Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s12: XIX The Criterion of Truth
Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s12
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XIX The Criterion of Truth
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According to the Advaita, a mental mode (vṛtti) must have an object (viṣaya). The latter may be either the mode itself or something else. It may apprehend an external object when it is modified in the form of the latter or apprehend itself.¹ There is no such thing as a cognition of cognition, since all cognitions are self-luminous. There is no intervening mental mode between a cognitive process and the cognition of this latter. There is direct and immediate consciousness of a cognition. In the apprehension of a mental mode there is a direct intellectual intuition.² Cognitions are said to be self-luminous (svaprakāśa) in the sense that they are objects of their own apprehension.³ Knowledge is known to be valid directly, *i.e.* by the same instrument by which it is known as knowledge. All knowledge is true knowledge.
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¹ Svaviṣayavṛtti.
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² Kevalasākṣivedyatva.
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³ The Bhāṭṭa theory that a cognition which is itself unperceived can apprehend an object is declared to be defective. Nor can a cognition be the object of another cognition, since cognitions are not of the nature of unconscious objects. This is also the view of Prabhākara. Some Buddhists hold that a cognition cognises itself and manifests itself. The Advaita contends that a cognition is not apprehended or manifested by another. If a cognition can make itself an object of cognition, then it can as well be the object of another cognition.
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We cannot think what is not true. If we can, then truth will be unattainable, for any standard of truth we can adopt will be unable to supply the intrinsic deficiency of thought itself, since the apprehension of the standard will itself be an act of thought and thus suffer from the natural uncertainty of thought. Therefore we must grant that there is no thought which is not a true thought, and error is only privation due to the passions and interests of men which cloud the intellect. Even the acceptance of śruti does not compromise the individual and intrinsic character of truth, for śruti refers only to a kind of experience (anubhava) which may be accepted as provisionally true.
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While thus all knowledge bears immediate witness to its own validity, this self-evident character is hidden by our psychological prejudices, and to know that empirical knowledge is free from flaws, empirical tests like correspondence, practical efficiency and coherence are also employed. "The question of the reality of a thing does not depend on human notions. It depends on the thing itself. To say of a post that it is either a post or a man or something else is not to give its truth. That it is a post is alone the truth, since it answers to the nature of the thing." The test of truth regarding things is their correspondence with the nature of things.¹ Śaṁkara allows that truth and error both have reference to objects. But in the ultimate sense there is only one reality (vastu), Brahman, and no idea corresponds to it, and so all our judgments are imperfect.
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¹ Evam bhūtavastuviṣayāṇāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ vastutantram (S.B., i. 1. 2).
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The principle of non-contradiction (abādha) is, in Śaṁkara, the test of truth. Knowledge which is not contradicted is truth.² The straight stick appears bent in the water. Its crookedness in water is as real to the eye as its straightness to the touch. Touch corrects the judging of the eye and reveals a more constant relation. This definition emphasises the systematic character or harmonious nature of truth. But can we succeed in comprehending all things in a unity? Does anyone lay claim to wholeness of knowledge about life and the universe? We know little of the past and nothing of the future, and the present is so immense that it exceeds our range of experience. Whatever undergoes a radical transformation by the experience of something else is not itself or is not its own truth. Dream states are contradicted by waking experiences, which latter are contradicted by insight into reality (brahmānubhava). This is the highest, since there is no other knowledge that can contradict it.³ Let us be clear that these tests are at best empirical. Highest knowledge, according to Śaṁkara, is the immediate witness of reality to itself, and this is rendered possible by the fact that the knower and the known are ultimately one real. Logical proof arises only in the empirical world, where this ultimate oneness of the observer and the observed is obscured by the clogging psychological hindrances which are summed up in the word avidyā. Logical proof enables us to break down the obstructing veils and reveal the self-evident character of truth. Logical rules are working tools, serving as negative checks by which we break down our prejudices.
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² Cp. Bhāmatī: Abādhitānadhigata-saṁdigdhabodhajanakatvaṁ hi pramāṇatvam pramāṇānām (i. 1. 4). See also Vedāntaparibhāṣā. Abādhitārthaviṣayajñānatvam. "A cognition is not valid simply because it represents a thing as it actually is, nor is it invalid because it represents it otherwise; but it is valid only when its object is such as is not subsequently rejected (as unreal), and it is invalid when its object is thus rejected; and as a matter of fact this validity can belong only to the knowledge of Brahman obtained by means of the scriptures and not by any other cognitions" (Advaitasiddhi, i. 12).
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³ Bādhakajñānāntarābhāvāt (S.B., ii. 1. 14).
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THE INADEQUACY OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
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Empirical knowledge revels in the distinctions of knower, knowledge and the known,¹ while the real is free from all these distinctions.² If the real excludes relations, then relational thought is imperfect. It is avidyā, since it does not yield the true nature of things (vastusvarūpam). The real self, which is pure consciousness, is not an object of knowledge. The self can never be the subject and the object of the knowing process. In true self-consciousness the subject must be all out there in the object, so that there is nothing more left in the subject. In no state of mind is the subject before itself as an object.³ Anything becomes an object only when we think of it as having a place in space and time; but these latter, as well as the objects that fall within them, are there only in relation to the self that holds them together. So the universal witness of all knowledge is unmanifest and imperceptible.⁴ The impossibility of grasping the real as an object of knowledge is the cause of the sense of the beyond in all knowledge. While the process of knowledge is nothing more than a manifestation of the ultimate reality, it is impossible to catch the real in a process of self-consciousness. As the Ātman is the condition of time and space and all objectivity, it involves a hysteron-proteron to confine Ātman within the limits of its own offspring. "How shall I know you?" is as absurd a question as Crito's to Socrates, "How shall I bury you?"⁵ Self-consciousness is possible only with regard to the self qualified by the internal organ.¹
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¹ Avidyākalpitaṁ vedyaveditṛvedanābhedam (S.B., i. 1. 4).
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² S.S.S., xii. 47. See also Advaitamakaranda, p. 19. See S.B. on Gauḍapāda's Kārikā, iv. 67.
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³ See S.B. on Tait. Up., ii. 1.
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⁴ Avyaktam anindriyagrāhyaṁ sarvadṛśyasākṣitvāt (iii. 2. 24).
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⁵ Socrates chaffs Crito for asking the question immediately after Crito had admitted the validity of arguments tending to show that Socrates was neither temporal nor spatial and so could not be buried.
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¹ Of this self there can also be recognition. While the recognising agent is the self qualified by the internal organ, the object of recognition is the empirical self qualified by the earlier and the later temporal experiences. The difference in the conditioning adjuncts renders it possible for the self to be at the same time agent and object of action. Immediate consciousness vouches for acts of recognition in the form “I am now the same person I was.” Cp. with this Kant’s theory: “Through this ‘I’ or ‘He’ or ‘It’ (the thing) which thinks, nothing is set before our consciousness except a transcendental subject = X, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates (or more properly which it attaches as predicates to other things), and of which, if it is separated from other things, we cannot have the smallest conception. In attempting to grasp it, in fact, we turn round it in a continual circle, since we must always make use of it in order to make any judgment regarding it. Here, therefore, we are brought into an awkward pass, out of which there is no escape, because the consciousness in question is not an idea which marks out for us a particular object, but a form which attaches to all ideas in so far as they are referred to objects, i.e. in so far as anything is thought through them” (Caird: *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii, p. 25). Descartes thought that since it was possible to abstract the subject in thought and free it from all determination, it existed as an object among objects. A logical possibility was transformed into an actually existent substance.
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Śaṁkara supports the inadequacy of all empirical knowledge by pointing out its affinity to the kind of knowledge possessed by animals.² “For just as the animals, when, for instance, a sound strikes their ears, in case the perception of sound is disagreeable to them, move away from it, and in case it is agreeable, move towards it—as, when they see a man with a stick raised before them, thinking ‘He will strike me,’ they try to escape, and when they see one with a handful of fresh grass, approach him—so men also whose knowledge is more developed (vyutpannacittāḥ), when they perceive strong men of terrible aspect, with drawn swords in their hands, turn away from them and turn towards the contrary. Thus with reference to the means and objects of knowledge, the process in men and animals is alike. Of course, in the case of animals, perception and similar processes go on without previous judgment (avivekapūrvakaḥ); but, as can be seen by the resemblance even in the case of developed men (vyutpattimatām), they are for the time being the same.”³
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² Paśvādibhiś cāviśeṣāt (S.B., Introduction). See D.S.V., p. 57 n.
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³ Cp. Darwin: “The difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind” (*Descent of Man*).
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In all this Śaṃkara has in view the selective nature of mental activity. Our practical interests determine our whole thought procedure. The internal organ helps us to concentrate consciousness on a narrow range, like a bull's-eye lantern which restricts the illumination to a particular spot. We take note of those features of the "what" of things which have a significance for our purposes. Even our general laws are established with a view to our plans and interests.
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Śaṃkara emphasises the point that discursive thinking, however extended, cannot lead us to an apprehension of reality. The philosophical imagination of Voltaire has conceived of beings with nearly a thousand senses, who could yet come no nearer to the apprehension of what reality is than those apparently less fortunate creatures who have only the five senses. It is difficult to know precisely how far our knowledge of the external world which science investigates is objective. The more we reflect on the matter the more impossible it seems to assert that the world known to us under the conditions of empirical knowledge is the real in itself. The man with five senses knows more than the blind man. May not the real exceed the empirical conception of it, even as the world known to sight exceeds that known to touch? May not a state like that of brahmānubhava, or what Tennyson has called a "last and largest sense," enlarge our own knowledge of reality, as the gift of sight would enlarge that of a race of blind men? This view does not involve any scepticism with regard to the world of science and common sense. So long as we do not reach a higher plane attainable only by higher intelligences, our conclusions are quite valid, except that they remain on the same plane as their premises.
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Śaṃkara, as we shall see, enforces his conclusion, that all thought is vitiated by a central flaw, by a mass of subtle dialectic, which aims at showing the unintelligibility of every concept which the human mind employs. Though we talk freely about experience, it is impossible for us to understand the true relation between consciousness (dṛk) and the objects of consciousness (dṛśya). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of connection with the object which it illumines. Were it not so, there could be any kind of knowledge at any time regardless of the nature of the objects. The kind of connection between consciousness and its objects is neither contact (saṃyoga) nor inherence (samavāya), i.e. neither external nor internal.
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Objectivity does not consist in the fact that jñātatā (knownness) is produced in the object as the Kumārila holds, for this effect is not admissible. To say that objects are those which are practically useful is not permissible, for there are many useless things like the sky which are objects of consciousness. Objectivity cannot mean that the thing is the object of the function of thought (jñānakaraṇa), since it applies only to perceived objects and not those remembered or inferred. Again, while in perception the conscious mode is moulded after the nature of the object, this is not the case with inferred objects. We do not understand the exact nature of the relation between consciousness and the objects of which we are conscious. Strictly speaking, all the life and movement belong to the object side, with which, we can only say, consciousness is compresent, in Alexander's phrase, and this compresence is assumed as intelligible, since subject and object are not opposed to each other but fall within the universal consciousness.
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All thought struggles to know the real, to seek the truth, but, unfortunately, it can attempt to know the real only by relating the real to something other than itself. The real is neither true nor false. It simply is. But in our knowledge we refer this or that characteristic to it. All knowledge, whether perceptual or conceptual, attempts to reveal reality or the ultimate spirit.¹ While perception is an event in time, non-existent both before it happens and after, it is still the manifestation of a reality which is not in time, though it falls short of the real which it attempts to manifest. So far as inadequacy to the grasp of the real is concerned, all means of knowledge are on the same level. All judgments are false in the sense that no predicate which we can attribute to the subject is adequate to it. We have either to say Reality is Reality, or say that Reality is X, Y or Z. The former is useless for thought, but the latter is what thought actually does. It equates the real with something else, i.e. the non-real. To attribute to the real what is different from it is what Śaṁkara calls adhyāsa, or attributing to one thing that is different from it.² Adhyāsa is defined as the appearance of a thing where it is not.³ When the light appears double, or when the rope appears as a snake, we have adhyāsa. All knowledge of finite things is in a sense the negation of pure being, since objects are imposed (adhyasta)
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¹ Pratyakṣapramā cātra caitanyam eva (Vedāntaparibhāṣā, i).
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² Adhyāso nāma atasmimś tadbuddhiḥ.
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³ Paratraparāvabhāsaḥ.
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on the one eternal consciousness. The most striking instance of this adhyāsa is the confusion ¹ of subject with object where we attribute to the Ātman activity, agency and enjoyment. Strictly speaking, there is nothing different from the subject, for the subject of reality includes all that we can possibly predicate of it. What we attribute to the subject is something less than the real, an appearance thereof. “Object (viṣaya) and subject (viṣayin), having as their province the presentation of the ‘thou’ (yuṣmat) and the ‘I’ (asmat), are of a nature as opposed as darkness and light. The transfer of the object which has as its province the ‘thou’ (or the not-self) and its qualities to the pure spiritual subject which has for its province the idea of the ‘I’ (or the self), and, conversely, the transfer of the subject and its qualities to the object, is logically false. Yet in mankind this procedure, resting on false knowledge (mithyājñānanimitta), of pairing together the true and the untrue (the subject and the object) is natural (naisargika), so that they transfer the being and qualities of the one to the other.” ² Adhyāsa leading to avidyā is “the presupposition of all practical distinctions—made in ordinary life and the Vedas—between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowers) and all spiritual texts, whether they belong to karma or jñāna.” ³ All the sources of knowledge are valid only until the ultimate truth is gained, ⁴ and thus have relative value for the finite understanding. All our knowledge is, strictly speaking, non-knowledge (avidyā), and the ascertainment of the ultimate consciousness by the exclusion of all that is imposed on it is vidyā, or wisdom.¹
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¹ Ātmani kriyākārakaphalādyāropalakṣaṇam. Kant's transcendental illusion, by which we apply to the thinking self conceptions which it makes and applies to phenomena given under conditions of space-time and regard the thinking self as a substance with things outside it, is a case of adhyāsa.
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² S.B., Introduction. Dehādiṣv anātmasu aham asmīty ātmabuddhir avidyā (S.B., i. 3. 2).
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³ “Without the delusion that ‘I’ and ‘mine’ consist in the body, sense-organs and the like, no knower can exist; and consequently no use of the means of knowledge is possible. For without calling in the aid of the sense-organs there can be no perception; but the action of the sense-organs is not possible without a resting-place (the body), and no action at all is possible without transferring the being of self (ātman) to the body, and without all this taking place no knowledge is possible for the soul, which is independent of embodied existence. But without the action of knowing, no knowing is possible. Consequently, the means of knowledge, perception and the rest belong to the province of avidyā” (S.B., Introduction). See D.S.V., p. 56 n. ; S.S.S.S., xii. 85–86.
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⁴ S.B., i. 1. 4.
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¹ S.B., i. I. I.
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What Śaṁkara means by subject and object, Ātman and non-Ātman, is the transcendental reality and the empirical existence. The "object" includes the individual agents, bodily organs and material world, etc. The subject is the ultimate consciousness² on which the whole object world depends. It is the characteristic of all objects of consciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from being manifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state (vṛtti). Even when we comprehend the nature of the ultimate Ātman from the scriptural texts, we do not comprehend its true nature. The true knowledge of Ātman is devoid of any form or mode.³
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² S.B., i. I. I.
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³ To the objection that Ātman is not an object, and so the attributes of other objects cannot be imposed on it, Śaṁkara replies that it is the object of the notion of self; nor is it necessary that the object should be in contact with our sense-organs, since the ignorant attribute dark-blue colour to ākāśa, which is not an object of sense-perception.
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That particular application of adhyāsa which inclines us to break up the nature of the one absolute consciousness into a subject-object relation results from the very constitution of the human mind. This adhyāsa, which gives rise to the world of subjects and objects, is said to be beginningless (anādi), endless (ananta), natural (naisargika), possessed of the form of wrong knowledge (mithyāpratyayarūpaḥ), the cause of the agency, enjoyment and activity of the individual souls,⁴ and patent to all.⁵
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⁴ Kartṛtvabhoktṛtvapravartakaḥ.
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⁵ Sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ.
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Śaṁkara’s analysis of erroneous perception gives us a clue to his view of knowledge. When we mistake a rope for a snake and judge "This is a snake," we have two elements: the "this," or what is present to the senses, and the "snake," which we attribute to the "this." The latter describes the mode or form in which we happen to cognise the presented datum. The error of the judgment is due to the element of interpretation or what our thought superimposes on the ground. The "this" element, or what is actually present before us, persists even after the disillusionment. Śaṁkara argues that, even in normal perception, we have the two elements of a datum and an interpretation, and asks, What is it that is common as the substratum of all objects of our consciousness? Is there anything which is held in common by everything we perceive, normal and abnormal, true and false? Śaṃkara answers that it is the quality of being. Everything we perceive is perceived as existent. Whatever be the nature of our interpretations, the substratum persists and is real. In the words of the Upaniṣads, it is like clay in things made of clay, or gold in ornaments made of gold. It endures, however much the forms impressed on it may change. The cause of avidyā is ignorance of the fundamental basis.¹
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¹ Adhiṣṭhānaviṣaya.
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Avidyā, or the natural tendency to adhyāsa, is involved in the very roots of our being, and is another name for our finitude. The real is its own explanation. It always remains in its own nature. It is the unreal that does not remain in its own nature that calls for some explanation. When avidyā is known, our bondage is broken. Avidyā is not inevitable, though quite natural. If it were inevitable, there is no point in asking us to get rid of it. We cannot strive against the inevitable. We cannot know what cannot be known. It is possible for us to check the course of avidyā, and it shows that we are really greater than our habits.
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The finite consciousness, bound up with the pramāṇas, is limited to a certain kind and order of experience in which bodily states play an exceedingly important part. Our intellect is so made that it demands order and regularity in things. It resents accident and disorder. The world of objects is rational through and through, and answers to the demand of reason for law and order in all things. This is the faith of common sense and science. Śaṃkara does not sever thought from things. The principles of our mind, expressing themselves through the categories of space, time and cause, are at once the forms of combination which make up the nature of the thinking subject and also the forms that are to be met with in the realm of objective fact. The categories of intelligence apply to the things presented to it. This space-time-cause world, with all its contents, exists for the knowing subject. The two depend on each other, the empirical self and the world. This fact of the response of nature to the demand of reason proves the reality of a universal mind, which on the one hand ensouls nature and on the other is the cause of the reason in us, participating in and co-operating with the universal mind. The reality of an ordered world exists only for mind and in terms of mind. The world of an animal presupposes the mind of an animal; that of man, the mind of man. The whole world reality in its fulness and complexity postulates a universal and perfect mind, Īśvara, who sustains those parts of the universe which are unperceived by us. Our phenomenal knowledge suggests the noumenal as a necessity of thought, but not as something known through the empirical pramāṇas. Being men, we think in a human fashion. The universal reality is viewed as a central personality or subject with the whole world as object. This is the synthesis arrived at through logic, but there is no necessity about it. It is not an immediate object of thought. It is assumed as the highest synthesis of our experience, and so long as other experience is of the same texture, it will hold.¹ The subject-object relation applies to the animal world, the human and the divine alike. But these two constituents of experience are relative to each other and subject to the same laws of change and development. That fully constructed view of reality in which every element, subject and object, mind and body, present, past and future, shall have fallen into its proper place, is not an object of human experience, though the ideal goal of all thinking. But all knowledge, whether of God or man, involves the subject-object relation, and cannot therefore be regarded as the highest. All determinate knowledge is a self-abnegation, involving, as it does, a modalisation of the ultimate consciousness into the subject, mode and object. Except in ecstatic intuition, there is the given element distinct from the cognising subject reaching to it through a mode. Thinking and logic belong to the level of finite life, while ultimate reality transcends thought. The real is present to itself and has therefore no need to think itself.
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¹ ii. I. II.
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ANUBHAVA OR INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE
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An object is established to be real, an idea proved to be true, when the denial of it brings consequences which are recognised as self-contradictory and so untenable. This seems to be the final test for fallible intelligence. Logically, there is no higher proof of the existence of the Ātman possible. To ask whether the Ātman is real or not is to raise a meaningless question, for all life, all thought, all experience is the abiding though unformulated affirmative answer to this question. But any attempt to grasp the real by the tools of mind lands us in a hopeless maze of contradictions. If mind is to avert this tragic destiny, it must try to suppress itself, and then the veil will be lifted. The dissatisfaction which we feel with our logical categories is a sign that we are greater than we know, that we can pass beyond our mental confines to a region of truth, though it is a mere beyond to our intellect, which seeks to transcend what it can and will never transcend. The limits which seem to be inevitable and impassable for intellect point to a limitless ground in us higher than logical mind. If thought becomes one with reality, and the individual subject shakes off its individuality and is lifted up into its universal essence, the goal of thought is reached, but it is no more thought. Thought expires in experience. Knowledge is lifted up into wisdom when it knows itself as identical with the known, where only the Ātman as eternal knowledge (nityajñāna) shines.¹ This absolute knowledge is at the same time knowledge of the absolute. The word " jñāna " is rather unfortunate on account of its empirical associations.² Integral experience or anubhava, brings out the sense better.
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¹ "To understand, much more to know, spiritual reality is to assimilate it with ourselves who know it" (Gentile : *Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, p. 10).
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² Madhva declares that it is not knowledge, since there is no object to be known. " Jñeyābhāve jñānasyāpy abhāvād." Bṛh. Up., S.B.H., p. 460.
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Śaṃkara admits the reality of an intuitional consciousness, anubhava,³ where the distinctions of subject and object are superseded and the truth of the supreme self realised.¹ It is the ineffable experience beyond thought and speech, which transforms our whole life and yields the certainty of a divine presence. It is the state of consciousness which is induced when the individual strips himself of all finite conditions, including his intelligence. It is accompanied by what Mr. Russell calls "the true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than man."² Foretastes of such bliss we have in moments of selfless contemplation and æsthetic enjoyment.³ It is sākṣātkāra or direct perception, which is manifested when the avidyā is destroyed and the individual knows that the Ātman and the antaḥkaraṇa are one. It is also called samyagjñāna (perfect knowledge)⁴ or samyagdarśana (perfect intuition).⁵ While samyagjñāna insists on the reflective preparation necessary for it, samyagdarśana points to the immediacy of intuition, where the ultimate reality is the object of direct apprehension (īkṣaṇa) as well as meditation (dhyāna).⁶ Śaṁkara explains that it is possible for us to meditate on unreal objects but not to experience them; so that his anubhava is different from idealised fancy. The Yogin is said to see God in the state of saṁrādhana, which Śaṁkara explains as sinking oneself in pious meditation.⁷ Śaṁkara admits ārṣajñāna, by which Indra and Vāmadeva realised identity with Brahman.⁸ Psychologically it is of the nature of perception,⁹ since it is direct awareness of reality; only the latter is not of the nature of an existent in space and time. Anubhava is not consciousness of this or that thing, but it is to know and see in oneself the being of all beings, the Ground and the Abyss. As direct experience or anubhava, in the Nyāya sense of the word, is the sole means of knowledge of the external world, anubhava of non-dual existence is the innermost experience on which whatever we know and believe of the supersensual world depends. The object of intuition is not a private fancy or a subjective abstraction in the mind of the knower. It is a real object,¹ which is unaffected by our apprehension or non-apprehension of it, though its reality is of a higher kind than that of particular objects of space and time which are involved in a perpetual flux and cannot therefore be regarded strictly as real.² The subtleties of the schools are all silenced before the protest of the soul that it has seen reality. "How can one contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman, though still in the body, vouched as it is by his heart's conviction?"³ All faith and devotion, all study and meditation, are intended to train us for this experience.⁴ Intuition of self, however, comes only to a mind prepared for it. It does not come out of the blue. It is the noblest blossoming of man's reason. It is not a mere fancy which refuses to make an appeal to man's intelligence. What is true is true for every intelligence that can apprehend it. There is no such thing as a private truth, any more than a private sun or a private science. Truth has an intrinsic and universal character, which depends on no individual, not even on God. The process of apprehending reality may be private or singular, but not the object apprehended. The real cannot be real now and then, here and there, but always and everywhere.
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³ See S.B., i. 1. 2; ii. 1 4; iii. 3. 32; iii. 4. 15.
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¹ See Ātmabodha, p. 41.
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² Philosophical Essays, p. 73.
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³ Plotinus says: "It is that union of which the union of earthly lovers who wish to bind their being with each other is a copy" (Enneads, vi. 7. 34). Cp. Bṛh. Up., vi. 3. 21.
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⁴ S.B., i. 2. 8.
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⁵ S.B., i. 3. 13.
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⁶ S.B., i. 3. 13.
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⁷ S.B., iii. 2. 24. See also Kaṭha Up., iv. 1. To the objection whether such an act of meditation does not involve a distinction between the subject and object of meditation, Śaṁkara answers: "As light, ether, the sun, and so on appear differentiated, as it were, through their objects, such as fingers, vessels, water, and so on, which constitute the limiting adjuncts, while in reality they preserve their essential non-differentiatedness, so the distinction of different selves is due to limiting adjuncts only, while the unity of all selves is natural and original" (S.B., iii. 2. 25).
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⁸ It is explained in Ratnaprabhā as "the spontaneous intuition of truth rendered possible through the hearing, etc., acquired in former existences." Janmāntarakṛtaśravaṇādinā asmiñ janmani, svatassiddham, darśanam ārṣam (i. 1. 30). See S.B. on Tait. Up., i. 10.
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⁹ S.B., i. 4. 14.
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¹ Anubhavāsanatvād bhūtavastuviṣayatvāc ca (S.B., i. 1. 2).
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² Cp. with this Plato's realism, where reason discloses the world of reality lifted altogether out of space and time, "a reality colourless, formless and intangible . . . visible to the mind alone who is lord of the soul" (Phædrus). While Plato recognises a plurality of essences, Śaṃkara has only one essence.
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³ Kathaṃ hy ekasya, svahṛdayapratyayaṃ brahmavedanam, dehadhāraṇaṃ cāpareṇa pratikṣeptuṃ śakyate? (iv. 1. 15, S.B.).
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⁴ S.B., ii. 1. 6. Anubhavāvasānaṃ brahmavijñānam (D.S.V., p. 89 n.). Anubhavārūḍham eva ca vidyāphalam (iii. 4. 15). The fruit of knowledge is manifest to intuition (S.B.G., ii. 21; Bṛh. Up., iv. 4. 19).
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Kant spoke of an intellectual intuition to indicate the mode of consciousness by which a knowledge of things in themselves might be obtained in a non-logical way. According to Fichte, intellectual intuition enables us to get at self-consciousness, which is the basis of all knowledge in his philosophy. Schelling employs the same term to denote the consciousness of the absolute, the identity between subject and object. But, according to Śaṁkara, the object of intuition is not the many things in themselves of Kant, or the self of Fichte, or the neutruum of Schelling, but the Ātman or the universal consciousness. As for Plotinus, so for Śaṁkara, the absolute is not presented as an object, but in an immediate contact which is above knowledge.¹ Since the intuitional knowledge is not contradicted by anything else, it is the highest truth.²
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¹ Enneads, vi. 9. 4.
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² Bādhakajñānāntarābhāvāc ca (S.B., ii. 1. 14). In the Śataślokī it is said: "Scripture speaks of the knowledge of Brahman as twofold, viz. experience relating to oneself (svānubhūti) and conclusive certainty (upapatti). The former arises in relation to the body (dehānubandhāt), while the latter arises with reference to the universe (sarvātmakatvāt). First arises the experience that 'I am Brahman' (brahmāham asmīty anubhava), and then that 'All this is Brahman' (khalv idam brahma)."
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Anubhava is not the immediacy of an uninterpreted sensation, where the existence and the content of what is apprehended are not separated. It has kinship with artistic insight rather than animal perception. It is immediacy which is higher and not lower than mediate reflective knowledge. The real is, no doubt, problematic from the point of view of demonstrable knowledge, and our ideas of God, freedom and immortality are only names and symbols of the deepest of human values, which we may strive after but never attain until we transcend the never-ending struggle of mind with its antinomies. Anubhava and adhyāsa, intuition and intellect, point to a fissure between the infinite reality and the finite mind.
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Śaṁkara admits that, while this anubhava is open to all, few attain to it.³ But the important point is, that it is open to all. Reality is there, objective, ever-present, waiting to be seen by the individual minds that can seize it. Apparently Śaṃkara has no sympathy with the view that the real reveals itself to a few elect souls in moments of illumination through doubtful dreams and mystic voices. A God who reveals himself to some and not to others is a fiction of pious imagination. Insight or spiritual experience is, as a matter of fact, confined to some individuals, though it is a universal possession, while reason is common to the greater mass of thinking humanity. While some powers are well developed in all men, others are not equally developed. In the present state of evolution, anubhava may be subjective and its evidence worthy of credence only when it is in conformity with the dictates of reason.
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³ Cp. Dean Inge: "Complete knowledge is the complete unity of the knower and known, for we can in the last resort only know ourselves. The process of divine knowledge therefore consists in calling into activity a faculty which, as Plotinus says, all possess but few use, the gift which the Cambridge Platonists called the seed of the deiform nature in the human soul" (Outspoken Essays, Second Series, p. 14).
Cites (11)
- Taittirīyopaniṣad — Sanskrit
- Āgamaśāstra — Gauḍapāda, Sanskrit
- Kaṭhopaniṣad — Sanskrit
- Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad — Sanskrit
- Advaitasiddhi — Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 1570, Sanskrit
- Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha — Śaṅkara, Sanskrit
- Vedāntaparibhāṣā — Dharmarāja Adhvarin 1550, Sanskrit
- Śaṅkarabhāṣya — Śaṅkara, Sanskrit
- Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya) — Sanskrit
- Ātmaprabodha — Jinalābha Sūri 1755, Sanskrit
- Advaitamakaranda — Lakṣmīdhara, Sanskrit