Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s33.4

Language: English

v2.c24.s33.4.1

The Sāṁkhya arguments for the existence of the puruṣa turn out to be proofs for the existence of the empirical individuals and not transcendental subjects. This fact comes out more clearly in the Sāṁkhya theory of the plurality of puruṣas. The chief argument for the plurality of puruṣas is that, if there were only one puruṣa, when its buddhi returns from its delusion the cosmic process would cease. But nothing of the kind happens. The cosmic play continues for the infinite number of bound souls, even when a few are released. The argument that if the puruṣas were not many but only one, then all individual souls existing in bodies would have to die at the same time and be born at the same time, assumes that birth and death apply to the eternal puruṣa, which is not allowed by the Sāṁkhya system. We can only infer that the embodied souls are many and different, since they do not rise or die together. If one man sees a particular object, others do not see it at the same time, simply because each jīva has its own separate organism and interests.¹ There does not seem to be any need to pass from the manyness of empirical souls, which all philosophers admit, to the manyness of eternal selves which the Sāṁkhya upholds. The Sāṁkhya puruṣa is altogether distinct from prakṛti. We cannot ascribe to it any features such as personality or creative force. All definite characterisation of puruṣas is due to confusion.

v2.c24.s33.4.2

The self is without attributes or qualities, without parts, imperishable, motionless, absolutely inactive and impassive, unaffected by pleasure or pain or any other emotion. All change, all character belong to prakṛti. There does not seem to be any basis for the attribution of distinctness to puruṣas. If each puruṣa has the same features of consciousness, all-pervadingness, if there is not the slightest difference between one puruṣa and another, since they are free from all variety, then there is nothing to lead us to assume a plurality of puruṣas. Multiplicity without distinction is impossible. That is why even the Sāṃkhya commentators like Gauḍapāda are inclined to the theory of one puruṣa.¹ That there must be an enjoyer of things shows that there is an enjoying soul and not a passive puruṣa. The separate allotments of form, birth, death, abode and fortune lead only to the empirical multiplicity of jīvas. From the different conditions of the three modes we cannot infer a radical pluralism, since they are only the modifications of prakṛti. The Sāṃkhya view of prakṛti as moving for the sake of the enjoyment and release of puruṣas, it is said, requires that there should be many puruṣas. If there were only one puruṣa there would be only one buddhi. But let us remember that the pure puruṣa is immortal and indifferent and has no longing for anything. The play of prakṛti is not for the sake of the ever-free puruṣas, but only for the sake of the reflected egos.

v2.c24.s33.4.3

There is no dispute about the manyness of the latter. Superintendence and yearning for release hold good of selves which suffer from want of discrimination. The different arguments prove the plurality of actual souls in relation to prakṛti and not of the puruṣa we reach by way of abstraction. Plurality would involve limitations, and an absolute immortal, eternal and unconditioned puruṣa cannot be more than one. If the being of puruṣa were necessary for the play of prakṛti, one puruṣa will do.² Apparently, the Sāṃkhya is compelled to concede the reality of puruṣa on account of its explanatory value. Every conscious state belongs to a conscious individual. We have never a feeling but that of the self feeling in a certain way. But how can we distinguish the self of puruṣa from its experiences? While we cannot describe mental facts without assuming a mental subject, we cannot describe them adequately if we make the subject an empty focus of an immaterial substance or an unchanging principle of universality utterly unrelated to the particular facts which it is said to relate. To explain the coherence of our conscious experiences by the presence of puruṣa is to restate the characteristic nature of the fact and hypostatise it as a causal prius of its own existence. Puruṣa is not a sort of supernatural hold-all to take in all conscious experiences. Throughout the Sāṁkhya there is a confusion between the puruṣa and the jīva.

v2.c24.s33.4.4

If puruṣa is eternally unchanging, inactive and isolated, then it cannot be the cogniser or the enjoyer subject to error resting on superposition.¹ But these qualities cannot belong to prakṛti, since they are attributes of intelligent beings. Superposition (adhyāsa) means the attribution by an intelligent being of the qualities of one object to another. So the conception of jīva is developed. Jīvas exist as individuals, but we cannot conclude that puruṣas have a separate existence of their own in another world beyond space and time. Puruṣa is the perfect spirit, not to be confused with the particular human spirit. The puruṣa is certainly in me, this individual me, as my very core and substance; and the jīva, or the individual, with all his irrational caprices and selfish aims, is but a distortion of puruṣa. To say that every jīva is striving to realise its puruṣa means that every jīva is potentially puruṣa, every man is potentially divine.