation and increase of righteousness.¹ In addition to study and reflection,² yoga practices are enjoined.³ Uddyotakara advises scriptural study, philosophic thought and meditation.⁴ We are sometimes asked to refrain from worldly pleasures, renounce all desires, retire to a forest and make our souls the sacrificial fire in which our physical actions are offered as oblations. Bhakti as a means of securing peace and happiness is permitted. Though God does not interfere, the act of devotion brings its own reward.⁵
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⁴ N.V., iv. 2. 2.
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¹ N.B., iv. 2. 38 and 41.
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² N.B., iv. 2. 47.
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³ N.B., iv. 2. 46. The Naiyāyikas are also called yogas. “Naiyāyikānāṁ yogaparābhidhānānām” (Guṇaratna’s Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayavṛtti). See also his Tarkarahasyadīpikā. Vātsyāyana mentions the Nyāya view under yoga in i. 1. 29.
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⁴ N.V., i. 1. 2.
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⁵ Nyāyasāra, pp. 38, 40-41; and S.S.S., vi. 10-21, and 40-44.
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Like the other systems of Hindu thought, the Nyāya accepts the principle of karma, and believes in the persistence of the results of our activity. Some of our activities produce their results immediately like, say, the act of cooking, while others take a longer time to mature, like the act of ploughing. Acts of piety and ceremonialism are of the latter kind, since attainment of heaven is not possible until after death.⁶ In the interval the causes have not disappeared, but persist in the form of dharma and adharma. “Prior to the actual accomplishment of fruition, there would be something (in the shape of an intermediary) just as there is in the case of the fruit of the trees.”⁷ The adṛṣṭa, or the unseen quality, is not different from karma; for, if so, “even after final release there would be a likelihood of a body being produced.”⁸ The bodies which the souls assume are determined by their past karma. The body gives the name to the soul, which, though neither man nor horse, is yet called man or horse according to the body with which it is endowed.¹ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system does not believe in any subtle body. The soul passes from one frame to another through the aid of manas, which is atomic and therefore supersensuous, and is not seen when it leaves the body on death. Since the souls are all-pervading, it is only the manas that can be said to proceed to the new abode of fruition in rebirth.
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⁶ Uddyotakara writes: “In cases where the action does not bring about the effect immediately, this is due to the obstruction caused by the peculiar circumstances attending the karmic residuum that is undergoing fruition or the obstruction caused by the fructifying karmic residuum of other living beings whose experiences are akin to those in question, or the acts being obstructed by the acts of those other living beings who may be sharers in the karma of the man in question, or because such auxiliary causes as merit and demerit are not present at the time” (N V., iii. 2. 60).
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⁷ N.B., iv. 1. 47. See iv. 1. 44-54.
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⁸ N.B., iii. 2. 68.
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¹ N B., iii. I. 26.
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The real, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is a complex of souls and nature. The natural order is not the product of souls, but is the arrangement of a God, who so fashions the atoms as to make the natural order the medium for the souls' experiences. The harmony between souls and nature is due to divine design.
Cites (7)
- Nyāyasūtra — Akṣapāda Gautama, Sanskrit
- Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit
- Visuddhimagga — Buddhaghosa, Pāli
- Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha — Śaṅkara, Sanskrit
- Nyāyasāra — Bhāsarvajña, Sanskrit
- Nyāyakandalī — Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, Sanskrit
- Tarkarahasyadīpikā — Guṇaratna Sūri, Sanskrit