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Ancient Indian Education (Brahmanical and Buddhist) c15: Chapter VIII: The Legal Aspects of Education

Ancient Indian Education (Brahmanical and Buddhist) c15

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Chapter VIII: The Legal Aspects of Education

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**Legal Evidence.** We may conveniently deal here with the very interesting educational evidence furnished in the *Smṛitis* or the Hindu legal literature proper. The evidence is very fully presented in the *Digest of Hindu Law* prepared by Colebrooke, upon which the following account is based.

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**Litigation between Teacher and Pupil.** The law-books have to discuss the relations between the teacher and the taught in connection with the question, To what extent, or under what circumstances, those relations can become the subject-matter of suits or legal proceedings?

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According to Nārada, "When a man yields not the obedience he has promised, it is called a breach of promised obedience, which is a title of law." "Persons bound to obedience are in law declared by the learned to be properly of four kinds, viz. those for science, human knowledge, love, or pay" (Bṛihaspati). Of these, the first class is comprised by the pupils proper who seek the acquisition of the knowledge of "science", i.e. of the Vedas and the like, while the second class by the apprentices or technical students who seek the acquisition of skill in arts or "human sciences" (Nārada).

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"The wise have declared their general dependence" (ib.), which means that they are not their own masters but are themselves subject to masters. This may further mean that they are incapable of acquiring wealth for themselves as pupils, or are liable to punishment for violation of their master's commands.

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Bṛihaspati describes the subjects of study of the pupil proper to be the triple science, Ṛik, Yajus, and Sāma-Vedas. "For these let him pay obedience to a spiritual teacher, as directed by the law." This means that, as the commentator points out, "he who yields it not may be reproved or chastised by the teacher, and the preceptor offends not."

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The infliction of punishment as a disciplinary measure on the pupil by his teacher is held to be perfectly legal. "In case of strife between teacher and pupil... their mutual litigation is not legal" (*Smṛiti*). The teacher's right to punish is also emphasized by Manu who also gives directions for its exercise by way of indicating its limiting conditions which it would be illegal for the teacher to transgress. "A pupil may be corrected when he commits faults with a rope or the small shoot of a cane but on the back part only of his body, and not on any noble part by any means." Says Gautama: "The correction of a pupil for ignorance or incapacity should be given with a small rope or shoot of a cane; the teacher shall be punished by the king, if he strike with any other instrument."

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The law-books contemplate the contrary possibility of the case of a pupil striking his preceptor. Such an offending pupil will, according to Yājñavalkya, have his punishment equal to that of the highest scale of crime.

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The meaning of these regulations is very well explained by Vijñāneśvara. According to one regulation cited above, *all* litigation between teacher and pupil is illegal. The fact of the matter is "that a suit preferred before the king is irregular, and, preferred by the teacher against his pupil, is forbidden. But if the pupil violate his duty, and the teacher being weak is not able to correct him, it is consistent with common sense that he should then apply to the king; for, by violating his duty, the pupil absolutely becomes *pāshaṇḍa* or irreligious". "The litigation of teachers and the rest is not laudable, either in a moral or civil law; therefore pupils and others should, in the first instance, be discouraged by the king or the court. But in very important cases, the suits of pupils may be entertained in the form mentioned." Thus, in regard to punishment, "if a teacher, from an impulse of wrath, strike his pupil with a great staff on a noble part (of his body), then should the pupil, hurt in a mode contrary to law, complain to the king, there exists a subject of litigation."

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The duties of studentship are thus stated. "Until he acquires the science, let the pupil diligently obey his preceptor; his conduct should be the same towards the preceptor's wife and his son: *Afterwards*, performing the stated ceremonies on his return home, and giving to his instructor the gratuity of a teacher, let him return to his own house. This conduct is prescribed to the pupil" (Nārada). Violation of duties under these injunctions cannot be subject-matter of litigation. The commentator has the following explanation: "The suit of a teacher, if his gratuity be not paid, is not mentioned by any other author:

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but hell is the pupil's fate, if he pay not a gratuity to his instructor." Obedience to the teacher implies the pupil's dependence on him, so that "he should not go anywhere, nor consume anything, without his preceptor's orders and what he acquires by labour should be delivered to the teacher". As Yājñavalkya puts the matter: "When called, let him study; and deliver what is gained to his teacher." The commentator takes this to be a moral ordinance. The pupil has the legal right to give away to anyone he pleases either his paternal property or property acquired by him during his minority, though if it is given away without the knowledge or the consent of his teacher there will be a violation of his moral duties. "The pupil must also perform other labour in his preceptor's house." As Yājñavalkya puts it, "Let him constantly promote his teacher's benefit, by every exertion of mind, speech, body, and action."

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**Rights of Property in respect of Gains of Learning.** We have in the legal literature another kind of interesting educational evidence in connection with the discussion of property which is not subject to partition. An example of such property is "wealth acquired by learning" as stated by Manu. Other law-givers describe the various means by which wealth can be acquired by learning and the description thus necessarily acquaints us with some typical facts and features in the intellectual life of the times and some characteristic educational institutions.

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The following texts of Kātyāyana will speak for themselves:

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What has been acquired by learning, after instruction received from a stranger and a maintenance provided by one of a different family, is called wealth gained by learning (1).

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What is gained by proving superior learning, after a prize has been offered by some third person, must be considered as the acquisition of a scholar, and ought not in general to be divided among co-heirs (2).

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So what has been received as a gift from a pupil, as a gratuity for the performance of a sacrifice, as a fee for answering a question in casuistry, or for ascertaining a doubtful point of law; or what has been gained as a reward for displaying knowledge, or for victory in a learned contest, or for reading the Veda with transcendent ability (3).

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Such wealth have the sages declared to be the acquisition of science, and not subject to distribution; and the law is the same in regard to liberal or elegant arts, and to increase of price from superior skill in them (4).

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A prize which has been offered for the display of superior learning and a gift received from a votary for whom a sacrifice was formerly performed, or a present from a pupil formerly instructed, sages have declared to be the acquisition of science : what is otherwise acquired is the joint property of the co-heirs (5).

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Even what is won by surpassing another in learning, after a stake has been deposited, Bṛihaspati pronounces the acquisition of knowledge and impartible (6).

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What is obtained by the boast of learning, what is received from a pupil, or for the performance of a sacrifice, Bhṛigu calls the acquisition of science (7).

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Yet Bṛihaspati has ordained that wealth shall be partible if it was gained by learned brothers who were instructed in the family by their father, or by their paternal grandfather or uncles (8).

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In case of increment to paternal wealth, the acquirer gets a double share according to the following text of Vasishṭha :

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He among the brothers who singly acquires wealth shall take a double share of it (9).

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Nārada mentions a distinction in the case of *Vidyādhana* (gains of learning) of a certain kind :

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He who, be he ever so ignorant, maintains the family of a brother while engaged in study will share the wealth which that brother may gain by his learning (10).

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**Variety of Educational Institutions.** Thus these texts point to a variety of institutions through which the spread of learning and culture was promoted.

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In (1) we have a reference to the normal method of imparting instruction to a pupil who has to leave his parental home and maintenance and live with his chosen preceptor who gives him free board, lodging, and tuition. But though usual and ordinary, this particular mode of acquisition of learning in which the pupil is not supported during the period of his tuition by his paternal property has, as shown in the text, important legal consequences to the material gains which he may subsequently realize from his learning.

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In (8) is indicated the parallel practice of giving to boys education in their own homes, the preceptor being their father, grandfather, or uncle. The special proficiency shown by a particular son with the necessarily superior earning power it gives him is duly recognized by law, as shown in (9).

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In (10) we have a reference to the third variety in the methods of educational organization. Where a preceptor would not admit a pupil for his inability to maintain him and yet is regarded as indispensable for his education, the pupil was allowed to bring his own means of maintenance with him and become a paying member of his preceptor's family. The text pictures to us a dutiful brother, himself devoid of learning, being anxious for the learning of a more promising brother whom he supports at school by his own self-sacrifice which is duly recognized and rewarded in law.

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**Presents to Teacher.** In (3) and (5) is indicated the time-honoured Hindu institution of paying voluntary fees to the preceptor for all the pains and expenses he undergoes in educating his pupil. In fact the usual source of the preceptor's property and maintenance is the presents of his pupils whether just discharged from their studentship or formerly instructed. In the case of the latter we have another proof of the abiding cordiality of the relations between the teacher and the taught which are cultivated with so much care under so many regulations during the period of the tuition and are expected to continue beyond it and indeed lasted through life.

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**Higher Academic Activities.** Besides the school for the young or the pupils proper, we have in the other texts references to institutions of a higher type meant for the advancement of learning of and by the elderly and mature scholars through the opportunities they afford of varied and vital academical intercourse. The friction of minds is necessary for sharpening their powers and strengthening their grasp of truth which must not remain only as a matter of one's subjective realization. The mastery of truth has to be proved by objective standards and established against external criticism. It is this sound principle of pedagogics on the basis of which the Nyāya philosophy has laid down *Suhṛitprāpti* as one of the aids to the acquisition of knowledge. Truth must triumph over all attacks. Hence the remarkable development in all ages of Indian culture-history of these characteristically Hindu institutions of academic gatherings for the purpose of holding intellectual tournaments, those Philosophical Conferences and Science Congresses which were known to India as early as 1000 B.C., as shown by the evidence of the *Brāhmaṇas* and Upanishads already dealt with.

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In the texts (2)–(6) are indicated various types of learned debates and dialectical contests with the different forms of recognition given to intellectual primacy.

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**Upanyāsa.** According to (2), the intellectual contest or examination is held, and the superiority of learning is proved, in the field of *Upanyāsa* which is "explained in the *Madanaratna* to be the recitation of the Vedas in the several modes of stringing together the different *padas* or words such as *Krama*, *Jaṭā*, etc. Others say it means the exposition of abstruse topics in an assembly" [*Vyāvahāra-Mayūkha*¹]. The prize of victory offered is in accordance with established tradition and approved precedent and practice as shown in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* already referred to.

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¹ Kramajaṭādīnāṁ saṁkalitānāṁ pāṭha iti *Madanaratne* | Sabhāyāṁ gūḍhaprameyavivṛiti iti kechit | The *Smṛiti-Chandrikā* explains it as ‘Vargatyāgādivaichitryena upanyaste’

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**Praśna ; Vāda.** In (3), there is a reference to various kinds of intellectual competition and competence. The principal sources of the preceptor's property are indicated. They are the presents of pupils and the fees for performing sacrifices paid by a votary. Thus the two normal occupations of a learned Brahmin were teaching and priestcraft. Next, there is a reference to controversial social questions (*praśna*) in the solution of which learned men found opportunities of proving their merit and honourably earning money. According to the *Smṛiti-Chrandikā*, the *Praśna* as a source of the gain of learning is that relating to the determination of the suitable atonement or *prāyaśchitta* for the minor sins (*upapātaka*). This indicates the specialization of some learned men in social legislation. Thirdly, there is a reference to the settlement of doubts of a person regarding the meaning of a particular ordinance or deciding a question of law between two contending parties who apply for an award (*Mitāksharā*). Thus some learned men would specialize in law and serve on the Parishads and find ample means of livelihood from a legal career, either from arbitration or giving "consultations" and opinions (somewhat like the "Chamber practice" of lawyers in modern times). Sometimes again a young scholar would have his learning and ability recognized by others and so would be selected for gifts by the wealthy acting on the public opinion about him. Sometimes victory in a *Vāda* explained as a "contest relative to sacred literature or any other learned controversy" would be amply rewarded.

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**Prādhyayanam.** There is again a reference to cases where something is proposed to be given away for which there are many deserving competitors. In such cases *Prādhyayanam*, i.e. ability in reciting the Veda would be adopted as the standard for determining superiority of learning. Some take *Prādhyayanam* to be not superior recitation of the Veda but "the excellent lecture of it", such as "the recital of one *Śākhā* of the Veda in one day". It may also mean recital of the Purāṇas and the like. As regards intellectual contests, the commentators draw attention to the fact that sometimes a prize may be previously announced for victory or "display of superior learning", or sometimes though no such prize may be offered the victor may win his due reward from a rich man in the assembly moved to make a gift by "the satisfaction afforded to him by overcoming an adversary in disputation". Such kinds of spontaneous literary patronage must have been of very usual occurrence in the academic life of the country when they have been noticed in the law-books as constituting a source of income to the learned men. Wealth could always be depended upon to come forward in support of learning. Again, "a fee for answering a question in casuistry (*praśna*)" is sometimes explained as "a reward received on account of the gratification afforded by the solution of a question. For instance, a man possessing immense knowledge attends a universal monarch and discusses a question proposed by him; though he do not gain the victory (for even in controversy a conqueror of worlds is invincible) yet, spreading lustre over the assembly, he receives a reward from the monarch". Regarding *Prādhyayanam*, some commentators take objection to its meaning as merely "reading the Veda with transcendent ability". Their view is that "the wages of mere transcribers, and generally the fee received from the audience for reading the Veda, Purāṇas, and the like, without transcendent skill in poetry, and in explaining the sense of poems: this, and other similar gains, according to Chaṇḍeśvara and the rest, are not the acquisition of science. In fact in all cases whatsoever wherein superior skill is required the wealth gained is technically denominated the acquisition of science. Otherwise it is simply wealth acquired by the man himself". The fees from *Prādhyayanam* (whatever may be the right meaning of the term) regarded as a source of income to the learned point without doubt to that remarkable agency of popular education under which readings in the Vedas, Purāṇas, and other sacred literature were organized by means of circles of competent scholars who specialized in such readings before the larger assemblies of the common people.

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**Appliances of Learning Impartible.** In (4) we see how property in the special gains derived from superior technical skill (‘such as that of painters, goldsmiths, and the like, and even of gaming’) is governed by the same laws as those applying in the sphere of liberal learning.

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Along with the *Vidyādhana* or gains of learning as acquired in the various ways explained above, the necessary implements or appliances of learning or of arts are also to be deemed impartible, e.g. “books and the like in the study of the Vedas, etc.”, or “pencils and tools” for the study of the fine arts. Books are “not to be shared by ignorant brethren. So what is adapted to the arts belongs to artists, not to persons ignorant of the particular art”.

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**Teacher as Heir of Pupil.** The relationship of a teacher, a pupil, or a priest has been given a distinct legal value in Hindu Law. According to Baudhāyana, on failure of all heirs claiming any sort of blood-relationship, “the spiritual preceptor, the pupil, or the priest engaged to perform sacrifices, shall take the inheritance.” The *Āchārya*, spiritual preceptor, is defined by Baudhāyana as “he who girds the pupil with the sacrificial cord and instructs him in the Vedas”. On failure of these heirs the succession passes on to the fellow-student “who studies the Veda under the same teacher”. According to the law as laid down by Gautama, the legal heirs may also include “persons allied by funeral oblations, family name, and by patriarchal descent”, but commentators differ as to whether this remote relationship in blood has precedence over the relationship in learning. At any rate it must be observed that the law accords a lower status to the spiritual relationship through learning than that given to it by the rules relating to Brahmacharya under which the preceptor is to be regarded as the equal of the pupil’s parents as regards the reverence and obedience due from him. This equality, as has been already pointed out, was emphasized in a much earlier age when we find its recognition in a Sūtra of Pāṇini relating to the relationship of blood and learning—*vidyāyonisambandha*—to which is to be applied the same grammatical suffix.

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**Property accruing to a person in pupilage.** The institution of the young pupil leaving his home and parents to live with his preceptor for education had its own legal consequences which are duly provided for. For it may so often happen that during this period of the pupil’s tuition, “wealth may descend to him by inheritance and become his property." In such a case Manu thus lays down the law: "The king should guard the property which descends to an infant by inheritance until he returns from the house of his preceptor."

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**Property of Ascetics.** Lastly, the law relating to the inheritance of anchorites and devotees gives some interesting evidence. According to Yājñavalkya [ii, 137] the heirs who take the wealth of a *Vānaprastha* (a hermit), of a *Yati* (an ascetic), and a *Brahmachārī* are in their order the preceptor, the virtuous pupil (*Satśishya*), and one who is a supposed brother and belongs to the same order (*dharmabhrātā* and *ekatīrthī*). Here we have a reference to some typical Hindu institutions. The term *Brahmachārī* points to the institution of perpetual studentship. The pupil who adopts this vow (of continuing as a student through life without marrying and entering upon the householder's state) is technically known as *Naishṭhika*, the temporary student being called an *Upākurvāṇa*. Next we have the term *Dharmabhrātā*, the spiritual brother, the brother by religious duties. The term *Ekatīrthī* means one resident in the same holy place, i.e. the same hermitage, and hence pupil of the same preceptor [Vīramitrodaya]. The *Satśishya*, the virtuous pupil, is he who is "versed in the study of revelation concerning the supreme soul and in preserving that sacred science". Such a man is the most suitable for inheriting the effects of one whose teachings and practices and way of life would have a chance of surviving him through his successor. The wealth of the deceased is best utilized when it is consecrated to the ideals and purposes for which he lived and worked.

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