Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s28: XXXVII Ātman and Jīva
Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s28
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XXXVII Ātman and Jīva
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We cannot attribute substantiality or simplicity to the individual ego. It is not an atomic unit, but a very complex structure. It is the systematic unity of the conscious experiences of a particular individual centre, which is itself defined or determined at the outset by the bodily organism and other conditions. The body, the senses, etc., enter into its experience and introduce a sort of unity and continuity into it. The consciousness linked up with the organism is a purely finite one, which includes bodily states as part of the content of consciousness. As the body is built up gradually, so also is its conscious experience. The finite self is not the ultimate cause of its own consciousness. The ego is the felt unity of the empirical consciousness, which is evolving in time. It is an ideal construction or an object of conceptual thinking.¹ It is shifting in the same individual, and therefore cannot be identified with the unchanging and unchangeable essence. The Ātman, which is the underlying basis of empirical egos, suffers no change and experiences no emotions.
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¹ Cp. Ward : *Psychological Principles*, pp. 361-382.
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Inconceivable though it is, the Ātman has nothing to do with the individual's life history, which it so faithfully attends and accompanies. Assumed as the constant witness, the Ātman serves merely as the screen or the basis on which mental facts play. We cannot say that they grow out of it, for the real is not affected by what is confused with it. Things do not alter their nature simply because we do not rightly understand them. How does the unchanging Ātman appear as limited, how can the eternal light of intelligence be darkened by any agency whatever, since it is free from all relations? It is the old question How does the real become the phenomenal? It is the relation of Ātman to the upādhis of body, senses, mind and sense-objects that accounts for its phenomenal character; but this relation between the Ātman and the psychological self is inexplicable, māyā, or mysterious. If Ātman is eternal freedom and pure consciousness, and wants nothing and does nothing, how can it be the source of movement and desire in the embodied self? "A thing, it is answered, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron."² When we speak about the relation of the finite selves to the infinite Ātman, we are at the mercy of the finite categories, which do not strictly apply.
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² S.B., ii. 2. 2.
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Śaṃkara discusses the different views of the relation between the individual soul and Brahman, mentioned in the Brahma Sūtra, such as those of Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakṛtsna. Āśmarathya takes his stand on the Upaniṣad texts which compare the relation of individuals to the Absolute to that of sparks and fire. As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, since they participate in the nature of fire and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different, since in that case they would not be distinguishable either from the fire or from each other; so the individual souls are neither different from the supreme reality, for that would mean they are not of the nature of intelligence, nor absolutely non-different from it, since, then, they would not be different from each other. So Āśmarathya concludes that the individuals are both different and non-different from Brahman.¹ Auḍulomi’s view is that the individual soul, bound by the limiting adjuncts of body, senses, and mind, is different from Brahman, though, through knowledge and meditation, it passes out of the body and becomes one with the highest self. He admits the absolute distinction between the unfreed individual self and Brahman and the absolute identity of the freed with Brahman.² Śaṁkara accepts the view of Kāśakṛtsna.³
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¹ S.B., i. 4. 20.
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² S.B., i. 4. 21.
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³ S.B., i. 4. 22.
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The individual ego cannot be a part of the absolute spirit, as Rāmānuja thinks, since the Absolute is without parts, being beyond space and time. It cannot be different from the Absolute, as Madhva supposes, since there is nothing different from the Absolute, which is one without a second.⁴ It cannot be a modification of the Absolute, as Vallabha thinks, since the Absolute is unchangeable. We cannot regard the individual soul as the creation of God, since the Vedas which speak of the creation of fire and other elements do not speak of the creation of the soul. Jīva is neither different from nor a part of nor a modification of the absolute Ātman. It is the Ātman itself. We do not realise its nature, since it is covered by the upādhis.⁵ Unless it were one with the supreme self, the statements of the scriptures proving immortality would become meaningless. Referring to the teaching of Āśmarathya, Śaṁkara says: “If the individual soul were different from the highest self, the knowledge of the highest self would not imply the knowledge of the individual soul, and thus the promise given in one of the Upaniṣads, that, through the knowledge of one reality, everything is known, would not be fulfilled.”⁶ Commenting on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Śaṁkara writes: “It is not possible that one can ever attain identity with another altogether distinct,”⁷ and as the Upaniṣads speak of the knower of the Brahman becoming Brahman, the knower must be one with Brahman.
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⁴ S.B., iv. 3. 14.
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⁵ See S.B. on Muṇḍ. Up., ii. 2. 1; Kaṭha Up., ii. 2. 1.
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⁶ S.B., i. 4. 20.
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⁷ S.B. on Tait. Up., ii. 8. 15.
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The metaphysical identity between the supreme Ātman and the individual jīva may be allowed; but it does not touch the question of the relation of the supreme to the latter, before it has arrived at a knowledge of its true nature. Our empirical egos move, weighted down by the burdens of the upādhis.¹ Knowing that the relation between the Absolute and the individual self is incapable of logical articulation, still Śaṃkara suggests certain analogies which have been developed into distinct theories in later Advaita.
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¹ When it is said that the ahaṃkāra or self-sense, becomes the knower by its proximity to Ātman, which is reflected in the former, Rāmānuja asks: "Does consciousness become a reflection of the ahaṃkāra, or does the ahaṃkāra become a reflection of consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of being a knower; and so is the latter, since the non-intelligent ahaṃkāra can never become a knower" (R.B., i. 1. 1).
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It is told of an Irishman that, when asked to describe infinite space, he replied that "space is like a box wid the thop and the botthom and the sides knocked out of it." As the box with its limits and bounds is not space, even so lives bound by the mind and the senses are not Brahman. When we do away with the sides and the bottom of our finite individuality, we are one with Brahman. The theory of limitation² is employed in many places. Śaṃkara uses the simile of one cosmic space and parts of space, since it brings out well certain features of the relation of Brahman to the individuals. When the limitations caused by a jar, and the like, are removed, the limited spaces become merged in the one cosmic space. Even so, when the limitations of space, time and causality are removed, the jīvas become one with the absolute self. Again, when the space enclosed in one jar is associated with dust and smoke, the other parts of space are unaffected by them; so, too, when one jīva is affected by pleasure or pain, the others are not affected by it. The one space has different names given to it, owing to its upādhis, while the space itself is unchanged. When the Absolute is merged in these limitations (upādhi-antarbhāva), the nature of Brahman is hidden (svarūpatirobhāva), and the natural omniscience of the Absolute suffers a limitation (upādhiparicchinna). This contact of limitations (upādhisamparka) is akin to that of the crystal by the red colour with which it is associated.³ Space does not burn with bodies or move with vessels.⁴ The space in a jar cannot be said to be a part or a transformation of the one infinite space; so also the jīvas are not parts or modifications of Ātman. As space appears to be stained with dirt, etc., to children, even so the Ātman appears as bound or tainted with sin to the ignorant. When the jar is produced or destroyed, the space in it is not produced or destroyed; so also the Ātman is not born nor does it die. Some of the later followers of the Advaita adopt this view, and hold that the jīva is the universal spirit limited by the internal organ.
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² Avacchedyāvacchedaka. S.B., i. 3. 7; i. 2. 6; i. 3. 14-18; i. 2. 11-12; ii. 1. 14, 22; ii. 3. 17; iii. 2. 34.
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³ S.B., iii. 2. 15; Ātmabodha, p. 16.
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⁴ S.B., i. 2-8.
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It is argued against the theory of limitation, that, when one jīva goes to heaven on account of its potency of merit, the intelligence limited by it in heaven is different from that which was limited by it while on earth. This will have unsatisfactory moral effects, such as the destruction of the rewards of our karma (kṛtanāśa) and attainment of the fruits of actions not performed by the agent (akṛtābhyāgama). We cannot say that the same limited intelligence goes to heaven, for that would be to attribute motion to what is all-pervading. Ether does not go with the jar, whenever we move the latter.
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To secure the identity of the enjoying soul, the latter is looked upon not as the limited intelligence but as the reflected intelligence which is inseparably connected with the reflector, i.e. mind.¹ In the commentary of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,² Śaṁkara suggests the theory of reflection. As the appearance of sun and moon in water is a mere reflection and nothing real, or as the appearance of red colour in a white crystal is a mere reflection of the red flower and nothing real, since on removing the water, sun and moon only remain, and on removing the red flower the whiteness of the crystal remains unchanged, even so the elements and the individual souls are reflections of the one reality in avidyā and nothing real. On the abolition of avidyā, the reflections cease to exist and only the real remains. The Absolute is the original (bimba) and the world is the reflection (pratibimba). Again, the universe in its variety of forms is like an ocean reflecting the sun of Brahman in various ways, and Śaṁkara supports this view on account of its suggestive value, seeing that it brings out that the original really remains untarnished by the impurities of the reflection. As the differences of the reflections are traced to the mirrors, the Absolute, which is without a second, appears as different individuals through its reflections in different inner organs. When the water in which the reflection is cast is disturbed, the reflection itself appears as disturbed. While the supporters of the limitation theory hold that avidyā, as subtle matter in the form of the inner organ, is an avacchedaka or limitation, or viśeṣaṇa or an essential part of the jīva, without which the jīva as such could not exist, those who support the reflection theory regard the inner organ as an upādhi³ merely, as the matter which receives the reflection of the pure intelligence, and is therefore present to it, but does not belong to jīva in its essential nature.
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¹ S.B., ii. 3. 50; S.B. on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, i. 6.
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² S.B., Bṛh. Up., iii. 4. 12. See also Brahmabindu Up., p. 12.
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³ While a viśeṣaṇa is an essential predicate which inheres in and is present with the product, i.e. the thing defined, an upādhi is not an essential property of the thing defined. Colour is the viśeṣaṇa of a coloured thing, while an earthen vessel is the upādhi of the space which it confines.
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Some of the later followers of the Advaita adopt this view and regard the jīva as a reflection of the universal spirit in the internal organ.¹ If the world is a shadow, then Brahman is the substance which casts the shadow. The theory of reflection is criticised on several grounds. A thing devoid of form cannot cast any reflection, much less in a formless reflector. Pure intelligence and avidyā are both formless. If the individual is a reflection, then that which is reflected must lie outside the reflector, and the reality which is the original must lie beyond the cosmos or the sum total of created objects. This is opposed to the "immanence" view of the system. The "reflection" hypothesis is not free from the difficulties of the limitation view. The reflection of each mind is due to the intelligence which is adjacent to it, and so it would follow that reflections in the same mind would vary at various places. This criticism forgets the uniform nature of intelligence. If the jīva is a reflection of Brahman, it is different from the latter and is therefore not real. The author of Vivaraṇa suggests a way out of this difficulty. The rays proceeding from the eyes are struck by the reflector, turn back and make the actual face perceptible. The reflection is thus the original itself. This view, called bimbapratibimbābheda vāda (or non-difference of the original and the reflection) is, however, not accepted. If the metaphor is taken literally, we require a luminous body, another on which the shadow is cast, and a third which intercepts the light. A reflection requires a really existing medium separate from the projection, but this contradicts the non-dualism of Brahman. Those who reject both the "limitation" and the "reflection" theories² declare that the jīva is the unchanging Brahman ignorant of its true nature. Śaṃkara is inclined to this view, as also Sureśvara. Personal consciousness is an inexplicable presentation of Brahman.³ The jīva appears, but we do not know how.
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¹ Antaḥkaraṇeṣu pratibimbaṃ jīvacaitanyam (Vedāntaparibhāṣā, i).
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² For a criticism of these theories see S.P.B., i. 152 and 153.
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³ See S.B. on Bṛh. Up., ii. 1.
Cites (5)
- Vedāntaparibhāṣā — Dharmarāja Adhvarin 1550, Sanskrit
- Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha — Appayya Dīkṣita 1550, Sanskrit
- Kaṭhopaniṣad — Sanskrit
- Brahmasūtra — Bādarāyaṇa, Sanskrit
- Ātmaprabodha — Jinalābha Sūri 1755, Sanskrit