Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s25: III Literature
Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s25
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III Literature
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Tradition unanimously ascribes the authorship of the system to Kapila.⁴ Some say that he is the son of Brahmā,⁵ others that he is
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⁴ Śvet. Up., v. 2. Cp. M.B., Mokṣadharma.
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⁵ M.B., xii. 340. 67; Rāmāyaṇa, i. 41.
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Sāṁkhyasya vaktā kapilaḥ paramarṣiḥ purātanaḥ
Hiraṇyagarbho yogasya vaktā nānyaḥ purātanaḥ.
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an avatār of Viṣṇu,¹ still others identify him with an incarnation of Agni.² While these accounts are mythical, it may be accepted that a historical individual of the name of Kapila was responsible for the Sāṃkhya tendency of thought. We shall not be wrong if we place him in the century preceding Buddha.³ There is no evidence to show that the Sāṃkhyapravacana Sūtra and the Tattvasamāsa generally attributed to Kapila were composed by him. Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his Kārikā describes himself as being in the succession of disciples from Kapila through Āsuri and Pañcaśikha.⁴ Āsuri probably lived before 600 B.C., if he be one with the Āsuri of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. Garbe thinks that Pañcaśikha may be assigned to the first century A.D. From the few fragmentary passages that have come down to us, Pañcaśikha held the theory of the three guṇas. He regarded the puruṣas⁵ as atomic in size,⁶ and attributed the connection of puruṣa and prakṛti to want of discrimination rather than to works.⁷
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¹ Bhāgavata, iii. 14. 36; ii. 7. 3.
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² S.P.B., vi. 70.
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³ Weber holds that the Sāṃkhya is the oldest of the existing systems (History of Indian Literature, p. 235). M.B. mentions the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga as very ancient systems, sanātane dve. xii. 13711.
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⁴ S.K., 70. According to the M.B. (xii. 218. 14-15), the successors of Kapila are Āsuri, Pañcaśikha, Gārgya and Ulūka. The Chinese tradition regards one Pañcaśikhī as the disciple of Kaṇāda. Evidently he is different from Pañcaśikha. See Ui: Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 7-8. There is in the M.B. a section on "Janakapañcaśikhasamvāda," and some of his opinions are quoted in Y.B.
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⁵ S.P.B., i. 127.
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⁶ Y.B., i. 36.
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⁷ S.P.B., vi. 68.
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The Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is the earliest available as well as the most popular textbook of the school. From its name it is clear that it is not the first work of the system. A Chinese tradition ascribes to Vindhyavāsa the rewriting of a work by Vārṣagaṇa. If Vindhyavāsa is the same as the author of the Kārikā,⁸ it follows that the Kārikā was based on an earlier work of which we have no information.⁹ It is a work of the third century A.D.¹ Gauḍapāda wrote a commentary on the Kārikā. Whether this commentator is the same as the author of the Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad cannot be decided, in view of the diversity of thought between the two works. As he is earlier than Vācaspati, he may be assigned to the eighth century A.D.² Vācaspati’s Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī (ninth century A.D.) is a popular work. Nārāyaṇa’s Sāmkhyacandrikā is a treatise on Gauḍapāda’s work.
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⁸ Takakusu thinks that Vindhyavāsin was a title of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (J.R.A.S., 1905). Guṇaratna regards them as different (Tarkarahasyadīpikā, pp. 102, 104).
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⁹ The Bhāgavata tells us that only a portion of the Sāṃkhya works has come down to us, while a large part is said to be lost by time (kālavipluta). Vijñānabhikṣu holds that many works have been devoured by time (kālārkabhakṣitam) (S.P.B., Introduction). The last verse of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā reads: "The subjects treated in the seventy verses are those of the entire Ṣaṣṭitantra, exclusive of the illustrative tales, and omitting also controversial questions." It is admitted that the verse is an interpolation, since Gauḍapāda, the earliest commentator of the Kārikā, does not mention it. Guṇaratna refers to Ṣaṣṭitantroddhāra. It is said that Āsuri popularised it, and Pañcaśikha made it atheistic and attributed it to Kapila. It is, however, difficult to be definite about all this. Vācaspati and Nārāyaṇa are of opinion that Ṣaṣṭitantra refers not to a work but only to a scheme of sixty topics. The same explanation may perhaps be true
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¹ The Buddhist monk Paramārtha (sixth century A.D.) translated it into Chinese and also wrote a commentary on it. The Chinese tradition places Vindhyavāsa before Vasubandhu, who quotes the second verse from the Kārikā. See Ui: Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. Whether Vindhyavāsa be the author of the Kārikā, as Keith suggests (Sāmkhya, p. 79; J.L.A., p. 248; Karmamīmāmsā, p. 59), or a commentator on it, as Belvalkar holds (Bhaṇḍārkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 175-178), Īśvarakṛṣṇa is earlier than Vasubandhu, who is now assigned to the fourth century A.D. Svapneśvara identifies Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Kālidāsa. “Īśvarakṛṣṇanāmnā kālidāsena kṛtaḥ kārikāḥ.” See Hall’s Sāmkhyasāra, p. 29. Īśvarakṛṣṇa seems to have been definitely atheistic Though the Kārikā is said to contain seventy verses, only sixty-nine have come down to us. B.G. Tilak tried to reconstruct from Gauḍapāda’s commentary on S.K., 61, the missing verse thus:—
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² Māṭharavṛtti is a work of the Sāmkhya philosophy, of which Gauḍapāda’s Bhāṣya is reported to be an abridgment. But, as a rule, vṛttis come later than the bhāṣyas, and the fact that the Māṭharavṛtti comments on the last three verses of the S.K. makes for its later date. See Bhaṇḍārkar Commemoration Volume.
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The Sāmkhyapravacana Sūtra, attributed to Kapila,³ has six chapters, of which the first three are devoted to an exposition of the Sāmkhya principles, the fourth gives some illustrative stories, the fifth refutes rival views, and the sixth winds up with a recapitulation. The work is assigned to the fourteenth century A.D., chiefly on the ground that Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasamgraha does not refer to it, but bases its account of the Sāmkhya on the Kārikā.⁴ While the Kārikā develops
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³ Svapneśvara, in his Kaumudīprabhā, assigns the S.P.S. to Pañcaśikha, and traces its attribution to Kapila to the fact that the latter initiated the tradition. See Hall’s Sāmkhyasāra, p. 8.
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⁴ Guṇaratna (fourteenth century A.D.) does not refer to this work. Besides, the Bhāṣya on it appeared in the sixteenth century, and if the
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of the Ṣaṣṭitantra mentioned in the Jaina Anuyogadvāra Sūtra. According to the Ahirbudhnyasamhitā (xii), the Sāmkhya is theistic system of sixty divisions of two parts of thirty-two (prakṛti) and twenty-eight (vikṛti) sections. Vācaspati quotes a passage from Rājavārttika in his Tattvakau-mudī (p. 72) to the effect that Ṣaṣṭitantra is so called since it dealt with the sixty topics of prakṛti, its oneness, its difference from puruṣas, etc. A Chinese tradition ascribes the authorship of Ṣaṣṭitantra to Pañcaśikha, while Vārṣagaṇya sometimes gets the credit for it. See Bhāmatī, ii. 1. 3.
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Kāraṇam īśvaram eke bruvate kālam pare svabhāvam vā,
Prajāḥ katham nirguṇato vyaktaḥ kālasvabhāvaś ca.
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Gauḍapāda’s commentary seems to have in view such a verse, and later it was perhaps suppressed, since it was inconveniently atheistic.
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a strict dualism, the *Sūtra* shows a more conciliatory attitude towards theistic monism.¹ Aniruddha's *Sāmkhyasūtravṛtti* belongs to the fifteenth century, while Mahādeva's *Sāmkhyasūtravṛttisāra* is said to have been written about A.D. 1600. Nāgeśa's *Laghusāmkhyasūtravṛtti* is not of much value. The most important work on the *Sāmkhyapravacana Sūtra* is Vijñānabhikṣu's *Sāmkhyapravacanabhāṣya* (sixteenth century). This author endeavours to minimise the distinction between the Sāmkhya and the theistic Vedānta, which he regards as the genuine Vedānta, while the Advaita Vedānta is its modern falsification. Vijñānabhikṣu wrote also *Sāmkhyasāra*, *Yogavārttika*, *Yogasārasamgraha* as well as a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* called *Vijñānāmṛta*.
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¹ Cp. Garbe : " In particular, the author of the Sūtras is at great pains to furnish proof of the utterly impossible thesis that the teachings of the Sāmkhya system are not in irreconcilable contradiction with the doctrine of a personal God, with the doctrine of the all-embracing unity of Brahman, with the doctrine of the nature of Brahman as bliss (ānanda), and with the doctrine of the attainment of the highest aim in the heavenly world " (see i. 95, 154 ; v. 64, 68, 110 ; vi. 51, 58, 59). Indeed, the Sāmkhya Sūtra shows easily recognisable results of Vedāntic influence in many places; most plainly perhaps at iv. 3, which is a word for word repetition of the Vedānta Sūtra, iv. 1. 11, and at v. 116, where the Vedānta technical term brahmarūpatā is used instead of the proper Sāmkhya expression " (Garbe's ed. of S.B.P., p. xi).
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CAUSALITY
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We may now consider the arguments by which the Sāmkhya system arrives at its dualism of prakṛti and puruṣa. The Sāmkhya argues to the existence of prakṛti, through the application of the principle of causality.
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The theory that the effect really exists beforehand in its cause is one of the central features of the Sāmkhya system. The Sāmkhya defines cause as the entity in which the effect subsists in a latent form, and gives the following grounds in support of it ²: (1) The non-existent cannot be the object of any activity. The sky-flower cannot be produced. What is non-existent can never be made existent. Blue cannot
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² S.K., 9.
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Sūtra was of an earlier date, it is difficult to know why no bhāṣya was composed earlier. It refers to all other systems. Vācaspati is not aware of it. Alberuni, who wrote his account in the first half of the eleventh century, is familiar with the works of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Gauḍapāda, but does not seem to know of the Sūtra.
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be made into yellow even by a thousand artists.¹ (2) The product is not different from the material of which it is composed. (3) It exists before it comes into being in the shape of the material. If this is not admitted, then anything can come out of anything. (4) Causal efficiency belongs to that which has the necessary potency. (5) The effect is of the same nature as the cause. The cloth is not different from the threads in its essence. The causal relation cannot subsist between objects essentially different from one another.² Development is the coming to light of what is latent and hidden, or, as Aristotle would say, it is the transition from potential being to actual being, or, in Hegel's words, it is the passage from the implicit to the explicit. This view has also the support of scripture.³ According to this doctrine of satkāryavāda, the cause and the effect are the undeveloped and the developed states of one and the same substance. All production is development (udbhāva), and all destruction is envelopment (anudbhāva) or disappearance into the cause.⁴ There is no such thing as utter annihilation. The past and the future states are not destroyed, since they are perceived by the Yogis.⁵ The Sāṁkhya adopts the theory of evolution (āvirbhāva) and involution (tirobhāva).
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¹ Nahi nīlaṁ śilpisahasreṇāpi pītaṁ kartuṁ śakyate (Tattvakaumudī, p. 9). ² See Tattvakaumudī, p. 9. ³ Chān., vi. 2.
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² See also B.G., ii. 16. ⁴ S.P.S., i. 120-1. ⁵ S.P.B., i. 121. ⁶ Kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt (S.K., 15).
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Cause and effect are different states, and so are distinct from each other,⁶ though this distinction is based on our practical interests. While a jar can hold water, clay cannot. While the material cause and the effect are fundamentally one, they are practically different, since they serve different purposes. Identity is fundamental, while difference is only practical. The Sāṁkhya distinguishes two kinds of causes, efficient and material. While the material cause enters into the effect, the efficient cause exerts influence from outside. Though the effect is contained in the cause, something else is necessary to liberate it from the causal state. We have to press the seeds to get the oil, beat the paddy to get the grain. When this concomitant activity (sahakāriśakti) is wanting, the effect does not arise.¹ Though the effect is potentially contained in the cause, this potentiality is not actualised all at once. The removal of the barriers is the concomitant cause required to actualise the potentiality. These concomitant conditions are, according to Vyāsa, place (deśa), time (kāla), and form and constitution of a thing (ākāra).² From a piece of stone a plant cannot spring.³ Two kinds of effects are distinguished. When cream is produced from milk, we have a case of simple manifestation. When a jewel is made of gold, we have an instance of reproduction. When the quality of a thing changes, we have a case of dharmapariṇāma; when the potential becomes actual and the change is only external, we have a case of lakṣaṇapariṇāma. The change of state due to mere lapse of time is avasthāpariṇāma.⁴ Change is taking place everywhere and at every moment. We cannot twice step into the same stream, since the waters do not remain identical for two moments together. It is also true that the same individual does not twice step into the same river, for he has meanwhile changed even as the river has done. All things and states, outward and inward, are subject to this law of change.⁵ From out of this changing process the mind of man constructs the rule of causality,⁶ by means of the relation of antecedents and consequents.
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¹ Vyāsa illustrates the working of these concomitant causes thus: "As the owner of many fields can irrigate from a field which is already flooded, others of the same or a lower level without forcing the waters thereto with his hand, and merely by making an opening in the barrier or dyke, on which the waters rush in by their own force; or, further, as the same person cannot force these waters, or the earthly matters held in solution therein, into the roots of the rice plants, but only removes the obstructive grasses and weeds, on which the fluids of their own power enter the roots; such is the action of an effectuating condition (nimitta) added to a sum of material causes or conditions." (Y.B., iv. 3.)
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² Y.B., iii. 14.
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³ But according to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, any cause can produce any effect (since all things are modifications of prakṛti) if only the obstructing barriers of that particular effect are removed. Vijñānabhikṣu admits that if by the will of God the arrangement of particles in the stone serving as a barrier to the potential tendencies to develop into the shoot of a plant is removed, then a plant may spring from a stone.
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⁴ Y.B., iii. 13.
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⁵ S.P.S., i. 121.
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⁶ Buddhinirmāṇa.
Cites (14)
- Yogabhāṣya — Vyāsa & Patañjali (author of the Yogasūtra), Sanskrit
- Sāṃkhyakārikā — Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Sanskrit
- Mahābhārata — Sanskrit
- Sāṃkhyasūtra — Kapila, Sanskrit
- Bhāgavatapurāṇa — Vyāsa, Sanskrit
- Bhāmatī — Vācaspati Miśra, Sanskrit
- Bhagavadgītā — Vyāsa, Sanskrit
- Śvetāśvataropaniṣad — Śvetāśvatara, Sanskrit
- Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā — Sanskrit
- Chāndogyopaniṣad — Sanskrit
- Aṇuogaddārāiṃ — Āryarakṣita, Ardhamāgadhī Prakrit
- Mahābhārata — Vyāsa, Sanskrit
- Vālmīkirāmāyaṇa — Vālmīki, Sanskrit
- Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya — Vijñānabhikṣu 1550, Sanskrit