Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s35: II Antecedents

Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s35

Language
English

Contents

II Antecedents

v2.c24.s35.2

That we can secure many physical and mental powers which are not found in ordinary men, by means of discipline, that restraint of bodily and mental activities helps us to gain release from suffering, is an old view in India. Crude conceptions of the value of ecstasy and hypnotic trance are to be met with in the Ṛg-Veda, which also mentions the word "muni."¹ According to it, the meditation on the divine light is a sacred act of devotion.² In the *Atharva Veda* the idea is very common that supernatural powers can be obtained through the practice of austerities.³ Soon the conception of *tapas* appears, giving a more ethical character to the discipline. One has to give up all worldly enjoyments to fix one's mind on the eternal. The *Upaniṣads* assume the Yoga practice in the sense of a conscious inward search or striving after a true knowledge of reality. Meditation and concentration are insisted on,⁴ since a direct knowledge of the self as subject is not possible. The *Upaniṣads* regard *tapas* and *brahmacarya* as virtues productive of great power.⁵ Those *Upaniṣads* which speak of the *Sāṃkhya* theories refer to the Yoga practices as well. The *Kaṭha*, the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Maitrāyaṇī* refer to the practical side of religious realisation, as distinct from the theoretical investigation of the *Sāṃkhya*. Yoga, as a technical term, occurs in the *Kaṭha*, the *Taittirīya*, the *Maitrāyaṇī*⁶ *Upaniṣads*, but it cannot be said that the Yoga mentioned in them is identical with the Yoga of Patañjali. The idea of *samādhi* may have developed out of the *Upaniṣad* doctrine that compares the realisation of the Absolute or freedom from the things of empirical life to the deep dreamless sleep. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* speaks of the highest condition of Yoga as a state in which the senses, with mind and intellect, are brought to a standstill.⁷ Not unnaturally, there were people who tried to induce artificially such states of trance. The *Maitrī Upaniṣad* speaks of a sixfold Yoga, and mentions the technical terms of Patañjali's system.⁸ Apparently the Yoga of Patañjali was not perfected at the time of the early *Upaniṣads*, though we see its gradual growth in the later ones.

v2.c24.s35.3

¹ x.

v2.c24.s35.4

Buddha practised Yoga in both its senses. He underwent ascetic austerities and practised the highest contemplation. According to *Lalitavistara*, numberless forms of ascetic austerities were in vogue in Buddha's time.⁹ Some of the teachers of Buddha, like Ālāra, were adepts in Yoga. The Buddhist *Suttas* are familiar with the Yoga methods of concentration. The four states of *dhyāna* of Buddhism correspond roughly to the four stages of conscious concentration in the classical Yoga.¹⁰ According to Buddhism, the possession of the five qualities of faith, energy, thought, concentration and wisdom, enables one to attain the end of Yoga¹¹; and the Yoga accepts this view.¹ The Yogācāra school of Buddhism openly combines Buddhist doctrine with the Yoga details. The later Buddhistic works assume a developed Yoga technique.²

v2.c24.s35.5

¹³⁶ See I.P., p. 111. ² The Gāyatrī is mentioned in the R.V., iii. 3. 9, 10. See also Śukla Yajur Veda, iii. 35; Sāma Veda, ii. 8. 12. ³ I.P., p. 121. ⁴ Bṛh. Up., iv. 14; iii. 5; iv. 4; Tait., i; Kaṭha, iii. 12; Praśna, v. 5. ⁵ Chān. Up., iii. 17. 4; Bṛh., i. 2. 6; iii. 8. 10; Tait., i. 9. 1; iii. 2. 1; iii. 3. 1; Tait. Brāh., ii. 2. 3. 3; Śat. Brāh., xi. 5. 8. 1. ⁶ vi. 10. ⁷ See also Chān., vi. 8. 6. ⁸ vi. 18. ⁹ I.P., p. 355, n. 3. ¹⁰ Y.S., i.

v2.c24.s35.6

¹⁷ See I.P., p. 426. ¹¹ Majjhima Nikāya, i. 164

v2.c24.s35.7

¹ Y.S., i. 33.

v2.c24.s35.8

² For a detailed account, see Hopkins : Yoga Technique in the Great Epic, J.A.O.S., xxii.

v2.c24.s35.9

In the *Mahābhārata*, the Sāmkhya and the Yoga are used as complementary aspects of one whole, signifying theory and practice, philosophy and religion. It is said that the Yoga admits a twenty-sixth principle of God. Besides, salvation, which was originally looked upon as identification with the Absolute, becomes isolation of spirit from prakṛti, when the Absolute ceased to be the all-comprehensive being from which the individual souls sprang and became the Īśvara, or helper. There are references to dhāraṇa, prāṇāyāma in the *Mahābhārata*.³ Many of the ascetics of the Epic resort to Yoga as a means to the attainment of magical powers,⁴ which are frequently mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*.⁵

v2.c24.s35.10

³ xii. 11683-4.

v2.c24.s35.11

⁴ xii. 326. 8.

v2.c24.s35.12

⁵ xii. 340-55; xii. 303. 163; xiii. 14. 420.

v2.c24.s35.13

The Upaniṣads, the *Mahābhārata*, including the *Bhagavadgītā*, Jainism and Buddhism accept Yogic practices. The Yoga doctrine is said to be as old as Brahmā. Patañjali’s Yoga is the crystallisation of ideas on asceticism and contemplation extant at his time in a more or less hazy and undefined way. He codified the nebulous tradition evolved under the pressure of life and experience. His system bears the marks of the age in which it was produced. While we have in it the most refined mysticism, we have also mixed with it many beliefs derived from the prevailing religions of the time.

v2.c24.s35.14

Vātsyāyana refers to an earlier form of Yoga which held the doctrine of the creation of the world by the karma of the spirit, which is also responsible for the evils of love and hatred and the impulse for activity and the coming into being of the non-existent and the passing away of the existent.⁶ This Yoga insists on the importance of human activity, and is more closely related to the Karma Mīmāmsā than to the Sāmkhya, which adopts the satkāryavāda, the ultimateness of soul and the rise of conscious occurrences on account of connection with the body, the senses, mind and material qualities. So, according to Vātsyāyana, there are sharp differences between the Sāmkhya and the Yoga even on such fundamental questions as the nature of the soul, activity and causation. When insistence on activity is attached to the Sāmkhya philosophy, we get the classical type of Yoga.

v2.c24.s35.15

⁶ Puruṣakarmanimitto bhūtasargaḥ, karmahetavo doṣāḥ pravṛttiś ca, svaguṇaviśiṣṭāś cetanā, asad utpadyata utpannaṃ nirudhyata ity yogānām (N.B., i. 1. 29). Uddyotakara adds that, according to this Yoga, the organs of senses were made of elements (bhūtas).

v2.c24.s35.16

DATE AND LITERATURE

v2.c24.s35.17

The Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali is the oldest textbook of the Yoga school. It has four parts, of which the first treats of the nature and aim of samādhi, or meditative absorption (samādhipāda), the second explains the means of attaining this end (sādhanapāda), the third gives an account of the supernormal powers that can be attained through the Yoga practices (vibhūtipāda), and the fourth sets forth the nature of liberation (kaivalyapāda).¹ According to Yājñavalkya Smṛti, Hiraṇyagarbha is the founder of the Yoga system, and Mādhava points out that this does not contradict Patañjali’s authorship of the Yoga Sūtra, since Patañjali calls his work “Anuśāsana,” where the preposition “anu” implies that his statement follows a primary revelation, and is not itself the first formulation of the system.² Patañjali, the grammarian, is assigned to the middle of the second century B.C.,³ though his identity with the author of the Yoga Sūtra is not proved.⁴ Vyāsa’s commentary on the Yoga Sūtra (fourth century A.D.) gives the standard exposition of the Yoga principles. Vācaspati wrote a glossary on Vyāsa's Bhāṣya called Tattvavaiśāradī (ninth century). Bhoja's Rājamārtaṇḍa is a work of considerable value. Vijñānabhikṣu's Yogavārttika and Yogasārasaṃgraha are useful manuals. The author criticises Vācaspati's views on some points and attempts to bring the Yoga system nearer the philosophy of the Upaniṣads.¹ Every system of thought utilises the methods of Yoga in its own interests. Some of the later Upaniṣads, such as Maitrī, Śāṇḍilya, Yogatattva, Dhyānabindu, Haṃsa, Varāha, and Nādabindu, attach great importance to the principles of the Yoga.

v2.c24.s35.18

¹ Since the criticisms of the other schools occur in the fourth part of the Y.S., and since the word “iti,” denoting the conclusion of a work, occurs at the end of the third, it is suggested that the fourth part is a later addition. See Das Gupta: Hist. of Ind. Ph., p. 230.

v2.c24.s35.19

² S.D.S., xv.

v2.c24.s35.20

³ Patañjali’s Y.S. is assigned to the second century B.C., though some are of opinion that it is so late as the fourth century A.D. The atomic theory (i. 40), the Sautrāntika theory of time as a series of moments (iii. 52), the sphoṭavāda (see Y.B., iii. 17), the Buddhist idealism (iv. 15-17) are referred to in the Y.S. Assuming that Vasubandhu’s idealism is criticised in the V.S., Professor Woods puts the earlier limit of the Y.S. at the fourth century A.D. His opinion seems to be supported by the fact that Nāgārjuna does not mention the Yoga in his Kārikā. This argument does not take us far, in view of the admitted fact that the Chinese translation of Nāgārjuna’s Upāyakauśalyahṛdayaśāstra mentions the Yoga as one of the eight schools of philosophy, and Buddhist idealism may be regarded as earlier than Vasubandhu and Asaṅga. Jacobi thinks that the Yoga system was in existence as early as 300 B.C. Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha Sūtra, ii. 52, refers to the Y.S., iii. 22. Umāsvāti, who must precede his commentator Siddhasena (fifth century) is generally assigned to the third century A.D. So Patañjali cannot be later than A.D. 300.

v2.c24.s35.21

⁴ Bhoja, in his commentary on the Y.S., called Rājamārtaṇḍa (Introduction, p. 5), says that he wrote works on grammar, Yoga and medicine, and so, “like Patañjali, removed the defilements from our speech, minds and bodies.” He thereby suggests that Patañjali wrote works on grammar (speech), Yoga (mind), and medicine (body). This is the earliest reference. It is, however, open to doubt whether Bhoja wrote the Introduction. Woods, in his Introduction to the Yoga System (Harvard Oriental Series), makes out a case against the identification of the grammarian Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, with Patañjali, the author of the Y.S. There are no special coincidences in language or doctrine between the two works. The great grammarians, Bhartṛhari, Kaiyaṭa, Vāmana and Nāgeśa, do not refer to the identity of the author of the Y.S. with the grammarian.

v2.c24.s35.22

¹ The other works on the Yoga systems, such as those of Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, Nārāyaṇabhikṣu and Mahādeva, modify Patañjali's views so as to suit their own preconceptions.

v2.c24.s35.23

THE SĀMKHYA AND THE YOGA

v2.c24.s35.24

Patañjali systematised the conceptions of the Yoga and set them forth on the background of the metaphysics of the Sāṃkhya, which he assumes with slight variations. In the early works the Yoga principles appear along with the Sāṃkhya ideas.² The twenty-five principles are accepted by the Yoga, which does not care to argue about them. The universe is uncreated and eternal. It undergoes changes. In its noumenal state it is called prakṛti, which is associated with the guṇas, and is always the same. There are countless individual souls which animate living beings and are by nature pure, eternal and immutable. But, through the association with the universe, they become indirectly the experiencers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable embodied forms in the course of saṃsāra. Regarding the development of prakṛti, the Yoga holds that there are two parallel lines of evolution, starting from mahat, which, on the one side, develops into ahaṃkāra, manas, the five senses of cognition and the five of action, and, on the other, develops into the five gross elements through the five tanmātras. According to Vyāsa, the gross elements are derived from the five essences, and the eleven senses from ahaṃkāra or asmitā. The tanmātras are not derived from the latter, but they, together with asmitā, are said to be the six slightly specialised ones (aviśeṣa) due to mahat. Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that Vyāsa is simply describing the modifications of buddhi in two classes, but does not mean to suggest that the rise of tanmātras from mahat is independent of ahaṃkāra.¹ In the Sāṃkhya, ahaṃkāra, as sāttvikā, gives rise to the senses, and, as tāmasa, to the tanmātras, and both these are held up in the mahat; and so this distinction between the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga accounts of evolution is not a serious one. We find that the Yoga brings the three internal organs of the Sāṃkhya under citta. It does not recognise ahaṃkāra and manas as separate from buddhi. It also looks upon the sense-organs as material in character, and so finds no need for a subtle body.

v2.c24.s35.25

² See Kaṭha Up. Vyāsa's commentary on the Y.S. is called Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, which brings out the intimate relation between the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga.

v2.c24.s35.26

¹ Yogavārttika, i. 45.

v2.c24.s35.27

Ignorance of the true nature of things causes desires and the like, which are the basis of pain and suffering in the world. The question of the origin of ignorance is meaningless in view of the beginninglessness of the world. Even in pralaya the individual cittas of puruṣas return to prakṛti and lie within it, together with their own avidyās, and at the time of each new creation or evolution of the world these are created anew, with such changes as are due to the individual avidyās. These latter manifest themselves in the cittas as the kleśas, or afflictions, which again lead to the karmāśaya, jāti, āyuṣ and bhoga. The Yoga accounts for creation by the two agencies of God and avidyā. Through the force of the latter, the ever-revolving energy of prakṛti transforms itself into modifications as the mental and the material world, while God, though remaining outside the pale of prakṛti, removes the obstructions offered by the latter. Avidyā is unintelligent and so is not conscious of the desires of the innumerable puruṣas; God is the intelligence adjusting the modifications of prakṛti to the ends of puruṣas. The jīva is found to be involved in matter, and this constitutes his fall from his purity and innocence. The individual, in the Yoga, is not so much at the mercy of prakṛti as in the Sāṃkhya. He has greater freedom, and, with the help of God, he can effect his deliverance. As in the Sāṃkhya, so in the Yoga, the round of rebirths, with its many pains, is that which is to be escaped.

v2.c24.s35.28

from; the conjunction of pradhāna and self is the cause of this saṃsāra; the destruction of this conjunction is the escape, and perfect insight is the means of escape.¹ The self is the seer and pradhāna is the object of knowledge,² and their conjunction is the cause of saṃsāra.

v2.c24.s35.29

The end of liberation is the isolation of puruṣa from prakṛti, to be attained by a discrimination between the two. While the Sāṃkhya holds that knowledge is the means of liberation, the Yoga insists on the methods of concentration and active striving.³ As we have seen, in the Bhagavadgītā, as in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, Sāṃkhya is the way of salvation by knowledge, while Yoga is that of active striving or dutiful action in a spirit of disinterestedness.⁴ So while the Sāṃkhya is busy with logical investigations, the Yoga discusses the nature of devotional exercises and mental discipline. Hence the latter was obliged to introduce the conception of God, thus meriting the title of Seśvara Sāṃkhya as distinct from Kapila’s Nirīśvara Sāṃkhya. The aim of the Yoga is to free the individual from the clutches of matter. The highest form of matter is citta, and the Yoga lays down the course by which a man can free himself from the fetters of citta. By withdrawing the citta from its natural functions, we overcome the pain of the world and escape from saṃsāra.

v2.c24.s35.30

¹ Duḥkhabahulaḥ saṃsāro heyaḥ, pradhānapuruṣayoḥ saṃyogo heyahetuḥ. Saṃyogasyātyantikī nivṛttir hānaṃ hānopāyaḥ samyagdarśanam (Y.B., ii. 15). ² ii. 18. ³ Madhusūdana Sarasvatī speaks of jñāna and Yoga as two different methods for attaining liberation, and quotes from Yogavāśiṣṭha in his commentary on B.G., vi. 29: “To suppress mind with its egoism, etc., yoga and jñāna are the two means. Yoga is the suppression of mental activity; jñāna is true comprehension. For some yoga is not possible; for some jñāna is not possible.”

v2.c24.s35.31

Dvau kramau cittanāśasya yogo jñānaṃ ca rāghava
Yogo vṛttinirodho hi jñānaṃ samyagavekṣaṇam
Asādhyaḥ kasyacid yogaḥ kasyacit tattvaniścayaḥ.

v2.c24.s35.32

Cp. Bhāgavata: Nirvāṇānāṃ jñānayogo nyāsinām iha karmasu (B.G., v. 5; Yogasārasaṃgraha, i. 7). It all depends on the psychological type to which we belong. Perhaps an introvert will take to the Yoga, while an extrovert will turn rather to the Sāṃkhya. ⁴ B.G., xiii. 24. See also M.B., xii. 11679–11707. See also S.S.S., x. 4–6, where mere knowledge is declared to be inadequate according to the Yoga system.

v2.c24.s35.33.1

What the Sāṃkhya calls "mahat" the Yoga calls "citta."[¹] It is the first product of prakṛti, though it is taken in a comprehensive sense, so as to include intellect, self-consciousness and mind.[²] It is subject to the three guṇas, and undergoes various modifications according to the predominance of the guṇas. It is essentially unconscious, though it becomes conscious by the reflection of the self which abides by it. It undergoes modifications when it is affected by the objects through the senses. The consciousness of puruṣa reflected in it leads to the impression that it is the experiencer. Citta is really the spectacle of which the self is by reflection the spectator. Citta, as cause, is all-pervading like ākāśa, and we have as many cittas as there are puruṣas, since each puruṣa has a citta connected with it. The citta contracts or expands in the various kinds of abodes in the successive lives. It appears contracted when the puruṣa assumes an animal body and expanded relatively when it assumes a human body. This contracted or expanded citta is called kāryacitta, which manifests itself in the states of consciousness. At death the kāraṇacitta, always connected with the puruṣas, manifests itself as kāryacitta in the new body formed by the apūra, or the filling in of prakṛti, on account of past merit or demerit.

v2.c24.s35.33.2

The Yoga does not admit a separate subtle body in which the citta is encased.[³] While kāraṇacitta always remains vibhu or all-pervading, the kāryacitta appears contracted or expanded according to the body which it occupies.[⁴] It is the aim of the Yoga discipline to turn back the citta to its original status of all-pervading kāraṇacitta, by the suppression of rajas and tamas. The Yogin acquires omniscience when the all-pervading state of citta is restored. When it becomes as pure as the puruṣa itself, the latter is liberated. It is by means of citta that the self (puruṣa) becomes aware of objects and enters into relation with the world.¹ Citta exists for the sake of the puruṣa, who is deeper than thought, feeling and will.² In knowledge the nature of puruṣa or self is not altered, though it is said to be the seat of knowledge.³ Knowledge results when the intelligence (caitanya) is reflected in the mirror of the thinking substance (citta), and assumes its form in so far as the latter has the form of the object. Citta may undergo modifications and assume the form of the objects presented to it; but it cannot perceive what it sees, since it is unconscious in its nature.⁴ It is the reflection of the self acting on it that makes it perceive what is presented to it. In the case of all objective knowledge, the citta is affected by the subject as well as the object. Even though citta is ever changing, our knowledge is constant, since the self, which is the real knower, is constant.

v2.c24.s35.33.3

Again, since citta can undergo only one modification at a time, the self knows only one object at a time. So we cannot have a cognition of the citta as well as the object at the same time.⁵ The objects perceived are independent of our perception. What causes the knowledge of a thing does not cause the thing itself.⁶ Two different ideas cannot arise simultaneously.⁷ Impressions produced in the citta leave behind certain residua which are the causes of interests and desires, new births and further experiences. The functionings of citta produce potencies, which, in their turn, cause potencies; and so the wheel of saṃsāra goes on perpetually.⁸ From these relations passions and desires arise, and the sense of personality is produced. Life in saṃsāra is the outcome of desires and passions. The subject is distinguished from the ego dependent on the experience of the world. The life of the ego is restless and unsatisfied, subject as it is to the five afflictions of avidyā, or mistaking the non-eternal for the eternal, the impure for the pure, the unpleasant for the pleasant, and the non-self for the self,¹ asmitā, or the erroneous identification of oneself with the instruments of body and mind,² rāga, or attachment to pleasant things, dveṣa, or hatred of unpleasant things, and abhiniveśa, or the instinctive love of life and the dread of death.³ Deliverance consists in severing the relation of self and citta.

v2.c24.s35.33.4

When the self is freed from citta, it withdraws itself into its ground, becomes passionless, purposeless and depersonalised. The puruṣa in its true nature is merely the spectator of the mind's activity. When the mind (citta) is active, the self appears to experience various conditions, and when the mind becomes calm in meditation the self abides in its own true form.

v2.c24.s35.34

¹ Citta in the Vedānta is used as a synonym for buddhi or its modification. See Vedāntasāra.

v2.c24.s35.35

² Cittaśabdena antaḥkaraṇam buddhim upalakṣayati (Vācaspati).

v2.c24.s35.36

³ See Tattvavaiśāradī, iv. 10.

v2.c24.s35.37

⁴ The Sāṃkhya, however, does not regard the citta as essentially all-pervading. See Vyāsa and Vācaspati on Y.S., iv. 10. Cp. Nāgeśa: Sāṃkhyāḥ pratipuruṣam sarvaśarīrasādhāraṇam ekaikam eva cittam. Kiṃ tu ghaṭaprasādarūpam, svalpamahadāśrayabhedena, pradīpavat svalpamahatśarīrabhedena, saṃkocavikāsacālitayā svalpamahatparimāṇam ca, na tu vibhuḥ iv. 10).

v2.c24.s35.38

¹ i. 2; ii. 6, 17 and 20.

v2.c24.s35.39

² Citta is not in connection with the self, but is only near it. This nearness does not result from a spatial or temporal correlation of the self with it. The distinguishing feature is that the self stands to citta in a condition of natural harmony (Yogyatā). The self can experience and the citta can be experienced. Citta is described as an object of experience when it undergoes changes which have the forms of various kinds of things (Vācaspati, i. 4).

v2.c24.s35.40

³ ii. 20.

v2.c24.s35.41

⁴ iv. 17-19.

v2.c24.s35.42

⁵ iv. 20.

v2.c24.s35.43

⁶ iv. 16.

v2.c24.s35.44

⁷ iv. 19.

v2.c24.s35.45

⁸ Evam vṛttisaṃskāracakram aniśam āvartate (Y.B., i. 5).

v2.c24.s35.46

¹ ii. 5. Avidyā is not merely the non-perception (akhyāti) of the difference between puruṣa and buddhi, but a false perception (anyathā-khyāti), by which we mistake buddhi for self and regard it as pure and permanent and a source of pleasure. Avidyā is the root of the unbroken series (santāna), of hindrances (kleśa), and of latent impressions of karma (karmāśaya), together with its fruition (Y.B., ii. 5).

v2.c24.s35.47

² ii. 6.

v2.c24.s35.48

³ ii. 7-9

v2.c24.s35.49

While the Yoga allows for the Sāṃkhya theory of liberation through discrimination, the main emphasis is on the other means of achieving freedom, the suppression of mental activities. The suppression of mental activities is not to be identified with the state of deep sleep. By yoga or concentration, we exclude the superficial layers and get at the inner spirit. Concentration is a quality of the citta in all its five stages.⁴ The citta is called kṣipta, or restless, when it has an excess of rajas and is tossed about by objects. We might fix our attention on objects due to our passions and interests, but this kind of concentration does not help us to our real freedom. It is mūḍha, or blinded, when it has an excess of tamas and is possessed by the modification of sleep. It is vikṣipta, or distracted, when, as more often, it is unstable on account of natural defects or accidental troubles. The ordinary mind is in this condition pursuing the pleasant and avoiding the unpleasant. These three are said to be imperfect, since they are associated with the three guṇas. The mind is said to be ekāgra or single-pointed, when it is devoted to one object of meditation and is entirely filled with sattva. This prepares the mind for its greatest efforts. It is niruddha or restricted, when its developments are checked. Though their latent impressions remain,¹ the flow of mental modifications is arrested. The Yoga psychologists admit that concentration is a general characteristic of all states of mind, though it is found in its intensest form in the state of samādhi. Every mental modification (vṛtti) leaves behind a saṃskāra, or latent tendency, which may manifest itself as a conscious state when the occasion arises. Similar vṛttis strengthen similar dispositions. The Yogi should not only arrest the modifications but also destroy the dispositions, otherwise they may shoot forth again. When the mind is rid of its modifications, it is said to be in a balanced state (samāpatti), and to assume the form of whatever object is presented to it, the knower, the known or the act of knowledge.² It assumes the nature of the object as it is in itself.

v2.c24.s35.50

⁴ Sa ca sārvabhaumaś cittasya dharmaḥ (Y.B., i. 1).

v2.c24.s35.51

¹ These two correspond to the saṃprajñāta and asaṃprajñāta samādhi. The first three are also brought under Yoga, since concentration in some degree is present even in the waking state. Yatkiṃcic cittavṛttinirodham (Yogasārasaṃgraha, v).

v2.c24.s35.52

² i. 41.

v2.c24.s35.53

There are lower forms of this balanced state. In savitarkasamāpatti, or the balanced state with deliberation, words, objects and meanings (śabdārthajñāna) are mixed up.³ When words and meanings drop out, i.e. when the memory is rid of them, then the object makes its appearance in the mind in its own distinct nature, and we have nirvitarkasamāpatti, or non-deliberative balanced state.⁴ Vyāsa says: "When the memory is purified from the remembrances of the conventional use of words, and when the concentrated insight (samādhiprajñā) is free from relations (vikalpa) of ideas of inference or of what has been heard, the intended object remains as it is in itself and nothing more, and is specifically characterised as having just that form which it has in itself and as nothing more."⁵ This is higher perception (param pratyakṣam) and the basis of all inferential and verbal knowledge. From it these have their being.⁶ This knowledge is not accompanied by an idea either of inference or of verbal knowledge.⁷

v2.c24.s35.54

³ i. 42.

v2.c24.s35.55

⁴ i. 43.

v2.c24.s35.56

⁵ Y.B., i. 42.

v2.c24.s35.57

⁶ Tac ca śrutānumānayor bījam. Tataḥ śrutānumāne prabhavataḥ (Y.B., i. 42).

v2.c24.s35.58

⁷ Na ca śrutānumānajñānasahabhūtaṃ tad darśanam.

v2.c24.s35.59

We have also the reflective (savicāra) and the non-reflective balanced states. The former refers to subtle elements whose forms have been manifested and are characterised by an experience of space, time and cause. In it a subtle element capable of being apprehended by one idea and particularised by the manifested (udita) forms serves as the object of insight. The latter non-reflective samāpatti refers in all ways and by all means to the subtle elements that are free from characterisations by forms latent or manifested or indeterminable (avyapadeśya) and which yet corresponds to all forms and is the essence of them all. In the non-reflective samāpatti the insight becomes the intended object and nothing more.¹ The reflective and the non-reflective deal with subtle objects, while the deliberative and the non-deliberative deal with gross ones; and all these are said to be forms of sabīja samādhi, since they provide objects for concentration. Puruṣa, though subtle, is not the object of these forms of concentration.

v2.c24.s35.60

¹ Y.B., i. 44.

v2.c24.s35.61

Our mind is an arena of conflicting forces which require to be subdued to some unity. There are some desires that seek satisfaction, some vital urges of life, such as those of self-preservation and self-reproduction, which refuse to be easily controlled. The obstacles to concentration are said to be the different forms of misconception,² namely, ignorance (avidyā), egoism (asmitā), attachment (rāga), aversion (dveṣa) and clinging to life (abhiniveśa). Others are sickness, languor doubt, heedlessness, laziness, worldliness, erroneous perception, failure to attain concentration, and instability in it when attained.³ While the forms of misconception state the general attitude to life unfavourable to concentration, the other list mentions the detailed incidents which obstruct the process of concentration.

v2.c24.s35.62

² i. 30.

v2.c24.s35.63

³ Y.B., ii. 3. See also Y.B., i. 8.

Cites (20)