Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s34: XLIII Mokṣa
Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s34
- Language
- English
XLIII Mokṣa
v2.c26.s34.2
Mokṣa is a matter of direct realisation of something which is existent from eternity, though it is hidden from our view. When the limitations are removed, the soul is liberated. It remains where it is, what it is and eternally was, the first principle of all things. It is the peace that the world can never give, nor take away, the supreme and only blessedness. " That which is real in the absolute sense, immutable, eternal, all-penetrating like ākāśa, exempt from all change, all-satisfying, undivided, whose nature is to be its own light, in which neither good nor evil, nor effect, nor past nor present nor future has any place, this incorporeal is called liberation."[¹] When avidyā vanishes, the true soul stands self-revealed, even as gold shines when freed from the impurities which affected it, or as the stars shine in a cloudless night, when the day which overpowers them disappears.[²] The enfranchisement of man from all his self-wrought bondages, the glory which is utterly beyond all grasp of thought, the peace that is the very purpose of all our striving, lies nearer to us than our nearest consciousness. Śaṅkara shows us not a heaven which is apart from, a different order of experience from, earth, but the heaven which is all the time here, could we but see it. It is not something in an imagined future, a continuance of existence in a world to come after the present life is ended, but a state of identification with the real here and now.[³]
v2.c26.s34.3
¹ Idam tu pāramārthikam, kūṭastham, nityam, vyomavat sarvavyāpi, sarvavikriyārahitam, nityatṛptam niravayavam svayaṁjyotissvabhāvaṁ, yatra dharmādharmau sahakāryeṇa kālatrayaṁ ca nopāvartate tad aśarīram mokṣākhyam (S.B., i. 1. 4).
v2.c26.s34.4
² S.B., i. 3. 19.
v2.c26.s34.5
³ Cp. with this Nāgārjuna's view that nirvāṇa is without origination or cessation, neither one nor many, without motion or absence of motion, neither eternal nor ceasing, and that it is one with saṁsāra (Mādhyamika Kārikā, xxv. 19).
v2.c26.s34.6
The freed soul assumes the form of his true self (svātmanyavasthānam).[⁴] Freedom is not the abolition of self, but the realisation of its infinity and absoluteness by the expansion and illumination of consciousness. Citsukhācārya says that mokṣa is the realisation of all bliss.¹ The essential nature of self as bliss is concealed by pain, bred by ignorance; in the absence of ignorance, pain disappears and the nature of the self as unmixed bliss manifests itself. The realising of mokṣa is not an objective process by which we try to destroy the whole world. It is not “like annihilating the hardness of butter by putting it on the fire.”² Such a huge undertaking as destroying the world is impossible for a mere man. If the significance of mokṣa be the destruction of the plurality of the world, then the whole world would have been destroyed when the first man attained liberation.³ The realisation of the truth does not mean the abolition of plurality, but only the removal of the sense of plurality.⁴ It is an insight which changes the face of the world and “makes all things new.” This insight, this changed attitude to life and its happenings, is not so much a condition of mokṣa as mokṣa itself.⁵ The unending procession of the world will go on through its ups and downs, but the liberated man’s attachment to it is over.
v2.c26.s34.7
⁴ S.B., iv. 4. 1-3. Cp. Advaitabrahmasiddhi: Ātmany evāvidyānivṛttiḥ.
v2.c26.s34.8
¹ Anavacchinnānandaprāpti.
v2.c26.s34.9
² S.B., iv. 4. 6. See also Bṛh. Up., iv. 5. 13.
v2.c26.s34.10
³ Ekena cādimuktena pṛthivyādipravilayaḥ kṛta itidānīm pṛthivyādiśūnyaṁ jagad abhaviṣyat (S.B., iii. 2. 21).
v2.c26.s34.11
⁴ Jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate.
v2.c26.s34.12
⁵ Cp. Śuddhabrahmāśrayaviṣayam ekam eva jñānaṁ tannāśa eva ca mokṣaḥ. Kṛṣṇānanda, the commentator on Siddhāntaleśa, writes: Caitanyasyājñānasambandho bandhas tadasambandho mokṣo na tu tannivṛttiḥ. Padmapāda holds that mokṣa is the absence of false knowledge. Mithyājñānavṛttimātram mokṣaḥ.
v2.c26.s34.13
The word avidyā is intended to bring out the essence of the position. On the attainment of freedom, nothing happens to the world but only our views of it alter. Its fleeting things, which have a bewildering fascination for the unwary, no more trouble the liberated. The cause of pain is simply the error of false knowledge,⁶ and with deliverance from error comes liberation from pain. Mokṣa is thus not the dissolution of the world but only the disappearance of a false outlook. In his anxiety to make out that the freed soul has no possibility of relapsing into the phenomenal world, Śaṁkara frequently suggests that freedom consists in an entire dissolution of all empirical categories and subject-object distinction.¹
v2.c26.s34.14
⁶ Mithyābhimānabhramanimitta eva duḥkhānubhavaḥ (S.B., ii. 3. 46).
v2.c26.s34.15
¹ Sureśvara says: "When the Infinite Light is intuitively realised, all creatures from Brahmā down to the lowest plant melt into an illusion like unto a dream" (Mānasollāsa, i).
v2.c26.s34.16
The criticism that the world is pure illusion finds its support in the view that the world of experience with its distinctions of souls, things and Īśvara, disappears for him who recognises the oneness of Brahman and the Ātman.² There are countless passages in Śaṁkara which declare that, as the misconception of the snake disappears on the perception of the rope, as the dream creations vanish on awakening, so also saṁsāra ceases to exist on attaining mukti. The form in which the world appears to our limited insight changes on the realisation of the identity of the soul with Brahman. The things we know as the contents of our environment in this practical life of ours are not present, as such, in the Absolute.³ Śaṁkara, in different ways, emphasises the fact that the world does not exist for the Absolute in the way in which it exists for us. Bradley is as certain as Śaṁkara that the distinctive nature of appearances does not survive in the Absolute. To use his expression, the appearances are transmuted somehow in the Absolute. How all these are resolved into reality is a "somehow" in Bradley and anirvacanīya in Śaṁkara. Śaṁkara would object to Bradley's use of the word "transmutation." Even the amount of reaction on the imperfect which the word suggests, is inconsistent with the unchanging perfection of the Absolute. It is Śaṁkara's excessive attachment to logical precision that leads him into somewhat misleading statements, to the effect that the world is nought. We are employing intellectual categories when we speak of the "transmutation" of appearances in reality or the "blending" of notes in an eternal harmony. All these, in the opinion of Śaṁkara, attempt to introduce plurality and empirical distinctions into the heart of the Absolute, for which there is no metaphysical warrant. Reality is superior to all relations. The Absolute remains something which we cannot translate into our terms. The relative, as the relative, has no place in the Absolute. When that which makes the Absolute into relative is destroyed, what remains is the Absolute. Commenting on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, Śaṁkara observes that the turīya or the fourth (integral experience) is realised by merging the three others (waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep) in it. The highest includes the rest, while transcending them.¹ The phrase used "prapañcopaśamam" means the sinking of the world in Brahman, and not its denial. We possess faculties capable of responding to orders of truth, the use of which would change the whole character of our universe. When we attain to the state of turīya, we shall have reality from another angle, lit by another light; only this angle and this light are absolute. When we apprehend reality from this angle, we see that the reality of the world is the Brahman itself.² What we negate is the illusory framework, and what remains is the real in itself.³ Māyā as concealment has no power over the liberated soul. When the certainty of the oneness of Brahman and the Ātman is reached by anubhava, the tie which binds us to forms is cut, and the forms cease to be attractive on their own account. They may remain and will remain, so long as the senses are alive and intellect operates, but there is no need to connect them with the intuited Brahman. When the illusion of the mirage is dissipated by scientific knowledge, the illusory appearance remains, though it no longer deceives us. We see the same appearance, but give a different value to it. When the illusoriness of the illusion is perceived, it ceases to be an illusion. Whether the forms dissolve themselves in the formless or show themselves to be mere appearances of Brahman, on either view the world is not a mere illusion.
v2.c26.s34.17
² Gṛhīte tv ātmaikatve bandhamokṣādisarvavyavahāraparisamāptir eva syāt (S.B., i. 2. 6).
v2.c26.s34.18
³ S.B., i. 2. 12; i. 2. 20.
v2.c26.s34.19
¹ Trayāṇāṁ viśvādīnāṁ pūrvapūrvapravilāpanena turīyasya pratipattiḥ. Pravilaya suggests merging, and not nirākaraṇa or negation.
v2.c26.s34.20
² S.B., i. 3. I.
v2.c26.s34.21
³ S.B., Māṇḍūkya Up., ii. 7.
v2.c26.s34.22
Śaṁkara declares in many passages that the nature of liberation is a state of oneness with Brahman,⁴ and even as the latter is lifted above all categories of experience, so the state of mokṣa cannot be described in terms of our knowledge. Since the latter deals with distinctions of space and time, cause and effect, persons and things, action and suffering, it is said that none of these distinctions applies to the state of freedom. It cannot be said that the liberated live in a geographical area called svarga or brahmaloka; nor can it be said that they last for endless time. For, Śaṃkara agrees with Aristotle that "endless duration makes good no better, nor white any whiter."¹ We cannot regard the state of mokṣa as one of continuous activity. It is the highest experience where all intellectual activity is transcended and even self-consciousness is obliterated. The soul is lifted above the wheel of the world, the saṃsāracakra, with its perpetual rhythm of growth and decay, birth and rebirth, and achieves that experience of eternity which Boethius defines as "the total and perfect possession of unlimited life at a single moment."² Freedom consists in attaining to the state of universal spirit, sarvātmabhāva (literally all-selfness), or Brahman, which is lifted above all distinctions of the empirical world.³ The state of mokṣa is "none other than one's own inherent nature as Brahman, and is not an acquired state like svarga (paradise) It has been taught in the scriptures (śruti), and even stands to reason, that Brahman is of one nature, and therefore liberation is of one sort, whether obtained by Brahmā or man. The sālokya (or being in the same world as Brahman) and other specific kinds of liberation mentioned, are acquired results, and therefore admit of degrees of excellence according to the quality of worship, but liberation (mukti) is not of that nature."⁴ Since Brahman is "present everywhere, within everything and is the self of everything . . . it is altogether impossible that it ever should be the goal of the process of going. For we do not go to what is already reached; experience tells us that a person goes to something different from him."⁵ The worshippers of personal God may have to go to Brahmaloka, but not those who have attained mokṣa.⁶
v2.c26.s34.23
⁴ Brahmaiva hi muktyavasthā.
v2.c26.s34.24
¹ Nichomachean Ethics, i. 6.
v2.c26.s34.25
² Quoted in Evelyn Underhill's Jacopone de Todi, p. 245.
v2.c26.s34.26
³ Sa sarvātmabhāvaḥ sarvasaṃsāradharmātītabrahmasvarūpatvam eva (S.B., Tait. Up., ii. 1).
v2.c26.s34.27
⁴ S.B., iii. 4. 52.
v2.c26.s34.28
⁵ S.B., iv. 3. 14. See also iii. 3. 31.
v2.c26.s34.29
⁶ S.B., iv. 3. 7-8.
v2.c26.s34.30
Mokṣa is described negatively as the state of freedom where there is neither day nor night, where the stream of time has stopped, where the sun and the stars are swept away from the sky. The distinctions of knowledge have no force in it.¹ It is like the heaven of the Christians, an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, that fadeth not away. But it does not follow that it is a state of utter blankness. The freed soul does not see another, but sees himself in all.² Even as Brahman seems from our empirical point of view a mere nothing, so the state of mokṣa seems to be a dead loss, a fading into forgetfulness, a putting out the light and melting away into non-existence, of the type suggested by George Eliot in *The Legend of Jubal*:—
v2.c26.s34.31
¹ Darśanādivyāhahārābhāva (S.B., i. 3. 9).
v2.c26.s34.32
² Muktasyāpi sarvaikatvāt samāno dvitīyābhāvaḥ (S.B., Chān. Up., viii. 12. 3).
v2.c26.s34.33
Quitting mortality, a quenched sun-wave,
The All-creating Presence for his grave.
v2.c26.s34.34
As Śaṁkara protests that Brahman seems non-existent only to the feeble-minded, so he argues that, from our empirical point of view, this becoming one with the great All seems to be a sinking into death and not rising into life, but, strictly speaking, it is not that. There are even passages which make out that on the attainment of mokṣa there is consciousness. Taking one such, Śaṁkara argues that individual consciousness (viśeṣavijñāna) disappears in it and not all consciousness. The pure substance of Ātman (vijñānaghanātmā) remains.³ Similarly, he holds that only limiting adjuncts are destroyed in mokṣa, and not the Ātman itself.⁴ Mokṣa is not vanishing into a waste. To us, from our limited view-point, the soul with its outlook confined to the body, the senses, the mind and the understanding, is the real; and the liberated soul which has realised its oneness with the universal self, has conquered time, and reached life eternal, seems to be unreal. We demand an immortal life in the sense of continued personal existence. Śaṁkara grants it to the soul whose outlook does not go beyond the body, the senses and the mind. Only he regards such a soul as a mere particular, a phenomenon among phenomena that arise and pass away. But when everything that characterises the finite as finite vanishes, when the body which is the symbol of finitude is shaken off, i.e. when the finite is raised to the infinite level, we reach the true state of blessedness even here and now. What is positively its content it is difficult to describe. Of it, it is true, that eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered the heart of man, to conceive the glory that shall be revealed. Yet, if mokṣa is to have any significance for us, we most clothe the idea of immortality in the language of time and call it sarvātmabhāva, all-selfness.¹
v2.c26.s34.35
³ S.B., i. 4. 22. He also quotes Bṛh. Up., iv. 3. 30, in S.B., i. 3. 19, and comments thus: "Viśeṣavijñānavināśābhiprāyam eva, na vijñātṛvināśābhiprāyam."
v2.c26.s34.36
⁴ Upādhipralayam evāyaṁ nātmapralayam (ii. 1. 14).
v2.c26.s34.37
¹ Sarvātmabhāvo mokṣa uktaḥ (S.B., Bṛh. Up., iv. 4. 6).
v2.c26.s34.38
Similarly there are passages where Śaṃkara declares that the true nature of the individual is that of the highest lord, " The self of the highest Lord is the real nature of the embodied soul; and the state of embodiment is due to the limiting adjuncts."² " Even as the imagined serpent becomes a rope after the removal of avidyā, so the apparent individual soul which is stained by agency and experience, love and hate and other imperfections, and is subject to much that is evil, is transformed through wisdom to the sinless essence of the highest God, opposed to all these imperfections."³ Appaya Dīkṣita quotes this passage and remarks that Śaṃkara evidently supports the view of mokṣa as oneness with Īśvara⁴ which he himself adopts.⁵
v2.c26.s34.39
² Pārameśvaram eva hi śarīrasya pāramārthikaṃ svarūpam, upādhikṛtaṃ tu śārīratvam (iii. 4. 8). Again: Evam mithyājñānakṛta eva jīvapara-meśvarayor bhedo na vastukṛto vyomavad asaṃgatvāvīśeṣāt (S.B., i. 3. 19). See also S.B., Īśa. Up., 14.
v2.c26.s34.40
³ Yad avidyāpratyupasthāpitam apāramārthikaṃ jaivaṃ rūpaṃ kartṛtva-bhoktṛtvarāgadveṣādidoṣakaluṣitam anekānarthayogi tadvilayanena, tadvi-parītam, apahatapāpmatvādiguṇakam pārameśvaraṃ svarūpaṃ vidyayā pratipādyate, sarpādivilayaneneva rajjvādīn (S.B., i. 3. 19). See Kalpataru and Parimala on it.
v2.c26.s34.41
⁴ Bhāṣyakāro 'py atispaṣṭam muktasya saguṇeśvarabhāvāpattim āha.
v2.c26.s34.42
⁵ See Siddhāntaleśa, iv. It is suggested that, according to the anekajī-vavāda, mukti is oneness with Īśvara until all are liberated, when it becomes identity with Brahman. See Siddhāntaleśa, iv, and Kṛṣṇānanda's Vyākhyā on it.
v2.c26.s34.43
The freed soul is said to be indistinguishable (avibhāga) from the highest.
v2.c26.s34.44
This indistinguishableness is interpreted in various ways. Jaimini⁶ regards the released soul as possessing the many qualities of freedom from sin, truthfulness of conception down to omniscience and omnipotence. Auḍulomi takes exception to this view, and holds that the freed soul has only the one positive quality of spiritual energy (caitanyam) and the negative one of freedom from sin.¹ The other qualities which Jaimini attributes to the freed soul are due to the limitations (upādhis). Bādarāyaṇa sees no contradiction between the two views.² Śaṁkara agrees with Bādarāyaṇa. Auḍulomi gives us the metaphysical truth which refuses to be squeezed into the empirical categories, but if we insist on an empirical description, Jaimini's view will have to be accepted. So Jaimini and Auḍulomi give the intellectual and the intuitional accounts of the one state of freedom. Bādarāyaṇa, after stating the almost infinite power and knowledge which will come to the liberated soul after the attainment of release, makes the observation that, nevertheless, none will get the power of creating, ruling and destroying the universe, since that belongs to God alone.³ This is consistent with the view of Madhva, who admits that it is impossible for the subordinate souls to acquire the infinite power and independence of God. Rāmānuja, with his view of internal differences in Brahman, and eternal differences between the liberated soul and God, has no difficulty. Śaṁkara finds the view inconsistent with the repeated declarations of the Upaniṣads that the liberated attains extreme "sameness with the pure One"; "He becomes the creator of the world," and yet Bādarāyaṇa says that he cannot rule the world. Śaṁkara explains that in the state of ultimate release there is neither subject nor object, neither self nor world, and so the question of rule and creation does not arise; but so long as we are at the stage of Īśvara and the souls and the world, mokṣa in the absolute sense is not attained, and so, in that state, it is true that the liberated soul has all the qualities of Īśvara, except the power of creation, etc.⁴ According to Śaṁkara, he who has spiritual insight obtains oneness with Brahman, though the state can be described by us only as sameness with God. Those, however, who do not possess spiritual insight, but are worshippers of the personal Īśvara, are not completely rid of avidyā, and so obtain all powers in the brahmaloka excepting those of creatorship and rulership of the world. They retain their individuality independent of Īśvara, though they are filled with the spirit of God.
v2.c26.s34.45
⁶ S.B., iv. 4. 5. See also Chān. Up., viii. 1. 6; viii. 7. 1.
v2.c26.s34.46
¹ S.B., iv. 4. 6. See also Bṛh. Up., iv. 5. 13.
v2.c26.s34.47
² S.B., iv. 4. 7.
v2.c26.s34.48
³ V.S., iv. 4. 17.
v2.c26.s34.49
⁴ The apparent contradiction between Bādarāyaṇa and the Upaniṣads, as also between some sayings of Bādarāyaṇa (iv. 2. 13 and 16, and iv. 4. 17 and 21) is thus resolved by Śaṁkara.
v2.c26.s34.50
Is the state of mokṣa, or release from saṁsāra, consistent with work for the world? Śaṁkara is inclined to answer this question in the negative, since all activity, with which we are familiar, presupposes a sense of duality, and is not consistent with the realisation of the truth of non-duality. Still, so far as jīvanmuktas are concerned, activity is allowed. It follows that activity, as such, is not inconsistent with the truth of non-dualism. The liberated, even while alive, are lifted above the sense of egoity, and so above the sway of the law of karma, and they act, filled with the vision of the most high. There is not an essential antagonism between action and freedom.
v2.c26.s34.51
In this connection the question of the possibility of a return of the liberated to earth in a new existence is discussed.¹ Sages like Apāntaratamas and others, though possessed of the highest wisdom, it is said, returned to bodily existence. Śaṁkara says that they do so in fulfilment of a mission (adhikāra) for the good of the world. When their mission is completed, their individual existence terminates, and there is no possibility of their return. It is, however, clear that, even after gaining insight into reality, we may take an interest in the world, though our return to it is of the nature of a visit and not habitation. Śaṁkara, however, insists that the state of liberation is opposed to that of saṁsāra; and since activity is a general characteristic of the latter, it is not present in the former.
v2.c26.s34.52
¹ S.B., iii. 3. 32.
v2.c26.s34.53
In later Advaita, different views of mokṣa make themselves felt.² Those who hold to the theory of one jīva declare that mokṣa is absorption in Brahman and abolition of the phenomenal world, including God and man.³ Those who accept the theory of the plurality of jīvas trace the phenomenal world to the avidyā of each soul. Though this world subsides on the cessation of avidyā, it continues to exist in the eye of the other unreleased souls. On the theory that God and the individuals are both reflections of Brahman, mokṣa means the breaking up of all reflecting mirrors and absorption into the original itself. It is also held that, while pure spirit underlies both Īśvara and jīva, the latter is a kind of reflection of Īśvara. On this view, liberation is not oneness with Brahman but oneness with Īśvara, so long as there are unliberated jīvas. When a single face is reflected in many mirrors, the removal of any one mirror causes the absorption so far of its reflection into the original; but the face will not get rid of its character as the original until all the mirrors are shattered. Accordingly, so long as there are unreleased souls, release means oneness with Īśvara; but when all souls are released, Īśvara loses his character as the bimba, or the original, and sinks back into Brahman, thus securing for all released souls oneness with Brahman. But, since according to the orthodox Advaita, there is no end of saṁsāra, release means oneness with Īśvara.
v2.c26.s34.54
² Siddhāntaleśa, iv.
v2.c26.s34.55
³ Ekajīvavāde tadekājñānakalpitasya jīveśvaravibhāgādikṛtsnabhedaprapañcasya tadvidyodaye vilayān nirviśeṣacaitanyarūpeṇaivāvasthānam.
v2.c26.s34.56
An interesting question about the nature of saving knowledge is raised. So long as there is knowledge, mokṣa is not reached, but until we obtain knowledge of Brahman, there can be no mokṣa. Is not this latter knowledge, as knowledge, inconsistent with ultimate fruition? It is admitted that there is no knowledge in the ultimate state, and the abolition of the highest knowledge itself is brought out by a number of similes. As the powder of kālaka fruit thrown into impure water carries down all its impurities and itself sinks to the bottom, as a drop of water thrown on a red-hot iron ball takes away a part of its heat and itself disappears, as fire after burning a heap of grass is extinguished of itself, so knowledge of Brahman destroys our ignorance and is itself destroyed.¹
v2.c26.s34.57
¹ See Siddhāntaleśa, iii.
v2.c26.s34.58
Śaṁkara admits the possibility of gradual liberation (kramamukti). Commenting on a passage of the Praśna Upaniṣad, regarding the meditation of Aum, he says that such meditation leads to brahmaloka, where we gradually attain perfect knowledge.² In another place, he argues that the worship of a personal Īśvara has for its aim purification from sin (duritakṣaya), attainment of lordship (aiśvaryaprāpti), or gradual liberation (kramamukti).³ In brahmaloka the soul retains its separate personality. For Śaṁkara, as for all the mystics, the notion of a paradise where the soul is intent upon God and God alone, falls short of the ideal. It may be that the soul sees God face to face and is flooded with his presence, but there is still the distinction between the soul and its object. The soul is not the object of its vision, and its finite and created character withstands its becoming the object.
v2.c26.s34.59
² S.B., i. 3. 13.
v2.c26.s34.60
³ S.B., iii. 2. 21.
v2.c26.s34.61
That life eternal is not a state of existence to follow upon physical death is clear from Śaṁkara’s account of jīvanmukti. When insight dawns even here on earth, liberation is accomplished. The persistence of the body until death does not deceive. As the potter’s wheel continues for a time to revolve even after the vessel has been completed, so also life continues after liberation, since it contains no cause to check the impetus already gained.⁴ Śaṁkara also gives the analogy of the man who sees the moon double, on account of some defect in the eye, and cannot prevent himself from so doing even though he knows that there is really one moon.¹ All activities are understood by the released soul to take place in Brahman.²
v2.c26.s34.62
⁴ S.B., iv. 1. 15.
v2.c26.s34.63
¹ S.B., iv. i. 15.
v2.c26.s34.64
² Different views are put forward in later Advaita, such as: (1) in the state of liberation during life primitive avidyā relaxes a little its power of projection, (2) the impression of avidyā survives its abolition for a little while, (3) the primitive avidyā exists lifeless like a burnt piece of cloth, and (4) the world, including the body, etc., ceases to exist for him. See Siddhāntaleśa, iv.
Cites (8)
- Brahmasūtra — Bādarāyaṇa, Sanskrit
- Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad — Sanskrit
- Chāndogyopaniṣad — Sanskrit
- Taittirīyopaniṣad — Sanskrit
- Mūlamadhyamakakārikā — Nāgārjuna, Sanskrit
- Īśopaniṣad — Sanskrit
- Mānasollāsa (Abhilaṣitārthacintāmaṇi) — Someśvara III, Sanskrit
- Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya (Śaṅkara) — Śaṅkara, Sanskrit