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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c6.s5.t11: Debates within Orthodox Systems of Philosophy

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c6.s5.t11

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English

Debates within Orthodox Systems of Philosophy

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The doctrine of cumulative pursuit of *karma* and *jñāna* continued till Śaṅkara vehemently discarded it. He was criticized by his contemporaries and his immediate followers like Bhāskara also for this. They even called him a non-conformist and the charge heterodoxy was levelled against him.

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This era is also marked with serious debates and the employment of tactics of *jalpa*, *chala*, *jāti*, *nigrahasthāna* and *vitaṇḍā*. The term *vāda* came in vogue in this era and *brahmodyas* were replaced by *vādas* (in the sense of friendly as well as hostile debates). With growth of diverse philosophical schools, the debates assume a tone of confrontation and challenge, and are carried through written texts and public platforms with ferocity.

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Philosophical systems referred to as *matas* or *siddhāntas* and later on as *darśanas* developed under two schools — the realist and idealist. A more rational grouping of various *darśanas* has been attempted by Mādhavācārya, who authored a Saṁgraha text on these *darśanas* — *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*. Accordingly, *darśanas* are divided into two groups — the *nāstikas* and *āstikas*. The former are of two types — Ādhyakṣikas (those who uphold perception as the only means of knowledge) and Tārkikas (rationalists). The *āstika* philosophers are also of two kinds — the Saguṇātmavādins and the Nirguṇātmavādins. The Saguṇātmavādins are of two type — Tārkikas (rationalists) and Śrautas (those who hold the authority of Śruti or scriptures alone). The Tārkikas are again of two types: Spaṣṭatārkikas (direct rationalists) and Prachannatārkikas (indirect rationalists).

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The proponent and the respondent (*vādin* and *prativādin*) stood before each with daggers drawn, abuses we are hurled and piquant satires we are used. And this was the era when India’s intellectual genius reached its zenith reverberating with its fertile thinking and presenting sumptuous feasts in intellection. Philosophy became a celebration of intellectual skills. Both intra-sectarian and inter-sectarian debates were fought by Bādarāyaṇa, Vātsyāyana, Nāgārjuna, Diṅnāga, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Dharmakīrti, Śaṅkarācārya and Udayana. Buddhist philosophers like Nāgārjuna, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti exemplified the theory and practice of debate not only through their writings, they also participated in debates on public platforms. *Vāda* was a means of propagation of Buddha's message for them.

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Diṅnāga was a debater par excellence. He remained conspicuous by his presence in the debates held at Nālandā University. There are references to some of the debates in which he proved the brilliance of his intellect. In one such debate, Sudurjaya, a brāhmaṇa scholar, received debacle at his hands.¹¹⁴

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The diversity of sects and their tolerant symbiosis were brought out by Bāṇa (seventh century CE) in his description of the hermitage of Divākaramitra. Harṣa sees here,

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devotees dead to all passion, Jaina monks in white robes, mendicants in white dress, followers of Kṛṣṇa, religious students, ascetics who had plucked off their hairs, followers of Kapila, Jainas, Lokāyatikas, followers of Kaṇāda, followers of Upaniṣads, theists, students of Dharmaśāstras, students of Purāṇas, experts of Vedic rituals, grammarians, followers of Pāñcarātra system of Āgama, all diligently following their own tenets, pondering, registering objections, raising doubts, resolving the objections and doubts, giving etymologies, disputing, studying, and explaining . . . .¹¹⁵

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Vātsyāyana had refuted the propositions of Nāgārjuna. Diṅnāga (CE 450–520) gave befitting rebuttal to him. Udyotakara subsequently refuted Diṅnāga, and then Dharmakīrti suitably replied to his critique of Diṅnāga. It was Vācaspati Miśra who further carried the fight against the Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti. Kumārila had attacked the very foundation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy and questioned the validity of grading the truth — *saṃvṛti-satya* (the relative) and *paramārtha-satya* (the ultimate). But to Mādhyamika all phenomena remain indeterminate and indefinable.

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Bhāvaviveka (CE 490–570), also known as Bhavya and also as a commentator of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*, founded Svātantrika school under Mādhyamika Buddhism. He opposed Buddhapālita (CE 470–540), the founder of Prāsaṅgika school of Mādhyamika philosophy. He differed with Buddhapālita with reference to the concept of *paramārtha* (the ultimate) and *saṃvṛti* (the relative).

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Śāntarakṣita (CE 680–740) was one of the most brilliant philosophers of Buddhist thought. In collaboration with his disciple Kamalaśīla (CE 700– 750), he criticized Bhāvaviveka and repositioned it under Yogācāra-Mādhyamika system. In his *Tattvasaṁgraha*, Śāntarakṣita presented a critique of Sāṁkhya theories of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* and examined the concepts of *Ātman* and God in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems, Syādvāda and Cārvāka systems. Kamalaśīla wrote a *pañjikā* on *Tattvasaṁgraha*.

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The deliberations of Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and other followers of Nāgārjuna show the sharp differences and debates even within the Mādhyamikas.

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Amongst the Jaina philosophers who entered into debate both with the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhist logicians mention may be made of Nīlakeśī, whose debates are described in the Tamil *kāvya* of the same name. Myth and imagination are interspersed in the whole texture of this text. By the time the text was created around fourth-fifth century CE, Nīlakeśī had become a mythical name. The debates described in *Neelakesi* are fictitious, but they bring out the perspectives with which Jainism encountered the other systems. Different sections in the text are named on the schools of thought or the masters belonging to these schools who are conquered by Nīlakeśī in debates, viz.:

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*daruma curaic carukkam*
*kuṇḍalakeśivāda carukkam*
*arulkkacandravāda carukkam*
*moggalavāda carukkam*
*biddhavāda carukkam*
*ācīvakavāda carukkam*
*saṁkhyavāda carukkam*
*vedavāda carukkam*
*bhūtavāda carukkam.*

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The debates are said to have been held at Ujjain, Padmapura, Kapilapura, Attināpura (Hastināpura) and Kākkalandī or Kāveripoompattinam.¹¹⁶

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Nīlakeśī is said to have debated with Bhadrā Kuṇḍalakeśī (referred above) at Campillī in the country of Pāñcāla; with Buddhist philosopher Arkacandra at Ujjayinī and Mokkala at Padmapura. After defeating these three, she went to Kapilapura and challenged Buddha himself and defeated him in the debate! In the same way Sāṁkhya-teacher Parāśara was routed at Hastināpura and Vaiśeṣika-teacher Lokajit at his hermitage. Nīlakeśī then met Vedic scholar Bhūtika in the town Kākanti and having defeated him finally she vanquished the teacher of Bhūtavāda (materialism), named Piśācaka in the royal court of King Madanajit.

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The issues taken up in the debates offer strong refutation from the Jaina point of view to various philosophical concepts in all the rival systems, but as Nīlakeśī is supposed to win all the debates, and the rival has to be silenced, the counter-positions from the opponents have not been properly stated.

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Haribhadra (6th century CE) enriched the Indian tradition of philosophical debates by his enormous contributions. He is one of the very few philosophers who always engaged in a constructive debate. Haribhadra exhibited extraordinary sensitivity to understand the point of view of his opponent. Even though he was a devout follower of Mahāvīra, he wrote a commentary on *Nyāyapraveśakasūtram* of Diṅnāga, in which he very faithfully elaborated upon the aphorisms of Diṅnāga. The propitiatory verse in the beginning of his commentary (*praṇipatya jineśvaram . . .*) is supposed to be a salutation for Mahāvīra and Buddha both. Haribhadra declared his commitment for remaining unbiased in his *Lokatattvanirṇaya*:

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I do not have any prejudice for Mahāvīra, nor do I foster any grudge for Kapila and others. (I believe in the principle that) whosoever speaks logically, must be respected.¹¹⁷

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It is said that Haribhadra had authored as many as 1,444 works, as he was asked to compose that many works by his *guru*, as an atonement for having finished 1,444 Buddhists (in debate?).

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Notable amongst his philosophical works are: *Ṣaḍdarśana- samuccaya* and *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, *Anekāntajayapatākā* (Victory Flag of Perspectivism) and *Lokatattvanirṇaya*. In the last work he refuted the concepts of *Īśvara* (God) and *Ātman* and considered the world as essential. With his faith in the theory of Anekānta, he criticized the opponent's view, but also tried to see it with another perspective and to unveil its validity. This way of looking at another's view embraces both agreements and disagreements. Also, in his attempt to justify the view of his rival, Haribhadra gave it a twist, which might not at all be acceptable to the opponent. He was guided by the philosophy that ideologies aim at one and the same target, i.e. *mokṣa*, therefore the points of disagreement between them might be rectified. For the refutation of *nairātmya* (theory of nonsoul) he even cited the authority of Veda: *svayaṁ jyotiḥ sadā eva ātmā tathā vede api paṭhyate*.¹¹⁸

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Besides well-established schools of philosophies, several ideologues and schools of thought like Daivavāda (fatalism), Svabhāvavāda (naturalism), Kālavāda (pessimism) and Puruṣakāravāda (activism) had existed. Vātsyāyana in his *Kāmasūtra* and Yājñavalkya in his *Smṛti* had criticized some of these. Haribhadra also presented refutation of Daivavāda (fatalism), Svabhāvavāda (naturalism), Kālavāda (pessimism) and Puruṣakāravāda or Karmavāda (activism) in his *Śāstrārthavārtāsamuccaya*. He did not completely overrule these theories, he simply said that none of them was sufficient to explain the theory of causality singularly. *Kāla*, *svabhāva*, *niyati* and *karma* all collectively become the cause for world.¹¹⁹

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During sixth-seventh centuries, the Pallava and Pāṇḍya courts in south India had become vibrant centres of debates between diverse sects. Sundara Pāṇḍya, a philosopher of Advaita Vedānta who flourished before Śaṅkarācārya in Tamil Nadu, was also known as Pāṇḍyarāja Kubjavardhana and Kūna Pāṇḍya. He is said to have converted from Jainism to embrace Śaivism after discussions with Jñānasambandhar. He is worshipped amongst the sixty-three Nāyanārs (devotees of Śiva). Akalaṅka, one of the most brilliant logicians, was contemporary of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Śubhatuṅga or Kṛṣṇa I (eighth century CE). He is said to have defeated the Buddhists in the debates held in Pallava court, so that they were forced to migrate to Laṅkā.

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