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The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana c7: Chapter XXV. Examination of Nirvāna

The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa c7

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Contents

Chapter XXV. Examination of Nirvāna

I. The Hīnayānist Nirvāna Rejected

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According to Hīnayāna, personalities that have lived a pure life and have acquired knowlege of the elements of existence as taught by the Buddha can attain Nirvāna There are two kinds of Nirvāna—(1) Sopādhiseṣa Nirvāna—Nirvāna in lifetime in which the residual substratum of the five *upādānaskandhas* remains and (2) Nirupādhiseṣa Nirvāna without any residue.

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These two kinds of Nirvāna are possible only when there is *nirodha* or suppression of (1) *kleśas* (defilements, obstructions) in the *sopādhiseṣa* Nirvāna and of (2) *skandhas* (groups of elements making a personality) in the *nirupādhiseṣa* Nirvāna If every thing is *śūnya* (devoid of independent reality), there would be neither *kleśa* nor *skandha* by whose Suppression Nirvāna may be attained

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The Mādhyamika says that if the *kleśas* and (*skandhas*) are absolutely real, if they have an "own-being" (*svabhāva*) of their own, then their "own-being" (*svabhāva*) cannot disappear. If they camot deisappear, now can there be Nirvāna on the Hīnayānistic assumption ?

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The Mādhyamika does not advance a conception of Nirvāṇa consisting in the annihilation of the elements. Hence this incongruity cannot apply in his case.

II. The Mahāyānistic Nirvāṇa

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According to the Mādhyamika, Nirvāṇa is that undefinable essence which can neither be extinguished as e. g. a desire, nor which can be attained as, e. g. a reward for renunciation, nor which can be attained as, e. g. a reward for renunciation, nor which can be annihilated, as, e, g. all the active elements of life, nor which is eternal, as e. g an absolute principle, which cannot really disappear, nor which can be produced Nirvāṇa really means the Quiescence of all plurality (Prapañcopaśama)

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Suppression of desire or the elements of existence etc. is simply a false construction of our imagination. It is really the suppression of the false construction of our imagination which is Nirvāṇa.

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Desire, illusion etc. have no real existence in the absolute sense even in the phenomenal condition of life.

III Nirvāṇa Not An Ens (a particular existing entity)

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There are people who imagine that Nirvāṇa is a particular kind of existence (bhāva).

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Nāgārjuna says that Nirvāṇa is not a particular kind of existence (bhāva) Every existence is invariably connected with decay and death. If Nirvāṇa is a bhāva (an existing entity) that would also be subject to decay and death

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All particular bhāvas (existing entities) are produced If Nirvāṇa is a bhāva, that would also be produced. All are agreed that Nirvāṇa is not a particular kind of production.

IV. Nirvāṇa is Not-Ens (non-existing entity)

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It may be said that if Nirvāṇa is not an Ens, it must a non-Ens (abhāva), for it consists in the fact that the defiling elements (kleśas) and their consequence, the individual existence is stopped.

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Nāgārjuna says that this is impossible. If it is maintained that Nirvāṇa is the absence of defiling elements and individual existence, then the impermanence of the defiling elements and personal existence would attach to Nirvāṇa. It would follow that impermanence is Nirvāṇa.

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Again if Nirvāṇa is considered to be a non-Ens (*abhāva*), it cannot be independent, for every non-Ens (*abhāva*) is dependent on its positive counter-part (*bhāva*).

V. Nirvana Is The World Viewed Sub specie Aeternitatis

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The phenomenal world consists of birth and death, appearance and disappearance All the so-called entities of the phenomenal world are either dependent upon conditions (i e. they are real) just as long is real relatively to short or they are produced, just as the sprout is produced by the seed. In both cases when the continuity of birth has ceased, it is called Nirvāṇa This cessation of phenomenal life is one view of Nirvāṇa. The Mādhyamika says that mere cessation of aspect can neither be considered as an Ens (*bhāva*), nor a non-Ens (*abhāva*) So Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens nor a non-Ens.

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A second view of Nirvāṇa is the following. Some followers of the Buddha e. g. Sarvāstivadins maintain that in the universe, there is no abiding central principle, that the world-process consists in the procession of co-ordinated energies. When all causal laws cease to operate when all energies are extinct, there is Nirvāṇa.

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There is a third view of Nirvāṇa like that of the Vātsīputrīyas which maintains that there is a central principle termed ‘personality’ (*pudgala*) which passes from one existence into another. It is neither momentary nor eternal. It goes on evolving When the evolution of this principle stops, it is said to have entered Nirvāṇa,

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Regarding the second and third view also, Mādhyamika says that whether it be co-ordinated energies or some central principle, called “personality”, the mere fact of their evolution being stopped can neither be characterized as an Ens, nor a non-Ens.

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Nirvāṇa (Absolute) and Samsara (phenomenal world) are not two separate realities, nor two states of the same reality. the Absolute viewed through thought-forms is the phenomenal world, the phenomenal world free of the thought-forms is Nirvāṇa or the Absolute. Nirvāṇa or the Absolute is the phenomenal world viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*.

VI. Nirvāṇa Is Not Both Ens And Non-Ens together

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Some, as for example the Vaibhāṣikas assume a double character in Nirvāṇa. It is a non-Ens (*abhava*) in so far as the defiling elements (*kleśas*) and the elements of existence are extinct in it, and in itself this lifeless condition is an Ens (*bhava*) So it is both an Ens and a non-Ens together.

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The Mādhyamika says that this double character is impossible. A final Deliverance (from phenomenal life), and the energies (of phenomenal life) cannot be the same.

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If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and non-Ens, it would be relative to the totality of causes and conditions. It would thus not be the Absolute Both Ens (*bhava*) and non-Ens (*abhava*) are relative to each other. Nirvāṇa is not within the realm of relativity. It is uncaused

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Again since Ens and non-Ens are mutually incompatible like light and darkness, Nirvāṇa cannot be both Ens and non-Ens

VII. Nor Is Nirvana A negation Of Both Ens And Non-Ens Together.

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Some may that Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens nor a non-Ens No one knows what a real Ens or non-Ens is. Therefore their negation is absurd

VIII. The Real Buddha, What?

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Just as all the alternatives of the four-cornered dialectic are inapplicable to Nirvāṇa, even so they are inapplicable to the Buddha.

IX. Ultimate Identity Of The Phenomenal And The Absolute.

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Ultimately there is no difference between the phenomenal and the Absolute. The phenomenal in essence being nothing but the Absolute, it is impossible to imagine either its beginning or its end.

X. The Antinomies.

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All the theories about these questions are inconsistent. They are mere antinomies of reason. The phenomenal and the Absolute are merged quiescent in the unity of the Whole. None of the alternatives of the four-cornered dialectic has ultimate reality. Every thing is "relative". Therefore questions about the finite and the infinite, identity and difference, eternity and non-eternity are meaningless.

XI. Conclusion

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Our bliss consists in the cessation of all conceptualization about Reality, in the quiescence of plurality. The Buddha really did not preach any doctrine about separate elements the *Goths*, the *Vandals*, the *Suevi*, the *Burgundians*, the *Alani*, the *Huns*, the *Franks*, the *Saxons*, the *Thuringians*, the *Rugians*, and the *Heruli*. The names of these tribes are familiar to the reader, but their origin, their migrations, and their settlements are involved in the deepest obscurity. The most probable opinion is that they were all of German or Scythian extraction, and that they had been driven from their native seats by the pressure of the Huns, a formidable nation of Tartars, who had crossed the Volga and the Tanais, and were advancing with rapid strides towards the frontiers of the Roman empire.

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The first of these nations that crossed the Danube was the *Goths*. They were divided into two great branches, the *Visigoths* or Western Goths, and the *Ostrogoths* or Eastern Goths. The Visigoths, under the conduct of Fritigern, implored the protection of the emperor Valens, and were permitted to settle in the province of Thrace. But the perfidy of the Roman governors, and the insolence of the Roman soldiers, soon provoked them to rebellion. They defeated the imperial armies, and Valens himself perished in the battle of Hadrianople.

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The death of Valens was followed by the accession of Theodosius, who, by his wisdom and valour, restored the discipline of the Roman legions, and compelled the Goths to accept a peace, which was rather a truce than a permanent settlement. The Goths, however, remained in the heart of the empire, and their presence was a constant source of danger and alarm. They were no longer the rude barbarians who had first crossed the Danube; they had learned the arts of war and the policy of the Romans, and they were ready to take advantage of any opportunity to assert their independence.

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The reign of Theodosius was the last period of the glory of the Roman empire. After his death, the empire was divided between his two sons, Arcadius and Honorius. Arcadius reigned in the East, and Honorius in the West. The division was fatal to the interests of the state. The two brothers were weak and indolent, and they were governed by their ministers and favourites. The Goths, under the command of Alaric, took advantage of the weakness of the government, and invaded Italy. They besieged and took Rome, and the eternal city, which had for so many centuries been the mistress of the world, was plundered by the barbarians.

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The fall of Rome was a shock to the whole civilized world. It was the end of an era, and the beginning of a new and darker age. The Goths, after the death of Alaric, retired from Italy, and settled in Gaul and Spain, where they founded kingdoms which were destined to last for several centuries. The Vandals, under the command of Genseric, crossed into Africa, and established a powerful kingdom, which for a time threatened the security of the Mediterranean. The Franks, under the command of Clovis, conquered Gaul, and laid the foundations of the French monarchy. The Saxons, under the command of Hengist and Horsa, invaded Britain, and established the kingdoms of the Heptarchy.

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Although a hundred years have elapsed since the scientific study of Buddhism has been initiated in Europe, we are nevertheless still in the dark about the fundamental teachings of this religion and its philosophy. Certainly no other religion has proved so refractory to clear formulation. We are confronted with an intricate terminology about whose meaning a variety of interpretation is current and which is often declared to be untranslatable or incomprehensible. In despair, some scholars were led to the conclusion that a religion or a philosophical system in India is not what it is in Europe, it is not a clear-cut construction of consistent speculation It is always vaguely indefinite, a display of dreamy thoughts about whose meaning their authors themselves are not quite sure¹. In a recent work M. de la Vallée Poussin² has undertaken to reconsider the question about the meaning of the Buddhist ideal of Nirvāṇa, and he warns us from the outset that we have not to expect something very illuminating from the Indian sources³. Formerly he confesses, the idea of Nirvāna seemed to him vague enough, but recently he has completely changed his opinion upon this subject and thinks that even the hazy speculations which he was trying to disentangle are but later additions, that at the beginning Nirvāna meant a simple faith in soul's immortality, its blissful survival in a paradise a faith emerging from practices of obscure magic

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¹ The late Professor G Bühler gathered from a long intercourse with Indian pandits in their own country a quite different impression He used to repeat to his pupils when perplexed by some difficult texts, "was ein Brahmane gemacht hat, das muss heraus". for very often it is something simple and clear, but expressed in a technical scientific terminology.

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² Etudes sur l'histoire des Religions, 5. Nirvāṇa par Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Paris, 1925.

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³ Op cit, p XI-XII.

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In the following pages we will try to test the arguments by which this new interpretation is supported, and append some considerations about the vicissitudes of this Buddhist conception of the Absolute and the changes which, in our opinion, it underwent during the first thousand years of its history