Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s29: The Empirical Individual

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s29

Language: English

The Empirical Individual

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The Jīva is the self distinguished by the conjunction of the senses and limited by the body.⁴ Vijñānabhikṣu says that puruṣa with ahaṃkāra is the jīva, and not puruṣa in itself.⁵ While the pure self remains beyond buddhi, the reflection of puruṣa in buddhi appears as the ego, the cogniser of all our states, pleasures and pains included. We have the notion of self in buddhi when we do not know that the self is beyond buddhi and different from it in character and knowledge.⁶ Each buddhi, with its grasp of senses and the like, is an isolated organism determined by its past karma,⁷ and has its own peculiarly associated ignorance (avidyā). The ego is the psychological unity of that stream of conscious experiencing which constitutes what we know as the inner life of an empirical self. This unity is a temporal one, which is ever changing, and not the puruṣa, which is timelessly

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⁴ S.P.S., Vṛtti, vi. 63.

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⁵ S.P.B., vi. 63.

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⁶ Y.S., ii. 6.

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⁷ S.P.B., ii. 46.

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Amūrtaś cetano bhogī nityaḥ sarvagato ’kriyaḥ
Akartā nirguṇaḥ sūkṣma ātmā kāpiladarśane.

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present as the presupposition of the temporal unity. While the puruṣa is the self which is eternally one with itself, the jīva is an item in the natural world. The egos are existences in a world of existences and alongside of them, and are no more ultimately real than material things. The egos may be experienced by us as other existences are, though differently from them. Every ego possesses within the gross material body, which suffers dissolution at death, a subtle body formed of the psychical apparatus, including the senses. This subtle body is the basis of rebirth,¹ as well as the principle of personal identity in the various existences. The subtle body, which retains the traces of all our experiences, is called the liṅga, or the mark distinguishing the puruṣa. The liṅgas are the empirical characteristics without which the different puruṣas cannot be distinguished. As products of prakṛti, they have the three guṇas. The specific character of the liṅga depends on the combination of the guṇas. Each life-history has its own liṅga. So long as the subtle body is present, there will be embodied existence and rebirth. In the lowest animal stage the tamas predominates, since we notice that the life of an animal is characterised by ignorance and stupidity. The faculties of memory and imagination are but imperfectly developed, so that the pleasure or pain experienced by the animals is neither long nor intense. Since the sattva nature is very low, the knowledge of animals is but a means to present action. When rajas becomes more predominant, the puruṣa enters the human world. The human beings are restless, and strive for liberation and freedom from pain. When sattva predominates, the saving knowledge is obtained, and prakṛti no longer binds the ego to the misery of existence. The released soul is a disinterested spectator of the world show. At death, the bond between puruṣa and prakṛti is dissolved, and the released soul is freed absolutely. The changes, i.e. release and bondage, belong to the subtle body attached to the puruṣa, which ever remains pure consciousness, though it forgets its true nature so long as the subtle body abounds in rajas and tamas. The puruṣas in all the subtle bodies are of the same kind, and the subtle bodies themselves which differentiate them belong to one continuous evolution in prakṛti. The evolution hypothesis links man in blood relationship with every other form of life, animal as well as vegetable.

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¹ S.P.S., iii. 16.

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The empirical self is the mixture of free spirit and mechanism, of puruṣa and prakṛti. Through the union of puruṣa and prakṛti, the subtle body, which is a product of prakṛti, becomes conscious, though it is in itself non-conscious. It is subject to pleasure and pain, action and its fruits, and rotates in the round of rebirth. The ātman or the puruṣa is quite indifferent to worldly concerns. Activity belongs to the buddhi, one of the products of prakṛti; nevertheless, on account of its union with puruṣa, the indifferent puruṣa appears as an actor. Actual agency belongs to antaḥkaraṇa, or the inner organ, which is lighted up by puruṣa.¹ The unconscious antaḥkaraṇa cannot by itself be the agent, but it is invested with consciousness. This investment or illumination of antaḥkaraṇa consists in a particular conjunction of it with consciousness, which is eternally shining; consciousness does not pass into the antaḥkaraṇa, but is only reflected in it. This conjunction of puruṣa with prakṛti is of course not a permanent one. Puruṣa allies itself with prakṛti in order that the nature of the latter may be revealed to itself and that it may attain freedom from association with prakṛti. Prakṛti underlies both psychical and physical phenomena. Its constituents behave in the one case as the subject or the perceiver, and in the other as the object or the perceived. The two represent different orders of development.² Prakṛti acts and enjoys the fruits of action. Happiness and misery belong to the modes of prakṛti, and puruṣa is said to experience them through its ignorance.³ The light of consciousness is attributed to the workings of prakṛti; and puruṣa, passively observing the workings of prakṛti, forgets its true nature, and is deluded into the belief that it thinks, feels and acts. It identifies itself with a particular finite form of existence, animal body, and is thus shut out from the true life. Losing the peace of eternity, it enters the unrest of time. Puruṣa does not move, though the body which invests it moves from place to place. Puruṣa, which is passive and supposed to give consent or withdrawal, is but a name for a movement which takes place in prakṛti. Though not an agent, the puruṣa appears as an agent, through confusion with the agency of prakṛti, even as prakṛti through proximity to puruṣa appears to be conscious.¹ The experience of pain (duḥkhasākṣātkāra) is only in the form of reflection, which is of the modification (vṛtti) of the upādhi.² The real bondage is of the citta, while only its shadow falls on the puruṣa.

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¹ S.P.S., i. 99.

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² Cp. Vācaspati: "Guṇānāṁ dvairūpyaṁ vyavaseyātmakatvam, vyavasāyātmakatvaṁ ca. Tatra vyavaseyātmakatāṁ grāhyatām āsthāya pañcatanmātrāṇi bhūtabhautikāni . . . vyavasāyātmakatvaṁ tu grahaṇasvarūpam āsthāya sāhaṁkārāṇīndriyāṇi" (Tattvavaiśāradī, iii. 47).

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³ Tattvakaumudī, p. 5.

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¹ S.K., 20 and 22; S.P.S., i. 162-3; Y.S., ii 17; B.G., viii. 21; Kaṭha Up., iii. 4.

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² S.P.B., i. 17.

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The narrow and limited existence of the jīva is not due to the essential nature of the soul as puruṣa; it is the result of a fall from its original estate. The experience of puruṣa means only the reception of the reflections of objects.³ When prakṛti acts, the puruṣa experiences the fruits, since the activity of prakṛti is intended for the experience of puruṣa.⁴ Strictly speaking, even this experiencing is due to abhimāna (sense of selfhood), born of aviveka (non-discrimination).⁵ When the truth is known, there is neither pleasure nor pain, neither agency nor enjoyment.⁶

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³ Puruṣasya viṣayabhogaḥ pratibimbādānāmātram (S.P.B., i. 104).

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⁴ S.P.S., i. 105.

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⁵ S.P.S., i. 106.

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⁶ S.P.S., i. 107.

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The Sāṃkhya account of puruṣa and jīva resembles in many respects the Advaita Vedānta account of the ātman and the individual ego. The ātman, according to the Advaita Vedānta, is free from action, from the encumbrances of body and mind which involve us in action. The ātman seems to act on account of its accidents. The unconditioned puruṣa or ātman is regarded as jīva, when it is confused with the narrow bounds of individuality. Strictly speaking, individuality belongs to the sūkṣmaśarīra in the Advaita and the liṅgaśarīra in the Sāṃkhya. Vijñānabhikṣu speaks of a mutual reflection, which is to some extent akin to the pratibimbavāda of the Advaita Vidānta, which holds that the ātman is reflected in the antaḥkaraṇa, or the inner organ. This cidābhāsa, or appearance of cit, is the individual self or jīva.

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The Sāṃkhya theory is evidently a compromise between the empirical view of the soul struggling for release and the metaphysical view of the Advaita Vedānta, that the infinite and passionless soul is incapable of submitting to bondage. So, it is said, that though the puruṣa remains in its essence eternally unchanged, still it experiences the reflection of the suffering which goes on. Even as a crystal allows a red flower to be seen through it without itself becoming red, the soul remains unchanged, though the illusion of its suffering or joy may be present in consciousness. Vijñānabhikṣu quotes a verse from the Sūrya Purāṇa to the effect: "As a pure crystal is observed by people to be red on account of the superimposition of some red-coloured stuff, so is the great puruṣa."¹ Śaṃkara uses the analogy of the crystal vase which appears red on account of the red flowers in it, though it is itself devoid of any taint² or tinge. If the puruṣa appears affected or disturbed, this appearance is due to the mind with which it is for a time associated. The association does not leave any permanent or temporary impression on the self. Since there is no real contact, there are no traces left behind.

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¹ Yathā hi kevalo raktaḥ sphaṭiko lakṣyate janaiḥ Rañjakādyupadhānena tadvat paramapuruṣaḥ. (S.P.B., i. 19.)

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² Atmabodha.

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PURUṢA AND PRAKṚTI

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The most perplexing point of the Sāṃkhya system is the problem of the relation between puruṣa and prakṛti. We have already seen that the evolution of prakṛti has not only a certain glamour, but has also a design in its adaptation to the realisation of spiritual ends.³ Prakṛti evolves a world full of woe and desolation to raise the soul from its slumber. The unrolling of the tragedy of the world is said to be necessary for the self, which remains inactive, though it sees all that is presented to it. Serviceability to puruṣa is acknowledged

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³ S.P.S., ii. 1; iii. 58.

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The puruṣa, passively indifferent, appears as if he were an agent owing to the influence of the three guṇas. Cp. Prakṛteḥ kāryaṃ nityaikā prakṛtir jaḍā Prakṛtes triguṇāveśād udāsīno 'pi kartṛvad. (S.S.S., ix. 15.)

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to be the end of the activities of prakṛti,¹ though parkṛti is not conscious of this end. While the Sāṃkhya eliminates mythological miracle-working, it admits an immanent teleology. It is a sublime thought to trace the grandeur of the cosmos and the marvellous arrangement of the world to the activity of prakṛti, which, though mechanical, effects results which suggest strongly the wisest computation of sagacity. But the Sāṃkhya is clear that the activity of prakṛti is not due to conscious reflection.² The analogies employed by the Sāṃkhya do not carry us very far. The non-intelligent prakṛti is said to act even as the non-intelligent trees grow fruits,³ or even as the milk of the cow is secreted for the purpose of nourishing the calf. Mechanism does not explain itself, nor can the products of prakṛti be regarded as the mechanical results of the lower conditions. If prakṛti were spontaneously active, then there can be no liberation, since its activity will be unceasing; if it were spontaneously inactive, then the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on. The Sāṃkhya admits that the activity of prakṛti implies a mover not itself in motion, though it produces movement. The evolution of prakṛti implies spiritual agency. But the spiritual centres admitted by the Sāṃkhya are incapable of exerting any direct influence on prakṛti; the Sāṃkhya says that the mere presence of the puruṣas excites prakṛti to activity and development. Though puruṣa is not endowed with creative might, prakṛti, which produces the manifold universe, is so on account of its union with puruṣa. Prakṛti is blind, but with the guidance of puruṣa it produces the manifold world. The union of the two is compared to a lame man of good vision mounted on the shoulders of a blind man of sure foot.⁴ The collective

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¹ S.K., 49. The Sāṃkhya view of prakṛti is different from the view of nature popularised by Huxley in his Romanes Lecture or by Hardy's lines :—

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² S.P.S., iii. 61.

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³ S.P.S., Vṛtti, ii. 1.

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⁴ S.K., 21. Gauḍapāda says: “As a lame man and a blind man, deserted by their fellow travellers, who, in making their way with difficulty

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“. . . Some Vast Imbecility,
Mighty to build and blend,
But Impotent to tend.
. . . An Automaton,
Unconscious of our pains.”

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influence of the innumerable selves which contemplate the movement of prakṛti is responsible for the evolution of the latter. The disturbance of the equilibrium of the guṇas which sets up the process of evolution is due to the action of the puruṣas on prakṛti.¹ The presence of the puruṣas disturbs the balance of the forces which keep each other at rest. At the beginning of the evolutionary process we have prakṛti in a state of quiescence and numberless puruṣas equally quiescent, but exerting on prakṛti a mechanical force. This upsets the equilibrium of prakṛti and initiates a movement which, at first, takes the form of development and, later, of decay and collapse. Prakṛti, again, returns to its quiescent condition, to be again excited by the puruṣas. The process will continue until all the selves are freed. So the first cause, as well as the final cause, of the cosmic process is puruṣa. But the causation of puruṣa is purely mechanical, being due not to its volition but to its mere proximity. Puruṣa moves the world by a kind of action which is not movement. It is compared to the attraction of a magnet for iron.² The puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya is not unlike the God of Aristotle. Though Aristotle affirms a transcendant God as the origin of the motion of the world, he denies to his God any activity within the world. God, according to Aristotle, is a purely contem-

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¹ Any system of constructive evolutionary philosophy needs an organising principle, a nisus or an elan. Alexander, who gets down at the base of the pyramid to a kind of space-time, makes time the energising factor. Hobhouse, in his preface to the second edition of Mind in Evolution, urges that mind in some form is the driving force of all evolution. Lloyd Morgan attributes this function to God in his Emergent Evolution.

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² S.K., 57; S.P.S., i. 96.

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through a forest, had been dispersed by robbers, happening to encounter each other, and entering into conversation so as to inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of walking and of seeing. Accordingly, the lame man was mounted on the blind man's shoulders, and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion. In the same manner the faculty of seeing is in the soul, though not that of moving—it is like the lame man; the faculty of moving is in prakṛti, but not of seeing, which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, as a separation takes place between the lame man and the blind man, when their mutual object is accomplished and when they have reached the end of the journey, so prakṛti, having effected the liberation of the puruṣa, ceases to act; and puruṣa, having contemplated prakṛti, obtains freedom; and so, their respective purposes being effected, the connection between them is dissolved" (Bhāṣya on Kārikā, p. 21).

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plative being shut up within himself, so that he can neither act upon the universe nor take cognisance of it. God, the first mover, is said to move the world by being the object after which the whole creation strives, and not as if it were in any way determined by his action. Concern with the affairs of the world would destroy the completeness of God's life. So God, who is pure intelligence, though himself unmoved, moves the world by his mere being. The further development of things arises from their own nature. But puruṣa is said to be outside prakṛti, and its influence on prakṛti, though real, is unintelligible. The relation between the two is a mystery which encompasses us, though we cannot penetrate it.¹ We cannot say that prakṛti acts with reference to the end of the puruṣas, since the latter are eternally free and are incapable of enjoying the activities of prakṛti. It follows that the activities of prakṛti are meant for the consumption of the jīvas, who, on account of imperfect insight, identify themselves with their liṅgaśarīras, or subtle bodies, possess desires and stand in need of discriminative knowledge. So prakṛti produces beings who are bound to suffer in order to give them an opportunity of extricating themselves.²

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¹ Cp. S.B., ii. 2. 6. Śaṃkara, discussing the question of the purpose of the activities of prakṛti, whether it is the enjoyment (bhoga) or release (mokṣa) of souls, says: "If enjoyment, what enjoyment can belong to the soul incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain)? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release (since the soul as inactive cannot aim at release, while pradhāna aims only at the soul's undergoing varied experience). If the object were release, the activity of pradhāna would be purposeless, since even antecedent to it the soul is in the state of release. If both enjoyment and release, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhāna to be enjoyed by the soul, there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be regarded as the purpose of the activity of pradhāna, since neither the non-intelligent pradhāna nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire. If, finally, you assume that the pradhāna is active, since otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul as intelligence) and the creative power (of the pradhāna) would be purposeless, it would follow that, since the two do not cease at any time, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that final release of the soul is impossible."

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² S.P.S., Vṛtti, ii. 1.

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The real puruṣa has relations with a real world on account of a fancied relation between the two. So long as this fancied relation subsists, prakṛti acts towards it. When the puruṣa recognises its distinction from the ever-evolving and dissolving world of prakṛti, the latter ceases to operate towards it.¹ The efficient cause of prakṛti’s development is not the mere presence of the puruṣas, for they are always present, but their non-discrimination.

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¹ S.K., 61; S.P.S., iii. 70.

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Prior to the transformation of prakṛti into mahat, etc., there is only non-discrimination. Adṛṣṭa, or unseen merit or demerit, is as yet unproduced, since it is a product of mahat and appears subsequent to the initial action of prakṛti. Adṛṣṭa, acquired in the previous creation, is of no help, since it is different for different individuals, and at the moment of creation the different adṛṣṭas are not distributed to the different selves. In the last analysis, the cause of the activity of prakṛti is non-discrimination,² since the connection with karma is only an effect of non-discrimination.³ This non-discrimination brings about a temporary union between puruṣa and prakṛti; the union, however, is not real, since it dissolves on the rise of true knowledge.

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² Y.S., ii. 24.

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³ S.P.S., iii. 67.

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Prakṛti has caught puruṣas somehow in her web. No cause is assigned to account for the original entanglement of the eternal souls, once free, in the equally eternal prakṛti. Only the fact is noticed that the puruṣas are caught in the meshes of prakṛti apparently without their consent. It is due to non-discrimination which has no beginning. If it had a beginning, then, prior to it, the souls would have been in release and after it, in bondage. This would mean the bondage of the released.

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We cannot say by what avidyā is caused. So it is regarded as beginningless, though it may have an end.⁴ Aviveka is said to be the cause of the conjunction (saṃyoga) between puruṣa and prakṛti.⁵ The former, which is the cause, exists even in pralaya or dissolution, though not the latter. This conjunction is not a real change (pariṇāma), since no new properties are produced in the puruṣa. The relation between the two is sometimes viewed as that of the enjoyer and the enjoyable.⁶

Cites (7)

Sāṃkhyasūtra — Kapila, Sanskrit
Yogasūtra — Patañjali (author of the Yogasūtra), Sanskrit
Sāṃkhyakārikā — Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Sanskrit
Kaṭhopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Bhagavadgītā — Vyāsa, Sanskrit
Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya (Śaṅkara) — Śaṅkara, Sanskrit
Ātmaprabodha — Jinalābha Sūri 1755, Sanskrit