Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c11.s17: Creating Hermeneutics

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c11.s17

Language: English

Creating Hermeneutics

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B.K. Matilal initiated dialogues between Indian and Western philosophies on one hand and also between diverse philosophical systems of Indian philosophy on the other.

Dayakrishna tried to initiate dialogues between the teachers of Philosophy Department of Rajasthan University and the *paṇḍits* of Sanskrit College, Jaipur. They became sterile and drab. But in the dialogues at Pune, Varanasi and Calcutta the *paṇḍits* responded creatively.

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The paradigm that the West is strong in materialist gains and India in spirituality was instituted by the British to legitimize the colonial project, says Edward Said. The mystical aura of the so-called Indian spirituality provided an escape to the educated Indian and a cover for the inferiority before the superior technology of the West.

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Pt. Badarinath Shukla (1898–1988) was an outstanding Naiyāyika of Kāśī. Known for his original works *Ārambhavādaḥ* and *Śataślokī* on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, he had proposed a new concept of *mokṣa* in Nyāya philosophy by defining it as *sukhātmaka* (imbued with pleasure). He was first introduced to the world of modern philosophers perhaps in 1982 when Dayakrishna convened a seminar at Sārnāth on Nyāya philosophy. He created quite a sensation amongst the traditional *paṇḍits* as well as the modern scholars of philosophy by his presentation on *nyāyaśāstrīyavicārapaddhatyā dehātmavādasambhāvanā* (the possibility to accept body as self according to Nyāya methodology). The event raised a new debate. Pt. Shukla argued that *ātman* (the self) need not be accepted as an additional category, its purpose is served by the body and the mind only. He clearly had a vision of modern democratic values that have been emerging.

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Pt. Shukla argued for *ātman* as a body substance according to the tenets of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. The individual self carries nine *viśeṣa guṇas* (special qualities), which are *jñāna*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *bhāvanā*, *sukha* and *duḥkha* and five *sāmanya guṇas* (general qualities), i.e. *saṁkhyā*, *parimāṇa*, *pṛthaktva*, *saṁyoga* and *vibhāga*. These fourteen qualities exist in the individual self and it can be accepted to be an indivisible part of the body. Thus the individual self is not a separate substance, as the body and the mind (*manas*) joined together would serve all the purposes of the existence of a human being. The combination of body with mind can be accepted as the individual self, as all the *viśeṣa guṇas* of individual self — *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa* and *prayatna* — will exist in the body and remaining other *dharma*, *adharma*, *bhāvanā* will remain only in the *manas*. Through this bifurcation of the qualities, Pt. Shukla revised the concept of *viśeṣa guṇas* and redefined some of them as *sāmānya guṇas*. He located these *sāmānya guṇas* in the body. The distribution of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa guṇas* in the body and mind respectively satisfies all the requirements of an individual self, therefore the need to consider the self as a separate entity from the body and the mind is nullified, and there is no need to accept the self as the ninth substance.

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Considering all possible objections to the theory of Dehātmavāda, Pt. Shukla refutes them one by one. When we accept body as an individual self, then the question arises how one would remember the experiences of childhood in old age when the body is totally different in both ages? Theoretically it would require the existence of a consciousness aware of that experience which remains unchanged in old age. In orthodox Nyāya, the individual self meets this requirement. Shukla attributes this function to *manas*, which always remains connected with body. The acceptance of a substance apart from *manas* and the body would lead to *gaurava-doṣa*. Concluding his arguments, Shukla cites a number of social objections that occur if an additional ninth substance like the individual self is accepted. The acceptance of soul as a ninth substance leads to the belief in rebirth. People think that their suffering is a result of the actions of the previous birth, and they tolerate injustice and oppression. The theory of *ātman* and rebirth helps in maintaining status quo and serves the interest of the oppressors. Dehātmavāda on the other hand would make the people confident and enable them to create better conditions in this life. Those who accept body as self may be more disciplined and alert to make their life more beautiful and fruitful. With this view in mind, Shukla has argued as a Naiyāyika in favour of the theory of Dehātmavāda which belongs to Cārvāka philosophy keeping in view the outlook of a common man. He was misunderstood by traditional scholars who severely criticized him for supporting atheism.

Linked texts (1)

Vaidyaśataślokī — Avadhāna Sarasvatī, Sanskrit