Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s30: XII Puruṣa and Buddhi
Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s30
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XII Puruṣa and Buddhi
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Of all the evolutes of prakṛti, buddhi is the most important. The senses present their objects to buddhi, which exhibits them to puruṣa. It is buddhi that discriminates the difference between puruṣa and prakṛti and accomplishes, for puruṣa, the fruition of all that is to be experienced.¹ Buddhi, by means of the reflection of puruṣa, which is adjacent to it, becomes verily of its form and accomplishes its experience of all objects. Though buddhi is a product of prakṛti and so non-conscious in character, still it appears as if intelligent.² Puruṣa does not transfer its characteristics of consciousness to buddhi “Because of the transparency of prakṛti in her sattva part, the puruṣa reflected therein mistakes the sense of selfhood and agency (abhimāna) of prakṛti as belonging to itself. This misconception is in the self also as reflected in prakṛti and not in the self as such; even as the motionless moon reflected in water moves through the motion of water.”³ Vācaspati holds that there can be no contact (saṃyoga) between puruṣa and the state of buddhi, since they belong to two different orders of reality; and so it is said that there is a reflection of puruṣa in buddhi which makes the latter conscious. The ego is the seeming unity of buddhi and puruṣa. When puruṣa sees there is a modification of buddhi simultaneous with it. When buddhi suffers modification, it catches a glimpse of puruṣa, so that the contact (saṃyoga) of puruṣa and prakṛti is simultaneous with the unity of the reflecting puruṣa and the particular transformation of buddhi. The relation between puruṣa and prakṛti associated with it is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the mind are interpreted as the experiences of the puruṣa. Even non-discrimination belongs to buddhi, and in bondage it is reflected in puruṣa.⁴
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¹ S.K., 37; S.P.B., i. 161.
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² Cetanavad iva (S.K, 20). See also S.K., 60.
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³ S.P.S., Vṛtti, vi. 59.
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⁴ Cp. S.P.B., i. 19. “Birth means conjunction with an individual buddhi. It is by reason of the conjunction of buddhi as an upādhi that conjunction of pain takes place in the puruṣa.”
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Puruṣa is said to be immediately connected with the buddhi pertaining to it, and indirectly with the rest. So Vijñānabhikṣu says that while puruṣa is the sākṣin of buddhi, i.e. the witness of the states of buddhi without any intermediary, it is the beholder (draṣṭā) of others through the aid of buddhi. The free and indifferent puruṣa becomes the sākṣin when connected with buddhi.⁵ If a real connection between soul and body is asserted, then the imperfections of the latter will have to be attributed to the former. This will prejudice the Sāṃkhya theory of the essential purity of the soul. Bondage is the reflection in puruṣa of the impurities of buddhi. Release is the removal of this reflection consequent on the recovery by buddhi of its original purity, i.e. dissolution into prakṛti. To say that the activity of prakṛti is for the benefit of puruṣa is a figurative way of saying that it is for the purification of buddhi. While buddhi is in itself sāttvika, in any individual it is rājasa or tāmasa, on account of the contaminating influences of its past life. The feeling of pain or pleasure which we experience arises from the interaction of buddhi and the objective world with puruṣa as the onlooker. While buddhi should give rise only to pleasure, on account of the play of its acquired influences, it brings about painful results. This is why the same thing affects different persons differently. Every object apprehended is viewed through the distracting medium of individual purpose. Thus, what is pleasant to one is unpleasant to another, or to the same person at a different time. We generally live in worlds of our own, where we over-estimate our particular needs and purposes and set a conventional value on our preferences. Our ordinary lives are bound up with our selfish desires and give rise to pain mixed with some amount of uncertain pleasure. If we purify our buddhi, get rid of our past tendencies, then we shall be in a position to look at things, not as related to us, but as related among themselves, i.e. absolutely. When buddhi is dominated by sattva, it gives rise to true knowledge; by rajas, to desire; and by tamas, to false knowledge and the like.¹
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⁵ S.P.S., vi. 50.
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¹ Sattvaṃ yathārthajñānahetoḥ, rajo rāgahetuḥ, tamo viparītajñānādihetuḥ.
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THE MECHANISM OF KNOWLEDGE
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In all knowledge, three factors are involved: the object known, the subject knowing, and the process of knowledge. In the Sāṃkhya philosophy "the pure consciousness is the knower (pramātṛ); the modification (vṛtti) is the pramāṇa; pramā is the reflection in consciousness of the modifications in the form of the objects. The knowable is the subject matter of the reflected modifications.”¹ Experience belongs to puruṣa.² Buddhi (intellect), ahaṃkāra (self-sense), manas (mind), and the senses constitute the apparatus by means of which the external object is apprehended by the subject. When an object excites the senses, the manas³ arranges the sense-impressions into a percept, the self-sense refers it to the self, and the buddhi forms the concept.⁴ Buddhi, spread over the whole body, contains the impressions (saṃskāras) and tendencies (vāsanās) of past lives, which are revived under suitable conditions. “By means of the contact with objects through the channels of the senses, or by means of the knowledge of the inferential mark and the like, is first produced a modification of buddhi in the form of the object to be cognised. This modification, tinged with the object, enters on (the field of union of) the puruṣa by the form of a reflection and shines there, since puruṣa, who is not liable to transformation, cannot possibly be modified into the form of the object.” If apprehension of the object means the assumption of the form of the object, such a transformation is not possible with the puruṣa; so buddhi is said to be modified. For the modification to be manifested, there must be the reflection of buddhi in consciousness.⁵ This reflection is determined by the modification of the buddhi. The reflection in puruṣa lasts only so long as that which is reflected is present. The reflection in puruṣa of the modification of buddhi is not subsequent to but simultaneous with the modification. When, through the sense-organs, buddhi comes into contact with the external object and is affected by it, it assumes the form of that object. The force of consciousness (cetanāśakti), reflected in the buddhi thus modified, imitates the modification of buddhi; and it is the imitation (tadvṛttyanukāra) that is known as apprehension (upalabdhi). The reflection of the puruṣa is not an actual intercourse, but is only apparent, being due to the failure to perceive the distinction between the puruṣa and buddhi. The connection of the puruṣa, as reflected in the buddhi, with the object is called knowledge, and the connection of the puruṣa with this knowledge is seen in the resulting determination that "I act,"¹ whereas in reality the "I," or puruṣa, cannot act, and what acts, *i.e.* buddhi, cannot think.²
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¹ S.P.B., i. 87.
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² S.P.S., i. 143.
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³ Manas is recognised as an eleventh sense for several reasons. If the eternal puruṣa were itself associated with the objects of pleasure and pain, then there could be no liberation. If the connection with objects took place in dependence on prakṛti, then there could be no liberation, since prakṛti is eternal. If the non-eternal objects, jars, etc., were associated with the eternal intelligence of puruṣa, then there could be no such distinction as seen and unseen, since all things now existing would necessarily be seen at one and the same moment. If the association of objects with intelligence depended only on the external organs, we could not account for the non-simultaneous character of our perceptions.
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⁴ Tattvakaumudī, p. 36. For a criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge, see N.V. and N.V.T.T., iii. 2. 8–9.
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⁵ S.P.B., i. 99.
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¹ Buddhāv āropitacaitanyasya viṣayeṇa sambandho jñānam, jñānena sambandhaś cetano'haṁ karomīty upalabdhiḥ (Haridāsa Bhaṭṭācārya on Udayana's Kusumāñjali, i. 14).
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² While Vācaspati thinks that the self knows the object through the mental modification on which it casts its reflection, Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the mental modification which takes in the reflection of the self and assumes its form is reflected back on the self, and it is through this reflection that the self knows the object.
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No movement of buddhi will be conscious apprehension until it attracts the attention of some puruṣa. This view is intended to bring out the unconscious nature of buddhi, manas and the senses.³
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³ But in the Sāṁkhya theory there cannot arise buddhi, ahaṁkāra, etc., until there is the pervading influence of puruṣa over prakṛti. It is therefore unnecessary for us to think that buddhi is simply non-conscious. The development of buddhi is itself due to the influence of puruṣa. We need not regard buddhi, ahaṁkāra, etc., as mere instruments ready made for the use of puruṣa, but remaining unconscious and inert, until puruṣas look through them as through a telescope; for this would be to ignore the central principle of the Sāṁkhya that prakṛti cannot give rise to buddhi, etc., until puruṣa disturbs the equilibrium of prakṛti.
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The action of the different functions is successive, though, in some, the succession is so rapid as to escape attention. When one sees a tiger in a dark night, one’s senses are excited, manas reflects, ahaṁkāra identifies, and the buddhi determines the nature of the object, and one runs away for dear life. Here the different acts take place so quickly that they seem to occur simultaneously. When one sees an object in a dim light, suspects it to be a thief, and slowly makes up one’s mind and moves away in an opposite direction, the different stages are discernible.⁴
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⁴ S.K., 30; Tattvakaumudī, p. 30.
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The psychic functions of perception and thought, desire and choice, are, strictly speaking, mechanical processes of the products of prakṛti, which constitute the inner organs.¹ They would remain unconscious but for the puruṣa which illuminates them, i.e. makes them conscious. This is the sole function of puruṣa, since all activity belongs to prakṛti. Puruṣa is a passive mirror in which the inner organ is reflected. The purely immaterial self bathes the processes of the inner organ in its own consciousness, so that they do not remain unconscious. The Sāṃkhya assumes not only the proximity of the puruṣa to buddhi, but also the reflection of puruṣa in buddhi. We cognise the conscious occurrence even as we see the face reflected in a mirror. Only in this way can consciousness have a vision of itself.²
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¹ The three inner organs, buddhi, ahaṃkāra and manas, are frequently treated as one, since they are closely related to one another. Cp. Garbe: "This combined material inner organ exactly corresponds as regards its unspiritual nature, and all the functions that the Sāṃkhya doctrine ascribes to it to the nervous system" (E.R.E., vol. ii, p. 191).
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² Citcchāyāpatti, or the falling of the shadow of consciousness (S.D.S., xv).
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The relation between the incorporeal puruṣa and the corporeal buddhi is hard to conceive. According to Vācaspati, there can be no contact between the two on the plane of space and time. He therefore interprets proximity (sannidhi) as fitness (yogyatā). The puruṣa, though it remains aloof from the states of buddhi, falls into the misconception of identifying itself with buddhi and ascribing the states of the latter to itself. Vijñānabhikṣu contends that if such a special kind of fitness is admitted, there is no reason why the puruṣa should lose it at the time of deliverance. In other words, there can be no deliverance, since the puruṣa will continue to experience the states of buddhi for ever. So he holds that there is a real contact of the puruṣa with the modifications of buddhi in any cognitive occurrence. Such a contact need not involve any change in the puruṣa, for change means the rise of new qualities. Buddhi suffers changes, and when these are reflected in the puruṣa there arises the notion of a person or experiencer in the puruṣa, and when the puruṣa is reflected back in the buddhi the state of the latter appears as a conscious occurrence. But even Vijñānabhikṣu allows that the relation between the puruṣa and the buddhi is like that of a crystal to a rose reflected in it; there is no actual transference (uparāga), but only the assumption of such transference (abhimāna).¹
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¹ S.P.B., vi. 28; Y.S., i. 4, 7. See also Y.B., ii. 20; iv. 22.
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The puruṣas, though innumerable and universal and of the form of consciousness, do not illumine all things at all times, since they are free from attachment (asaṅga) and cannot by themselves be modified into the form of the objects. The puruṣas reflect the modifications of their respective buddhis and not those of others. That object by which the buddhi is affected is known, while that by which it is not affected is not known.²
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² S.D.S., xv.
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The different states of waking, dreaming, sleep and death are distinguished. In the waking state, buddhi is modified in the form of objects through the channels of senses; in dreams the modifications of buddhi are the results of the saṃskāras, or the impressions of previous experiences. Dreamless sleep is twofold according as the withdrawal (laya) is partial or complete. In the former condition buddhi is not modified in the form of objects, though it assumes the forms of pleasure, pain and dulness inherent in it. This is why, when one wakes from sleep, one has memory of the kind of sleep one had. In death we have a case of complete laya.³
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³ S.P.B., i. 148.
Cites (4)
- Sāṃkhyasūtra — Kapila, Sanskrit
- Sāṃkhyakārikā — Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Sanskrit
- Yogasūtra — Patañjali (author of the Yogasūtra), Sanskrit
- Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit