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Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s39: IV Life of Rāmānuja

Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s39

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IV Life of Rāmānuja

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Rāmānuja was born in Śrīperumbudūr in the year A.D. 1027. He seems to have lost his father while young. After receiving the general training given to boys of his class, he had a course in the Vedānta under Yādavaprakāśa of Conjeevaram, but he could not support the interpretations of Yādava on all points. Āḷavandār, the famous head of the mutt at Śrīrangam, was impressed by Rāmānuja's learning, and thought of installing him in the apostolic seat at Śrīrangam. When Āḷavandār drew near his end, his disciples sent Perianambi to bring Rāmānuja. By the time he arrived, the master was no more, and the tradition relates that, when Rāmānuja approached the body, he saw three out of the five fingers of the right hand folded. The disciples explained this to mean that he had three unfulfilled desires, the chief of which was an easy commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*. Rāmānuja returned to Conjeevaram and continued his usual devotions to God. One day, in great distress, he asked the priest of the temple to ascertain the divine will regarding his own future. The will of God was expressed in a verse to the effect, "I am the supreme reality, my view is distinction. Self-surrender is the unfailing cause of salvation, individual effort not being essential, release will come in the end. Perianambi is the best of the teachers."¹ God spoke thus or Rāmānuja heard the voice and set his heart to obey. He met Perianambi at Madhurāntakam, and was initiated by him into the mysteries of the Vedānta. Great men are often unable to find a woman suitable for them, and Rāmānuja was not blessed with a wife who would strive for his ideals and thus increase his powers. Incompatibility in marriage is difficult to conceal, and Rāmānuja soon felt, as Buddha and Śaṃkara, Plato and Paul did, that renunciation is a necessary condition for attaining the highest summits of human perfection or drawing near to God. When he became a saññyāsin, he grew very popular, and the admiring world called him the prince of ascetics (Yatirāja). Rāmānuja settled down at Śrīrangam and acquired a full knowledge of the Tiruvāymoyi. With the help of his disciple Kūrattāḷvār, who knew by heart the *Bodhāyanavṛtti*, Rāmānuja wrote *Vedāntasāra*, *Vedārthasaṃgraha* and *Vedāntadīpa*, and composed his great commentaries on the *Brahma Sūtra* and the *Bhagavadgītā*. The learned among the Vaiṣṇavas gave their approval to Rāmānuja’s exposition of the *Brahma Sūtra*, and it became the commentary (*Śrībhāṣya*) for the Vaiṣṇavas. Rāmānuja toured round South India, restored many Vaiṣṇava temples and converted large numbers to Vaiṣṇavism.

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¹ Śrīmān paraṃ tattvam aham, matam me bhedaḥ, prapattir nirapāyahetuḥ Nāvaśyakī ca smṛtir antyakāle mokṣo mahāpūrṇa ihāryavaryaḥ. That all men attain salvation at the end of life is the central feature of the Pañcarātra religion. See Vedānta Deśika’s *Pañcarātrarakṣā*.

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The great thinker is the spokesman of his age, and re-lives in his own experience the ancient wisdom transmitted to him. The saints and the teachers in whose company Rāmānuja spent his days moved in the region of religious life and piety. The hymns of the Āḷvārs were outbursts of god-filled souls, for whom God was not merely the author of existence but an intimate personal friend and guide. The religious instinct of Rāmānuja seized on the concrete idea of God as a person. Both Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja were great exponents of the Vedānta. Their minds were driven to the same problems, their texts were practically the same, their methods were based on the same assumptions, and yet their results show striking differences. Their conclusions reveal their visions, their respective apprehensions of the truth. Rāmānuja trusts firmly to the religious instinct, and sets forth a deeply religious view which reveals God to man through creation, through the theophanies, through the prophets, through the incarnations. His study of the Āḻvārs and his training by the Ācāryas helped him to develop elements which otherwise would have remained latent in the Upaniṣads and the Brahma Sūtra. He did not for a moment feel that he was propounding a system of his own; he was but expounding the wisdom of the wise of all time.

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HISTORY AND LITERATURE

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The Vaiṣṇava movement has had a continuous history almost from the beginning of the Epic period. In the Ṛg-Veda, Viṣṇu is a solar deity regarded as the pervader, having his place in the supreme heaven.¹ The ideal of Varuṇa is strongly monotheistic in character. We have also in the Vedas the conception of the god Bhaga, who is a bestower of auspicious blessings. It soon came to stand for the power of goodness, and he who possessed the power was called Bhagavān. The religion in which Bhagavān (or Bhagavat) is the object of worship is Bhāgavatism. We have references in the Mahābhārata to the Bhāgavata religion. Vaiṣṇavism is the development of the Bhāgavata religion, which identifies Viṣṇu with Bhagavān. The distinctive features of Vaiṣṇavism are found in the Pañcarātra religion² mentioned in the Mahābhārata. In the Epic, however, Viṣṇu has for his rival Śiva, but in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa Viṣṇu’s supremacy is unrivalled. Hariwaṃśa strengthens the cult of Viṣṇu. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa (A.D. 900) emphasises the Bhāgavata cult centring round Kṛṣṇa. Its bhakti is of an emotional character, and the relation of God and soul is symbolised by that of man and maid. From the Nanaghat inscription, it is clear that Bhāgavatism found its way into South India some time before the first century of the Christian era. The Bhāgavata says that in the Kali age the worshippers of Nārāyaṇa will be numerous in Southern India.³ The hymns of the poet-saints called Āḻvārs—twelve of whom obtained canonical recognition—are commonly known as Nālāyira Prabandham.¹ Among the Āḻvārs are a woman, several Śūdras and a prince. They are succeeded by the Ācāryas or the theologians, whose main objective was to establish a philosophical basis for the worship of a personal God and faith in the saving grace of that God. The chief of the teachers who preceded Rāmānuja are Nāthamuni and Āḷavandār or Yāmunācārya. Nāthamuni (tenth century), a disciple of the last of the Āḻvārs, is said to have arranged the hymns of the Āḻvārs. Nyāyatattva and Yogarahasya are attributed to him. Yāmunācārya struggled hard to defend the Vaiṣṇava Āgamas, and make out that they had the same purport as the Vedas. His chief works are: Āgamaprāmāṇya, Mahāpuruṣanirṇaya, Siddhitrayam, Gītārthasaṃgraha, Catuślokī and Stotraratna. The sacred literature of the Vaiṣṇavas is often referred to as Ubhaya Vedānta, since it included the Sanskrit Prasthānatraya as well as the Tamil Prabandham. The tradition has long been current that the hymns of the Āḻvārs were in agreement with the Vedic scriptures. The uncompromising Advaitism of Śaṃkara made it necessary for Rāmānuja to reiterate the theistic view of the Vedas. He declares that he is only developing the views contained in the Vṛtti of Bodhāyana, and refers to other teachers of his way of thinking, Taṅka, Dramiḍa,² Guhadeva, Kapardin and Bhāruci.³ Śaṃkara admits the antiquity of the theistic tradition emphasised by Rāmānuja. Accordingly we may count as the antecedents of Rāmānuja's philosophy some of the theistic Upaniṣads, portions of the Mahābhārata, including the Nārāyaṇīya section, and the Bhagavadgītā, Viṣṇu Purāṇa, the Vaiṣṇava Āgamas, the works of the Āḻvārs and the Ācāryas. His own chief works attempt to reconcile the thought of the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and the Brahma Sūtra with the faith and belief of the Vaiṣṇava saints. Though it is not easy to decide the exact extent of his originality and independence, it must

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¹ Viṣṇoḥ paramam padam.

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² I.P., pp. 490, 496-9.

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³ xi. 5. 38-40.

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¹ This collection, which consists of four thousand verses (nālāyiram), is arranged in four parts. The first, called Mudalāyiram, contains the utterances of various saints as Periāḻvār and the lady Āṇḍāḷ. The second, called Periaturunori, is the work of Tirumangai; and the third is the famous Tiruvāymoyi of Nammāḻvār. The fourth, Iyarpa, is a miscellany like the first. Nammāḻvar's Tiruvāymoyi is said to be the Tamil adaptation of the Vedas. Cp. "Vedam tamiy śeyda māran"; also

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² Śaṃkara, according to Ānandagiri, refers to this writer in his commentary on the Chān. Up., iii. 10. 4.

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³ Vedārthasaṃgraha.

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Krūre kaliyuge prāpte nāstikaiḥ kaluṣīkṛte
Viṣṇor aṃśāṃśasaṃbhūto vedavedārthatattvavit
Stotraṃ vedamayaṃ kartuṃ drāviḍyāpi ca bhāṣayā
Janiṣyati satāṃ śreṣṭho lokānāṃ hitakāmyayā. (Bhaviṣya P.)

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Nāthamuni says of Tiruvāymoyi: "Sahasraśākhopaniṣatsamāgamam . . . drāviḍavedasāgaram." Tiruvāymoyi has for its central purpose the elucidation of the five topics (arthapañcakam) of the absolute reality, the individual soul, its relation to the Supreme, the destruction of the undesirable, and the realisation of the desirable.

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be said that his attempt in the Śrībhāṣya “ in substantial merit and completeness far outdid any previous effort to find in the Brahma Sūtra a basis for monotheism.”¹ Rāmānuja’s faith is more philosophical and restrained than that of some of his predecessors as well as successors. He did not show any anxiety to reject the ritual and the regulations of the Vedas, nor did he make much of the mythology of the Purāṇas. His chief aim was to proclaim the doctrine of salvation through bhakti, and make it out to be the central teaching of the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and the Brahma Sūtra. Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa’s Śrutaprakāśikā is a celebrated gloss on Rāmānuja’s Bhāṣya.

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¹ Keith, in E.R.E., vol. x, p. 572.

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About the thirteenth century the distinctions between the Tengalais (Southern school) and the Vaḍagalais (Northern school) became accentuated. The former regard the Tamil Prabandham as canonical, and are indifferent to the Sanskrit tradition. The Vaḍagalais accept the two as equally authoritative. The Tengalais adopt the dangerous doctrine of doṣabhogya, namely, that God enjoys sin, since it gives a larger scope for the display of his grace.² The Vaḍagalais use more Sanskrit than Tamil, and adopt elements of Śākta theology in their conception of Lakṣmī.³

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² See Oscar Wilde’s De Profundis: “ Christ, through some divine instinct in him, seems to have loved the sinner as being the nearest possible approach to perfection in man. . . . In a manner not yet understood of the world, he regarded sin and suffering as being in themselves beautiful, holy things and modes of perfection.”

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³ They believe that the consort of Viṣṇu is, like him, uncreated and is to be equally worshipped as the bestower of grace; while the Tengalais look upon her as created and, though divine, merely a mediatrix or channel of the Lord’s grace. See Aṣṭādaśabhedas, by Govindācārya Svāmin, J.R.A.S., 1910.

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Piḷḷai Lokācārya is the chief representative of the Tengalai school. He teaches that the grace of God is irresistible and should be met not merely by active faith (bhakti) but by passive surrender (prapatti). Entire submission to the guidance of the spiritual preceptor (ācāryābhimāna) is emphasised by this school of thought. It must be said that this is not quite the same as the active and intelligent devotion taught by Rāmānuja. Lokācārya is the author of eighteen works called Rahasyas (secrets), of which the chief are Arthapañcaka and Tattvatraya. Maṇavāḷa Mahāmuni is the chief saint of the Tengalais.

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Vedānta Deśika, or Veṅkaṭanātha (thirteenth century), one of the greatest of the successors of Rāmānuja, is the founder of the Vaḍagalai sect. Though a native of Conjeevaram, he spent much of his life at Śrīrangam. He was a prolific writer on many subjects, but his chief philosophical works are Paramatabhaṅga and Rahasyatrayasāra, in Tamil. His Pañcarātrarakṣā and Saccaritrarakṣā describe the principles and practices of the Pañcarātra school. He wrote a commentary on Śrībhāṣya called Tattvaṭīkā, and another called Tātparyacandrikā on Rāmānuja’s commentary on the Gītā. His Seśvara Mīmāmsā treats the Pūrva and the Uttara Mīmāṃsās as parts of one whole, and argues that karma cannot produce its fruit, independent of divine agency. His Nyāyasiddhāñjana and Tattvamuktākālāpa, with its commentary Sarvārthasiddhi, are useful works. His polemical work, Śatadūṣaṇī, which is an attack on Advaita philosophy, had an equally tell-tale commentary called Caṇḍamāruta (seventeenth century). Śrīnivāsācārya’s Yatīndramatadīpikā is a valuable work of the seventeenth century. Appaya Dīkṣita, though a follower of Śaivism, commented on several Vaiṣṇava treatises.¹ Raṅgarāmānuja (eighteenth century) wrote commentaries on the Upaniṣads in the interests of Rāmānuja’s theism. The influence of Rāmānuja is visible throughout the later history of Hinduism. The movements of Madhva, Vallabha, Caitanya, Rāmānanda, Kabīr and Nānak, and the reform organisations of Brahmoism are largely indebted to Rāmānuja’s theistic idealism.

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¹ At a meeting of the Pundits held at Conjeevaram, he said that he saw no distinction between Śiva and Viṣṇu, and so he clung to Śiva. Māheśvare vā jagatām adhīśvare Janārdane vā jagadantarātmani Na vastubhedapratipattir astu me Tathāpi bhaktir taruṇenduśekhare.

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BHĀSKARA

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Bhāskara wrote a commentary on the Brahma Sūtra called the Bhāskarabhāṣya about A.D. 900.² It is not a sectarian work, and does not favour either Śaṃkara’s views or those of Pañcarātra Vaiṣṇavas. Bhāskara is an upholder of the bhedābhedavāda, or the doctrine that unity and multiplicity are equally real.³ Brahman is not an undifferentiated mass of pure consciousness, but possesses all perfections. The causal state of Brahman is regarded as a unity, while its evolved condition is one of multiplicity.⁴ Things are non-different in their causal and generic aspects and different as effects and individuals. Non-difference does not absorb difference as fire consumes grass. The two are equally real. Bhāskara believes in real evolution (pariṇāma).⁵ He regards the illusion theory as unauthentic, and traces it to Buddhist influence.⁶ He holds that the world of matter has real existence, though it is essentially of the same nature as Brahman. When matter acts on Brahman, it serves as a limiting adjunct in the form of body and senses and results in the rise of individual souls. He admits the reality of upādhis, and does not trace them to avidyā. The jīva is naturally one with Brahman, while its difference from Brahman is due to limitations.¹ The relation of jīvas to Brahman is illustrated by the analogy of sparks and fire. The life of Saṃsāra is based on the confusion between Brahman and the upādhis. Through virtue and piety, we can discriminate between the two, and then we are saved. Bhāskara thinks that Brahman actually undergoes the suffering and the rebirth of the individual souls. Karma is, according to him, an essential means (aṅga) to knowledge which results in salvation. He adopts the view of Rāmānuja, or more accurately, jñānakarmasamuccaya or the combination of karma and jñāna.

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² His views are attacked by Udayana in his Kusumāñjali (A.D. 980).

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³ For a criticism of it, see R.B., i. 1. 4.

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⁴ Kāryarūpeṇa nānātvam, abhedaḥ kāraṇātmanā. Bhāskara on i. 1. 4.

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⁵ Bhāskarīyās tu cidacidamśavibhaktam brahmadravyam acidamśena vikriyate (Sarvārthasiddhi, iii. 27).

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⁶ Māhāyānikabauddhagāthitam māyāvādam. Bhāṣya on i. 4. 25.

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¹ Jīvaparayoś ca svābhāviko 'bheda aupādhikas tu bhedaḥ. Bhāskara on iv. 4. 4. See also iv. 4. 15; ii. 3. 18.

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YĀDAVAPRAKĀŚA

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Yādavaprakāśa, for some time the guru of Rāmānuja, who lived in the eleventh century A.D. at Conjeevaram, wrote an independent commentary leaning to the Advaita interpretation. He adopts the Brahmapariṇāmavāda, or the theory of the transformation of Brahman. He holds that Brahman is really changed into cit (spirit), acit (matter), and Īśvara (God). If Īśvara is brought under cit, both conscious and unconscious forms are only different states (avasthābheda) of one substance and not different substances themselves. His theory is called the bhedābhedavāda, or the doctrine of the simultaneous difference and non-difference. While Brahman undergoes changes, it does not forfeit its purity. Yādava does not find any contradiction in saying that a thing can be different and at the same time non-different from itself. He says that all things always present themselves under these two different aspects. They present non-difference so far as their causal substance (kāraṇa) and class characters (jāti) are concerned; they present difference so far as their effected conditions (kārya) and individual characteristics (vyakti) are concerned. Brahman and the world are thus both different and non-different.² While Bhāskara believes that Brahman undergoes in a way the experiences of the finite souls, Yādava contends that Brahman remains in its pristine exalted condition.³ If we believe that the three, God, soul and matter, are ultimate realities and not transformations of Brahman, we are in the realm of misconception (bhrama). Brahman alone is real, and all else is produced from Brahman. For Yādava the distinctions are as real as the identity, while for Bhāskara the distinctions are due to upādhis, which are of course real, while the identity is the ultimate truth. Saṃsāra is nothing more than life based on the wrong knowledge that cit, acit and Īśvara are ultimately distinct. For removing this false knowledge, both karma and jñāna are useful.

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² Sarvārthasiddhi, iii. 27.

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³ Bhāskara on i. 1. 17.

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Rāmānuja protests against Yādava’s view on the ground that the distinction between Brahman and Īśvara is unauthorised. There is none else beyond Īśvara, and Īśvara is not to be regarded as a mere modification of Brahman. The relation of the śaktis, or powers of God, souls and matter to the basis of them (śaktyāśraya), Brahman, is not clear.¹

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¹ Tattvamuktākalāpa, iii. 28.

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THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

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Rāmānuja accepts perception, inference and scripture as valid sources of knowledge, and is indifferent about the rest. His followers add one or two to this list. Perception has for its object what is distinguished by difference, possessing a general character which constitutes its form.²

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² The external properties are open to perception. When we hear a sound, the vṛtti of the ear goes out. Air is an object of the senses. Light is open to touch and sight, even though devoid of smell.

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Rāmānuja admits the distinction between determinate and indeterminate perception. Indeterminate perception is neither the apprehension of an absolutely undifferentiated object or pure being, nor the apprehension of a qualified object and its qualifications unrelated to one another. It is not the former, since it is impossible to apprehend objects devoid of all elements of distinction. The essential feature of consciousness is discrimination, and we cannot apprehend an object without apprehending some special features of it. All knowledge consists in the apprehension of an object qualified by some specific quality³; for, even in determinate perception, only those qualities which were apprehended in indeterminate perception are remembered and recognised. The difference between the two consists in this, that in indeterminate perception we perceive the individual for the first time, and, though we apprehend its class character, we are not aware that it is common to the individuals belonging to the class.⁴

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³ Saviśeṣavastuviṣayatvāt sarvapramāṇānām (i. 1. 1).

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⁴ Tattvamuktākalāpa, iv. 32.

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When we perceive a second individual or a third, we recognise the generic character as common to the whole class.

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For Rāmānuja the individuals alone are real. There is no such thing as a class essence subsisting in them, though there is a resemblance (sādṛśya) among the individuals, such as the arrangement of parts (saṃsthāna). We frame the concept from the fact of resemblance. It is the resemblance that is the basis of the use of the same word.¹ Vedānta Deśika argues that difference in itself (bheda) is in no way relative to the fact which it distinguishes. Accordingly, perception can give us a knowledge of fact as well as its distinction.² These two do not determine each other and are not dependent on one another. They seem to determine each other when it is sought to unite them. But even if we assume all this, it is difficult to understand how there can be a difference which differentiates nothing.³

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¹ Cp. this with the Jaina view.

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² Sarvārthasiddhi, v. 14.

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³ Abhāva or non-existence is said to be an object of perception, since non-existence of a thing means its existence somewhere else. Through anupalabdhi or non-perception we know that consciousness has not always objects with which it is related (i. 1. 1).

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Yogic perception is not admitted as an independent source of knowledge by the followers of Rāmānuja. Each sense has its particular sphere of objects, and, even when well trained, cannot grasp objects belonging to other senses. The ear cannot see nor the eye hear. If the Yogic perception operates through the senses, then it is not different from sense-perception; if it is independent of all experience, then it is invalid.

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Smṛti or remembrance is regarded as valid and given a separate place. We cannot bring it under perception simply because all remembered knowledge assumes perception; for in that case even inference, which presupposes perceptual knowledge, will have to be brought under perception.

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Inference is knowledge derived from a general principle. As a matter of fact, a single instance suggests the general principle. A number of instances helps us in removing our doubts. By means of tarka or indirect proof, and the use of both positive and negative instances, we eliminate the non-essentials and establish the general rule.⁴ The syllogism has three members, the first three or the last three of the Nyāya five-membered syllogism. Comparison is not recognised as independent, since it is a case of either remembrance or inference. Implication (arthāpatti) and subsumption (saṃbhava) are also brought under inference.

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⁴ Sarvārthasiddhi, iv. 47.

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Rāmānuja accepts the authority of scripture. The highest reality, which is the sole cause of the world, is not the object of the other means of knowledge, but is known only through the śāstras.¹ Brahman is not an object of perception.² No generalisation from experience can prove or disprove the reality of Brahman.³ Its reality, to which intelligence points, lies in a region beyond that which can be actually observed or understood by finite intelligence. Scripture is our only source regarding supersensuous matters, though reason may be employed in support of scripture.⁴ The Vedas are eternal, since at every world-epoch Īśvara only gives utterance to them. The smṛtis and the Epics expound the ideas contained in the Vedas, and so they are also authoritative. The Pañcarātra Āgamas may also be accepted as valid, since they owe their origin to the divine Vāsudeva.⁵ Aitihya or tradition, when it is true, is a case of scriptural knowledge (āgama).⁶

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¹ i. 2. 1.

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² i. 1. 3.

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³ i. 2. 23.

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⁴ ii. 1. 12. Yāmunācārya adopts a thoroughly rational view in dealing with rival dogmatisms. Declining to accept the assertion of his opponent, he remarks: "All this teaching may carry weight with believers; we are not credulous, and so we require logic to convince us" (Siddhitraya, p. 88).

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⁵ Tattvamuktākalāpa, iv. 121.

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⁶ When false, it is a case of āgamābhāsa.

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Rāmānuja admits that thought by itself cannot bring us face to face with reality. Even the Vedas give us only indirect knowledge. Something more is needed than the mere understanding of the words of the scripture. Intuition (sākṣātkāra) of reality, which is not the logical knowledge of it, is possible only in meditation bearing the character of devotion.⁷ Vāmadeva and others saw the one Brahman with the material and immaterial objects for its distinguishing modes.⁸ This, the highest knowledge, involves the exercise of the non-cognitive elements of the soul. The mind has other ways of exploring the nature of reality, and all these ways are connected in their final purpose and first source. To realise the truth the mind must exercise all its resources and act at the highest level of its life. Mind at its fullest stretch is suffused with reason as well as feeling. It is quite true that there are wrong feelings even as there are wrong cognitions. It is also true that, in the lower level, feelings stand isolated even as cognitions do. But as the cognitions are systematised, so are feelings transformed and disciplined, *i.e.* rationalised. Since the object intuited is not directly presented, the nature of intuition is said to be indirect or representative in character; yet, so far as its immediacy and clearness go, it is not inferior to perceptual knowledge.¹ As we shall see, this knowledge arises through divine grace in response to acts of daily worship and prayer. This is religious experience or the immediate awareness of the infinite. The individual soul is *en rapport* with the ultimately real.

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⁷ R.B., iii. 2. 23.

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⁸ iii. 2. 24.

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¹ R.B., iii. 4. 26.

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If all knowledge is of the real,² how does it happen that our knowledge sometimes does not correspond to things? The object, appearing in false perception, is not illusory but real; for, according to the doctrine of quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa), all objects of the physical world are compound substances, containing the five elements in varying proportions. "That one thing is called 'silver' and another 'shell' has its reason in the relative preponderance of one or the other element. We observe that shells are similar to silver; thus perception itself informs us that some elements of the latter actually exist in the former." Likeness in certain respects is the indication of a partial identity of substance. We perceive water in the mirage simply because water exists in connection with light and earth particles. When the white conch is seen as yellow by a person suffering from jaundiced eyes, the yellowness of the eye is transmitted to the conch along with the rays of the organ of sight, and the white colour of the conch is obscured. However unscientific this theory may be, it shows Rāmānuja's unwillingness to give up his view that knowledge is always of the real Even in dreams, God creates objects for the enjoyment or suffering of the individual, in accordance with his merit or demerit.³ God, “ while producing the entire world as an object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their respective good and evil deserts, creates certain things of such a nature as to become common objects of consciousness, while certain other things are created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons and to persist for a limited time only. It is this distinction of things that are objects of general consciousness and those that are not so which makes the difference between what is called ‘ things sublating ’ and ‘ things sublated.’ ”¹ It is a mistake to think that some cognitions have false things for their objects and others true ones.

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² Sarvaṁ vijñānajātaṁ yathārtham (i. 1. 1).

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³ See also R.B., iii. 2. 5 and 6.

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¹ i. i. I.

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Rāmānuja’s view seems to explain away all error. While he maintains that all knowledge is of the real, he does not say that knowledge is of the whole of reality. Our knowledge is generally imperfect and partial. When we mistake a piece of shell for silver, we notice certain features and miss others. In the illusion of the “ yellow ” conch we fail to notice the whiteness of the conch. In dream experiences we overlook the fact that the objects are private and peculiar to the dreamer and not to others. Even in what is generally taken as true knowledge we ignore much that is unnecessary for practical purposes. While both true and erroneous knowledge are incomplete, the former takes note of the features necessary for the interests in view and serves our needs; the latter fails to achieve the end in view. True knowledge is useful in life. The mirage is an error, not because the element of water is not present in it, but because the water in it does not quench our thirst. The true is what represents the real (yathārtha) and is practically useful (vyavahārānuguṇa).²

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² Yatīndramatadīpikā.

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While all knowledge is representative of some aspects of reality, it is not complete and perfect until it takes in the whole of reality. The possibility of error is not removed until our knowledge becomes complete and comprehensive, and the individual knower is freed from all defects. In saṃsāra this is not possible, though the aspiration is there.

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Rāmānuja believes in an immanent necessity operating in the nature of knowledge. It is this necessity which enables the indeterminate cognition to pass over into the determinate. Throughout, our judgments attempt to relate the subjects to the larger whole. When knowledge is at its highest, *i.e.* when it reaches its goal, we shall have a single organised experience including a number of parts with their specific functions. In such a whole each member would be characterised by its own place and function, and, though finite, would be none the less individual and unique. The jīva, when freed, attains the ideal of perfect knowledge.

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Śaṁkara is quite right in thinking that a bare identity cannot be grasped by thought, but thought need not be blamed for not achieving the impossible. If the subject is a simple self-identity, then the judgment which asserts that S is P is not true, for we can only say S is S. Significant predication is false, and tautological judgment is useless. But Rāmānuja asserts that while the judgment affirms the identity of the subject with the predicate, there is another equally important factor, that the subject and the predicate are different. There can be no judgment unless there be an identity maintaining itself through the different aspects of things, but the identity must manifest itself in difference and overcome it. Identity is a relation, and every relation requires two terms. If the terms are not distinct, they cannot be related. The negation of all difference renders impossible even the relation of identity. In absolute self-sameness there cannot be any talk of identity. Even when we say S is S, we make such a proposition only in answer to a suggested difference. Śaṁkara argues that when we say " That art thou " there is the apparent difference between the two, and the judgment asserts the real identity between them. But Rāmānuja contends that identity and difference apply to terms which are on the same level of reality. All identity is an identity in and through difference, and every judgment is an illustration of it. In " the sky is blue," " the sky " and " blue " are not identical; nor are they completely different. The object and the property of blueness subsist together, though the two have different significations. The relational view of thought is best adapted to the exposition of the nature of reality, since the real is a perfect system determined by and determining its contents. It is a false standard of intelligibility that regards the rational nature of thought as a defect. Knowledge, to be knowledge, must unfold and develop the system of relations through which it asserts its own existence. The active living principle is what inwardly distinguishes itself and yet remains free in so doing. Śaṃkara holds that a system of relations leads to an infinite regress. A relation implies two terms which, with the relation itself, make three; and if we add to them the mutual relations of them to one another, we are forced to an infinite regress. Rāmānuja rejects this view in favour of a dynamic reality, which has in it the possibility of self-revelation. He does not believe that there are no relations where there is oneness, and where there are relations there is no oneness. The world for knowledge is an orderly whole, the detailed development or expression of a single principle. God and the world are equally real, and each must be real through the other; and this is possible only if we regard the system as a single experience of the personal type. Thought reaches the full apprehension of God as self-conscious intelligence. Reality is an individual of which the elements are the lesser individuals.

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CAUSE AND SUBSTANCE

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Rāmānuja adopts the theory of satkāryavāda. Every effect implies a pre-existent material cause. Alteration of state is the meaning of causation.¹ Threads are the cause of cloth, for cloth is only a cross arrangement of threads.² Existence and non-existence are different states of a substance. Non-existence is only relative and not absolute.

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¹ Avasthāntarāpattir eva hi kāryatā (R.B.G., xiii. 2).

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² R.B., ii. 1. 19-20. See also ii. 1. 16.

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Whatever has qualities is a substance or dravya. The basis (ādhāra) is the substance, and what depends on it (ādheya) is the non-substance (adravya). While things are dravyas, attributes and relations are adravyas. The lamp is a substance, so also the light (prabhā), though the latter is also a guṇa or a quality. Buddhi is a substance, as it has the quality of being subject to expansion and contraction; it is also a quality of the self.¹ The whole world as the viśeṣaṇa (adjective) of God is non-substantial (adravya) from the standpoint of Īśvara. While substances serve as the material cause, non-substances cannot do so.² The substances are prakṛti or matter, kāla or time, śuddhasattva or pure matter, dharmabhūtajñāna or attributive consciousness, jīva or the individual soul, and Īśvara or God.³ While the first three are unconscious (jaḍa), God and the soul are conscious (ajaḍa), and jñāna has the features of both. It is unlike unconscious substances, since it can manifest itself and external objects. Knowledge, however, is never for itself, but is always for another, the self. Knowledge is a unique adjunct of the self, and is called dharmabhūtajñāna. The self knows this or that object when the jñāna issues forth through this or that sense and comes into contact with an object. It is assumed that subjects and objects exist independently and are brought into relation with each other by means of knowledge.

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¹ Tattvamuktākalāpa, iv. 7.

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² Ibid., v. 2.

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³ Ibid., i. 6.

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The five qualities of sound, resistance, form, taste and smell, cohesion, quantity, number, magnitude, individuality, conjunction, distinction, as well as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and will and understanding, are non-substances.

Cites (28)