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Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s18: II Date and Literature

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s18

Language
English

II Date and Literature

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“The Vaiśeṣika system seems to be of much greater antiquity than the Nyāya.”² This opinion of Garbe seems to be a reasonable one. In human knowledge the particular precedes the general. A theory of knowledge such as the one we have in the Nyāya is not possible until knowledge has made independent progress. Logic appears as a criticism and a corrective. The Sūtra of Kaṇāda and the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda do not show so much the influence of the Nyāya system, while the Sūtra of Gautama and the Bhāṣya of Vatsyāyana are considerably influenced by the Vaiśeṣika views.

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² Garbe : *The Philosophy of Ancient India*, p. 20.

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It is urged that the Vaiśeṣika preceded Buddhism and Jainism. The Buddhist theory of nirvāṇa is traced to the asatkāryavāda of the Vaiśeṣika. The astikāyas of the Jainas, as well as their atomic theory, are traced to the Vaiśeṣika, which is mentioned in many Jaina works as well as the Lalitavistara. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra alludes to the atomic views. One of the late Jaina works, Āvaśyaka¹ attributes the authorship of the Vaiśeṣika system to a Jain Rohagutta (A.D. 18), the chief teacher in the sixth schism of Jainism. Though its statement of the Vaiśeṣika view agrees with Kaṇāda’s scheme,² the claim that the Vaiśeṣika is an offshoot of Jainism is hardly warranted. The point of similarity between the two, suggestive of such a claim, is the atomic theory; but even on this matter we find fundamental differences between the two views. According to the Jaina view, the atoms are qualitatively alike, each atom possessing colour, taste, smell and contact, as well as the capacity to produce sound though itself soundless. According to the Vaiśeṣika, atoms are qualitatively different, and possess one, two, three or four of the ordinary qualities according as they are atoms of air, fire, water, and earth, and they have no connection with sound. The atomic theory, the classification of substances and the acceptance of the two means of knowledge, strongly suggest that the Vaiśeṣika arose about the time of Buddha and Mahāvīra³ (sixth-fifth century B.C.).

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¹ S.B.E., vol. xlv, p. xxxviii.

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² Dravya, guṇa, karma, samavāya are admitted, and slight variations are found as regards sāmānya and viśeṣa. The former is distinguished into: (1) mahāsāmānya, which answers to padārtha or abhidheyatva, or the possibility of being named, or jñeyatva, or the possibility of being known. All the categories are covered by it (see P.P., p. 16; V.S., i. 1. 8). Mahāsāmānya is pure sāmānya, and not a species of anything higher, while others are both sāmānya (general) and viśeṣa (particular); (2) sattāsāmānya, which corresponds to sattā or bhāva of the V.S. Praśastapāda ascribes existence (astitva) to all the six categories as a common quality (sādharmya); and (3) sāmānya-viśeṣa, which covers the other instances of generality. See Ui: Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 37-38.

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³ See Ui: Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 33. Aśvaghoṣa, in his Sūtrālaṃkāra, assigns the Vaiśeṣika to the period before Buddha (ibid., pp. 40-41).

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The first systematic exposition of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is found in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda (or Kaṇabhuj or Kaṇabhakṣa). The name, which signifies etymologically atomeater, seems to have been suggested by the character of the system,⁴ which is also called Aulūkya Darśana.⁵ The real name of the author of the Sūtra seems to have been Kāśyapa.⁶ His work is divided into ten books. Book I discusses the five categories of substance, quality, action, generality and particularity. Book II deals with the different substances, excepting soul and mind, which, along with the objects of the senses and the nature of inference, are treated in Book III. The atomic structure of the universe is the central topic of Book IV. Book V is devoted to a discussion of the nature and kinds of action, while ethical problems are considered in Book VI. Book VII discusses the questions of quality, self and inherence. The last three books are mainly logical, and treat of the problems of perception, inference and causality. For reasons already stated, the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra seems to be of an earlier date than the Nyāya Sūtra, and is perhaps contemporaneous with the Brahma Sūtra.¹ Since Kauṭilya does not refer to the Vaiśeṣika under Ānvīkṣikī, it is said that the system was formulated later than 300 B.C.² Kaṇāda’s Sūtra seems to have received additions from time to time.³ Some of the sūtras now found in his treatise were not commented on by the scholiast, Praśastapāda, which indicates that at the time the latter commented on the Sūtra, they were not included in it. While Kaṇāda mentioned only three categories,¹ Praśastapāda added three more, and still later, the category of non-existence (abhāva) was introduced. Praśastapāda added seven qualities to the list mentioned by Kaṇāda.²

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⁴ Though the atomic theory is found in some Buddhist and Jaina views, it is regarded as the central feature of the Vaiśeṣika. See B.S., ii. 2-11, and Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, p. 86.

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⁵ Ui: Vaiśeṣika Philosophy.

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⁶ See P.P., p. 200.

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¹ Vātsyāyana quotes from the V.S., which is unaware of the Nyāya distinction of inference into pūrvavat and śeṣavat. In the V.S. there is a reference to time as the ultimate cause (ii. 2. 9; v. 2. 26), a view mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Up. (i. 1. 2), and not adopted by any of the well-known systems Even on the problem of self the Vaiśeṣika does not seek to establish its existence, but is more interested in discussing whether the self is an object of inference or of direct intuition. Bādarāyaṇa refers to the atomic theory in B.S., ii. 2. 11, and Kaṇāda uses Vedānta terms like avidyā and pratyagātman, and has in view the Vedānta theory when he asserts that the soul is not proved by scripture alone and the body is not compounded of three or five elements (V.S., iii. 2. 9; iv. 2. 2-3). If we trust the commentators, V.S. presupposes a knowledge of the Mīmāṃsā and the Sāṃkhya. See V.S., ii. 1. 20; iii. 1. 1-2; v. 2. 19-20; vii. 2. 3-8; vii. 2. 13; ix. 2. 3. The Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra of Vasumitra refers to the five kinds of karma. Caraka’s allusions to the Vaiśeṣika do not help us much. Nāgārjuna, in his Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, refers to the Vaiśeṣika theory of time as an unchangeable real existence relating to a cause (V.S., ii. 2. 7-9; v. 2. 26; vii. 1. 25). His references to space, atoms and self indicate that he was familiar with the V.S., and he practically quotes a number of them : iii. 2. 4, and viii. 1. 2, on the nature of self; iv. 1. 1, and vii. 1. 10, on the theory of atoms; and vi. 2. 13, and v. 2. 17-18, on atomic combination. Āryadeva is familiar with the V.S., and Harivarman knows the development of the Vaiśeṣika system after the formulation of the Sūtra. See Ui : Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 46-55.

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² Dr. Das Gupta suggests that the Vaiśeṣika as expounded in the Sūtra of Kaṇāda represents an old school of the Mīmāṃsā (History of Indian Philosophy, pp. 280-285). The argument that the V.S. opens with the declared aim of explaining dharma and closes with the exhortation that Vedic works lead to prosperity through the force of adṛṣṭa, or unseen virtue, is not conclusive, since the discussion of and emphasis on dharma cannot be regarded as the monopoly of any system of thought. The attempt to explain away the points of distinction between the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā is hardly convincing. Kaṇāda believes that the Vedas are the work of ṛṣis, though not of Īśvara (ii. 1. 18; vi. 1. 1-2), while the Mīmāṃsā clings to the eternality of the Vedas, which cannot be said to be a later development. The two doctrines of the eternality of sound and that of the Vedas are closely allied. In spite of the occurrence of identical views and terms in the two systems, it is difficult to say that the Vaiśeṣika is a branch of the Mīmāṃsā.

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³ Faddegon : The Vaiśeṣika System, pp. 10-11.

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¹ V.S., viii. 2. 3. Artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu (i. 1. 4), which mentions the six categories, is said to be a later addition.

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² See also V.S., i. 1. 4; i. 1. 6; i. 2. 3.

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Praśastapāda’s Padārthadharmasaṃgraha is not so much a commentary on the Sūtra as an important independent work on the subject. It is difficult to defend the position that Praśastapāda’s mature views are simply the development of the suggestions contained in Kaṇāda’s work.³ Praśastapāda’s account of the twenty-four qualities, the theory of the creation and the destruction of the world, the statement of fallacies and the nature of inference are distinct additions to Kaṇāda’s work. He was much influenced by the Nyāya philosophy and was later than Vātsyāyana. He may be assigned to the end of the fourth century A.D.⁴

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³ See Das Gupta : History of Indian Philosophy, vol. i. p. 351; I.L.A., pp. 25 and 93; Ui : Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 17, n. 3. “Almost all the peculiar doctrines that distinguished the later Vaiśeṣikas from the Naiyāyikas and other schools are to be found in Praśastapāda’s work, and are conspicuously absent in Kaṇāda’s Sūtra. The doctrines about dvitva, pākajotpatti, vibhāgajavibhāga and several others, which are regarded as the peculiarities of the Vaiśeṣika system, are not even touched upon in Kaṇāda’s aphorisms, although they are pretty fairly discussed in Praśastapāda’s Bhāṣya” (Bodas : Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 30).

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⁴ Keith makes out an elaborate case for the priority of Dignāga and Praśastapāda’s indebtedness to him in several points of logical doctrine (I.L.A., pp. 93-110). For a different view, see Faddegon : The Vaiśeṣika System, pp. 319-323. Śaṃkara and Uddyotakara are familiar with the work of Praśastapāda. Even if Keith’s view is accepted, he is earlier than Uddyotakara and later than Dignāga, and so belongs to the fifth century A.D. If Praśastapāda is credited with the authorship of the doctrine of the six categories, then he is earlier than, or at least of the same period as, Vātsyāyana. Dharmapāla (A.D. 535-570) and Paramārtha (A.D. 499-569) discuss Praśastapāda’s views. See Ui : Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 18.

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A Vaiśeṣika treatise based on Praśastapāda’s work is Candra’s Daśapadārthaśāstra, which is preserved in a Chinese version (A.D. 648). It did not, however, influence the development of thought in India.⁵ Rāvaṇabhāṣya and Bhāradvājavṛtti,⁶ which are said to be commentaries on the Vaiśeṣika, are not available. Four commentaries were written on Praśastapāda’s work, which are Vyomaśekhara’s Vyomavatī, Śrīdhara’s Nyāyakandalī, Udayana’s Kiraṇāvali (tenth century A.D.), and Śrīvatsa’s¹ Līlāvatī (eleventh century A.D.). Vyomavatī is earlier than the other three.² Śrīdhara’s Nyāyakandalī was written in A.D. 991, and the author is familiar with the views of Kumārila, Maṇḍana and Dharmottara. Līlāvatī and Kiraṇāvali came perhaps immediately after Nyāyakandalī. Both Śrīdhara and Udayana admit the existence of God and accept the category of non-existence.³ Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī belongs to this period. It presents the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika principles as parts of one whole. It starts as an exposition of the categories and introduces the Nyāya logic under the quality of cognition. Laugākṣi Bhāskara’s Tarkakaumudī is another syncretical work based on Praśastapāda’s treatise. Śaṁkarānanda’s Upaskāra on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra is a work of some importance.⁴ Viśvanātha (seventeenth century) treats of Kaṇāda’s scheme in his Bhāṣāpariccheda and the commentary on it called Siddhāntamuktāvali. He was influenced considerably by the modern school of Nyāya. Annam Bhaṭṭa’s works, Jagadīśa’s Tarkāmṛta (A.D. 1635) and Jayanārāyaṇa’s Vivṛti (seventeenth century A.D.) are useful compendiums of the Vaiśeṣika principles. The Vivṛti, though based on the Upaskāra, differs from it on certain points.⁵

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⁵ According to Ui, who has translated it into English, its author belongs to the sixth century A.D. As its name implies, the work mentions ten categories, the four additional being potentiality (śakti), non-potentiality (aśakti), commonness (sāmānyaviśeṣa), and non-existence (abhāva). There is no reference to Īśvara. The work has been widely commented on by Japanese writers.

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⁶ See Ratnaprabhā, ii. 2. 11; Bodas : Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 33. Bhāradvājavṛttibhāṣya, edited by Gaṅgādhara (Calcutta, 1869), is considerably influenced by the Sāṃkhya, and makes several important alterations. See Faddegon : The Vaiśeṣika System, pp. 35-40.

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¹ Alias Vallabha.

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² See Introduction to Ghate’s edition of Saptapadārthī.

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³ Śivāditya is later than Udayana and earlier than Gaṅgeśa, who is familiar with his views.

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⁴ It refers to a Vṛtti (see i. 1. 2; i. 2. 4, 6; iii. 1. 17; iv. 1. 7; vi. 1. 5, 12; vii. 1. 3) which has not been traced.

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⁵ See especially i. 1. 4, 25; ii. 1. 1; ii. 2. 5; ix. 1. 8.

Cites (16)