Indian Philosophy v2.c27.s5: VI Madhva
Indian Philosophy v2.c27.s5
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VI Madhva
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A leading form of reaction against Śaṃkara’s Advaitism is the dualistic philosophy associated with the name of Madhva, which has many points in common with Rāmānuja’s view of reality.¹ Madhva stands out for unqualified dualism and insists on the five great distinctions of God and the individual soul, God and matter, the individual soul and matter, one soul and another, and one part of matter and another. The doctrines of exclusive mediatorship through Vāyu, the son of Viṣṇu, eternal hell as well as the missionary fervour of Madhva’s faith, suggest the influence of Christianity, though there is little evidence in support of it. In view of the fact that Madhva’s commentary on the Kena Upaniṣad is taken from Brahmasāra, it is reasonable to think that there was the tradition of dualism even prior to Madhva. As we shall see, Madhva makes a clever use of the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika theories.
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¹ The main differences are that while Rāmānuja thinks that the individual souls are similar in their natural essence, Madhva makes them different. Madhva denies that Brahman is the material cause, which Rāmānuja admits. For Madhva, the universe is not the body of God. In Rāmānuja there are no souls disqualified for salvation and there are no differences in the enjoyment of bliss for freed souls.
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LIFE AND LITERATURE
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Madhva,² also known as Pūrṇaprajñā and Ānandatīrtha, was born in the year 1199 in a village near Udipi, of the South Canara district. He became early very proficient in Vedic learning and soon became a saññyāsin. He spent several years in prayer and meditation, study and discussion. He developed his dualistic philosophy in discussions with his preceptor Acyutaprekṣa, an adherent of Śaṃkara’s school. He proclaimed the supreme godhead of Viṣṇu and admitted the validity of branding one’s shoulders with the arms of Viṣṇu, a practice accepted by Rāmānuja. He made many converts to his faith in different parts of the country, founded a temple for Kṛṣṇa at Udipi, and made it the rallying centre for all his followers. Prohibition of bloodshed, in connection with sacrifices, is a salutary reform for which he is responsible. He died at the age of seventy-nine.
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² Nārāyaṇācārya’s Madhavavijaya and Maṇimañjari contain the orthodox account of Madhva’s life and work. If we eliminate the miracles and supernatural incidents which the piety of his followers attributed to him, we may get the historical basis of Madhva’s life and mission.
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The standard treatises of this school of thought are, of course, the works of Madhva. He wrote a commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, and justified his interpretation of it in another work called Anuvyākhyāna. His commentaries on the Bhagavadgītā and the Upaniṣads,¹ his epitome of the Mahābhārata called Bhāratatātparyanirṇaya and gloss on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa help to elucidate his philosophy. He also wrote a commentary on the first forty hymns of the Ṛg-Veda and discussed many philosophical and other themes in his Prakaraṇas. Throughout his works he gives the impression that he relies more on the Purāṇas than on the Prasthānatraya, the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Brahma Sūtra. It is not quite easy for Madhva to interpret these authoritative works in the interests of his dualistic metaphysics. Jayatīrtha’s commentary on Madhva’s Sūtrabhāṣya and that on Madhva’s Anuvyākhyāna called Nyāyasudhā, are works of great importance. Vyāsarāya wrote a gloss called Candrikā on Jayatīrtha’s commentary on Madhva’s Sūtrabhāṣya. Pūrṇānanda’s Tattvamuktāvali² is a bitter attack on the Advaitavāda.
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¹ See S.B.H., vols. i, iii and xiv.
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² Translated by Cowell. See J.R.A.S., vol. xv, pt. ii.
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THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
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Madhva accepts the three sources of knowledge, perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Comparison (upamāna) is regarded as a variety of inference. Perception and inference by themselves cannot help us to solve the riddle of the universe. Perception is confined to the facts open to the senses. Inference is incapable of supplying us with new facts, though it helps us to test and systematise the facts obtained through other means. We have to depend on the Vedas for a true knowledge of reality. Madhva accepts the authoritativeness of the Vedas as a whole, and does not discriminate between the different parts of it. The Hymns and the Brāhmaṇas are as useful and valid as the Upaniṣads. Madhva distinguishes between testimony due to personal authority (pauruṣeya), which may be fallible, and that which is not the composition of any person (apauruṣeya). The latter is of absolute validity and infallible. The Vedas, of which Madhva’s philosophy purports to be the right interpretation, are regarded by Madhva as apauruṣeya or uncreated by any personal author, and are therefore said to be authoritative in character.
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Apprehension, through whatever means, is the direct evidence of the thing that is apprehended. The instruments which mediate apprehension are not present in the apprehension itself. The relation between the knower and the known is direct and immediate. The pramāṇas of perception, inference, and Vedic testimony, are so called simply because they are instrumental in producing knowledge—which fact comes out when we study knowledge externally. Every apprehension of fact that we have is valid, and implies the existence of the fact, even though it may exist only for the moment of apprehension. If we repudiate it as invalid, it is because of some other apprehension whose validity we accept. Sunrise and sunset are occurrences, until we have the further knowledge that the sun neither rises nor sets. Madhva accepts the intrinsic validity of apprehension as such, and disputes every theory which regards our knowledge as a mere appearance. If our knowledge does not reveal the structure of reality and indicate objective existence, but simply gives us a wrong lead, then the unreal cannot even appear, cannot be the object of even erroneous apprehension, and cannot be related to knowledge as cause to effect. If all knowledge is erroneous, the distinction between true and false ideas disappears. An analysis of illusion tells us that there is an object presented to consciousness, though we mistake its nature, owing to some defect of the senses or other means of knowledge. The elements of false perception are not false. They are facts of experience. Through some defect, we do not take a full view of the object, but what we see of it recalls something like it in nature, though different from it, with which we confuse the given datum. Every case of illusion implies two positive entities, a given thing and a suggested object. The notion of the unreality of the world means that there is something real which we mistake for something else. It does not mean that there is nothing real at all.
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Madhva takes his stand on experience or knowledge and argues that there can be no knowledge without a knower and a known. To speak of knowledge, independent of a knowing subject or a known object, is meaningless. Knowing subjects and known objects must exist. The world is not an unreality. If we do not admit distinctions of things, we cannot account for distinctions of ideas. Our knowledge tells us that differences exist. We cannot regard them as merely conventional, for convention does not produce the distinctions.
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The fact of difference is generally traced to the force of space and time, which are considered to be mere forms of the subject's intelligence. If space and time were identical with the knowing self, it is difficult to see how the notion that they are identical with the subject could arise. If the self as knowledge is all-pervading, we cannot have distinctions of space and time. To attribute the latter to the force of avidyā does not help us, since the status of avidyā and its relation to the self cannot be explained satisfactorily. Every explanation of avidyā implies the presuppositions of space and time, and so the latter cannot be explained away as the products of avidyā. Space and time are regarded as real wholes having parts. If they have no parts, we cannot have distinctions of here and there, now and then. We are presented with parts of space, for it is incorrect to hold that everything presented to us occupies all space, unlimited and indivisible. We are conscious only of limited bodies occupying portions of space and resisting one another. We perceive parts of space and time, and so they must be regarded as existing. According to Madhva, they are objects of perception to the witnessing self (sākṣin).
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Reality (padārtha) is of two kinds, according to Madhva, independent (svatantra) and dependent (paratantra). God, the supreme person, is the only independent reality. The dependent beings are of two kinds, positive (bhāva) and negative (abhāva). Of the positive we have two varieties, conscious (cetana) souls, and unconscious (acetana) entities, like matter and time. Unconscious existence is either eternal like the Vedas, eternal and non-eternal like prakṛti, time and space, or non-eternal like the products of prakṛti.¹
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¹ According to Madhvasiddhāntasāra (2), there are ten padārthas. Dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣaviśiṣṭāṃśiśaktisādṛśyabhāva daśa padārthāḥ.
Cites (1)
- Ṛgvedasaṃhitā — Sanskrit