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The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana c5: The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana: Analysis of Contents

The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa c5

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The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana: Analysis of Contents

Preliminary

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Before the rise of Buddhism, there was a variety of views about the survival of the individual after death. Materialists denied survival of the individual after death in any form. Some adherents of the sacrificial religion believed in a blissful existence in paradise. Some believed that the individual would enjoy supreme bliss by the dissolution of its personality in an impersonal all-embracing Absolute. Some believed in an eternal individual soul which would return to its original condition of a pure spirit after many rebirths.

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Buddha adopted a middle course. He agreed with the Eternalists that there was an accumulation of merit through a series of progressive rebirths, but he denied that there was any eternal spiritual principle. He did not believe in any permanent substance. He considered the world-process to be an appearance of discrete evanescent elements. His was a system of radical Pluralism

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Buddha had reduced Reality to discrete elements of matter and mind without any permanent substance or a permanent personality Therefore it became difficult for him to explain moral law without a personality on whom the law would be binding or salvation without the existence of some one who would reach that goal

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Buddha attempted to solve the problem by emphasizing the attainment of "quiescence" as the highest bliss. According to him, the goal of man was to escape from the movement of phenomenal life into absolute quiescence in which all mental activity was stilled for ever. The name for this quiescence was Nirvāna. The term was pre-Buddhistic used in the sense of the dissolution of the personal in the universal whole (brahma-nirvāna). The means of attaining this was Yoga.

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According to some scholars early Buddhism was merely Yoga, and lack of permanent individual, Nirvāna etc. was invented by later Buddhism These scholars interpret Yoga as vulgar magic Yoga is, however, not magic but a well-developed technique of concentration.

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Yoga brings about a ‘condition of quiescence’ A personality (pudgala) which, in other systems, is considered to be a permanent spiritual principle (ātmā), is according to Buddhism, only a bundle of elements or forces (Sanskāra-Samūha) and a stream of thought (santāna). It contains nothing permanent, or substantial, it is anātma Some of the elements are constant, some appear only under certain conditions.

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Among the constantly present elements, there are two precious ones, viz., prajñā or the faculty of appreciative analysis and samādhi or the faculty of concentration. When fully developed, prajñā becomes transcendent wisdom (prajñā amalā). Life in ordinary men is controlled by ignorance (avidyā) which is not a constant faculty and can be eliminated (phrahīna).

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The moral progress of man is the outcome of a struggle, in man between the good (kuśala) and the evil (akuśala) inclination. The presence of defiling ignorance (avidyā) together with its disturbing qualities (kleśas) makes the whole stream of thought (santāna) impure.

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The disturbing or defiling faculties (kleśas) are divided into two classes, (1) those that can be remedied by insight (drsti-heya) and (2) those that can be remedied only by concentrated attention (bhāvanā-heya) In the path of Nirvāna, bhāvanā is the most decisive step It can transport the individual into a higher realm of existence

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Existence is divided into two distinct spheres the mystic world or samāpatti, and the gross world of carnal desire or kāma-dhātu. The latter includes hells, earth and the heavens where gods are living and enjoying themselves in a human way.

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The mystic worlds are further divided into two classes—those in which the denizens possess ethereal bodies, and those in which they do not possess any physical bodies. The purely spiritual realms (*arūpa-dhātu*) are four. Their denizens are engrossed in contemplation (*samāpatti*) out of the three incentives of human action on earth, viz., wealth, love and duty (*artha-kāma-dharma*), the last alone continues its unimpeded sway in the mystic's world

III Mystic Intuition (Yogi-Pratyakṣa)

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It is contended both in Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna that in a mystic trance, the mystic sees in a moment the construction of both the gross and the mystic worlds as vividly as if they were an experience of direct sense-perception But the picture given by Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna mystics is entirely different. The Hīnayāna mystic views the universe as an infinite continuity of single moments in gradual evolution towards ‘Final Extinction’ The Mahāyāna mystic sees another picture corresponding to the theoretical teaching of that system.

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The preparation for salvation consists of (1) a preliminary course of acquiring moral qualities (*sambhāra mārga*), (2) a subsequent course of training (*prayoga mārga*), (3) insight into essential truths (*dṛṣṭi mārga*) *Dṛṣṭi mārga* means insight into the four truths of the saint (*catvāri ārya satyāni*), viz., (1) phenomenal existence (*duḥkha*) (2) its driving force (*samudaya*) (3) its extinction (*nirodha*), and (4) the means for the final extinction (*nirodha-mārga*).

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In Hīnayāna, the process of illumination is described in two aspects (1) that of feeling (2) and that of knowledge. The feeling is one of satisfaction (*kṣānti ruci*). This is followed by knowledge or intuition which means the vision of the elements of existence (*dharma-jñāna*)

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In later times when the study of Abhidharma was superseded by that of logic and epistemology, direct cognition was defined as containing no synthetic thought (*kalpanāpodha*). The four truths were at first ascertained by sound logic (*pramāṇena vimśita*), and then suddenly perceived as vividly as a gram of corn on the palm of the hand. In Mahāyāna, the preparation consisted in a course of negative dialectic after which the intuition of the transcendental truth, springs up as an inward conviction (*pratyātma-vedya*)

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Buddhist yoga was an inseparable part of the belief in a pluralistic universe of separate elements (*dharmas*) gradually evolving towards extinction. All yoga practices which did not have this philosophical aim were condemned by the Buddha.

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All the systems of philosophy in India excepting Mīmāmsā believed in yoga as a means for 'transition out of the phenomenal into the absolute'

IV. Buddha's Belief in Personal Immortality

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'Immortal' is one of the epithets used for Nirvāna Does immortality connote blissful existence among the forefathers in heaven ? Or does it connote the paradise of Amitābha ? The epithet 'Nirvāna' does not mean any of these things. Nirvāna is 'beyond all imaginable spheres , it is the absolute limit ' It simply means changeless, lifeless, deathless condition ; it connotes a state in which there is neither birth nor death. "People enter paradise by being re-born in it , they disappear for ever in Nirvāna by being extinct "

V Was Buddha An Agnostic ?

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Buddha maintained a studied silence regarding some fundamental metaphysical questions e g, 'Is the world beginningless or has it a beginning, is it finite or infinite, what is the condition of the saint after death or what is the nature of the Absolute ?' Buddha either did not answer such questions at all or declared them as futile

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Scholars like N de la Vallée Poussin and B Keith interpret his silence as due to ignorance, but the fact is that fundamental reality cannot be explained in terms of the discursive intellect. Buddha maintained that the very effort of the intellect to confine truth to a simple 'either-or' to extremes is bound to prove futile, the truth lies in the middle path. It cannot be described in terms of the human language which is the product of analytical intellect. It is ‘unspeakable’ ‘indefinable’. Non-duality is above words.

VI. The Position Of The Later Schools Of Hinayāna

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Scholars like N. de la Vallée Poussin divide the history of Buddhism into three main periods, viz., a period of primitive faith, a period of confused ideology and a period of scholasticism. Such scholars have only attempted to construct the history of Buddhism on lines parallel to the Western Church.

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Such a division of Buddhism is artificial. It is preferable to keep to the broad divisions of Buddhism into early or Hinayāna and later or Mahāyāna and the Sautrāntikas as a transitional school.

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Scholasticism is used in two senses, viz., (1) philosophy in the service of religion (2) excessive subtlety and artificiality in philosophical constructions. Scholasticism in Buddhism is to be taken in the second sense The Vaibhāsikas were scholastic in this sense. The Sautrāntikas were in favour of simplification.

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Mahāyāna may be assigned to the 1st Century A. D. and the decline of Hinayāna in the North to the 5th Century A. D. The Sautrāntikas occupied an intermediate position between the extreme Mahāyānists and the "school men" Finally they coalesced with the Mahāyānists forming the school of Yogācāra-Sautrāntika

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The Vaibhāsikas considered Nirvāna to be something real (vastu), the Mahāyānists and the Sautrāntikas maintained that it was only nominal , it was nothing real by itself, it was merely the cesation of all personal life

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Poussin has given interesting details of the controversy regarding Nirvāna, but he has missed the meaning of the controversy. The Vaibhāsikas did not maintain that Nirvāna was a kind of paradise as Poussin seems to think, but that the annihilation of all life (*nirodha*) the essence of Nirvāna was a reality (*nirodha-satya, vastu*) i. e ‘a materialistic lifeless reality’. The Sautrāntikas adhere to the Mahāyāna conception which consists in identifying Nirvāna with the living world itself They deny the reality of that materialistic kind of Nirvāna which was maintained by the Vaibhāsikas.

VII The Double Character Of The Absolute

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Nirvāna may be said to be the equivalent of the Absolute With regard to Nirvāna, there are two diametrically opposed views both in Brāhminical and Buddhist philosophies.

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Nirvāna is considered to be either eternal annihilation or eternal life The various views may be represented clearly in the following tabular form .

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| Schools | Views |
| Early Nyāya-Vaiśesika | In Mukti, there is mere *sat* or existence without *cit* or consciousness |
| Early Buddhism and the Vaibhāsika school | Nirvāna is a reality (*dharma, vastu*) but without any consciousness (*yasmin sati cetaso vimoksah*) |
| Vedānta, Sānkhya and Yoga | Nirvāna is eternal life |
| Hinayāna | Supreme Buddha has no body. |
| Mahāyāna and Sautrāntikas | Buddha has a glorious, all-embracing cosmic body (*dharma-kāya*) |
| Early schools of Hinayāna and the Vaibhāsikas | Both Samsāra and Nirvāna are real separately |
| Mādhyamika | Both Samsāra and Nirvāna are separately unreal |
| Sautrāntika | Samsara is real, Nirvāna is separately unreal |
| Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda | Samsara is unreal, Nirvāna is real. |

VIII. The Vaibhāṣikas

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They may be considered to be the representatives of the Sarvāstivādins or Early Buddhism in general. Their views may be summed up in the following words. Existence has a dual aspect, viz., (1) transient and phenomenal (2) eternal and absolute. The phenomenal aspect may be analysed into matter, mind, and forces, the eternal into Space and Nirvāṇa.

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There are two sets of elements of the phenomenal life, viz. (1) the one representing their everlasting nature (dharma-svabhāva), (2) the other representing their momentary manifestation in actual life (dharma-lakṣaṇa). When all manifestations are stopped and all forces become extinct, only lifeless residue remains. This is similar to the undifferentiated Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya It must, however, be remembered that the Sāṅkhyas admitted both eternal Matter and eternal Souls, but the Buddhists denied Soul.

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The Vaibhāṣika maintains that Nirvāṇa is an entity (dharma) which remains when consciousness becomes extinct.

IX. The Sautrāntikas

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According to the Sautrāntikas, Nirvāṇa was the absolute end of all manifestation known to us, the end of passion and life (Kleśa-Janmanoḥ kṣayaḥ), without any positive counterpart. They denied any residue or substance in which life was extinguished. In other words, like all the Mahāyānists, they denied materialistic Nirvāṇa.

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They neither admitted the monistic spiritual principle (ālaya-vijñāna) of the idealistic Mahāyānists, nor the principle of relativity (śūnya-vāda) of the Mādhyamikas.

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It appears from the works of the famous Sautrāntika, Vasumitra that according to this school, there were two kinds of elements (skandha)—those which were subject to total extinction, and a subtle consciousness which survived after Nirvāṇa, and of which the former were but a manifestation.

X. The Yogācāras

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This was an idealistic school founded by Āryāsanga in the 4th, 5th Century A. D.

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The Yogācāra School is divided into two (1) Āryāsanga and his followers (2) Dignāga and his followers. According to Āryāsanga, *alaya-vijñāna* is a store-consciousness in which the seeds (*bīja*) of all future ideas and the traces of all past deeds are stored up It is not the Absolute. It belongs to the phenomenal part of existence, because all the results of *karma* are stored therein

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From their predecessors, the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras adopted the theory of the relativity and consequent unreality, (*śūnyata=niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all individual existence, of all plurality, with the difference that they introduced different degrees of this unreality.

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According to this school, individual ideas were unreal, since they were merged in the unique reality (*pariniṣpanna*) of the Absolute (*tathatā=dharmatā*) This was called their unreality in the absolute sense (*paramārtha niḥsvabhāvatā*) The Absolute was immanent in the phenomenal world, neither different, nor non-different (*nānya, nānanya*) It was a pure consciousness, undifferentiated into subject and object (*grāhya-grāhaka-rahita*) It is identified with the cosmic body (*dharma-kāya*) of the Buddha.

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Both Vasubandhu and Asanga ultimately adopted the idealistic view, according to which all separate elements were relative, not real in themselves, but real only when regarded *sul specie aeternitatis*

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Hinayāna regarded both Samsāra and Nirvāna as realities, Yogic power achieved the transition from Samsāra into Nirvāna

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According to Mahāyāna, the Absolute was immanent in the world So there was no need to convert the *samskṛta-dharmas* into *asamskṛta-dharmas* There was only a change of aspect when Nirvāna was attained The Yogi viewed every separate object as unreal eparately, but real sub specie aeternitatis.

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Dignāga analysed reality into the concrete and the individual (svalaksana), a point-instant (ksana) in which existence and cognition, object and subject coalesce.

XI. The Mādhyamkas

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The Mādhyamika system of philosophy and dialectics is the main foundation of the Mahāyāna religion. The Mahāyāna religion differs from early Buddhism in many respects and has several points of contact with Brāhmanical religion.

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The Mādhyamika system of philosophy is represented as extreme nihilism. Kumārila, Vācaspatimiśra and Sankara have all condemned it as downright nihilism. Japanese scholars have, however, never committed the mistake of regarding its philosophy as nihilism or pure negativism.

XII. The Doctrine of Causality in The Hinayāna

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Hinayāna contains an analysis of existence into its component elements, and establishes a certain number of ultimate data. It transforms soul into a stream of continuously flowing discrete moments of vijñāna, vedanā, samjñā, samaskara etc Matter (rūpa) is also considered to be a flow of momentary flashes without any continuant stuff. It admits only the reality of sense data and the elements of mind. *

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Its conception of causality, viz, pratītya-samutpāda is in consonance with its conception of reality which could neither move nor change, but could only appear and disappear. Pratītyasamutpāda can hardly be called causation in the sense in which it is usually understood. It really means dependently co-ordinated-origination or dependent existence. According to it every momentary entity springs into existence in co-ordination with other moments. Its formula is ‘asmin sati idam bhavati’ there being this, there appears that ! According to this, there could be neither causa materialis, nor causa efficiens. An entity is not really produced, it is simply co-ordinated.

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Apart from the momentary entities called *nāmarūpa*, Hinayāna believes in two unchanging entities viz. space and Nirvāna. It considers both Samsāra and Nirvāna, as realities, somehow interconnected in a whole.

XIII. The Doctrine Modified in Mahāyāna

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The main distinctions between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna are the following

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(1) According to Mahāyāna, the Real was that which possessed a reality of its own (*sva-bhāva*), which was not produced by causes (*akrtaka=asamskṛta*), which was not dependent upon anything else (*paratra nirapeksa*)

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(2) In Hinayāna, the elements, although interdependent (*samskṛta=pratītyasamutpanna*), were real (*vastu*). In Mahāyāna, all elements, because interdependent, were unreal (*śunya=svabhāva-śunya*)

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(3) In Hinayāna, every whole (*raśi=avayavin*) is regarded as a nominal existence (*prajñaptisat*) and only the parts or ultimate elements (*dharma*) are real (*vastu*). In Mahāyāna, all parts or elements are unreal (*śunya*) and only the whole (*dharmatā=dharma-kāya*) is real.

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According to Mahāyāna, Reality (*tattva*) is ‘uncognisable from without, quiescent, undifferentiated in words, unrealisable in concepts, non-plural’.

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(4) In Hinayāna, the individual (*pudgala*), the self (*ātmā*) was resolved in its component elements (*skandha—āyatana—dhātavah=anātma*), there were no real personalities (*pudgal-nairātmya*), but a congeries of flashing forces (*samskār-samūha*).

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In Mahāyāna we have, on the other hand, a denial of real elements (*dharma-nairātmya*), and an assertion of the absolute Whole (*dharma-kāya*)

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In Hinayāna, we have a radical pluralism, in Mahāyāna, we have a radical monism.

XIV. The Doctrine of Relativity

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Mahāyāna gives a new interpretation of *pratītya-samutpāda*. It maintains that whatsoever is dependent or relative cannot be considered as ultimate reality.

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The central conception in Early Buddhism is a plurality of ultimate elements (*dharmas*). The central conception of Mahāyāna is their relativity (*śūnyatā*). The word *śūnya* can best be translated by ‘relative or contingent’ and the term *śūnyatā* by ‘relativity or contingency’. The entire Mahāyāna literature goes to show that the term *śūnya* is a synonym of dependent existence (*pratītya samutpāda*) and means not something ‘void’, but something ‘devoid’ of independent reality (*svabhāva-śūnya*). Śūnya has two implications, viz. (1) that nothing short of the whole possesses independent reality (2) and that the whole forbids every formulation by concept or speech (*niṣprapañca*). Concept or speech (*vikalpa*) can give us only a distorted view of reality; it can never seize it.

XV. The Real Eternal Buddha

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Mahāyāna does not believe in the Hīnayānistic conception of Buddha having a real existence of his own According to Mahāyāna, Buddha is above every possible determination (*niṣprapañca*). The real Buddha must be perceived directly by intuition. Those who dichotomise him as eternal or non-eternal, existent or non-existent, relative or non-relative, omniscient or non-omniscient are misled by words. Buddha must be regarded as the cosmical order (*dharmatā*), his Body is the Cosmos (*dharmatā*). It is impossible to know the essence of the Cosmos conceptually.

XVI. The New Conception of Nirvāṇa

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Early Buddhism and Vaibhāsikas regarded Space and Nirvāṇa as ultimate realities on the ground that they possessed a character (*dharma*), a reality (*vastu*), an individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*), an existence of their own (*svabhāva*). These contentions were rejected by the Sautrāntika on the ground that they did not possess any such reality

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The Mādhyamikas also rejected those contentions because of their new definition of reality (*anapekṣaḥ svabhāvaḥ*). The Mādhyamika's conception of Relativity (*śūnyatā*) covered everything, the conditional as well as the eternal elements of the Vaibhāsikas. The new interpretation of the principle of Relativity (*pratītya-samutpāda*) made the Hīnayānistic Absolute also relative, and according to Mahāyāna, whatever was relative was false, transient and illusory

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The unique reality, according to Mahāyāna, cannot be characterised in words (*anirvacanīya*), but a hint of it may be found in the following descriptions. It is the Whole of all wholes, it is the element of all elements (*dharmānām dharmatā* or *dharma-dhātu*), as their relativity (*śūnyatā*), as ‘thisness’ (*idantā*), as ‘suchness’ (*tathatā*) as the suchness of existence (*bhūta-tathatā*), as the matrix of the Lord (*tathāgata-garbha*) and as Buddha's Cosmic Body (*dharma-kāya*) In the last conception, Buddhism becomes at once pantheistic and theistic, or as Prof Anesaki puts it, *Cosmotheistic*.

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The great Mahāyānist, Nāgārjuna gives a new orientation to Nirvāna. The Vaibhāsika maintained that Nirvāna was something real (*dharma*) in which consciousness and life were extinct for ever, the Sautrāntika believed that it was the simple cessation of the world process. In both cases, something real was assumed to exist before Nirvāna and to disappear afterwards This made Nirvāna a product of causes (*samskṛta*) Nāgārjuna asserted that there was not a shade of difference between the Absolute and the Phenomenal, between Nirvāna and *Samsāra*. The universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process, it is the phenomenal

XVII. Is Relativity Itself Relative?

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The main problem for Mahāyāna is—“Is Relativity itself relative?” Obviously the concept of Relativity depends upon its opposite-the Non-relative It should be borne in mind that the principle of Relativity is invoked to destroy all theories and to replace them by direct mystic intuition, not by a new theory. Candrakirti, the commentator on Nāgārjuna's "Madhyamaka-śāstra" puts it beautifully "Relativity is here the common characteristic of all the elements (dharma) of existence. That is our view. But since there is no element which would be non-relative, Relativity itself, for want of those objects with which it could be contrasted, becomes as inane as a mirage, as a garland of flowers in the sky".

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Relativity (śūnyatā) may be used to understand that all existence is relative and when that is understood, the theory of Relativity should be discarded

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Middle path in Early Buddhism meant middle course between materialism ucchedavāda and the doctrine of Eternal Soul (śāśvatavāda). In Mahāyāna, Middle path comes to mean Relativity.

XVII. Parallel Developments in Buddhism and Brāhmanism

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Just as Mahāyāna moved towards radical Monism, even so Brāhmanism moved towards radical Monism. It is most probable that Mahāyāna is indebted to some Upanisadic influence. Gaudapāda and Śankara have been, in their turn, influenced by the dialectic of Nāgārjuna.

XIX. European Parallels

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To characterize Nāgārjuna as a 'nihilist' as some scholars have done would be misleading, for his condemnation of Logic is only one part, and not the principal one, of his Philosophy.

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Prof Keith and Prof M. Walleser suppose that Nāgārjuna denies even the empirical reality of the world. this is bacause they have missed the positive counterpart of his negativism, the identity of Dharmakāya and Brahman. Nāgārjuna's philosophy was certainly opposed to rationalism, European or Indian, which believes that Reality could be known by logical reason.

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Prof. H. Jacobi has suggested a comparison between Zeno of Elea and Nāgārjuna The similarity was not limited only to their dialectic. Nāgārjuna's philosophy points to a Whole which, when characterized in limited particulars leads to the antinomy of reason. Particulars are merely relative (Śūnya). Zeno also devised his "sophisms" to prove the impossibility of motion, and to lead the thinker to Parmenides' conception of the world as a motionless whole.

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There are remarkable coincidences between Nāgārjuna's negativism and Bradley's condemnation of the concepts of things and qualities, relations, space and time, change, causation, motion, the self etc. Bradley may be characterized as genuine Mādhyamika.

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A similarity may be found between Heigel's dialectic method and that of Nāgārjuna. Hegiel challenges common sense to point some object which is certainly known for what it is, and solves the question by stating that all we know of the object is its "thisness", all its remaining contents being merely relation. This is also the meaning of *tathatā* or "suchness", and, as we have seen *śunyatā* only means Relativity. Both philosophers assure us that Negativity (*śunyatā*) is the soul of the Universe. Reducing the world of fact to a realm of universal relativity this implies that everything cognisable is transient and illusory.

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A similarity may also be noticed between the Mahāyānist conception of Buddha's Cosmical Body as the unique substance and Spinoza's conception of God as the only substance.

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It will be seen, therefore, that it will not be correct to characterize Nāgārjuna as a "Nihilist". All that Nāgārjuna was at pains to show was that logic was incapable of giving us an idea of the Absolute, and that we can have a knowledge of the Absolute only by direct mystic intuition.

XX. The Position of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

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In the conception of *Mokṣa* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika a similarity to the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa may be noticed. The highest goal of life, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is *Mokṣa* or *Apāvarga* in which there is neither consciousness as.

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we know it here down on Earth nor bliss. Vātsyāyana, the great commentator on the Nyāya-sūtras says that such a goal could hardly be acceptable to the average man. He puts the aversion of the average man to such a goal in the following words. "Is it possible that an enlightened man should favour a final Release in which there is neither bliss nor consciousness?" And he answers the question by a counter-question—"Is it possible that an enlightened man should not favour the idea of a final Release where all turmoil of life is stopped for ever and where there is no consciousness about it?"

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The goal of Indian philosophical systems is Moksa or Nirvāṇa They start with the conception of whole (sarvam) which is divided into phenomenal life and the Absolute (Samsāra and Nirvāṇa) The phenomenal part is further analysed into its actual condition (duhkha), its driving force (duhkha-samudaya), its extinction (nirodha), and the means for acquiring this extinction (nirodha-mārga) It is not only Buddhism which preaches these four truths. This scheme is accepted by almost all the Indian philosophical systems.

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Both in Nyāya-Vaiśesika and Buddhism, phenomenal life is designated as duhkha It is wrong to translate it as suffering, misery or pain, since it covers such items as inanimate matter, the five objects of sense etc

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In both the systems, the analysis of existence into its elements is undertaken in order to determine the means by which all the forces of life must be brought to a standstill.

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There is another general feature of practically all the systems of Indian philosophy They believe in a central force which keeps life going in all the worlds. This general force (karma) is resolved into special ones called illusion, desire and aversion. They produce germs of future action which bring about the continuation of phenomenal life. The decisive and final step which stops empirical life for ever, and transfers the individual into the Absolute is Yoga.

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The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system assumes a limited number of substances with their changing qualities. In this system, the soul of the individual is an eternal substance, it is ubiquitous and conterminous with space. Knowledge is produced in it by contact with *buddhi* or the internal organ. By the power of Yoga, *buddhi* is kept back from all contact with the soul. No consciousness is then produced, all phenomenal life is annihilated, but the substance of the soul reverts in *Mokṣa* (liberation) to its original and natural condition (*svarūpāvasthā*).

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There is a controversy between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems and Vedānta regarding the condition of the liberated soul. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that it is a cessation of all life, just as there is cessation of fire when all life is exhausted. According to them, there is no eternal bliss and eternal consciousness in *mokṣa* as Vedānta maintains. Since all objects of knowledge have disappeared for ever in *mokṣa*, if there is any joy in that condition, it would be joy without any thing to be enjoyed, if there is any knowledge in that condition, it would be knowledge without knowing anything. Such feeling and such knowledge would be as good as non-existent (*sthitopy asthitān na viśiṣyate*).

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The only meaning of *Mokṣa* or *Nirvāṇa* according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the annihilation of phenomenal life. This closely resembles the conception of Nirvāṇa of the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhism. The Nirvāṇa of the Mahāyānists and the Sautrāntikas, however, resembles the conception of *Mokṣa* entertained by the Vedāntists.

XXI Conclusion

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The following stages may be marked in the Buddhist conception of the Absolute

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(1) In the 6th century B. C. there was a great effervescence of philosophical thought among the non-brāhmanical classes in India. Buddha at that time proposed a system denying the existence of eternal soul and reducing phenomenal existence to a congeries of separate elements, evolving gradually towards final extinction.

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(2) Only some schools remained faithful to this ideal of lifeless Nirvāna and an extinct Buddha.

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(3) In the 1st century A. D. Buddha was converted into a superhuman, living principle. This system of thought was probably influenced by the Upaniṣads. Buddha now became converted into a full-blown Brahman and its personification was worshipped under the name of a Cosmical Body (*dharma-kāya*), Samantabhadro, Vairocan and others.

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(4) The Mahāsaṃghikas and Vatsīputrīyas assumed a kind of consciousness surviving in Nirvāna.

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(5) The philosophical doctrine of the old school stuck to the conception of separate elements of matter, mind and forces, and investigated the method of their gradual extinction in the Absolute.

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(6) The Sautrāntikas cut down the list of artificially constructed elements, cut down Nirvāna itself as a separate entity, and thus constituted a transition Mahāyāna.

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(7) The philosophy of the new religion is an adaptation of Vedānta. It became monistic.

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(8) This monistic philosophy was divided into two different schools. One school known as Vijñānavāda maintained that there was store-consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*) of which all phenomenal life was a manifestation. This school made a good deal of contribution to Logic. The other school denied the possibility of cognising the Absolute by logical methods. It declared all plurality to be an illusion, and nothing short of the Whole to be Reality which could be known only in mystic intuition.

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(9) The transitional Sautrāntika school merged in the 5th Century A. D. in the idealistic school of Mahāyāna and produced philosophers like Diguāga and Dharmakīrti. According to it, Nirvāna was a pure spiritual principle in which subject and object coalesced, and the force of transcendental illusion (*vāsānā*), producing the phenomenal world disappeared

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(10) In the 7th century A. D., the relativistic school (*śūnyavāda*) of early Mahāyāna received a fresh impulse.

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(11) The Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda now influenced Vedānta which adapted its methods for its own purpose

Cites (9)