Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s4: Metaphysical Views

Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s4

Language: English

Metaphysical Views

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The Vedānta Sūtra has four chapters. The first deals with the theory of Brahman as the central reality. Its purpose is samanvaya or reconciliation of the different Vedic statements on this subject. Any interpretation of religion, any explanation of God, soul and the world is bound to take account of the religious experiences of those who declare that they have seen the eternal, and all conflicts among the recorded experiences of the sages of the past require to be reconciled if the theory put forward is to be looked upon as a satisfactory one. We have, in the first chapter, an account of the nature of Brahman, its relation to the world and the individual soul. The second (avirodha) meets objections brought against this view and criticises rival theories. It also gives an account of the nature of the dependence of the world on God and the gradual evolution from and reabsorption into him, and in the latter part¹ there are interesting psychological discussions about the nature of the soul, its attributes, its relation to God, body and its own deeds. The third discusses the ways and means (sādhana) of attaining Brahma-vidyā. We have in it an account of rebirth and minor psychological² and theological³ discussions, together with many exegetical comments. The fourth deals with the fruits (phala) of Brahma-vidyā. It also describes in some detail the theory of the departure of the soul after death along the two paths of the gods and the fathers and the nature of the release from which there is no return. Each chapter has four parts (pādas), and the sūtras in each part fall into certain groups called adhikaraṇas. Some textual differences in the readings adopted by the different commentators are found, though they are not all of great importance.⁴

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¹ ii. 3. 15 onwards.

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² iii. 2. 1. 10.

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³ iii. 2. 11-41.

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⁴ See Belvālkar: The Multiple Authorship of the Vedānta Sūtras, pp. 144-145, I.P.R.

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For Bādarāyaṇa the Veda is eternal⁵ and the śāstra is the great authority.⁶ He declares openly that there is no possibility of discovering metaphysical truth by means of tarka or reflection.⁷ He admits that there are two sources of knowledge, śruti and smṛti, and calls them pratyakṣam (perception) and anumānam (inference)⁸ possibly because the latter, as Śaṃkara suggests, requires a basis of knowledge (prāmāṇyam), and the former not. The revealed śruti, which is self-evident, is called pratyakṣam. By śruti Bādarāyaṇa understands the Upaniṣads, and by smṛti he means the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Code of Manu*. As in the world of secular knowledge, inference rests on perception, so is smṛti dependent on śruti. Bādarāyaṇa admits of no other pramāṇas. He makes a distinction between two spheres of existence, the thinkable, which is the region of prakṛti, with the elements, mind, intellect and egoity, and the unthinkable, which is Brahman. In the latter, śāstras are our only guide.¹ Any reasoning which is not in conformity with the Veda is useless for Bādarāyaṇa. Reasoning proceeds from characteristic marks. But of Brahman we cannot say that it is characterised by this or that to the exclusion of other attributes. Reasoning, therefore, is subordinate to intuitional knowledge,² which can be obtained by devotion and meditation.³

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⁵ i. 3. 29.

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⁶ i. 1. 3.

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⁷ ii. 1. 11.

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⁸ i. 3. 28; iii. 2. 24; iv. 4. 20.

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¹ i. 1. 3; ii. 1. 27.

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² ii. 1. 6; ii. 1. 11.

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³ iii. 2. 24.

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According to the *Vedānta Sūtra*, the puruṣa and prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya are not independent substances, but modifications of a single reality. A plurality of true infinites is not possible. The one infinite substance, Brahman, is identified with the highest reality set forth in the Upaniṣads. In the first chapter we have a discussion of the several descriptions of Brahman given in the Upaniṣads.⁴ He is the origin, support and end of the world,⁵ the efficient and the material cause of the universe. He creates without implements.⁶ A psychological proof of the reality of Brahman is offered on the evidence of dreamless sleep.⁷ Brahman is not to be confused with the unintelligent pradhāna, or the individual soul. He is possessed of all dharmas,⁸ and is the inner law and guide.⁹ He has the qualities of purity, truth of purpose, omniscience, omnipotence, etc.¹⁰ His cosmic aspects are also brought out. He is the cosmic light, the golden person in the Sun, the cosmic space or ākāśa, and the cosmic breath or air or prāṇa.¹¹ He is also the light in the soul.¹² He is to be contemplated as residing in the heart of man,¹³ and we are allowed to look upon the omnipresent God as occupying a limited space. The ultimate ground of things is a single supreme spirit, which is the source of everything, and an adequate object of unqualified adoration and worship.¹

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⁴ i. 2 and 3.

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⁵ i. 1. 2.

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⁶ ii. 1. 23-27

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⁷ i. 1. 9.

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⁸ ii. 1. 37.

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⁹ i. 1. 20.

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¹⁰ i. 2. 1-2; ii. 1. 30.

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¹¹ i. 1. 20-23.

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¹² i. 1. 24.

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¹³ i. 2. 7.

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¹ i. i. 7.

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How are unintelligent things and intelligent souls to be related to the one supreme? Are we to regard them, as the Gītā does, as the higher and the lower manifestations of the one reality? The Sūtra does not give a clear lead. The vagueness of the Upaniṣad view of creation remains in it. Brahman, itself uncreated and eternal,² is the cause of the whole universe.³ Every material element is created by Brahman.⁴ If, through the activity of the primary elements, the evolution of the world takes place, even then it is Brahman that conferred the power through the exercise of which the evolution takes place. As it is said, Brahman, after creating the elements, enters them; and it is Brahman dwelling in the elements that effects the production of other things.⁵

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² ii. 3. 9.

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³ i. i. 5; i. 2. i; ii. i. 22; i. I. 22.

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⁴ ii. 3. 7.

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⁵ ii. 3 .13.

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It has already been said that Brahman is the material cause as well as the instrumental cause of the world.⁶ Brahman is the creator of all things, and transforms himself into all things, as clay or gold becomes things of clay or of gold. In the Sūtra⁷ the nature of the relation between the cause and the effect, Brahman and the world, is discussed. The identity of cause and effect is brought out by two illustrations. Just as a piece of cloth, when rolled up, does not show its nature properly, but shows its nature fully when spread out, though the same piece of cloth is present in the two cases, so cause and effect are the same though their qualities differ.⁸ Just as, when breath is held up, the individual is not able to perform any action, though he continues to live, and, when the breath is let loose, he is able to move the limbs, the breath remaining the same throughout, similarly cause and effect produce different actions, though they really are the same.⁹ Brahman and the world are not different (ananya),¹⁰ even as the clay pot is not different from clay.¹¹ While the commentators agree that the cause is not different from the effect, the nature of the identity of Brahman and the world is differently explained by them. To Bādarāyaṇa, ananya does not mean absence of difference or change. For the explanation of this change Śaṃkara postulates avidyā. The world exists only for those who are under the influence of avidyā, even as the imagined serpent exists only for the man who has the wrong view of the rope. The other commentators hold to the theory of pariṇāma or transformation. The instances of cause and effect given in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad are earth, gold and iron, and things made of them, and not rope and snake or shell and silver. Finite things are real as determinations of Brahman. The statement that Brahman is the material cause of the world suggests that the world is a modification of the substance of Brahman.¹ The world is not an illusion or a dream-like structure, but a real, positive something which has its origination, existence and absorption in Brahman.² Bādarāyaṇa believes that the power of creation belongs to the pure, stainless Brahman, even as heat belongs to fire.³ Brahman for its own sport⁴ develops⁵ itself into the world without undergoing the least change⁶ and without ceasing to be itself. Bādarāyaṇa does not care to explain how this is possible. He does not even say, as Rāmānuja and others urge, that Brahman has wonderful powers by which even the inconceivable might be achieved. He invites our attention to the apparently contradictory statements contained in the śruti, and warns us that we have no right to question the authority of the śruti. From a philosophical point of view this answer is unsatisfactory. Śaṃkara explains the situation and shifts the contradiction from the śruti to the individual mind, and contends that Brahman is not transformed into the world. We, the victims of the confusion, believe that the one changes into the other. He holds that the ultimate reality is Brahman, the indeterminate spirit, and argues that the world of knower, known and knowledge is somehow in Brahman. Rāmānuja is of a different opinion. He resorts to śruti when he is confronted by the difficulty of a pure, secondless Brahman having the beginningless (anādi) course of the world (jagatpravāha) for its second. The impossible is possible with God,¹ who has wonderful powers.²

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⁶ i. 4. 23-27.

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⁷ ii. I. 14-20.

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⁸ ii. i. 19, S.B.

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⁹ ii. i. 20, S.B. The effect, according to Rāmānuja, is a transformed condition of the cause. Even Śaṃkara owns that the world is only an avasthāntara of Brahman as cloth of threads.

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¹⁰ ii. i. 14.

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¹¹ i. i. 4; i. 4. 22.

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¹ i. 1. 26. See also ii. 3. 7.

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² iii. 2. 3.

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³ i. 3. 1.

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⁴ ii. 1. 33.

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⁵ i. 4. 26.

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⁶ ii. 1. 27.

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¹ See R.B., ii. 1. 27.

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² According to the B.S. (iii. 2. 3), the world is not māyā as dreams are. The word "māyā" is, as is clear from the later Vedānta, highly ambiguous. We may take it to mean arthapratyayaśūnyatva with Bhāskara, or dṛṣṭanaṣṭasvarūpatva with Śaṃkara, or āścaryātmakatva with Rāmānuja, or sarvabhāvanāsāmarthya with Vallabha.

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Bādarāyaṇa³ says that the soul is jña, which Śaṃkara interprets as intelligence, while Rāmānuja takes it as an intelligent knower. Vallabha agrees with Śaṃkara, while Keśava thinks that the soul is both intelligence and knower. The individual soul is an agent (kartā).⁴ Birth and death refer to the body and not the soul,⁵ which has no beginning. It is eternal.⁶ The jīvātman is said to be aṇu, of the size of an atom. Rāmānuja, Madhva, Keśava, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Śrīkaṇṭha accept this view. Śaṃkara is of opinion that the soul is all-pervading or vibhu, though it is considered to be atomic in the worldly condition.⁷ Bādarāyaṇa holds that Brahman is in the individual soul, though the nature of Brahman is not touched by the character of the soul.⁸ As the jīva and Brahman are different as the light of the sun and the sun, and as when the light is covered by clouds the sun is not affected, even so, when the jīva is subject to pain, Brahman is not.⁹ The embodied self acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by pleasure and pain, while the highest self has an opposite nature and is free from all evil.¹⁰ The statements "That art thou" and "This ātman is Brahman" attempt to show that the two, Brahman and ātman, God and man, are in reality one. If Brahman be the cause of everything, it must be the cause of the individual soul as well. The absolute divine essence is present in all its manifestations. Every individual shares in the spirit of God. It is not clear, from Bādarāyaṇa's account, in what exact manner the individual is related to Brahman, as a part (aṃśa) or reflection (ābhāsa) of the universal self.¹¹ Bādarāyaṇa points out that Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, and Kāśakṛtsna take up different positions with regard to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Āśmarathya thinks that the soul is a part of Brahman, even in a spatial sense. Auḍulomi holds that, in deep sleep, the soul is temporarily in union with Brahman. Kāśakṛtsna, whose opinion Śaṃkara upholds, believes that Brahman exists, whole and undivided, in the form of the individual soul, and Bādarāyaṇa simply mentions these different opinions, but does not say which view he supports.¹ The passage that the jīva is a part (aṃśa) of the highest reality is taken by Śaṃkara to mean "a part as it were" (aṃśa iva).² Since Brahman, who is not composed of parts, cannot have parts in the literal sense, Bhāskara and Vallabha assert that the jīva is a part of the Lord because there is difference as well as identity between them. Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Baladeva and Śrīkaṇṭha think that the jīva is a real part of Brahman, even as the light issuing from a luminous object like the fire or the sun is a part of that object. The view that the jīva is both different and not different from the supreme, even as a serpent is both different and not different from its folds,³ is refuted. Rāmānuja, however, takes the sūtra as dealing with the relation of Brahman to matter, and disputes the view that matter is only a different posture of Brahman and not different from it, even as the folds of the serpent are only a different position of and not different from the serpent. Rāmānuja contends that both jīva and matter are parts of Brahman. Keśava argues that matter is both different from and one with Brahman, even as the serpent and its hood are different and also not different when the serpent is viewed as a whole. Matter is identical with Brahman inasmuch as its very existence depends on Brahman, and it is different from Brahman since it has name and form. The jīva is also different and not different from Brahman, and the difference is certainly real.⁴ There is strong support for the view that Bādarāyaṇa looks upon the difference between Brahman and the individual soul as ultimate, i.e. something which persists even when the soul is released. The jīva, though minute in size, pervades the whole body even as a little sandal ointment refreshes the whole body.⁵

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³ ii. 3. 18.

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⁴ ii. 3. 33-39.

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⁵ ii. 3. 16.

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⁶ ii. 3. 18.

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⁷ See ii. 2. 19-28. The jīvas, according to the B.S., are of four classes: those born of uterus (jarāyuja), of eggs (aṇḍaja), or moisture (svedaja), and of plants (udbhijja). All of them are considered to be conscious, though in different degrees. The plants are not able to express their consciousness on account of the predominance of tamas.

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⁸ i. 2-8.

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⁹ ii. 3. 46. See Keśava on it.

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¹⁰ i. 1. 17. See also ii. 1. 22.

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¹¹ ii. 2. 43 and 50.

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¹ i. 4. 19-22.

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² ii. 3. 43, S.B.

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³ iii. 2. 27.

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⁴ Keśava on iii. 2. 27-28.

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⁵ ii. 3. 23. According to the Sūtra, the jīva has its seat in the hṛdaya or the hṛtpadma, which is a subtle centre of the spinal cord of the nervous system, where different nerves, 101 in number, meet. Of them all, the suṣumṇā passes up to the cranium. At the approach of death, the knowing soul, through the grace of the Lord, breaks open the knot of the hṛdaya and enters the path suṣumṇā, and passes out of the body, piercing the skull (iv. 2. 17). When the jīva passes out of the body, it does so enveloped by the subtle senses, mind (manas), and the chief prāṇa (iii. 1. 1-7; iv. 2. 3-21). It takes rebirth along with them.

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The world is due to the will (saṃkalpa) of God. It is his līlā, or play. It does not, however, mean that he created sin and suffering for his joy or, as it is sometimes put in some religious schemes, that there may be inferior creatures who will praise and glorify him for his eternal greatness. A God all blissful, who delights in the suffering of creatures, is no God at all. The diversity of mankind is determined by the karma of the individuals.¹ God is limited by the necessity of taking into account the previous lives of men. The unequal distribution of happiness is the expression of the moral order of which God's will is the embodiment. So Brahman is neither partial nor pitiless, and has not the delightful freedom and irresponsibility which some theologians would like to attribute to him. If God's inexorable impartiality is saved by the doctrine that he renders unto every man according to his work, the other view that God himself is the causal agent of right and wrong conduct² remains unexplained. If God pulls the strings for every kind of action, then he is the agent as well as the patient. He seems to be inextricably involved in the endless succession, and is also the giver to himself of the fruits of good and evil. Here again the Sūtra resorts to śruti, but does not attempt to remove the contradiction.

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¹ ii. i. 34.

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² iii. 2. 41; Kauṣītaki Up., iii. 8.

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In chapter iii of the Sūtra it is pointed out how ethical discipline can secure for the individual a body fit for the acquirement of absolute knowledge or Brahmajñāna. The general rules of the Upaniṣads regarding the purification of the instruments in our possession are accepted.³ The three upper classes are, as a rule, allowed the right to perform sacrifices, etc., and even śūdras and women attain salvation through the grace of the Lord.⁴ The author finds that active service and renunciation of the world get equal support from the scriptures,⁵ and is himself inclined towards the combining of the spirit of renunciation with strenuous life.⁶ Action done out of ignorance, but not all action, impedes the rise of spiritual perception or jñāna.⁷ Whatever freedom we might have after attaining release, on earth, even in the jīvanmukta condition, action is enjoined.⁸ Following the Upaniṣads, the Sūtra allows worship of gods who grant blessings to their devotees, though even these are governed by the supreme.⁹ The reality is beyond and not contained in the pratīkas, or symbols, which are permitted in view of the weakness of man.¹⁰ The absolute is avyakta or unmanifested, though he is seen in the state of *samrādhana*.¹ The highest kind of religion is the possession of God-vision. Those who are incapable of developing this spiritual intuition rely on the *śāstras*. The ultimate end of the individual is the attainment of the self.² We cannot say whether this union with the self is of the nature of identity or communion and fellowship. Bādarāyaṇa believes in *jīvanmukti* or liberation in life. Knowledge of Brahman puts an end to the karmas which have not begun to operate,³ though the body lasts until the karmas which have started to operate (*ārabdha*) are exhausted.⁴

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³ ii. 3. 40-42.

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⁴ i. 3. 34-38; iii. 4. 38.

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⁵ iii. 4. 9.

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⁶ iii. 4. 32-35.

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⁷ iii. 4. 26.

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⁸ iii. 4. 32.

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⁹ iii. 2. 38-41.

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¹⁰ iv. i. 4.

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¹ iii. 2. 23-24.

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² i. 1. 9.

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³ iv. 1. 13-15.

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⁴ iv. 1. 19.

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In chapter iv we have an account of how the individual soul reaches Brahman through the *devayāna*, whence there is no return. In iv. 4. 5-7, the characteristics of the released soul come up for discussion. According to Auḍulomi, its chief feature is thought. Jaimini maintains that it has a number of exalted qualities, and the author of the *Sūtra* declares himself in favour of a combination of these two views. After mentioning the almost infinite power and knowledge which will come to the liberated soul on attaining *mokṣa*, the author remarks that none, however, will get the power of creating, ruling and dissolving the universe,⁵ since that belongs to God alone. Madhva and Rāmānuja easily explain this passage, since it is in line with their doctrine of the eternal distinction of soul and God.⁶ Bādarāyaṇa, however, is not explicit on this question. While some passages declare the difference to be permanent,⁷ others explain it away.⁸

Linked texts (2)

Brahmasūtra — Bādarāyaṇa, Sanskrit
Kauṣītakibrāhmaṇopaniṣad — Sanskrit