A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy c4.s3.19

Language: English

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(v) Yājñavalkya, like his teacher Āruṇi, is a great psycho-metaphysician. We shall consider the points of his metaphysics first, and then go on to the consideration of his psychological doctrines. In fact, Yājñavalkya's philosophy would be so much called upon in our later Chapters, that we can only indicate it here very briefly and for the purpose of giving a synoptic view of his philosophy. We shall not consider the points of Yājñavalkya's philosophy in the order in which he answers the questions of his wife, and of the philosophers that meet him in King Janaka's court, and of King Janaka himself in the second, third and fourth chapters respectively of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka. We shall consider them only logically. In Chapter III of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, he had, no doubt, a formidable number of intellectual adversaries to grapple with. Aśvala and Śākalya were interested more or less in ritualism and theology, and so they could be easily disposed of; but Jāratkārava, who was interested in eschatology Bhujyu, whom we have already met with as a psychical researcher, Ushasta, who was interested in the nature of Ultimate Reality, Kahola, who wanted to know the practical way to the realisation of Ātman, Gārgī and Uddālaka, who were both interested in the problem of immanence, the one dynamically, the other statically, were, in any case, a formidable list of opponents.

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The philosophy of Yājñavalkya which emerges in his conversation with these adversaries as well as his wife and king Janaka, may be briefly set down as follows. He teaches that all objects are centred in the Self, as all thoughts are centred in the mind, as all touches in the skin, as all waters in the ocean (II. 4. 11). The Ātman pervades all. Yājñavalkya also uses the simile of the immanence of salt in water (II. 4. 12), borrowing it probably from his teacher Aruṇi. Secondly, Yājñavalkya teaches that all things exist for the Self; if we do not so regard them, they would vanish for us (II. 4. 6). Thirdly, he tells us that all things are dear for the sake of the Self. In every act of mental affection, the Ātman is calling unto Ātman. The realisation of Ātman is the end of all endeavour (II. 4. 5). Fourthly, Yājñavalkya says that this Ātman alone is real; all else is "ārtam"—a mere tinsel-show (III. 4. 2 and III. 5. 1). Yājñavalkya then proceeds to characterise the Ātman in negative terms ; the Ātman is neither large nor small, neither short nor long; he is flavourless, eyeless, odourless, and quality-less (III. 8. 8). Contrast this negative theology of Yājñavalkya with the positive theology of Śāṇḍilya. As a proof of the existence of Ātman, Yājñavalkya draws upon the argument from order : Ātman is the “ bund ” of all existence : our very hours and days are measured by this Ātman (III. 8. 9). The Ātman is universally immanent. He is the inner controller of all things.

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We are merely like little dolls, and throw out our hands and feet according as the great Thread-puller, Ātman, wishes to make us dance (III. 7). The Ātman is the ultimate light of man ; all other lights are lights by sufferance. When Ātman is realised as the light of man, one reaches self-consciousness (IV. 3. 1-6). The Ātman alone is the ultimate hearer, seer, thinker : there is no thinker beside Him (III. 4. 2). The Ātman perceives himself. Only when there is a duality, then one may see another ; but when One alone is, processes of perception and thought are alike impossible, and we are reduced to a state of solipsism (II. 4. 14). But Yājñavalkya takes care to say that the organs of perception of the percipient do not cease to function. That, from the epistemological side, is the relieving feature of his solipsism (IV. 3. 23-30). In psychology, Yājñavalkya teaches, like other Upanishadic philosophers, that when the state of dream occurs, the Ātman spreads out his own light (IV. 3. 9). The Ātman in this state moves out from his nest, guarding it nevertheless with breath (IV. 3. 12). It must be remembered, however, that the Ātman only seems to move, or only seems to imagine in the state of dream, and does not really move or imagine (IV. 3. 7). Yājñavalkya advises that when a man is dreaming, let no one wake him up suddenly, for fear, apparently, that the Soul may depart (IV. 3. 14). A father in that state is not a father; a mother, a mother; a thief a thief;

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a murderer, a murderer; a Cāṇḍāla, a Cāṇḍāla; and analogically, a Brahmin a Brahmin (IV.3.22). As regards the state of sleep, he advocates, like Āruṇi, the fatigue theory (IV.3.19). He tells us, furthermore, that sleep is a twilight condition, where one sees this world as well as the other world (IV.3.99). As regards departing consciousness, Yājñavalkya tells the story of the process of death in such a realistic fashion that we cannot but regard him as an exceedingly shrewd observer of nature. At the time of death, the corporeal self is mounted on by the intelligent self, the Śārīra Ātman by the Prājña Ātman, and it moves along groaning like a heavy-laden cart (IV. 3. 35). Before death occurs, the person in the eye first turns away (IV. 4. 1). The end of the heart is lighted, and by that light, the soul departs either by the way of the eye, or the head, or any other part of the human body (IV. 4. 2). His "Karman" alone accompanies him: it is the guardian of his destiny (IV. 4. 5). It is probably this doctrine of "Karman" that, we may say, Yājñavalkya imparted to Jāratkārava in III. 2. 13, and thus silenced him. According to Yājñavalkya, it seems that only when the Ātman has prepared another abode for himself that he leaves the body. Not unless it finds another blade to rest upon would a caterpillar leave its original blade (IV. 4. 3).

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Yājñavalkya says also that the newer existence must be even a brighter existence: does not the goldsmith create from the old gold a newer and brighter form (IV. 4. 4)? If the Self has left any desires in him while yet he lives in his body, he returns from his sojourn to this existence again; if no desires be left in him, he becomes one with Brahman (IV. 4. 6). At that time no consciousness remains. Consciousness is merely a "fleeting" phenomenon due to the entry of the Ātman in the elements which produce the bodily form (II. 4. 12). Yājñavalkya’s wife was really frightened at the pass to which Yājñavalkya’s philosophy had led, but we, who understand Yājñavalkya’s absolute idealism may not wonder if, from that point of view, he regarded even transmigration as a delusion. If we may be allowed to use Yājñavalkya’s own manner of philosophising, we may well ask, when the Ātman alone is, at all places and at all times, from what would he transmigrate, and to what? But all this is only implied in Yājñavalkya. For fear of disturbing the ordinary routine of thought, of which his wife supplies us with an illustration, Yājñavalkya hastily excuses himself from the *impasse* to which his doctrine had led him, by saying that sufficient for the nonce was the wisdom he had imparted (II. 4. 13).