Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s7: XIV Tarka and Vāda
Indian Philosophy v2.c24.s7
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XIV Tarka and Vāda
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In tarka, or indirect proof, we start with a wrong assumption and show how it leads to absurdities. If the soul were not eternal, it would not be able to experience the fruits of its actions, undergo rebirth or attain release. It is therefore eternal. The admission of a false minor necessitates the admission of a false major.⁴ Tarka is a type of inference distinct from other types, since it is not based on any perception. It leads indirectly to right knowledge.⁵ Vātsyāyana thinks that it does not give us determinate knowledge, though it tells us that the opposite of a suggested premise is impossible.⁶ Uddyotakara argues that the reasoning about the soul does not enable us to say that the soul is beginningless, but only that it should be so.⁷ Tarka is not by itself a source of valid knowledge, though it is valuable as suggesting hypotheses.
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⁴ S.D.S., xi.
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⁵ Pramāṇugrāhakas tarkaḥ (S.S.S.S., vi. 25).
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⁶ N.B., i. I. 40.
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⁷ N.V., i. I. 40.
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The older Nyāya admits eleven kinds of tarka, which the modern reduces to five, of which the chief is what we have described, the reductio ad absurdum, called pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga. The other four are ātmāśraya, or ignoratio elenchi; anyonyāśraya, or mutual dependence; cakrika, or circular reasoning; and anavasthā, or infinite regress. Even the reductio ad absurdum is regarded as a case of fallacious reasoning, since it derives a conclusion which is absurd. But when we transcend the error, we arrive at definitive cognition (nirṇaya).⁸
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⁸ i. I. 41.
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Vāda, or discussion, proceeds by means of the free use of syllogisms and aims at the ascertainment of truth. But it often degenerates into mere wrangling (jalpa), which aims at effect or victory and cavil (vitaṇḍā), which delights in criticism for its own sake.¹ Such a futile discussion can be put an end to by convicting the opponent of his error and forcing him to accept defeat.²
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¹ i. 2. 1–3.
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² The points of defeat (nigrahasthāna) are of twenty-two different kinds: (1) pratijñāhāni, or surrendering the proposition to be established; (2) pratijñāntara, or shifting the argument by importing new considerations; (3) pratijñāvirodha, or self-contradiction; (4) pratijñāsamnyāsa, or disclaiming the proposition; (5) hetvantara, or shifting the reason; (6) arthāntara, or shifting the topic; (7) nirarthaka, or senseless talking; (8) avijñātārtha, or using unintelligible jargon; (9) apārthaka, or incoherent talk; (10) aprāptakāla, or overlooking the order of argumentation; (11) nyūna, or dropping essential steps of the argument; (12) adhika, or elaborating the obvious; (13) punarukta, or repeating oneself; (14) ananubhāṣaṇa, or keeping quiet; (15) ajñāna, or not understanding the proposition; (16) apratibhā, or wanting in resourceful replies; (17) vikṣepa, or evading the discussion by feigning illness, etc.; (18) matānujña, or admitting the defeat by pointing out that it is also present in the opponent's view; (19) paryanuyogyopekṣaṇa, or overlooking the censurable; (20) niranuyogyānuyoga, or censoring the non-censurable; (21) apasiddhānta, or deviating from an accepted tenet; and (22) hetvābhāsa, or semblance of a reason.
Cites (3)
- Nyāyasūtra — Akṣapāda Gautama, Sanskrit
- Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit
- Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha — Śaṅkara, Sanskrit