Indian Philosophy v2.c25.s5: XIV Ethics

Indian Philosophy v2.c25.s5

Language: English

XIV Ethics

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Dharma is the scheme of right living. Jaimini defines dharma as an ordinance or command.² Codanā, or injunction, is the lakṣaṇa or sign of dharma. It is the jurist's definition of law. According to Śabara, codanā denotes utterances which impel men to action.³ The "ought" has an external source, since duties are revealed to us by a power not ourselves. The word "codanā" has another meaning, namely, inspiration or impulsion from within. What appeals to the heart within agrees with what is commanded from without. The individual's will and the verdict of the race agree. The commentators make out that what is enjoined has the capacity to produce more pleasure than pain; so the courses of conduct prescribed lead to desirable ends. Happiness is the goal recognised by the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, though it is not happiness in this world. For the sake of happiness hereafter we have to practise self-denial here. Activities which result in loss or pain (anartha) are not dharma. Dharma is what is enjoined, and it leads to happiness.¹ If we do not observe the commands, we not only miss our happiness but become subject to suffering.

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² Codanālaḳṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ (i. 1. 2).

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³ Codaneti pravartakaśabdo nāma (Śabara on i. 1. 2).

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¹ Command corresponds to vidhi, duty to dharma, and sanction to phala.

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The ethics of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is founded on revelation.² The Vedic injunctions lay down the details of dharma. Good action, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, is what is prescribed by the Veda. The smṛti texts, according to the orthodox theory, have corresponding Vedic texts, though some of them may be lost. If the smṛtis are in conflict with the śruti, the former are to be disregarded.³ When we find that the smṛtis are laid down with a selfish interest, they must be thrown out.⁴ Next to the smṛtis is the practice of good men or custom.⁵ The duties which have no scriptural sanction are explained on principles of utility. If we perform any acts in response to natural instincts, we are not virtuous.⁶ The life of the Hindu is governed by the rules of the Vedas, so that Mīmāṃsā rules are very important for the interpretation of the Hindu law.

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² Cp. Paley's definition of Virtue as "the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness."

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³ i. 3. 3.

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⁴ i. 3. 4.

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⁵ i. 3. 8-9.

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⁶ iv. 1. 3.

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To gain salvation, we have to observe nitya karmas like sandhyā, etc., and naimittika karmas when the proper occasion arises. These are unconditional obligations. If we do not fulfil them we incur sin (pratyavāya). To gain special ends, we perform kāmya karmas. We need not perform them if we do not care for the ends. By avoiding forbidden (niṣiddha) courses of conduct we avoid hell, and if we keep clear of kāmya (optional) karmas we will free ourselves from selfish ends, and if we keep up the unconditional duties we attain salvation.

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According to Jaimini, only the three upper classes are entitled to the performance of sacrifices. He has the support of Ātreya. But even then there were thinkers like Bādari who held that all castes were equally entitled to their performance. Jaimini takes his stand on the fact that the Śūdras cannot study the Vedas, and so holds that they cannot perform sacrifices.¹

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¹ vi. i. 25-38. Jaimini is opposed by certain facts which he tries hard to explain away. In vi. i. 44-50, the right of the chariot-builder (rathakāra), who is outside the four castes, to the performance of Agnyādhāna sacrifice is admitted. Niṣādas are entitled to perform Raudrayajña (vi. i. 51-52).

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The followers of Prabhākara enter into an elaborate analysis of volition. In the *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, Prabhākara’s view of voluntary action is set forth as consisting of the following steps: The consciousness of something to be done (kāryatājñāna), or the feeling of the sense of duty; the desire to do it (cikīrṣā), which implies the consciousness that it can be done (kṛtisādhyatājñāna); the volition (pravṛtti); the motor reaction (ceṣṭā); and the act (kriyā). Prabhākara lays more stress on the sense of duty than on the consciousness of good, which is, however, present in kāmya karmas. In the Vedic sacrifices, the injunction by its verbal power (śābdibhāvanā), tends to produce action in the agent towards the end indicated in the injunction. The Mīmāṁsā assumes human freedom, otherwise the human individuals cannot be held responsible for their acts.

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The law of karma, when rightly understood, is not inconsistent with freedom. We can refrain from taking the first step, but when once we take it we are led on easily to the second by the operation of the law of habit.²

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² The ghost of Darius moralises on the Persian downfall: "When of our own free will we rush into sin, God himself becomes our ally."

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The Vedas represent the wisdom of the race, and if they are found to conflict with enlightened social opinion, a suspicion of their validity naturally arises. Kumārila argues that Vedic injunctions have intrinsic validity, since they are acceptable to most people. In his opinion, the social consciousness confirms the authoritativeness of the Vedic rules. He, however, asks us to accept the guidance of the Veda in the matter of duty, and not rely on such uncertain guides as the social good or the happiness of others.³ The conduct of the great men also indicates to us the nature of dharma. But Kumārila is afraid of supporting the principles of Buddhism on account of their opposition to the authoritativeness of the Vedas. He has the honesty to admit that the Buddhist code of conduct emphasising ahiṁsā is a noble one, though its repudiation of the Vedas is ignoble. The truth of Buddhism is mixed up with much that is false, and so he compares it to the milk put in the dog’s skin.¹

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³ S.V., ii. 242-47.

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¹ Svacarmanikṣiptakṣīravad (Tantravārttika, i. 3. 6, p. 127).

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The Vedānta protests against the doctrine of mechanical ceremonialism in the same spirit in which Jesus protested against the Pharisees and Luther against the doctrine of justification by works. Every work, however holy it may seem, may be done in a mechanical way without any feeling whatever, and cannot therefore by itself be of much avail for salvation. It is rather injurious on account of the false trust reposed in it. We may perform any number of sacrifices, though they may not effect much change in the inner spirit. If virtue consists in moral regeneration or transformation of the heart, what is necessary is not the ceremonial sacrifice, but the sacrifice of selfishness. The Vedas speak of śraddhā or faith, bhakti or devotion, and tapas or austerity,² which are only remotely connected with sacrifices. The theistic views which declare that all work should be performed as a sacrifice to God are in conformity with the spirit of the Veda. Some later Mīmāṁsakas hold this view. Laugākṣi Bhāskara tells us that when duty is performed in a spirit of dedication to God it becomes the cause of emancipation.³ The scene of rewards in this world or hereafter suppresses the spirit of disinterestedness and self-sacrifice. The Mīmāṁsakas, moreover, speak to us mainly of sacrifices,⁴ and thus fail to cover the major part of human life.

Cites (6)

Mīmāṃsāsūtra — Jaimini, Sanskrit
Tantravārttika — Sanskrit
Ṛgvedasaṃhitā — Sanskrit
Atharvavedasaṃhitā — Atharvan & Aṅgiras, Sanskrit
Ślokavārttika — Abhinavagupta, Sanskrit
Arthasaṅgraha — Laugākṣi Bhāskara 1600, Sanskrit