Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s32: XIX Is Sāṁkhya Atheistic?

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s32

Language: English

XIX Is Sāṁkhya Atheistic?

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We have seen how the elements of the Sāṃkhya were subordinated in the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā to an idealistic theism. While the Epic philosophy borrowed the cosmogony and the theory of the absolute passivity of puruṣa from the Sāṃkhya, it did not regard puruṣa and prakṛti as self-sufficient realities, but represented them as modes of one ultimate Brahman. In its classical form, however, the Sāṃkhya does not uphold theism. In its indifference to the supremacy of an absolute spirit, as well as in its doctrine

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intellectual creation (pratyayasarga or bhāvasarga), consisting of the affections of intellect, its sentiments and faculties classified into four groups according as they obstruct, disable, satisfy and perfect the understanding (S.K., 53; S.P.S., iii. 46).

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of the relation of avidyā and the soul's entanglement in saṃsāra, the Sāṃkhya reminds us of Buddhism. It may well be that the attempt of the Sāṃkhya in its systematic form was to declare that a strict adoption of the rationalistic method did not lead us to the repudiation of the reality of selves.

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The difficulties of creation are noticed. All actions are motivated by self-interest or benevolence. God, who has all his interests fulfilled, can have no more selfish interests. If God is affected by selfish motives or desires, then he is not free; if he is free, then he would not involve himself in the act of creation.¹ To say that God is neither free nor fettered is to remove all basis for argument. The creation of the world cannot be regarded as an act of kindness, since the souls, prior to creation, have no pain from which they require to be released. If God were moved by goodwill, he would have created only happy creatures. If it is said that differences of conduct require God to deal with men in accordance with these differences, the answer is that the law of karma is the operative principle and the aid of God is unnecessary.² Again, material things cannot issue from an immaterial spirit. The eternal existence of the puruṣas is inconsistent with the infinity and creatorship of God. Theism seems to weaken belief in immortality, for if we have a creator of souls, then souls have a beginning and need not be immortal. The Sāṃkhya, which is anxious to abide within the strict limits of knowledge, holds that the reality of God cannot be established by logical proofs.³ There is no sensible evidence or inferential knowledge or scriptural testimony of Īśvara. The Sāṃkhya is not atheistic in the sense that it establishes that there is no God. It only shows that there is no reason for supposing there is one.⁴ The passages which are apparently theistic in the scriptures are really eulogies of freed souls.⁵

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¹ S.P.S., i. 93-94.

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² S.P.S., v. 1. See Tattvakaumudī, p. 57.

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³ S.P.S., v. 12. Cp. Darwin: "The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us, and I for one must be content to remain an agnostic" (Life and Letters of Charles Darwin).

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⁴ It does not say Īśvarābhāvāt, but only "Īśvarāsiddheḥ."

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⁵ S.P.S., i. 95; iii. 54-6.

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The old gods of the Vedic hymns manage to live under the ægis of the rationalistic Sāṃkhya. They are, however, not eternal in nature. The Sāṃkhya accepts the theory of a Vyavasthāpaka Īśvara, who, at the time of creation, arranges the successive developments of prakṛti. Śiva, Viṣṇu, etc., are regarded as phenomenal.¹ The Sāṃkhya admits the existence of an emergent Īśvara previously absorbed in prakṛti.² The souls, who, through the practice of unattachment to mahat, etc., become absorbed in prakṛti, are said to be all-knowers and all-doers.³ These are the characteristics we generally attribute to God, but, as the Sāṃkhya holds that prakṛti is always under the rule of another,⁴ these gods are not independent.

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¹ S.P.S., iii. 57.

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² Prakṛtilinasya janyeśvarasya siddhiḥ (S.P.B., iii. 57).

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³ Sarvavit, sarvakartā (S.P.S., iii. 56).

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⁴ S.P.S. Vṛtti and S.P.B., iii. 55, and Y.S., iv. 3.

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The unconscious but immanent teleology of prakṛti, which reminds us of Leibniz’s doctrine of pre-established harmony, is a crux in the Sāṃkhya philosophy. How does it happen that the evolution of prakṛti is adapted to the needs of spirits? Prakṛti without puruṣa is helpless, nor can puruṣa gain freedom without the aid of prakṛti. It is difficult to regard the two as entirely distinct. The analogy of the lame and the blind is unsound, since both are conscious and can take counsel together. But prakṛti is not conscious.⁵ Again, in the end only the puruṣa is said to be liberated and not prakṛti. The metaphor of the magnet and the piece of iron is unavailing, since the permanence of the proximity of the puruṣa to prakṛti would involve an unceasing evolution. “The pradhāna being non-intelligent and the puruṣa indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connection of the two.”⁶ The simile of the actress, who desists from the dance after exhibiting herself to the spectators, does not seem to be rightly conceived. Puruṣa falls by error into a confusion with prakṛti, and the remedy seems to be to make the confusion worse confounded. The evil is said to be removed by a full enjoyment thereof. The puruṣa is liberated when it gets disgusted with prakṛti’s doings.

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⁵ S.B., ii. 2. 7.

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⁶ S.B., ii. 2. 7.

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The later thinkers found it impossible to account for this harmony between the needs of puruṣa and the acts of prakṛti, and so attribute the function of guiding the development of prakṛti, by removing the barriers, to God.¹ They thus improve on the original plan of the system. The Sāṁkhya requires a comprehensive life, which allots to different puruṣas their respective organisations. Vācaspati holds that the evolution of prakṛti is directed by an omniscient spirit. Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that Kapila’s denial of Īśvara is a regulative principle, which he insisted on to induce men to withdraw themselves from the excessive contemplation of an eternal god, which would impede the rise of true discriminative knowledge. He also regards atheism as an unnecessarily extravagant claim (prauḍhivāda) to show that the system does not stand in need of a theistic hypothesis. He sometimes explains the atheism of the Sāṁkhya as a concession to popular views,² and suggests also very naïvely that it is propounded with the set object of misleading evil men and preventing them from attaining true knowledge.³ He attempts to explain away the Sāṁkhya attitude to God. In several places⁴ Vijñānabhikṣu tries to reconcile the Sāṁkhya views with those of the Vedānta.⁵ He admits the reality of a universal puruṣa. “He, the supreme, *i.e.* the generic universal, collective puruṣa, possesses the power of knowing all and doing all, being like the lodestone, the mover to activity by means of mere proximity.”⁶ The Sāṁkhya, however, overlooks the fundamental problem of metaphysics by not being sufficiently thorough. It has had a misleading idea that the inquiry was irrelevant for its purpose.

Cites (3)

Sāṃkhyasūtra — Kapila, Sanskrit
Yogasūtra — Patañjali (author of the Yogasūtra), Sanskrit
Sāṃkhyakārikā — Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Sanskrit