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A History of Agriculture in India v2.c56: Chapter 4. Rural Economy of Europe in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries

A History of Agriculture in India v2.c56

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English

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Chapter 4. Rural Economy of Europe in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries

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Here it would be pertinent to examine the agrarian conditions and the state of agriculture in Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by way of comparison. Carlton Hayes states : ‘The twelfth and thirteenth centuries constituted a period of significant agrarian as well as commercial development in Europe. Much of the change was a natural expansion of agriculture resulting from an increase in population. But the growth of trade and urban life also radically affected the economy of the rural manor. Since much of the surplus population was drawn to the towns and since towns depended on food brought from the outside, a heightened agricultural production was necessitated. And the provisioning of towns opened up the possibility of farming for profit, rather than merely for local manorial consumption. Thus the clearing of new agricultural land from the forest, which had commenced in the early middle ages, reached its climax in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Afterwards, for several centuries, there was not much further addition to cultivated land in central or western Europe. A great deal of the new farming of the high middle age was done in districts opened up along the frontiers, but much was also done within the older regions, where there was forest land to be cleared. Technological improvements furthered agricultural progress. The wheelbarrow, which came into use in the thirteenth century, was helpful; and the appearance of windmills in the same period was of marked utility, especially in areas where natural waterflow was sluggish.

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The effects of the rise of towns on agriculture were striking. Manors which in the early feudal age produced only for home consumption were now able to produce a surplus for sale outside. Grain became an article of mercantile circulation, brought by the peasant to the town or sold to the merchant who traded in foodstuffs. As a consequence, money circulated more freely in the countryside. Peasants were able to buy freedom or to become tenant farmers paying a fixed rent. Some became labourers for hire. The size of holdings could be increased more readily by hard-working peasants who invested their savings in more land. Even the bourgeoisie speculated in land. The immobility of the manorial relationship was broken.

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'Since the dues and rents exacted by the landlords were usually fixed by immemorial custom and did not fluctuate, and since the general increase in money caused a rise in prices, many landlords—nobles, abbeys, and bishops—faced serious financial loss if not ruin. These in order to keep their serfs from running away to the towns and if possible to increase their revenues were forced to enfranchise serfs and to accept money rent. Since the process of emancipation was primarily the result of economic change, it was more rapid and widespread in the regions where commercial development was most advanced. Accordingly, in western and central Europe, by A.D. 1300, a substantial proportion of the peasants were in reality tenant farmers, not serfs in the older sense. In eastern Europe, on the other hand, serfdom was more general and lasted longer.

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'Another significant effect of the commercial revival was the tendency toward agricultural specialization. Certain regions concentrated on one product. Some landlords devoted all their acres to a crop which could be exported. The Cistercian abbeys of England, for example, were famous for their wool. In certain favourable areas, vineyards spread at the expense of grain growing. All these tendencies quickened in the later middle ages.'⁵ In India such developments did not take place, and agriculture deteriorated.

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⁵ Hayes, Carlton J.H., *History of Europe*, pp. 257-259

Price Control Measures of Ala-ud-Din

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Ala-ud-din made his mark in history by his price control measures. Barni thus narrates how it was achieved. 'The Sultan consulted with his most experienced ministers as to the means of reducing the prices of provisions without resorting to severe and tyrannical punishments. His councillors replied that the necessaries of life would never become cheap until the price of grain was fixed by regulations and tariffs. Cheapness of grain is a universal benefit. So some regulations were issued, which kept down the price for some years.

Regulation I. Fixing the Price of Grain

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| Wheat | per maund | 7½ jitals |
| Barley | " | 4 " |
| Rice | " | 5 " |
| Māsh | " | 5 " |
| Chanā | " | 5 " |
| Moth | " | 3 " |

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This scale of prices was maintained as long as Ala-ud-din lived, and grain never rose one dáng, whether the rains were abundant or scanty. This unvarying price of grain in the markets was looked upon as one of the wonders of the time.

Regulation II. Administrative Arrangement

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To secure the cheapness of grain, Malik Kabul Ulugh Khan, a wise and practical man, was appointed controller of the markets. He received a large territory and used to go round the markets in great state with many a horse and on foot. He had clever deputies, friends of his own, who were appointed by the crown. Intelligent spies also were sent into the markets.

Regulation III. Accumulation of Corn in the King's Granaries

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The Sultan gave orders that all the khalsa villages of the doab should pay the tribute in kind. Corn was brought into the granaries of the city of Delhi. In the country dependent on the New City half the Sultan's portion of the produce was ordered to be taken in grain. In Jhain also, and in the villages of Jhain, stores were to be formed. These stores of grain were to be sent into the city in caravans. By these means so much royal grain came to Delhi that there never was a time when there were not two or three royal granaries full of grain in the city. When there was a deficiency of rain, or when for any reason the caravans did not arrive, and grain became scarce in the markets, then the royal stores were opened and the corn was sold at the tariff price, according to the wants of the people. Grain was also consigned to the caravans from New City. Through these two rules, grain never was deficient in the markets, and never rose one dáng above the fixed price.

Regulation IV. Control Over Transportation

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The Sultan placed all the carriers of his kingdom under the controller of the markets. Orders were given for arresting the head carriers and for bringing them in chains before the controller of the markets, who was directed to detain them until they agreed upon one common mode of action and gave bail for each other. Nor were they to be released until they brought their wives and children, beasts of burden and cattle, and all their property, and fixed their abodes in the villages along the banks of the Jumna. An overseer was to be placed over the carriers and their families, on behalf of the controller of the markets, to whom the carriers were to submit. Until all this was done the chiefs were to be kept in chains. Under the operation of this rule, so much grain found its way into the markets that it was unnecessary to open the royal stores, and grain did not rise a dáng above the standard.

Regulation V. Regrating

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The fifth provision for securing the cheapness of grain was against regrating. This was so rigidly enforced that no merchant, farmer, corn-handler, or any one else, could hold back secretly a man or half a man of grain and sell it at his shop for a dāng or a diram above the regulated price. If regrated grain was discovered, it was forfeited to the Sultan, and the regrater was fined. Engagements were taken from the governors and other revenue officers in the doab that no one under their authority should be allowed to regrate, and if any man was discovered to have regrated, the deputy and his officers were fined, and had to make their defence to the throne.

Regulation VI. Control Over Cultivators

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Engagements were taken from the provincial revenue officers and their assistants that they would provide that the corn-carriers should be supplied with corn by the raiyats on the field at a fixed price. The Sultan also gave orders that engagements should be taken from the chief diwan, and from the overseers and other revenue officers in the countries of the doab, near the capital, that they should so vigorously collect the tribute that the cultivators should be unable to carry away any corn from the fields into their houses and to regrate. They were to be compelled to sell their corn in the fields to the corn-carriers at a low price, so that the dealers should have no excuse for neglecting to bring the corn into the markets. A constant supply was thus secured. To give the villagers a chance of profit, they were permitted to carry their corn into the market and sell it at the regulation price.

Regulation VII. Control Over Market

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Reports used to be made daily to the Sultan of the market rate and of the market transactions from three distinct sources: 1st, the superintendent made a report of the market rate and of the market transactions; 2nd, the barids, or reporters, made a statement; 3rd, the manhis, or spies, made a report. If there was any variance in these reports, the superintendent received punishment. The various officials of the market were well aware that all the ins and outs of the market were reported to the Sultan through three different channels, and so there was no opportunity of their deviating from the market rules in the smallest particular.

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All the wise men of the age were astonished at the evenness and the price in the markets. If the rains had fallen regularly, and the seasons had been always favourable, there would have been nothing so wonderful in grain remaining at one price; but the extraordinary part of the matter was that during the reign of Ala-ud-din there were years in which the rains were deficient, but instead of the usual scarcity ensuing, there was no want of corn in Delhi, and there was no rise in the price either in the grain brought out of the royal granaries, or in that imported by the dealers. This was indeed the wonder of the age, and no other monarch was able to effect it. Once or twice when the rains were deficient a market overseer reported that the price had risen half a *jital*, and he received twenty blows with the stick. When the rains failed, a quantity of corn, sufficient for the daily supply of each quarter of the city, was consigned to the dealers every day from the market, and half a *man* used to be allowed to the ordinary purchasers in the markets. Thus the gentry and traders, who had no villages or lands, used to get grain from the markets. If in such a season any poor person went to the market, and did not get assistance, the overseer received his punishment whenever the fact found its way to the king's ears.

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For the purpose of securing low prices for piece goods, garments, sugar, vegetables, fruits, animal oil, and lamp oil, five Regulations were issued.

Slavery

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For securing a cheap rate for the purchase of horses, slaves, and cattle four Regulations were issued.

Regulation IV. Price of Slaves

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The price of a serving girl was fixed from 5 to 12 *tankas*, of a concubine at 20, 30 or 40 *tankas*. The price for a male slave was 100 or 200 *tankas*, or less. If such a slave as could not in these days be bought for 1,000 or 2,000 *tankas* came into the market, he was sold for what he would fetch, in order to escape the reports of the informers. Handsome lads fetched from 20 to 30 *tankas*; the price of slave-labourers was 10 to 15 *tankas*, and of young domestic slaves 17 or 18 *tankas* ....

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Great pains were taken to secure low prices for all things sold at the stalls in the markets, from caps to shoes, from combs to needles, etc., etc. Although the articles were of the most trifling value, the Sultan took the greatest trouble to fix the prices and settle the profit of the vendors.

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The fourth Regulation for securing cheapness provided severe punishments; blows, and cutting off flesh from the haunches of those who gave short weight. The market people, however, could not refrain from giving short weight. They sold their goods according to the established rate, but they cheated the purchasers in the weight, especially ignorant people and children. When the Sultan turned his attention to the subject, he discovered that the market people, as usual, were acting dishonestly. He, therefore, used to send for some of the poor ignorant boys, who attended to his pigeon-houses, and to give them ten or twenty *dirams* to go into the market and buy bread and various other articles for him. When the boys had purchased the articles, and brought them to the Sultan, the inspector of the market was sent for, and he had to weigh the things in the presence of the Sultan. If the weight was less than required by the Sultan's scale of prices, the inspector took the lad and went to the shop of the dealer who had given short weight, and placed the purchased article before him. The inspector then took from his shop whatever was deficient, and afterwards cut from his haunches an equal weight of flesh, which was thrown down before his eyes. The certainty of this punishment kept the traders honest, and restrained them from giving short weight, and other knavish tricks. Nay, they gave such good weight that purchasers often got somewhat in excess.’

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‘During the reign of Ala-ud-din, either through his agency or the beneficent ruling of Providence, there were several remarkable events and matters which had never been witnessed or heard of in any age or time, and probably never will again’, states Barni. ‘The cheapness of grain, clothes, and necessaries of life. The constant succession of victories. The destruction and rolling back of the Mongols. The maintenance of a large army at a small cost. The severe punishment and repression of rebels, and the general prevalence of loyalty. The safety of the roads in all directions. The honest dealings of the bazar people. The erection and repair of mosques, minarets, and forts, and the excavation of tanks. That during the last ten years of the reign the hearts of Musulmans in general were inclined to rectitude, truth, honesty, justice and temperance.’⁶

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⁶ Zia-ud-din Barni. *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*, in Elliot and Dowson, *The History of India*..., Vol. III, pp. 192 to 197,206,207

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Ala-ud-din certainly succeeded in preserving an artificial cheapness in the markets of Delhi, but at the cost of savage oppression. Cheapness of foodgrains for the city people was achieved at the cost of the Hindu peasants.

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Muhammed Habib gives the title of rural revolution to the revenue administrative measures of Ala-ud-din. He further equates Ala-ud-din with Mao Tse-Tung. To give such proceedings the name of rural revolution is inappropriate and misleading. The beneficiaries of these measures were the Sultan, his Turkish officials and army, not the cultivators of land. They had to give half the gross produce to the government instead of one-sixth provided by immemorial rule. Thus their standard of living which was already wretched, was further lowered.

References

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Allan, J., Haig, T.W. and Dodwell, H.H. *The Cambridge Shorter History of India*, Cambridge, 1943 Elliot, Sir H.M. and Dowson, J. *The History of India as Told by its Own Historians*, Vol. III, London, 1867 Habib, M. *Introduction to Elliot and Dowson’s History of India*, Vol. II, Aligarh, 1952 Hayes, C.H., Marshall, W.B. and Cole, C.W. *History of Europe*, New York, 1956 Smith, V.A. *The Oxford History of India*, Delhi, 1976

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