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A Concise History of Science in India c13.s5: Atomism

A Concise History of Science in India c13.s5

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English

Contents

Atomism

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One of the most noteworthy Indian physical concepts is atomism. Perhaps it may not be proper to consider this concept chemical or physicochemical for the reason that the Indian atomism is one of speculation, based on causal consideration. When the atoms, the primordial stuff of the world, unite to form the gross bodies, the process seems to be a physical one strictly following a plausible causal mechanism. In this manner the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, the Jaina and the Bauddha schools have expounded

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a *VS.*, 1, 1.7.

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b *VS.*, 1, 1.4.

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TABLE

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*Different types of substances and their attributes*

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| *pṛthvī* | *ap* | *tejas* | *vāyu* | *ākāśa* | *kāla* | *diś* | *ātman* | *manas* |
| eternal in atomic state corporeal principle of olfactory organ | eternal in atomic state corporeal principle of gustatory organ | eternal in atomic state corporeal principle of visual organ | eternal in atomic state corporeal principle of tactile organ | eternal and one ubiquitous principle of auditory organ (limited by the air-hole) | eternal and one ubiquitous — | eternal and one ubiquitous — | eternal and plural ubiquitous — | eternal and plural corporeal — |
| specific quality— odour | specific quality— taste | specific quality— colour | specific quality— touch | specific quality— sound | — | — | — | — |
| 14 qualities: colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, gravity, fluidity and faculty | 14 qualities: colour, taste, touch, number, distinctness, dimension, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, gravity, viscidity, fluidity and faculty | 11 qualities: colour, touch, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, fluidity and faculty | 9 qualities: touch, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, proximity, distance and faculty | 6 qualities: sound, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction | 5 qualities: number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction | 5 qualities: number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction | 14 qualities: cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, faculty, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction | 8 qualities: number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority and faculty |

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(The five generic qualities: number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction common to all the substances)

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their atomic concepts. The word used for atom is *aṇu* or *paramāṇu*. Each school has conceived of *aṇu* or *paramāṇu* as a logical necessity to explain the physical world in furtherance of its own philosophical ideas.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Atomism

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The *Vaiśeṣika*, *Nyāya* and the later syncretic *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* exponents are noted for their logically-structured atomism.a,b,c The concept of *avayavin* (whole) and *avayava* (constituent part) has shaped the atomic theory of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. As stated before, the substance is considered to be of nine types. Among them, the first four, viz. earth, water, fire and air, are considered to be atomic. The atom is indestructible (i.e. eternal), indivisible and without any magnitude. Each element has its own class of atoms with particular attributes. However, all the atoms are regarded as spherical. The four kinds of atoms possess specific attributes as follows: earthy atom has odour, airy atom—touch, watery atom—taste, and fiery atom—colour. By these particular attributes the atoms are capable of being differentiated, i.e. qualitatively.

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Constructively, it is the atoms that produce matter of visible magnitude. The process is logically thought of as follows. According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, atoms are in eternal motion. As a result, there always exists a possibility of combination of any two like atoms, i.e. atoms of the same physical substance. It is, however, presumed that the combination takes place in the presence of atoms of the other substance or substances also. The two like atoms are the material causes for the combination while the other types of atoms are considered to play the role of supportive atoms. Two unlike atoms, i.e. an atom of earth and an atom of water cannot, it is stated, enter into combination.

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The effect of the combination of the two like atoms goes by the name of dyad (*dvyaṇuka*).d The dyad is also suprasensible as well as infinitesimal even though it is formed out of two atoms. The magnitude of the dyad is stated to be derived from the number *two only*. The question is: Why is it that only two atoms combine to begin with? Atom is so minute that it cannot be a causative component in such a way that it contributes to the magnitude of the product. Minuteness, in other words, cannot contribute to grossness. The atomic magnitude is of the minutest order. Consequently it can only impart a magnitude which would still be in the same order of minuteness. This means that the magnitude of a dyad is not superior to that of the two atoms which produce the former. Hence the conclusion that the magnitude of a dyad must be derived from the number of atoms only. Logically the minimum number of atoms that can be causative is two and hence the first product is a dyad.

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In the atomism of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, the dyad, as stated before, is not considered as gross matter. In other words, it is invisible. The minimum visible is a triad, designated as *trasareṇu* or *tryaṇuka*a (of the size of a mote in sunbeam). A triad is formed out of three dyads. Nevertheless, the triad is not formed directly from six atoms which constitute the three dyads which are recognized as the intermediates between the primordial atoms and the triad. The atoms as well as the dyads are considered as not having any extension in themselves. In addition, they do not possess magnitude on a gross scale. These two concepts mean then that the gross magnitude of the triads is not due to atoms or the inter-dyadic space, but is due to the plurality of dyads. The minimum standard for plurality is again logically three. Hence at least three dyads are required for the production of the minimum gross matter. Dyads numbering more than three can also enter into union. For example, four dyads can combine to form a product, a tetrad.

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a Bhaduri, pp. 55–81.

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b Mishra (U.) (1), pp. 64–159.

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c Keith (4), pp. 10–17.

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d Mishra (U.) (1), pp. 116–17.

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As stated earlier, the atoms (six or eight in number) cannot directly form a triad or tetrad (*caturaṇuka*) as the case may be. For, it is argued by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* that a thing of gross magnitude is formed by those which are themselves products. Atoms are eternal, and if they were to produce a gross substance like a triad directly, the process would go on and the resultant would also be eternal. But the experience is to the contrary. This anomaly can therefore be overcome by postulating that the dyads, which are the products of atoms and which are neither eternal nor indestructible, constitute the triad, tetrad and so on. Thus atoms play only one role, i.e. the production of a dyad. They do not have yet another role to play, i.e. to produce in addition a triad directly.

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The atomism of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* is noted for its strict adherence to the principle of causality. Atoms are the material cause for a dyad, the effect; the dyads are the cause for the production of a triad which is again an effect. The atoms lose their causal efficiency after the triad comes into existence. In this way, the chain of formation of gross bodies can be maintained. The cause in each case brings about the effect, but is immediately absorbed into the latter which in turn performs the functions of a cause to continue the sequence. In dyads the two like atoms do exist; only they are devoid of their causative functions. In other words, their activities as atoms are exhausted.

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Further the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* atomism has a rational explanation for the presence of different qualities in a single substance. A triad of earth possesses various qualities because of the presence of different types of atoms, say of fire or water. Besides, the structural arrangement (*vyūha*) of a triad, it is said, confers the observed properties on the substance.

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Why do the primordial atoms unite and produce gross matter? The explanation given by the *Vaiśeṣika* is that there is what may be designated as the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) which sets off this process. *Adṛṣṭa* as an unseen force, then, is the efficient cause of the world while atoms are its material cause.

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It is now fairly certain that the atomic views of the *Vaiśeṣika* school were in existence even in the pre-Buddhist period. In course of time the *Vaiśeṣika* atomism was developed by a number of its adherents. Among them Praśastapāda, Udyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana, Śrīdhara, Jayantabhaṭṭa, Śaṅkara Miśra and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi threw fresh light on this mode of thinking. The atomism had its powerful opponents, too. The great Śaṅkarācārya (c. eighth century A.D.) opposed the atomic views in unequivocal terms. Yet even in the late middle ages the atomism was very popular among the learned and continued to enjoy a considerable following. Even the followers of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* school, like Prabhākara (probably late seventh century A.D.) and Kumārila (c. eighth century A.D.), subscribed to the atomic theory of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. In fact, Prabhākara introduced the problem of part and whole (*avayava-avayavī*) and recognized atoms as the material cause. In the history of science the *Vaiśeṣika* atomism seems to have gone almost unnoticed while the Greek atomism of Leucippus and Democritus (about fifth century B.C.) has earned its due position.

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a Mishra (U.) (1), pp. 114–16.

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*The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Greek Atomic Views*

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The *Vaiśeṣika* atomism differs from the Greek atomism in conception as well as formal details. In the Greek atomism, both atoms and void are real. The atoms have different sizes and shapes, and they constitute the physically indivisible building materials of the universe. Moreover, the atoms are held to be in perpetual motion; and thus motion and void are equally real. This idea is not found in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* atomism. While the atoms of the Greeks have quantitative differences, those of the *Vaiśeṣika* are noted for their qualitative differences. As mentioned already, there are four classes of atoms corresponding to earth, fire, water, and air, each class of atoms having different specific qualities. Furthermore, while Democritus considers that atoms are in eternal motion, the *Vaiśeṣika* believes that they are not in such a state of motion. Only the free atoms at the time of creation are recognized to be in motion. Above all, Democritus thinks of soul to be composed of atoms and seeks to explain the life processes in terms of atoms. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, on the other hand, regards soul to be non-material and hence not being composed of atoms. The non-material conscious soul is not explained in terms of material unconscious atoms. Besides, there is in Greek atomism a sort of mechanical conception of the universe, while such a view is totally absent in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* atomism. The *Vaiśeṣika* concepts of *adṛṣṭa*, *ākāśa*, atomic dimension, dyad, triad and the like do not have their parallels in the Greek atomic views.a

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Now a question arises: historically is the atomism of the *Vaiśeṣika* earlier than that of the Greeks? As mentioned earlier, the *Vaiśeṣika* school is pre-Buddhistic.b It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the *Vaiśeṣika* atomism has its claims for antiquity. But it is very difficult to say how far the Greeks were influenced by the Indian atomism against their philosophical convictions. All that can be said with a fair degree of certainty, based on the available evidence, is that the concept of atom is a product of an intuitive mind imbued with a spirit of free inquiry. The Indian and the Greek thinkers were intuitive and indulged in free inquiry. Therefore, the two atomisms might have originated independently of each other.

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a Subbarayappa (1), p. 127.

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b Kuppuswamy Sastry, p. xviii.

The Jaina Atomism

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The two heterodox systems, the Jaina and the Bauddha, have developed also an atomism, each in its own way and structurally different from that of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. The Jaina thinkers discard the doctrine of part-whole of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. In addition, they maintain that atom is both cause and effect—a view totally at variance with that of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. For, the latter asserts unequivocally that atoms are the material cause of the world. In the Jaina view, the world is not merely a changing phenomena but is beginningless and endless. It is said to be composed of two principal categories: *jīva* (the living) and *ajīva* (the non-living). The latter comprises *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *pudgala* and *kāla*. Each of them (except *kāla*) is known as *astikāya*, i.e. that which exists and has pervasiveness, and occupies space or *pradeśa*. A *pradeśa* is part of *ākāśa* occupied by the ultimate particle called *aṇu* or *paramāṇu* (atom). The *Bhagavatīsūtra* defines *paramāṇu* as that which cannot be cut or divided.a The atom is also conceived to be the subtlest particle, without any parts, even though with reference to its *bhāva* (condition) its capacity is said to change in relation to colour, taste, smell and touch. The Jaina atom appears also to be in the nature of a point with reference to *kṣetra* or field, and momentary with reference to *kāla* or time.

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*Pudgala* is that which undergoes transformations by combinations (*pud* = to combine) and dissociations (*gala* = to dissociate). It is said to possess five kinds of colour (black, blue, red, yellow and white), eight types of touch (soft, hard, heavy, light, cold, hot, smooth and rough), five tastes (bitter, pungent, acidic, sweet and astringent) and two different odours (fragrance and its opposite).b According to Kundakundācārya, *pudgala* is that which can be experienced by the five senses and has forms or states. The two recognized states of *pudgala* are atomic (*aṇu*) and aggregate (*skandha*). Amṛtacandasūri recognizes six kinds of modifications of *pudgala*, viz. *bādara-bādarāḥ*, *bādarāḥ*, *bādara-sūkṣma*, *sūkṣmabādara*, *sūkṣma* and *sūkṣma-sūkṣma*.c

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The Jaina thinkers believe that two or more atoms combine to produce an aggregate. The latter is called *skandha*, and the physical world is a *mahāskandha*. A *skandha* may contain two or more atoms. It may also be formed by the dissociation of large *skandhas*. While the atom is absolute and without beginning, the *skandha* is not absolute and beginningless. Two *aṇus* produce a *dvipradeśa* (a *skandha*). Similarly a *tripradeśa skandha*, *caturpradeśa skandha* and so forth are thought of. According to the Jainas there are also *skandhas* with countable units (*saṃhatapradeśika*), uncountable units (*asaṃkhyātapradeśika*), infinite units and in finite-fold combinations. Further, with reference to vibration and non-vibration, there are varieties of *skandhas* according as the component atoms vibrate, non-vibrate, partly vibrate and partly non-vibrate.

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a Bhag. Sū., 20, 5.570.

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b Mishra (U.) (2), I, p. 317.

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c Mishra (U.) (2), I, pp. 317–20.

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The atoms combine because of their inherent attributes, viz. *snigdha* (attractive force), *rūkṣa* (repulsive force) and even *snigdhatva-rūkṣatva* (attractive-*cum*-repulsive force). These two attributes are natural to or inherent in the atoms as well as the *skandhas*. This is in contradistinction to the concept of *adṛṣṭa* of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. According to Umāsvāti,a combination of similar or dissimilar atoms occurs when there is a difference of at least two units of *snigdha* or *rūkṣa*. In other words, the atoms can-not combine if they do not have sufficient degree of *snigdha* or *rūkṣa*; nor would they combine when they are of equal degree. Likewise, two similar types of atoms (say, those which have cohesive forces) cannot enter into combination. In a refreshing approach, the Jaina appears to hold the view that a combination means the coming into play of the cohesive and repulsive forces which are natural to the atoms.

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Further, each atom is said to possess the attributes (*bhāvas*) of touch, taste, odour and colour, even so potentially; for *pudgala*, composed as it is of atoms, possesses these attributes. According to the Jaina view, these four qualities associated as they are with what is called *vyavahāra paramāṇu* in contradistinction to the indivisible *sūkṣma paramāṇu*, are also capable of being divided. While the atoms of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* differ from one another qualitatively, the Jaina atoms are all similar without any qualitative or quantitative differences. In short, they are of one class without any distinction such as, earth-atom, water-atom, etc., like those of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. Thus every atom is capable of producing any colour, odour, taste and touch. However, it is believed that, in relation to the attribute of a *skandha*, the corresponding atoms may have attributes also.

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The atom, according to the *Bhagavatīsūtra*,b is endowed with one colour (black, blue, red, yellow or white), one taste (bitter, sour, astringent, acidic or sweet), one smell (pleasant or unpleasant) and two touches (cold and cohesive, warm and cohesive, cold and dry or warm and dry). However, the atom is not considered to be heavy or large, but light (*agurulaghu*) in its own state. There is no matter lighter than atom.c The attributes are present in every atom to an equal extent, participating in transformations and aggregations. It is of interest to note that the Jaina thinkers do not regard the aggregate (*skandha*) as a new substance, but as a special form of the aggregation of atoms which are infinite in number. A noteworthy aspect of the transformation is that, as atoms are devoid of shape, no transformation with reference to shape is possible. Evidently the atoms experience increase or decrease in their attributes. There could be infinite groups of transformations even though there are admittedly (5 × 5 × 2 × 4) two hundred basic such groups.a In the Jaina view the atom is not always active. It sometimes vibrates or revolves itself in a regular (*samita*) or irregular (*aniyamita*) way. The motion of atom when it proceeds from one point of space to another is considered to take place in a straight line. Some of the Jaina texts like the *Bhagavatīsūtra*, *Pannavana* and *Sthānāṅga sūtra* discuss in considerable detail the vibration of the atom from the point of view of time, its dissociation from *skandha*, resistance encountered in its activity and the like.

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a *TSū. Bh.*, 5, 23.

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b *Bhag. Sū.*, 20, 5.668.

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c *Bhag. Sū.*, 25, 4.740.

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It would appear that the Jaina concept of *pudgala* and of atoms is a well-knit part of the religious speculation; for, the Jaina believes that *karma* is also composed of subtle particles of matter and that these particles find their path into the soul which, as a result, becomes corrupt. *Jīva* is believed to take in such *pudgalas* as are productive of *karma*. And Jaina thinkers have given an elaborate account of how the *karmapudgalas* flow into *jīva* and how soul and atom can exist together in one space-point. It is even pointed out that wherever there is an atom, there are one unit of *dharmāstikāya* and one unit of *adharmāstikāya*. In understanding the Jaina atomism these aspects have to be kept in view.

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The most important aspect of the Jaina view of matter, however, is that matter exists eternally and does not remain in the atomic state as if to signify the beginning or to mark the end. This means, then, that the Jaina atoms represent a stage in the natural process. In other words, they are not the ultimates of gross matter. The Jaina atom, in addition, is a determinant of the period of time according as it experiences motion from one point in *ākāśa* to the immediate next point.

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*The Bauddha Atomism*

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There does not seem to be any account of atomism in the old canonical Buddhist works. The four principal Buddhist schools are: *Vaibhāṣika* and *Sautrāntika* (belonging to the *Hīnayāna* sect), the *Yogācāra* and the *Mādhyamikā* (belonging to the *Mahāyāna* sect). The *Mādhyamikā* school does not subscribe to the reality of matter. The *Yogācāra* also declares that the external world is not real. Hence both these schools are opposed to the atomic theory of matter. The *Vaibhāṣika* and the *Sautrāntika* which are regarded as the realists (*sarvāstitvavādins*) admit the atomic state of matter within their philosophical views. They have elaborated on atomic view of matter as a part of their concept of *rūpa*.b They consider matter as collocation consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, taste, odour and touch, and regard atom as the minutest unit of *rūpa* (that which has the capacity to affect sense organs).

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a *Bhag. Sū.*, **1**, 9.73; **25**, 4.730.

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b Das Gupta, I, pp. 94–95; 121 ff.

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According to these Buddhists, the atom is ‘indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untestable and intangible’. However the Bauddha atoms are momentary in the sense they undergo phase-changes continually. There are two types of atoms: simple (*dravyparamāṇu*) and compound (*saṃghātaparamāṇu*). Nevertheless, some different views have been expressed concerning their aggregation. Some believe that it is a clean combination; others think that there remains always an intervening space between the atoms; and yet others view that they are in such a close proximity that there is no inter-atomic space. In the ultimate analysis, it would seem that the Bauddhas do not think of a combination of the modern chemical type between the atoms. By and large, they appear to hold the view that gross matter is a conglomeration of independent atoms (a sort of a cluster having one atom at the centre and the others around it), and that the latter are not hollow and hence cannot penetrate one another.

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According to the Buddhists, there are in an aggregate eight atoms—four fundamental and four secondary atoms. The fundamental ones are of earth (solid), water (liquid), fire (hot) and air (moving). The secondary atoms are of colour, odour, taste and touch. Thus in this scheme the qualities are also atomic. Moreover the Buddhists seem to regard organs of sense as modifications of atomic matter. Each secondary atom requires four fundamental atoms for its support. The aggregate therefore consists of 20 atoms (4 × 4 + 4) if the body does not sound. If it is to sound, the aggregate will consist of 25 atoms.a

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The Buddhists do not speak of atoms in terms of particles of some stuff; instead they think of them as force or energy thus: earthly atom-force of repulsion; watery atom-kinetic energy.b All these forces are considered to be present in all things and in the same proportion. Different types of bodies (say liquid or solid) are perceived because the intensity of the force-content of the different elements varies, even though the proportionality of the elements remains unaltered. The Buddhist view of atoms as dynamic forces is in tune also with the doctrine of momentariness which unequivocally states that all things change and everything is momentary. (‘All things without exception are nothing but strings of momentary events’). The so-called permanence or stable existence of objects which are perceived in the ordinary way is indeed a function of our thought-process. What is ultimately real is instantaneous being. As things have momentary existence, i.e. as they disappear as soon as they appear, the Buddhists do not consider motion with reference to matter at all. But, as Sāntirakṣita says, ‘The essence of reality is motion. Reality is indeed kinetic... the interdependence of the moments following one another, evokes the illusion of stability of duration, but they are forces (*saṃskāras*) flashing into existence without any real enduring substance in them... An everlasting substantial matter is pure imagination’. The atomism of the Buddhists should be viewed in this light also.

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a Stcherbatsky, I, pp. 190 ff.

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b Stcherbatsky, I, p. 191.

Cites (3)