Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s15: XXV Theology
Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s15
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XXV Theology
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In the Nyāya Sūtra, we find only a casual mention of God, which justifies the suspicion that the ancient doctrine of the Nyāya was not theistic.² The theory of divine causality is referred to in the Nyāya Sūtra.³ While Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Viśvanātha regard it as the Nyāya view, Vācaspati, Udayana and Vardhamāna interpret is as a criticism of the Vedānta view, that God is the constituent cause of the universe. To the objection that man does not often reap fruits proportionate to his acts, and so everything seems to depend on God's will and not on human effort, the Nyāya says that human acts produce their results under the control and with the co-operation of God. Vātsyāyana supports theism when he declares that the self sees all, feels all and knows all. This description loses all meaning, if it is applied to the imperfect individual self.⁴ Later Naiyāyikas as well as Vaiśeṣikas are frankly theistic and enter into a discussion of the nature of God in considering the theory of ātman. Annam Bhaṭṭa classifies souls into two kinds, supreme and human. While the supreme is God, one, omniscient, the human souls are infinite in number, different in each body.¹ God is looked upon as a special soul, possessing the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, by which he guides and regulates the universe. Since the human and the divine souls differ in many respects, it is difficult to believe that the original authors, Gautama and Kaṇāda, meant to bring together these two kinds of souls under one comprehensive class. The empirical tendency and the dialectical interests of the Nyāya are responsible for its practical indifference to the question of the reality of God.²
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² "The fundamental textbooks of the two schools, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya Sūtras, originally did not accept the existence of God; it was not till a subsequent period that the two systems changed to theism, although neither ever went so far as to assume a creator of matter" (Garbe: *Philosophy of Ancient India*, p. 23). Muir "is unable to say if the ancient doctrine of the Nyāya was theistic" (*Original Sanskrit Texts*, vol. iii, p. 133).
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³ iv. i. 19-21.
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⁴ N.B., i. i. 9; iv. i. 21.
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¹ Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 17.
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² Athalye writes: “Kaṇāda and Gautama might have at first purposely excluded God from their systems, not as being totally non-existent, but as being beyond and above the phenomenal world with which their systems were chiefly concerned. Possibly the aphorists confined themselves to a classification and discussion of sublunary things only, without minding the supernatural agency, while commentators, considering this to be a defect, supplied the omission by inserting God under the only category where it was possible to do so” (Tarkasaṁgraha, pp. 136–137). “The Nyāya is so predominantly dialectical in interest that its excursions into metaphysics have an air of divagation from the work in hand, which forbids us to assume that silence on any topic means its exclusion” (Keith: I.L.A., p. 265).
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Udayana’s Kusumāñjali is the classic statement of the Nyāya proofs for the existence of God. It sets out, in the first chapter, certain considerations which make for the reality of an unseen cause, adṛṣṭa, or the force which determines our happiness and misery.³ Every effect depends on a cause, and so there must be a cause for our happiness and misery.⁴ Every cause is an effect in relation to its preceding cause, which in its turn is the effect of some other cause. As the world has no beginning, this succession of cause and effect has also no beginning. So the cause of our happiness and misery cannot be traced back to its beginning.⁵ Diversity of effects implies diversity of causes. Our varying lots cannot be traced to common causes like God or nature.⁶ Our acts disappear, leaving behind them traces capable of bringing about the fruits. "A thing long passed cannot produce its result without some continuant influence (karmātiśayam)."¹ The trace of a good action is called merit (puṇya) and that of an evil one demerit (pāpa), and the two together form the adṛṣṭa, or the desert which resides in the soul of the person who performs the acts, and not in the thing from which he derives happiness or misery. This adṛṣṭa causes happiness and misery when the suitable time, place and object occur. The persistence of merit and demerit is accounted for by the transcendent agency of adṛṣṭa. The connection of souls with organic bodies is not due to natural causes. The law of moral causation supervenes on the natural order. The different degrees of enjoyment which different souls receive are determined by the differences in their adṛṣṭa.
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³ Sāpekṣatvād anāditvād vaicitryād viśvavṛttitaḥ. Pratyātmaniyamād bhukter asti hetur alaukikaḥ (i. 4).
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⁴ i. 5.
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⁵ i. 6. Thus the question about the beginning of adṛṣṭa is avoided. See N.V., iv. 1. 21.
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⁶ i. 7.
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¹ i. 9.
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Udayana, thus far, is faithful to the ancient Naiyāyikas, who account for the creation of the universe by the hypothesis of an original activity among the atoms and adṛṣṭa among the souls. But he goes beyond them when he argues that a non-intelligent cause like adṛṣṭa cannot produce its effect without the guidance of an intelligent spirit. God is said to supervise the work of adṛṣṭa.² The world cannot be explained by the atoms or the force of karma. If atoms are active by nature, then their activity should be unceasing. If their activities are determined by the force of time, then this unconscious principle of time must be either always active or always inactive. The analogy of the flow of milk for the nourishment of the calf will not serve, since milk should flow out of the dead cow also, if it were active by itself. It follows that if an unconscious thing is active, it is so under the influence of a conscious agent. The individual soul cannot be the controller of adṛṣṭa, since then it would be able to avert unwished-for miseries, which it is not. So the unintelligent principle of adṛṣṭa, which governs the fate of beings, acts under the direction of God, who does not create it or alter its inevitable course, but renders possible its operation. God is thus the giver of the fruits of our deeds (karmaphalapradaḥ).
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² i. 19.
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The other arguments are summed up by Udayana in the following verse. "From effects, combination, support, etc., from traditional arts, from authoritativeness, from scriptures, from sentences thereof, and from particular numbers, an everlasting omniscient being is established."¹ The causal argument is considered first. The world is looked upon as a product, since it consists of component parts, and so it must have had a maker. For "that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently of any series of concurrent causes." The maker of the world is an intelligent being, "possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act, and knowledge of the proper means which sets in motion all other causes, but is itself set in motion by none." Combination (āyojana) is the action which produces the conjunction of two atoms, forming the binary compound at the beginning of creation. This action implies an intelligent agent. Support (dhṛti) signifies that this wonderful universe is supported by his will. The "ete" (ādi) is intended to make out that God is also the destroyer of the world. God makes, unmakes and remakes the world. The traditional arts imply an intelligent inventor. The authoritativeness of the Vedas is derived from a being who imparted that character to them. Udayana holds that the Vedas are non-eternal, like the other things of the world subject to creation and destruction. If they are yet sources of right knowledge, it is because God is their author.² Besides, śruti, or the scripture, speaks to us of the author of the world. Again, since the Vedas consist of sentences, they require an author who can only be God. The argument from number is based on the view that the magnitude of the dyad is produced not from the infinite minuteness (parimāṇḍalya) of the atoms, but from the number (two) of the atoms composing the binary. As we shall see, this conception of duality is dependent on understanding (buddhyapekṣā), so that to account for duality which produces the diads at the beginning of creation, an intelligent being must be postulated. Udayana sets aside the objection against the existence of God based on non-perception. The non-perception of an object proves its non-existence, only if the object is one which is ordinarily open to perception. Things beyond the range of the senses are not non-existent. The utmost that we can say is that the existence of God cannot be established through perception.³ Inference neither proves nor disproves the existence of God.⁴ Comparison has nothing to do with the existence and non-existence of objects.⁵ Śabda is in favour of theism.⁶ Presumption (arthāpatti) and non-perception (anupalabdhi) are not independent means of knowledge.⁷
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¹ Kāryāyojanadhṛtyādeḥ padāt pratyayataḥ śruteḥ Vākyāt saṁkhyāviśeṣāc ca sādhyo viśvavid avyayaḥ (v. 1). ² ii. 1. ³ iii. 1. ⁴ iii. 4-7. ⁵ iii. 8-12. ⁶ iii. 13-17. ⁷ iii. 18-23.
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The God of the Naiyāyika is a personal being, possessing existence, knowledge and bliss. He is "endowed with such qualities as absence of demerit (adharma), wrong knowledge (mithyājñāna) and negligence (pramāda), and presence of merit, knowledge and equanimity (dharmajñānasamādhisampad). He is omnipotent in regard to his creation, though he is influenced by the results of acts done by the beings he creates. He has obtained all the results of his deeds (āptakarmaphala), and continues to act for the sake of his created beings. Just as the father acts for his children, so also does God act fatherlike for living beings."¹ God is omniscient since he possesses right knowledge, which is an independent apprehension of reality. He has eternal intelligence and, since his cognitions are everlasting, there is no need for memory and inferential knowledge. What in ordinary men is a sort of intermittent mystical perception, what in the yogis is an acquired power, is in God a steady mode of apprehension.² God is also endowed with desire.³ God has pure unimpeded intelligence as well as eternal bliss.
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¹ N.B., iv. I 21.
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² Udayana raises the interesting question whether God's omniscience includes a knowledge of the illusory cognitions of finite beings together with their objects, and consequently whether God perceives things otherwise than they are, and answers it by saying that God's knowledge of human illusions is not illusory.
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³ N.N., iv. I. 21;
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The difficulties of creation are not ignored. All activity is brought under pain, and is said to be caused by faults (doṣa).⁴ The question is raised whether God creates the world to realise any desire of his own, or for the sake of others. But God has all his desires fulfilled, and so creation cannot be the means of helping God to realise his desires. He who worries about other people is a mere busybody. Nor can we justify God's activity by tracing it to his love for humanity. The miserable nature of the world militates against this supposition. The Naiyāyika answers this criticism thus: " His action in creation is indeed solely caused by compassion, but the idea of creation which can consist only of happiness, is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own independence (as he would thus seem to depend on others' actions). For there is the maxim, "one's own body does not hinder one; nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims."¹ Uddyotakara admits that God's activity is limited by other considerations, and yet these latter are only self-imposed limitations.² The end which God has in view is not so much the happiness of creatures as their spiritual development. The world is to be regarded as the sphere for the realisation of spiritual ends, as goodness through suffering and perfection through sacrifice.
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⁴ i. I. 18.
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¹ S.D.S., xi. ² N.V., iv. I. 21. ³ See Guṇaratna's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayavṛtti*, pp. 49-51. See also Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* :— Akṣapādamate devaḥ sṛṣṭisaṃhārakṛc chivaḥ Vibhur nityaikaḥ sarvajño nityabuddhisamāśrayaḥ (13). Rājaśekhara's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of a slightly earlier date confirms this view. See Keith : I.L.A., pp. 262-263. ⁴ *Nyāyasāra*, p. 39. ⁵ *Kusumāñjali*, ii. 4. ⁶ Jayanta, criticising the Cārvāka theory in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, says that we put down a thing as svābhāvika, or natural, when we do not know its cause. ⁷ *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 54-57.
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The Naiyāyikas are Śaivas, while the Vaiśeṣikas are said to be Pāśupatas.³ Jinadatta in his *Vivekavilāsa* (middle of the thirteenth century) says that Śiva is the deity of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Uddyotakara was a Pāśupata. Bhāsarvajña speaks of the direct vision of Maheśvara as the result of meditation.⁴ Udayana equates the Supreme with Śiva.⁵
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The Nyāya doctrine of theism has been the subject of great discussion in the history of Hindu thought. The critic observes that the Naiyāyika resorts to adṛṣṭa whenever natural explanation fails. The first stirrings in the primordial atoms, the upward motion of fire, even the attraction of the needle by the magnet, are assigned to it. Adṛṣṭa constitutes only a limit of explanation.⁶ It is supposed to call for an intelligent controller, Īśvara, for the remarkable regularity with which events happen cannot be explained apart from God, who has jñāna (wisdom), icchā (desire) and prayatna (volitional effort). The souls lose their activity at the time of dissolution, and regain it at creation, and all this is inexplicable apart from divine guidance. The causal argument is made much of by Udayana and Śrīdhara.⁷ By assuming that the world is an effect, the Naiyāyika takes for granted what is to be proved. Plants and animals are not self-sufficient, they are born, they grow and die. To say that individual things are products, is not to say that the world as a whole is a product. The Naiyāyika admits several eternal entities which are not products.¹ May not the world as a whole also be eternal? Again, should all effects have efficient causes as well? As we have already seen, the law of causality, as the Naiyāyika interprets it, has not universal validity. It has no other signification than uniform and concomitant variation. Since its evidence is derived from the phenomenal world, it is wrong to extend its scope beyond it. To know the cause of the world is not within the power of the human understanding. The impossibility of an infinite regress of infinite causes leads the Naiyāyika to assert the reality of a cause outside the series, an uncaused cause. Śaṃkara repudiates the causal argument and asks us to admit boldly that we know nothing except that the universe appears to us to exist. Whether it exists of itself or is but the effect of a remote cause cannot be understood by us. If we admit a remote cause, why should we not demand another remoter cause for it and so forth indefinitely to the verge of madness? If God is, who created him? According to the Sāṃkhya, it is as easy to believe that the universe made itself as to believe that the maker of the universe made himself. The question remains metaphysically irreducible, and the solution is worse than the riddle. The anthropomorphism of the Naiyāyika, moreover, creates other difficulties. It is asked, whether God, the maker of the world, has a body or not. If he has a body, then he is subject to adṛṣṭa, since bodies are all determined by it. Embodied beings are created, and are not capable of exercising control over subtle atoms and merit and demerit. We do not know what an eternal body is. The Naiyāyikas are not clear on this question. They sometimes say that God creates without the aid of any body, while it is also suggested that God becomes endowed with a body, on account of our adṛṣṭa. Sometimes the atoms are made the body of God, while ākāśa is assigned this status on other occasions. If in some inscrutable manner God is able to fashion the world out of atoms without a body, we may as well say that he can create the world without any pre-existing material.
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¹ "Of the eternal thing there is no production; nor is there any cause of the eternal thing" (N.V., iv. I. 32).
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Even if we grant the validity of the arguments employed to establish the reality of God, the Īśvara of the Nyāya philosophy is not the comprehensive spiritual reality of which we are the imperfect expressions. He is outside of us and the world too, however much he may be said to cause, govern and destroy it. Reality is composed of a great number of particulars, linked together by an external bond, even as a cord binds together a number of sticks. God is not the creator of atoms, but only their fashioner. His reason works on the elements of the universe from without, but does not operate as a power of life within. This conception of God as beyond the world, as outside the entire frame of space, as dwelling apart in eternal self-centred isolation, is arid and empty. We cannot maintain the dualism of an infinite creator on the one side and the infinite world on the other. The two limit each other. Things which are defined each against the other cannot but be finite. The souls obtain release some time or other. With the liberation of all, saṃsāra disappears. The lordship of Īśvara will also come to an end. What has an end has a beginning. The two must have come out of the void, and must disappear into the void. It is true that the creation of the world is assigned to the love of God; but what is the meaning of creation on this hypothesis? If atoms and souls are both eternal, and if the world is an interaction between the two types, then there is nothing for God to create. The Naiyāyika must either give up his notion of God as creator or admit that the atoms and the souls are the expressions of the eternal and constant causality of God, though this causality ought not to be conceived in a mechanical sense. This seems to be the implication of the Nyāya suggestion that the nature of things is the body of God, an analogy, worked out with great care and to high purpose, in Rāmānuja’s system. Some such immamental conception of God is forced on us by a consideration of God’s omniscience. According to the Nyāya, finite beings know only thought and the bare fact that the real is not a thought. Whether and how thought and reality are related to each other, only an infinite mind, conceived as identical with the finite minds, is capable of knowing. The souls and atoms are co-eternal with God, who is only *primus inter pares*. At first sight, it may perhaps appear that the Nyāya by insisting on devotion to Īśvara helps the religious life of mankind. But certainly the Nyāya cannot hold up the ideal of communion or identity with God, for by the nature of the hypothesis, God is outside man and the universe. The Vedānta in all its forms and the Yoga advocate the method of worship (upāsana), but it is with a view to enable the individual to attain the divine status. The Nyāya is bound to revise its conception of God, if it is to meet the highest religious instincts of humanity.
Cites (3)
- Nyāyasūtra — Akṣapāda Gautama, Sanskrit
- Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi — Udayana, Sanskrit
- Tarkasaṅgraha — Annaṃbhaṭṭa 1550, Sanskrit