Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s28: IX Puruṣa

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s28

Language: English

IX Puruṣa

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All organic beings have a principle of self-determination, to which the name of “soul” is generally given. In the strict sense of the word, “soul” belongs to every being that has life in it, and the different souls are fundamentally identical in nature. The differences are due to the physical organisations that obscure and thwart the life of the soul. The nature of the bodies in which the souls are incorporated accounts for their various degrees of obscuration. The souls cannot be referred to the same principle from which physical organisations spring. So the Sāṁkhya asserts the existence of puruṣas freed from all the accidents of finite life and lifted above time and change. There is the testimony of consciousness that, though the individual is in one aspect a particular finite being subject to all the accidents and changes of mortality, there is something in him which lifts him above them all. He is not the mind, life or body, but the informing and sustaining soul, silent, peaceful, eternal, that possesses them. When the facts of the world are viewed from the epistemological point of view, we get a classification into subjects on the one side and objects on the other. The relation between any subject and any object is that of cognition or, more broadly, experience. The Sāṃkhya regards the knower as puruṣa and the known as prakṛti.

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The Sāṃkhya puts forward several arguments to establish the existence of puruṣas¹: (1) The aggregate of things must exist for the sake of another. Gauḍapāda says that even as a bed, which is an assemblage of different parts, is for the use of the man who sleeps upon it, so " this world, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another's use; there is a self for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body, consisting of intellect and the rest, has been produced." (2) All knowable objects have the three guṇas, and they presuppose a self who is their seer devoid of the guṇas. (3) There must be a presiding power, a pure consciousness which co-ordinates all experiences. (4) Since prakṛti is non-intelligent, there must be someone to experience the products of prakṛti. (5) There is the striving for liberation (kaivalya), which implies the existence of a puruṣa with qualities opposed to those of prakṛti. The longing for escape from the conditions of existence means the reality of one that can effect the escape.

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¹ S.K., 17; S.P.S., i 66; Y.S., iv. 24.

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What is the nature of the self or the subject consciousness? It is not the body. Consciousness is not a product of the elements, since it is not present in them separately, and so cannot be present in them together.² It is different from the senses,³ since the latter are the instruments of seeing and not the seer. The senses bring about modifications in buddhi. Puruṣa is different from buddhi, since the latter is non-conscious. The consolidation of our experiences into a systematic whole is due to the presence of the self, which holds the different conscious states together. The self is defined as pure spirit, different from the body, or prakṛti.¹ If it were liable to change, knowledge would be impossible. As its character is consciousness, it helps to bring the products of the evolutionary chain into self-consciousness. It illuminates the whole sphere of thought and feeling. If puruṣa underwent transformation, then it would lapse at times, and there would be no security that the states of prakṛti, as pleasure and pain, will be experienced. Puruṣa’s nature as unfailing light (sadāprakāśasvarūpa) does not change.² It is present in dreamless sleep,³ as well as in states of waking and dreaming, which are all the modifications of buddhi.⁴ So puruṣa exists, though it is neither cause nor effect.⁵ It is the light by which we see that there is such a thing as prakṛti. It does not depend on anything else for illuminating objects. Prakṛti and its products are not self-manifested, but depend for their manifestation on the light of puruṣa. Consciousness, though physically mediated, is not physically explained. Buddhi, manas, and the like, are the instruments or the means; they cannot explain the end of consciousness which they subserve. Puruṣa is only consciousness and not bliss, for happiness is due to the sattva guṇa, which belongs to the side of prakṛti. The duality of subject-object is involved in pleasurable experiences as much as in painful ones. Pleasure and pain belong to the buddhi.⁶ Moreover, the presence of bliss in addition to consciousness would introduce duality into the nature of puruṣa.⁷ If pain constitutes the nature of puruṣa, no liberation is possible. Puruṣa is incapable of movement, and on attaining release it does not go anywhere.⁸ It is not of limited size, since then it would be made up of parts and so be destructible.⁹ It is not of atomic size, for then it is not possible to account for its cognition of all bodily states. It does not participate in any activity. The Sāṃkhya denies the puruṣa all qualities, since otherwise it would not be capable of emancipation. The nature of a thing is inalienable, and happiness and misery cannot belong to the soul.

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² S.P.S., v. 129.

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³ S.P.S., ii. 29; iii. 20-21

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¹ S.P.S., vi. 1-2.

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² S.P.B., i 75; Y.S., iv. 18; S.P.S., i. 146.

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³ S.P.S., i. 148.

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⁴ S.P.B., i. 148.

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⁵ S.P.S., i 61.

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⁶ S.P.S., vi 11.

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⁷ v. 66.

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⁸ S.P.S., i. 49.

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⁹ i. 50.

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There are many selves, since experience shows that men are differently endowed physically, morally and intellectually. There are many conscious beings in the world, each regarding the world in his own way, and with an independent experience of its subjective and objective processes. The differences of outlook cannot be due to the operations of prakṛti, and so it is argued that there are different witnessing consciousnesses. These have different organs and actions and undergo separate birth and death.¹ One goes to heaven, the other goes to hell. The Sāṃkhya lays stress on the numerical distinctness of the streams of consciousness as well as the individual unity of the separate streams. While we cannot account for the organised unity of the individual's experiences apart from the assumption of an individual subject, the distinctness of the different unities makes for a plurality of selves. If the self were one, all should become free if any one attained freedom.² If the self is opposed in nature to prakṛti, which is one and common to all, the plurality of selves follows. The passages of the scriptures which support monism are interpreted as referring to the non-difference of essential properties.³ They imply non-difference in kind and not homogeneity.⁴ Freedom is not coalescence with an absolute spirit, but isolation from prakṛti. The selves lodged in the several individuals have the common property of being the silent spectators of the proceedings of the products of prakṛti with which they are temporarily connected.

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¹ S P.S., vi. 45 ; i 149 and 150.

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² S.K., 18.

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³ S.P.S., v. 61 ; S.P.B., i. 154.

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⁴ Vaidharmyaviraha, and not akhaṇḍatā.

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The Sāṃkhya view of puruṣa is determined by the conception of Ātman in the Upaniṣads.⁵ It is without beginning or end, without any qualities, subtle and omnipresent, an eternal seer, beyond the senses, beyond the mind, beyond the sweep of intellect, beyond the range of time, space and causality, which form the warp and woof of the mosaic of the empirical world. It is unproduced and unproducing. Its eternity is not merely everlastingness, but immutability and perfection. It is of the form of consciousness (cidrūpa), though it does not know all things in the empirical sense, for empirical cognition is possible only through the limitations of body. When the self is set free from these limits, it has no cognition of modifications, but remains in its own nature.¹ Puruṣa is unrelated to prakṛti.² It is mere witness, a solitary, indifferent, passive spectator.³ The characteristics of prakṛti and puruṣa are opposed in nature. Prakṛti is non-consciousness (acetanam), while puruṣa is consciousness (sacetanam). Prakṛti is active and ever-revolving, while puruṣa is inactive (akartā). Puruṣa is unalterably constant, while prakṛti is so alterably. Prakṛti is characterised by the three guṇas, while puruṣa is devoid of the guṇas; prakṛti is the object, while puruṣa is the subject.

Cites (6)

Sāṃkhyasūtra — Kapila, Sanskrit
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Yogasūtra — Patañjali (author of the Yogasūtra), Sanskrit
Amṛtabindūpaniṣad — Sanskrit
Sāṃkhyakārikā — Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Sanskrit
Śvetāśvataropaniṣad — Śvetāśvatara, Sanskrit