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Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s31: XIV The Sources of Knowledge

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s31

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XIV The Sources of Knowledge

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Cognitive consciousness is of five different kinds: pramāṇa, or valid knowledge, viparyaya, or unreal cognition resting on a form not possessed by that which is its object,⁴ vikalpa, or doubtful cognitive consciousness, where we oscillate between two alternatives,⁵ nidrā (sleep), or cognition supported on tamas,⁶ and smṛti, or remembrance.

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⁴ Y.S., i. 8.

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⁵ Y.S., i. 9.

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⁶ Y.S., i. 10.

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The Sāṃkhya accepts the three pramāṇas of perception, inference and scriptural testimony.⁷ Knowledge produced through sense-activity is perception. When a thing like a jar comes within the range of vision, buddhi, or the intellect, is so modified as to assume the form¹ of the jar; and the soul becomes aware of the existence of the jar.² The two kinds of perception, indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka), are admitted. According to Vācaspati, buddhi comes into touch with external objects through the senses. At the first moment of the contact there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particular features of the object are not noticed, and we have only indeterminate perception. At the second moment, through the exercise of mental analysis (vikalpa) and synthesis (saṁkalpa), the object is perceived as possessing a definite nature,³ and we have determinate perception. While Vācaspati thinks that the activity of manas is necessary for perception, Vijñānabhikṣu denies it, and holds that buddhi directly comes into touch with the objects through the senses. Vācaspati assigns to manas the function of arranging the sense-data and ordering them into determinate perceptions, while Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the senses and that manas is only the faculty of desire, doubt and imagination. Yogic perception is admitted by the Sāṁkhya, which holds that all things exist involved or evolved at all times. The mind of the yogin can come into connection with the past and the future objects which exist at present in a latent condition by virtue of certain powers produced by meditation.⁴ Yogic perception produced by the powers of mind is unlike ordinary sense-perception. In memory—knowledge, the manas, the self-sense and the intellect alone are active, though their activity presupposes the results of previous perceptions—such as a memory image. While the outer organs of perception can operate only on objects presented to them, manas can deal with the past and the future as well. In the case of internal perception, the co-operation of the sense-organs is lacking. Buddhi perceives the states of pleasure and the like.⁵

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⁷ S.K., 4.

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¹ Tadākāraullekhi.

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² S.P.S., i. 89.

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³ Cp. Vyāsa : Sāmānyaviśeṣasamudāyo dravyam (Y.B., iii. 44).

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⁴ S.P.B., i. 91.

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⁵ "What is manifested in dreamless sleep, when there is no contact with objects, as the sāttvika pleasure of tranquillity (śāntisukham), the same is the property of buddhi, the pleasure of the self (ātmasukham)" (S.P.B., i. 65).

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Even if puruṣa is knowable, it is because puruṣa is reflected in buddhi. The eye cannot see itself except as it is reflected in a mirror. All cognitions are modifications of the internal organ. A primary cognition such as "This is a jar" is a modification of that organ. When its reflection falls on puruṣa, it is apprehended. The cognition, "I cognise the jar," is a modification of the internal organ. Puruṣa, along with the reflection of the modification of the internal organ, such as "This is a jar," is reflected in the internal organ. This second reflection is the modification of the internal organ. Even the cognition "I am distinct from prakṛti" is a modification of the internal organ.¹ Buddhi changes according to the objects offered to it.

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¹ Y.S., ii. 20, reads: "The self as seer is absolute in its purity, yet is capable of being perceived in experience" (pratyayāñupaśyah). ² Tattvavaiśāradī, iv. 35. ³ Y.B., iii. 35. ⁴ Yogavārttika, iii. 35. ⁵ For a criticism of the theory, see N.S., iii. 2. 1-9.

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The notion of self, which is connected with all our mental phenomena and which illumines them, is due to the reflection of the self in buddhi. So puruṣa may be said to see again that which was perceived by the buddhi, and so impart consciousness by transferring its illumination to the buddhi as the ego. The puruṣa can know itself only through its reflection in the buddhi, modified into the form of the object. According to Vācaspati, the self can know itself only when attention is entirely withdrawn from the mental function in which the self is reflected, and is wholly concentrated on the reflection of the self in the sattva nature of buddhi. In this act the subject of self-apprehension is said to be buddhi in its sattva nature, rendered conscious by receiving the reflection of puruṣa in it; and the object is the self in its purity.² Vyāsa³ holds that the self cannot be known by the buddhi in which it is reflected, but it is the self which knows itself through its reflection in the pure nature of buddhi. Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that the self knows itself through the reflection in itself of the mental modification, which takes in the reflection of the self and is modified into its form, even as it knows an external object through the reflection in itself of the mental modification which assumes the form of the object.⁴ Since the self is essentially self-luminous, it can know itself through the reflection in itself of the mental mode which assumes the form of the self. Vijñānabhikṣu regards the self as determined by the mental mode which is modified into the form of the self as the subject, and the self in its pure essence as the object.

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Pratyabhijñā or recognition, is brought under perception. It is possible because buddhi is eternal, and quite different from the momentary cognitions of individuals. The eternal buddhi undergoes modifications, by virtue of which it becomes connected with the different cognitions involved in recognition. This would not be possible of the self which is unmodifiable.⁵

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According to the Sāṃkhya, a cognition is not perceived by another cognition, but is perceived by the self. For cognition is regarded as a function of the buddhi, which is unconscious, and so it cannot be its own object, but can only be apprehended by the self.¹

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¹ V.B., iv. 9.

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Negation (abhāva) is also brought under perception. Mere non-perception cannot prove non-existence, since it may be due to other causes, such as long distance, excessive nearness, extreme subtlety, or disturbance of sense-organs, inattention, concealment of the object, and mixture with other things.² Internal perception, self-consciousness, recognition and knowledge of non-existence are treated as falling under perception.

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² S.K., 7; S.P.S., i. 108-9.

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Inference is said to be of two kinds: affirmative (vīta) and negative (avīta). The former is based on affirmative concomitance and the latter on negative concomitance.³ The five-membered form of the syllogism is admitted.⁴ Generalisation is the result of the observation of the accompaniment attended with the non-observation of non-accompaniment.⁵ Vyāpti, which is constant concomitance, is not a separate principle.⁶ It is a relation of things, but not itself a thing.⁷ Arthāpatti or implication, and sambhava or subsumption, are included under inference.

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³ Vācaspati brings the pūrvavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa kinds under the former and śeṣavat under the latter. See Tattvakaumudī, p. 5.

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⁴ S.P.S., v. 27.

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⁵ S.P.S., Vṛtti, v. 28. Constant coexistence of both the sādhya and sādhana or of one is vyāpti (S.P.S., v. 29). All produced objects are non-eternal is a case of the former, while "all smoky things are fiery" is a case of the latter.

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⁶ Tattvāntaram, v. 30. Pañcaśikha is of opinion that vyāpti is the possession of the power of that which is sustained (Adheyaśaktiyoga, v. 32).

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⁷ v. 33-35.

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Āptavacana or trustworthy assertion, is also a source of valid knowledge. A word is related to its object as a sign to the thing signified. This is evident from the instruction of the trustworthy, the law of use and wont, conventions and the fact of their possessing the same denotation.⁸ The Vedas are not said to be the composition of persons, since there are not any persons who can be their authors.⁹ The released have no concern with the Vedas, and the unreleased are not competent for the work.¹ Nor are the Vedas eternal, since they possess the character of effects. Letters perish after they are pronounced. When we say “It is the same letter,” we mean that it belongs to the same genus.² Simply because the Vedas are not of personal origin, we cannot infer that they are eternal, since a sprout is not eternal, though it has not a personal origin.³ Their objects are supersensuous, yet “there can be intuition even in the case of supersensuous objects, by means of the universal forms which determine the character of being a padārtha, or an object denoted by a word.” ⁴ Though the Vedas are not of personal authorship, their natural power to denote objects is communicated by āptas to their disciples.⁵ The Veda, on account of its non-personal authorship, is free from doubts and discrepancies, and is regarded as of self-evident validity. If the validity of the Vedas depended on something else, they would not be authoritative for us.⁶ Kapila, at the beginning of the kalpa, only remembered it. The scriptural statements are tested and lived by the muktas or the liberated, who pass them on to others. If those who teach us the śāstras are not inspired seers, but have accepted them at second-hand, then it would be a case of the blind leading the blind.⁷ We accept the utterances of the āptas as valid, since their authority is established by the tested validity of their sayings in other branches of knowledge as āyurveda.⁸

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⁸ S.P.S., Vṛtti, v. 38.

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⁹ S.P.S., v. 46.

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¹ S.P.S., v. 47. ² S.P.S., Vṛtti, v.

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The Sāṃkhya is aware that there are other systems which profess to be revealed, and so argues that reason will have to be employed in finding out which codes of revelation are true and which not. Vācaspati says: “The invalidity of these systems is due to their making unreasonable assertions, to the lack of sufficient support, to their making statements opposed to the canons of logic, to their acceptance by the mlecchas and such other low classes.” ⁹ Aniruddha quotes a verse in his *Vṛtti* to the effect: "Huge giants do not drop from heaven simply because an āpta, or competent person, says so. Only sayings which are supported by reason should be accepted by me and others like yourselves."¹

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⁴⁵ The sphoṭavāda is refuted in v. 57, and sound, on account of its character as effect, is said to be non-eternal (v. 58). ³ S.P.S., v. 48. ⁴ Atindriyeṣv api padārthatā'vacchedakena sāmānyarūpeṇa pratīter vakṣyamāṇatvād (S.P.S., v. 42.) ⁵ S.P.S., v. 43. ⁶ S.P.S., v. 51. ⁷ S.P.S., iii. 81. ⁸ S.P.B., i. 98. ⁹ Tattvakaumudī, p. 5.

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¹ Na hy āptavacanān nabhaso nipatanti mahāsurāḥ Yuktimad vacanam grāhyam mayānyaiśca bhavadvidhaiḥ. (i. 26.)

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The Sāṃkhya avoids the appearance of being an innovation by its acceptance of the Veda as a means of knowledge. But, as we shall see, it discards many an old dogma and silently ignores others. It, however, never openly opposes the Vedas, but adopts the more deadly process of sapping their foundations.

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The modification of buddhi is the pramāṇa, and the validity or the invalidity of these modifications can be tested by the later modifications, and not by any reference to external objects. The object of illusory cognition is not a non-existent object, but an existent one. Water is the object of the illusion of water, and when this illusory cognition is contradicted by the cognition of the rays of the sun, the latter cognition has for its object the rays of the sun.² Validity, as well as invalidity, belongs to the cognition itself.³ Sometimes it is said that only the śruti is of self-evident validity (svataḥpramāṇam), while perception and inference are liable to error and require confirmation.⁴ The test of reality is workability (arthakriyākāritva). Our apprehension, moreover, is relative to our ahaṃkāra, or individual purpose. It is difficult to have a disinterested knowledge of the world independent of us. The jīva is imprisoned in its own isolated consciousness, and cannot attain to the knowledge of reality beyond it. It follows that all empirical knowledge is vitiated by a central flaw. Every cognition implicating the puruṣa confuses it with the internal organ. It is when the shadow of buddhi falls on puruṣa that the latter appears as though possessed of cognition.⁵

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² Prabhācandra criticises this view on the ground that it abolishes the distinction between valid and invalid cognitions.

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³ The Naiyāyika criticises this view on the ground that if cognitions were inherently invalid, we cannot act; and if they were inherently valid we cannot account for erroneous cognitions which are facts.

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⁴ S.P.S., i. 147; also i. 36, 77, 83, 154; ii. 20, 22; iii. 15, 80; iv. 22.

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⁵ *Tattvakaumudī*, p. 5.

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SOME CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SĀMKHYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

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Postponing to a later section a critical estimate of the Sāṃkhya metaphysics, we may briefly notice here some of the striking defects of the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge.¹ From the fact that in the world of experience the individual deals with a datum or something given, the Sāṃkhya argues to the independent existence of subjects and objects. As we have seen, in the discussion of the Nyāya theory of knowledge, pure subjects and pure objects are false abstractions which have no meaning apart from the concrete experience in which they function. When the Sāṃkhya breaks up the concrete unity of experience into the two elements of subject and object and makes them fictitiously absolute, it cannot account for the fact of experience. When puruṣa is viewed as pure consciousness, the permanent light which illuminates all objects of knowledge, and prakṛti as something opposed to consciousness and utterly foreign to it, the latter can never become the object of the former. The Sāṃkhya cannot get across the ditch which it has dug between the subject and the object. The metaphors of proximity, reflection, and the like, are artificial remedies intended to cure imaginary diseases. Puruṣa can never know prakṛti, if the two are what the Sāṃkhya takes them to be. The puruṣa cannot say in what way the changes in its consciousness, said to be the reflections of the modifications of buddhi, are brought about. The Sāṃkhya says, when buddhi is modified, this modification is reflected in the consciousness of puruṣa. Granting for argument's sake the validity of this theory of reflection, are we not in the grip of psychological subjectivism? To receive a reflection is not the same thing as to perceive a reality that is not merely mental. What is the relation between the external object and the internal idea? If the two things are related causally, what becomes of the radical opposition between the two? Is perception at any time a mere change of consciousness? Is it not always an awareness of an object? Are we not going beyond the verified experience when we regard the awareness and the object as two distinct realities? If the puruṣa and the prakṛti are absolutely unrelated to each other, then we cannot account for a conscious occurrence or even a material process. This is evidently a *reductio ad absurdum*. But the Sāṃkhya hides from itself the unsatisfactoriness of its position by a number of metaphors and inconsistencies. When subject and object approach one another, there is said to be a mutual reflection of qualities and transfer of properties. Unless the subject and the object are akin to each other, how can the one reflect the other? How can buddhi, which is non-intelligent, reflect puruṣa? How can the formless puruṣa which is the constant seer be reflected in buddhi which is changing? The two cannot, therefore, be absolutely opposed in nature. The last sūtra of the Vibhūtipāda of the Yoga Sūtra states that when buddhi becomes as pure as puruṣa, freedom is attained.¹ A purified buddhi does not bind the puruṣa; and, before the abolition of buddhi, we have the reflection of puruṣa in the purified buddhi. Buddhi makes possible complete knowledge of puruṣa and prakṛti and their distinction. So long as buddhi is tinged with selfish aims and particular purposes the truth cannot be known by us.

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¹ There is some similarity between the Sāṃkhya and the Kantian theories of knowledge. The phenomenal world is constituted in both by the co-operation of the transcendental subjects (puruṣas) and objects (prakṛti). Both assert the autonomy of the selves in the trans-empirical world and admit the existence of matter in view of the passivity of the subjects which cannot produce their own sensations. Both hold that the existence of God cannot be proved. In other respects there are vital differences.

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¹ Sattvapuruṣayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyam.

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The Sāṃkhya theory does not account for the fact of knowledge which is a subject-object relation. It admits that the object depends on the subject to be known, and the subject requires an object to know. In other words, there is no knowledge without the synthesis of the two. The subject cannot know itself fully until it knows the object fully. It cannot know the object until the latter is manifested by the subject. Is not the relation between the two essential? The two cannot be external to each other. The appearance of externality arises on account of our going beyond the fact of experience to account for it.

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The principle of consciousness is never perceived in itself. It is inferred from knowledge. It is said to be pure awareness. The universal element of knowledge is abstracted and set down as the puruṣa or the consciousness which has no form, no quality, no movement. It is called the pure subject. The contents of consciousness which are ever fluctuating are traced to the object world, which is regarded as a fundamental unity whose character is variableness. All objects are material, including sense-data and mental states which are limited in their nature. They come and go and are copies of outer things, though made of subtler stuff. Though the modifications of buddhi belong to the same group as the things of the world, the puruṣa illuminates the former, since buddhi is of a far subtler nature and possesses the quality of sattva in a preponderant degree. Buddhi is better adapted for the reflection of the light of puruṣa than the other products of prakṛti.¹ So far as knowledge is concerned, we get to know other things through the modifications of buddhi or mind-stuff. Each act of knowledge is broken up into the principle of consciousness, which illumines it, and a modification of buddhi which is in itself non-conscious, though it becomes a content of consciousness the moment it is illumined by the puruṣa. The movements of buddhi are in themselves unconscious, but through their connection with puruṣa they are interpreted as the coherent experiences of an individual.

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Since experience has in it two elements, one constant and the other variable, we cannot isolate the two and argue that the two exist separately and happen to come together in experience. To assume that the subject and the object of knowledge are complete in themselves is to rend the seamless garment of truth by setting up its different elements against the whole to which they essentially belong. If puruṣa is self and prakṛti selfless, then they are, by definition, reciprocally exclusive, and there can be no communion between them; and rightly the Sāṃkhya views the relation between the two as a mechanical one. A mechanical relation implies that the subject and the object of consciousness are not only numerically different, but are also, *per se*, wholly independent of and separate from each other. The mechanical modifications of buddhi become illuminated, as if by magic, with the light of consciousness. We have not here any explanation of conscious knowledge.¹ The rise of consciousness on the occasion of a mechanical modification is a baffling mystery. But the problem is of our own creation. We first of all assume the existence of a pure subject and a pure object, which lie wholly without the range of experience, and then struggle to bring them together into experience. A truer philosophy tells us that subject and object are distinguished within consciousness or knowledge, and not simply outside of it.

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Subject and object do not happen to come together, but are really inseparable from each other. If experience is allowed to speak for itself, it will tell us that subject and object are presented as one. Knowledge becomes intelligible when we recognise that the fundamental relation in all conscious experience is a relation of members which are in an organic unity, which exist as terms in a living process, in and through each other, or in and through a universal which transcends them both, though it does not exclude them. The fundamental fact of a universal consciousness is the presupposition of all knowledge. The Sāṃkhya puruṣa should be really this one universal self, though it is regarded as many on account of the confusion between the psychological and the metaphysical self. Of course, every jīva has the universal self operating in it. In one sense, our knowledge is the manifestation of a universal principle; while, from another point of view, it is dependent on a sensible process, which must be stimulated from without by its appropriate objects. Intelligence is the same in all in whom it is developed, and is everywhere struggling to free itself from individual limitations and regards things, not from the point of view of a particular organism, but from that of a pure subject. While in one sense our knowledge is our own, in another it is independent of us who possess it.

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¹ In gross matter, mass and energy answering to tamas and rajas are the dominant features. In buddhi, tamas is at its lowest and sattva at its highest, and so it has the power of translucence. If buddhi had only sattva and rajas elements, it would give rise to a simultaneous revelation of all objects. It does not do so because of the element of tamas in it. The light of consciousness is reflected wherever tamas is removed. In a sense buddhi hides within it all knowledge potentially. What becomes actual depends on the lifting of the veil of darkness.

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¹ Cp. "That the non-intelligent ahaṃkāra should manifest the self-luminous self has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the sun." Śāntāṅgāra ivādityam ahaṃkāro jaḍātmakaḥ Svayaṃjyotiṣam ātmānaṃ vyanaktiti na yuktimad. Yāmunācārya: *Atmasiddhi*, quoted in R.B., ii. I. 1).

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The Sāṃkhya starts with the idea of the universality of suffering,¹ which is of three kinds: ādhyātmika, *i.e.* arising from the psychophysical nature of man; ādhibhautika, *i.e.* arising from the external world; and the ādihdaivika, *i.e.* arising from the supernatural agencies. The pain caused by the disorders of the body or mental unrest is of the first kind; the second type is due to men, beasts and birds; while the third owes its existence to the influence of planets and the elemental agencies.² Every individual strives to alleviate and if possible get rid of pain. But pain cannot be rooted out by the remedies prescribed by the science of medicine or the scriptures.³ Liberation is not attainable by the observance of Vedic rites. Like Buddhism and Jainism, the Sāṃkhya urges that the Vedic rites involve a violation of the great moral principles. The law of ahiṃsā is set aside when we kill an animal for the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice. Killing is productive of sin, even though it be in a sacrifice. Besides, the kind of heaven we get to by the performance of the sacrifice is a temporary one. Life in heaven (svarga) is not exempt from the influence of the three guṇas. By the practice of virtue and the performance of sacrifices we simply postpone the evil but do not get rid of it. We cannot escape from evils by death, since the same fate pursues us life after life. If the miseries are natural to the soul, there is no help for us; if they are only accidental and arise from something else, we can escape suffering by separating ourselves from the source of suffering.

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¹ S.P.S., vi. 6-8; Y.S., ii. 15.

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² Tattvakaumudī, p. 1.

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³ S.K., 2.

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Bondage belongs to prakṛti and is attributed to puruṣa.

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“Although bondage in the form of the cognition of pain, and discrimination and non-discrimination in the form of functions belong to the citta or the inner organ, still puruṣa’s enjoyment or suffering consists in the mere reflection of pain in him.”¹ Puruṣa’s bondage is a fiction,² due to its proximity to citta. It is therefore said to be adventitious (aupādhika). If puruṣa’s connection with pain were real, it could not be cut off. Vijñānabhikṣu quotes a verse from the Kūrma Purāṇa³ to the effect: “Were the self by nature impure, unclean, mutable, verily release would not be possible for it even by hundreds of rebirths.”⁴ Bondage is not due to time or space, embodiment or karma.⁵ All these belong to the not-self. The property of one thing cannot produce change in another, for then all would enjoy pleasure or suffer pain.⁶ Bondage arises through the conjunction of prakṛti with puruṣa, which is by nature eternal and pure, enlightened and unconfined.⁷ Nor is the mere presence of prakṛti the cause of experience, since on such a view the released soul might have experience; but its cause is “the object of experience, which does not exist in the state of release.”⁸ Non-discrimination (aviveka) is the cause of bondage (bandhahetu). This aviveka belongs to buddhi, though it has the puruṣa for its object. It follows that our misery will terminate only when our aviveka ends. Knowledge and ignorance are the sole determinants of release and bondage.⁹

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¹ S.P.B., i. 58.

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² Vānmātram. S.P.S., Vṛtti, i. 58.

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³ ii. 2. 12.

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⁴ Yady ātmā malino ’svaccho vikārī syāt svabhāvataḥ Na hy tasya bhaven muktir janmāntaraśatair api. (S.P.B., i. 7.) Were pain natural to puruṣa, there would be no point in the injunction to get rid of it (S.P.S., i. 8–11).

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⁵ S.P.S., i. 12–16.

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⁶ S.P.S., Vṛtti, i. 17.

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⁷ i. 19.

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⁸ S.P.S., Vṛtti, vi. 44.

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⁹ S.P.S., ii. 7. Aniruddha quotes a verse in his S.P.S., Vṛtti, to the effect: “There is no bondage in the nature of things (vastusthityā), nor does release follow from its non-existence. Both these constituted by error have no real existence” (i. 7).

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Puruṣa is eternally free. It does not desire or hate, govern or obey, impel or restrain. The moral life is vested in the subtle body which accompanies the puruṣa from birth to birth; pain is the essence of bodily existence.¹⁰ When the soul is left alone, it is said to be purified. The supreme good, which the jīva aims at and strives for, is to realise the perfection of the puruṣa. All ethical activity is for the fuller realisation of the puruṣa in us. The circuit of saṃsāra is one of conflict and change, made up of parts that are indifferent and external to each other. The jīva, in its endless revolutions, is ever seeking and ever failing to attain to unity with itself, i.e. attain to the status of puruṣa, which is eternally one with itself and complete in itself, having no necessary relation with anything external to it. Every jīva has in it the higher puruṣa, and to realise its true nature has no need to go out of itself, but only to become conscious of its real nature. The ethical process is not the development of something new, but a re-discovery of what we have forgotten. Release is a return into one’s true self and deliverance from a yoke to which the jīva has subjected itself. It is the removal of an illusion which hides our true nature from our eyes. The knowledge that “I am not” (nāsmi), that “naught is mine” (na me), and that “the ego exists not” (nāham), leads to release.¹

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¹⁰ S.K., 55.

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¹ S.K., 64.

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While freedom is brought about by knowledge, this knowledge is not merely theoretical. It is what results from the practice of virtue, yoga, etc.² While bondage is traced to wrong knowledge (viparyaya), this wrong knowledge includes not only avidyā, or unreal cognition, but also asmitā, or egoism, rāga or desire, dveṣa or hatred, and abhiniveśa or fear.³ These are brought about by aśakti, or incapacity, which is of twenty-eight kinds, of which eleven belong to the senses and seventeen to buddhi.⁴ Unselfish activity is an indirect means to salvation.⁵ By itself it does not lead us to freedom. It may yield birth in the divine regions, which is not to be confused with mokṣa.⁶ Vairāgya, which follows the rise of discriminative knowledge, is different from that which precedes it.⁷ Through vairāgya, or unattachment, absorption into prakṛti takes place.⁸ This dissolution into prakṛti is not ultimate freedom; for the souls thus absorbed in prakṛti reappear as Īśvaras, or Lords, since their error is not consumed by knowledge. "He who in a previous creation was absorbed into the cause (prakṛti) becomes in another creation the ādipuruṣa, having the character of Īśvara, or Lord, all-knowing and all-doing."¹ Ethical virtues help us to realise the deeper consciousness, while vices involve a darkening of this consciousness. By indulging in vices the soul immerses itself more and more completely in the material body.

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² iii. 77 and 78.

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³ S.P.S. and S.P.B., iii. 37.

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⁴ S.P.S., iii. 38; S.K., 49.

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⁵ i. 82, 85.

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⁶ S.P.S., iii. 52-53.

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⁷ Four kinds of vairāgya are distinguished in Tattvakaumudī, p. 23.

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⁸ Vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ (S.K., 45; S.P.S., iii. 54).

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¹ S.P.B., iii. 56. Different kinds of bondage are distinguished by Vācaspati as natural (prākṛtika), incidental (vaikṛtika), and personal (dākṣiṇaka). While the first look upon prakṛti as the absolute spirit, the second look upon the products of parkṛti as the absolute spirit. The third neglect the true nature of spirit in worldly activities indulged in for the gaining of personal ends (iṣṭāpūrta) (Tattvakaumudī, p. 44; Tatvasamāsa, p. 19).

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The method of yoga occupies a prominent place in the Sāṃkhya Sūtra, though not in the Kārikā. We can obtain discriminative knowledge only when our emotional stirrings are subdued and intellectual activities are controlled. When the senses are regulated and the mind acquires calm, buddhi becomes transparent, and reflects the pure light of purusa. While buddhi is in its intrinsic nature sāttvika, on account of its acquired impulses and tendencies (vāsanās), it has lapsed from its innate purity. By dhyāna (meditation), the taints of citta caused by the external objects are removed.² When the citta regains its pristine condition and rids itself of its desires, the objects no longer excite love or hatred. We have to gain spiritual calm and composure, when the objects do not excite our egoistic interests but reveal their true nature. Since this absolute detachment is beyond the reach of ordinary men, they attempt to develop the impersonal outlook by resorting to art. Works of art offer a temporary release from the natural world.

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² S.P.S., iii. 30; S.P.B., iii. 30.

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The doctrine of the guṇas³ has great ethical significance. The beings of the world are classified according to the preponderance of the different guṇas in them. In the devas the sattva element predominates, while the rajas and the tamas are reduced. In man the tamas element is reduced to a less extent than in the devas. In the animal world the sattva is reduced considerably. In the vegetable kingdom tamas is more predominant than in the others. The upward ascent consists in the gradual increase of the sattva element and diminution of the tamas, since pain is a particular modification of the quality of rajas.¹ Strictly speaking, the guṇas mingle, combine and strive in every fibre of our being. Their relative strength determines our mental character. We have men of elevated spirituality, passionate force and depressing apathy. Tamas, if predominant, brings in inertia, ignorance, weakness, incapacity, want of faith and disinclination to act. It produces the coarse, dull, ignorant type of human nature. The individuals in whom the rajas is predominant are intrepid, restless and active. Sattva develops the critical, balanced, thoughtful nature. While the three guṇas are present in different proportions in all men, the seer, the saint and the sage have sattva highly developed in them; the warrior, the statesman and the forceful man of action have rajas highly developed in them. Again, though the guṇas affect every part of our natural being, relatively speaking, the three guṇas have their strongest hold in the three different members of it, namely, mind, life and body. The Sāṁkhya recognises no merit in sacrifices. It does not exclude the śūdras from higher studies. The teacher is not necessarily a Brahmin, but he who has freed himself. The winning of a good teacher depends on our previous conduct.

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³ While in the Sāṃkhya the guṇas are purely non-intelligent, in the Vedānta they reflect the character of intelligence.

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¹ Duḥkhaṁ rajaḥpariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ.

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RELEASE

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Salvation in the Sāṁkhya system is only phenomenal, since bondage does not belong to puruṣa. Bondage and release refer to the conjunction and the disjunction of puruṣa and prakṛti resulting from non-discrimination and discrimination.² Prakṛti does not bind the puruṣa but itself in various shapes.³ Puruṣa is entirely free from the oppositions of merit and demerit.⁴ While bondage is the activity of prakṛti towards one not possessing discrimination, release is its inactivity towards one possessing discrimination.¹ When prakṛti is active, it catches the reflection of puruṣa and casts its shadow on the puruṣa. Yet the change appearing in puruṣa is unreal and fictitious.² The union of puruṣa with the subtle body is the cause of saṃsāra, and salvation is attained through the breaking of the union by means of the knowledge of the distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti. When prakṛti withdraws itself from puruṣa, the latter realises the absurdity of attributing the adventures of prakṛti to itself. Puruṣa remains in eternal isolation and prakṛti relapses into inactivity. So long as there are objects concealing the real natue of the soul, liberation cannot be attained. When prakṛti ceases to act, the modifications of buddhi cease, and the puruṣa assumes its natural form.³ "The cessation of the creation by the pradhāna in regard to the released one is nothing but this, viz. the non-production of the cause of the experience thereof, i.e. the particular transformation of one's own upādhi called birth."⁴ When freed, the puruṣa keeps no company, looks to nothing without itself, and entertains no alien thoughts.⁵ It is no longer at the mercy of prakṛti or its products, but stands as a star apart, undisturbed by the earthly cares. There is in reality no distinction between the bound and the released, for freedom consists in the removal of obstacles which hinder the full manifestation of the glory of puruṣa.⁶ In samādhi or ecstatic consciousness, suṣupti or dreamless sleep and release, the puruṣa rests in its own form of Brahman (brahmarūpatā) through the dissolution of the modifications of buddhi.⁷ In dreamless sleep and ecstatic consciousness the traces of past experiences are present, while they are absent in release.⁸ The discriminative knowledge itself disappears when release is attained, for it is like a medicine which purges itself out as well as the disease. While deliverance is an escape from suffering, it is not an escape from all existence. The Sāṃkhya has firm faith in the continuance of puruṣa, and so cannot be regarded as pessimistic. When the play of prakṛti ceases, its developments will lapse into the undeveloped. The puruṣas will be seers with nothing to look at, mirrors with nothing to reflect, and will subsist in lasting freedom from prakṛti and its defilements as pure intelligences in the timeless void. On release, “the puruṣa, unmoved and self-collected, as a spectator contemplates prakṛti which has ceased to produce.”¹ The Sāṁkhya ideal of freedom is not to be confused with the Buddhist goal of voidness or extinction of self,² or the Advaita absorption into Brahman,³ or the Yogic acquisition of supernatural powers.⁴ Nor is mukti the manifestation of bliss (ānanda), since puruṣa is free from all attributes.⁵ The scriptural passages which speak of bliss mean to convey that the state of release is one of freedom from pain.⁶ So long as the puruṣa has attributes, it is not free.⁷

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² S.P.S., iii. 72.

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³ S.K., 62.

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⁴ S.P.S., iii. 64; Y.S., ii. 22.

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¹ S.K., 62.

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² S.P.S., ii. 8.

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³ S.P.S., ii. 34; Y.S., ii. 3.

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⁴ Muktam prati pradhānaṣṛṣṭyuparamo yat tadbhoga hetoḥ svopādhi pariṇāmaviśeṣasya janmākhyasyānutpādanam (S.P.B., vi. 44).

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⁵ Prakṛtiviyogo mokṣaḥ : Haribhadra.

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⁶ S.P.S., vi. 20.

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⁷ Y.S., i. 4.

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⁸ S.P.S., v. 117.

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¹ See also S.K., 59.

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² S.P.S., v. 77-79.

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³ S.P.S., v. 81.

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⁴ S.P.S., v. 82.

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⁵ v. 74.

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⁶ v. 74.

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⁷ The Sāṁkhya view of freedom is not unlike Aristotle's view of blessedness as eternal thinking free from all activity.

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When discrimination arises, prakṛti does not forthwith free the puruṣa, for, on account of the momentum of past habits, its work continues for some little time⁸; only the body is no more an obstacle to it. By virtue of the force of prārabdhakarma, the body continues, though no fresh karma is accumulated. Though the jīvanmukta has no aviveka, yet his past saṁskāras compel him to possess a body.⁹ Release from bondage and continuance of body are compatible with each other, since they are determined by different causes. At death the jīvanmukta attains complete liberation, or disembodied isolation (videhakaivalya).¹⁰ The jīvanmuktas teach us about the nature of freedom and the means of attaining it.¹¹

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⁸ S.K., 67.

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⁹ S.P.S., iii. 82-83.

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¹⁰ Chān. Up., viii. 12. 1.

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¹¹ iii. 79.

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If the play of prakṛti ceases, the puruṣa is no more the spectator, since there is nothing to see; yet it is said that the freed soul has knowledge of the whole universe.¹² We do not know whether the released souls hold social intercourse among themselves. The goal seems to be an extinction of individuality, and not an enhancement of personality. The highest state of isolation from prakṛti and other souls is one of passivity, which no breath of emotion or stir of action disturbs. It is likely to be confused with a state of unconscious existence. Praśastapāda objects to the Sāṃkhya theory of freedom, on the ground that prakṛti, which is by its very nature active, cannot rest idle. If prakṛti is unintelligent, how can it know whether the puruṣa has perceived the truth or not?¹ If, according to the Sāṃkhya, there is only disappearance and not destruction of things, there is no possibility of a complete destruction of ignorance, passion, etc.; in other words, there is every chance that they may burst out again in the released soul.²

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¹² S.P.S., Vṛtti, vi. 59.

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¹ ' In fact, we find that even when it has duly brought about a certain perception of sound, for instance, it still goes on functioning towards the same perception; and in the same way, even after it will have brought about discriminative knowledge, it would go on with its functioning towards the same end, as its active nature will not have been set aside (by the said knowledge) " (P.P., p. 7).

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² Udayana's Pariśuddhi, ii. 2. 13; Śastradīpikā, p. 323.

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FUTURE LIFE

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The Sāṃkhya guarantees the endless existence of the soul in both directions. If the soul does not exist from all eternity, then there is no reason why it should exist to all eternity. The soul is not, therefore, created. The more we recognise the eternity of souls the less need do we find for a creator God.³ According to the Sāṃkhya, the failure to discriminate between puruṣa and prakṛti is the cause of saṃsāra. This non-discrimination leaves an impression on the internal organ which produces in the next birth the same fatal defect. The liṅgadeha, or subtle body, which migrates from one gross body to another in successive births, is composed of buddhi, ahaṃkāra and manas, the five organs of perception and the five of action, the five tanmātras as well as the rudiments of the gross elements, which serve as the seed whence the physical body grows. These subtle portions of the gross elements are as necessary to the psychic apparatus as the canvas to a picture.¹ This subtle body, incorporeal in character, receives the impressions made by deeds performed in the course of its various migrations. The form of the new embodiment is determined by it. It is the real seat of pleasure and pain.² The liṅga, though distinct from puruṣa, constitutes the character and essential being of the person. In it are contained the saṃskāras or predispositions. The liṅga is compared to an actor who plays various parts. It has this power, because it shares in the property of all-pervadingness which belongs to prakṛti. The conjunction of puruṣa with the liṅga is the cause, as well as the symptom, of misery, and persists until the attainment of true insight. While the subtle bodies are continuant, those produced from father and mother perish at death.³ The union of the liṅga with the gross body constitutes birth, and its separation from it death. Except in the case of those who have attained freedom, the existence and rebirth of liṅga last for a whole world-period, at the end of which come quiescence and equilibrium. But, when creation is renewed, it starts out again on its career.

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³ Some thinkers like McTaggart argue for a non-omnipotent and non-creative God.

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¹ S.K., 41. We cannot therefore say that mere buddhi, ahaṃkāra, manas will do, since these require the support of a subtle body. Some construe this passage as demanding the existence of a gross body, but this interpretation is not satisfactory in view of the obvious fact that during the transition from one life to another the subtle body subsists without the gross. Vijñānabhikṣu suggests that there is a third kind of body called adhiṣṭhānaśarīra formed of a finer form of the gross elements and serving as the receptacle of the subtle body (S.P.B., iii. 12).

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² S.P.S., iii. 8.

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³ S.K., 39.

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The investiture in successive frames is determined by the dispositions (bhāvas), which are the results of acts which are impossible without bodies subtle and gross.⁴ This mutual dependence, like that of seed and sprout, is beginningless, and need not be regarded as a defect.⁵ The evolution of buddhi, ahaṃkāra, the subtle body and the gross body, is a physical process, and the result is also a physical one, though some of these products are of so fine a structure that they cannot be perceived by the ordinary senses. The physical organisation becomes a living being, a god, man or animal, when it is connected with a puruṣa.

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⁴ S.K., 52. While Vācaspati and Nārāyaṇa interpret the relation of liṅga and bhāva as one of experiencing and the objects experienced, Vijñānabhikṣu takes it to refer to the relation of intellect and its conditions.

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⁵ Thus there are three kinds of creation : corporeal creation (bhautikasarga), consisting of souls with gross bodies, comprising eight orders of superior beings and five of inferior, which, together with the human kind, which forms a class apart, constitute the fourteen orders of being distributed in the three worlds, the creation of the subtle bodies (tanmātrasarga), and

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Dharma and adharma are the products of prakṛti and attributes of the inner organ,¹ which help the formation of particular bodies and senses suited to the living beings, according to their place in the scale of development. The law of karma operates through the bhāvas or dispositions of buddhi.² Each soul is relative to its organism, and, according to its merit, can pass through all the grades of being from the lowest to the highest,³ which are fourteen in number. We may get a bodily organism where our life is confined to the obscure sensations, and instincts of the animal or the unconscious movements of the plants. The plant world is also a field of experience.⁴ All these products of prakṛti can only stunt, but not kill, the puruṣa within.

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¹ S.P.S., v. 25; S.K., 43.

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² S.K., 40, 43, 55; B.G., vii. 12; x. 4. 5. For the three kinds of bodies, see v. 124.

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³ S.K., 44.

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⁴ S.P.S., v. 12.

Cites (16)