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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c7.s1: Vāda and Nyāyadarśana

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c7.s1

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English

Vāda and Nyāyadarśana

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Even though the tradition of intellectual discourses, debates and discussions was assiduously pursued for more than a millennium, it was the Nyāya philosophy that made it a part of an epistemology within the system. *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama (sixth-fifth century BCE) discusses the theory of debate in detail. Out of the sixteen *padārthas* (categories) that are supposed to be essential for the discipline of Nyāya, the following fourteen *padārthas* are directly related to debate — *saṁśaya* (doubt), *prayojana* (purpose/motive), *dṛṣṭānta* (illustration/example), *siddhānta* (theory/tenet), *tarka* (argument), *avayava* (members of a syllogism/parts of sentence presenting the thesis), *nirṇaya* (conclusion), *vāda* (conversation), *jalpa* (debate, wrangling), *vitaṇḍā* (cavil), *hetvābhāsa* (fallacy), *chala* (trick/quibbling), *jāti* (legitimate objection/rejoinder) and *nigrahasthāna* (points of capture/checkmates/clinchers); and the remaining two — *pramāṇa* and *prameya* — are indirectly linked with debate.

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There are four *pramāṇas* — *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (analogue) and *śabda* (scripture).

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The knowledge arising out of sense contact with an object, and which is determinate, unnamable and non-erratic, is *pratyakṣa* (perception). Inference is knowledge preceded by perception and is of three kinds — *pūrvavat* (a priori), *śeṣavat* (a posteriori) and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* (commonly seen). A discourse from an authentic source is *śabda* (scriptural authority). Knowledge of an object through similarity is *upamāna* (analogue).⁸

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Of these, *anumāna* (inference) is crucial for sustaining any conversation or debate. It has three cases in relation to *hetu* (reason/cause) — *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. *Pakṣa* is the thesis case, *sapakṣa* is the observed case in which *hetu* is essentially present, and *vipakṣa* another observed case in which *hetu* is essentially absent. Inference is employed in two ways — for the understanding of one’s own self and for the understanding of the other one (a disciple or an opponent in debate). The former is called *svārthānumāna* and the latter *parārthānumāna*. *Pañcāvayava-vākya* is required for *parārthānumāna*. The five *avayavas*, comprised in five statements, are *pratijñā* (thesis), *hetu* (reason), *dṛṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa* (illustration), *upanaya* (application) and *nigamana* (conclusion).

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The statement of *sādhya* (probandum) is *pratijñā*. The cause or probans for proving the probandum by similarity or dissimilarity is *hetu*. *Udāharaṇa* is *dṛṣṭānta* having similarity with the probandum. Application of the illustration is *upanaya*. Reaffirming the statement of probandum on the basis of justification from *hetu* and *upanaya* is *nigamana*.⁹

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In the well-known instance “there is fire on the mountain, because smoke is arising out of it”, the *pañcāvayava-vākya* will be formulated in the following manner:
• There is fire on the mountain — *pratijñā*.
• Because there is smoke arising from its top — *hetu*.
• Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, just as we see it in the kitchen — *dṛṣṭānta*.
• So is on the mountain — *upanaya*.
• Therefore the fire burning on this mountain — *nigamana*.

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The enunciation of any *anumāna* is not complete without the five *avayavas*, and in the very first aphorism of his *Nyāyasūtra*, Gautama says that the forms of debate are initiated through the five *avayavas* and the system of thought in Nyāya rests on debates.

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Mahāvidyā syllogisms comprising of other members were first formulated by Kulārka Paṇḍita in eleventh century. They were refuted by Vādīndra in his *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* and the system sank into oblivion.¹⁰

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*Vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) is the rule of unfailing relationship between the cause and its effect. A statement specifying the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum is also called *vyāpti*. Wherever there is smoke, fire is there — this is *vyāpti*. There are two *vyāptis* — *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance.

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*Saṁśaya* (doubt) is an irresolute judgement about the precise character of an object arising from recognition of common properties in many objects, or properties uncommon to any from the conflicting testimony or irregularity of perception and non-perception.¹¹

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*Prayojana* is the aim for which the discourse is initiated.¹²

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*Dṛṣṭānta* (illustration) is the statement comprising an example on which both an ordinary person and an expert would have the similarity in understanding.¹³ It is used in the five member syllogism as stated above.

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*Siddhānta* (theory) is a position resting on the authority of a certain treatise, a section of a treatise or implication.¹⁴ It is of four types — *sarvatantra siddhānta* (the theory followed by all systems), *pratitantra siddhānta* (theory in the system followed by the proponent not followed by the opponent), *adhikaraṇa siddhānta* (theory in the system followed in a treatise required for the validation of other sections) and *abhyupagama siddhānta* (the theory to be validated).

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*Tarka* (argument/reasoning) is the confutation carried out on ascertaining the real character of an unknown entity by showing the absurdity of all other characters.¹⁵ Incorrect application of *tarka* leads to *tarkābhāsa* (fallacious reasoning). Udayana has propounded five types of blemishes of *tarka* — *ātmāśraya* (self-dependence), *anyonyāśraya* (mutual dependence), *cakraka* (vicious circle), *anavasthā* (infinite regress) and *aniṣṭaprasaṅga* (*reductio ad absurdum*).

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Arriving at a decision after hearing both the sides — *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa* — is *nirṇaya*.¹⁶

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*Kathā* (conversation) is a generic term for all kinds of debates, discourses and dialogues. *Vāda* (discussion), *jalpa* (debate) and *vitaṇḍā* (cavil) — these are the three forms of *kathā* according to *Nyāyasūtra*. *Jalpa* (debate) is a defence or attack with the aim of winning over the opponent. *Chala* (quibble), *jāti* (objection) and *nigrahasthānas* (clinchers) are essentially employed in it.¹⁷ Mere attack on the opposite side is *vitaṇḍā* (cavil). The proponent in *vitaṇḍā* makes refutations of other systems without ascertaining his own position.¹⁸ *Jalpa* is thus a tricky debate whereas *vitaṇḍā* is destructive debate involving scholastic exercise with arguments from one side only. The practitioner of *vitaṇḍā* does not argue for establishing his own theory, but demolishes all the other theories, so that his theory alone remains vindicated. Texts written exclusively in the genre of *vitaṇḍā* have been discussed earlier (see Chap. 2). There are two categories of *vitaṇḍā*. The higher category of *vitaṇḍā* serves its *siddhānta-pakṣa* through refutation of all rival systems. The second category is comprised in the misuse of *vitaṇḍā* just for scholastic exercise. Those who practise this basic form of *vitaṇḍā* are called the *durvaitaṇḍikas* by Śrīharṣa.¹⁹

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*Vāda* is a pervasive concept. It is defined by Gautama as the conversation between the master and the disciples or between peers involving discussions of friendly nature. Both the sides of a theory are discussed in *vāda* employing five-member syllogism.²⁰ In his presentation of *Nyāyadarśana*, Haribhadra (sixth century CE) in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamgraha*²¹ defines *vāda* in the following way: The means for the practice of discourse between the master and the disciple with taking up positions and counterpositions is *vāda* (discussion).²²

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The gamut of *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* is named as *kathā*. The author of *Tārkikarakṣā* defines *kathā* in the following manner: Expansion of sentences by various speakers deliberating upon a particular topic is *kathā*. It has six and according to some, four divisions.²³

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In *Milindapañho*, King Milinda asks Monk Nāgasena — “let there be *kathāsallāpa* (discussion and dialogue) between us”.

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Śaṅkara Miśra in his *Vādivinoda* takes up the following alternate theses with regard to *kathā* and refutes them one by one:
1. Sanātana’s theory of a different kind of *vitaṇḍā*, consisting of *tattvabubhutsuvāda*, i.e. exposition of the own theory alone by the proponent and its vilification only by the respondent.
2. The proposition of the author of *Ratnākara*, holding a fourth category of *kathā* in the form of the exploration of the theory of the proponent only.
3. The theory of *kathā* as a unified single form of debate without any categorizations.

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Śaṅkara Miśra also discusses the concept and verities of *vipratipatti* (disagreement) in *kathā*.²⁴

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There are seven regulations of *kathā* as defined in *Tārkikarakṣā*. They are:
• *Nirūpyanirūpakaniyama* — regulations for using signifiers and signs.

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• *Kathāviśeṣavyavasthā* — arrangements for special types of debates.
• *Vādiprativādiniyama* — rules for the opponent (*vādī*) and respondent (*prativādī*).
• *Sadasi anuvidheyasaṃvaraṇa* — codes of conduct for the juries defining scopes for their interference and maintaining restraint by both the head of assembly (*sabhā*) and the juries.
• *Nigrahasthānasāmastya* — deciding the clinchers.
• *Asāmastyodbhāvanapratijñāna* — ascertaining the extent to which the clinchers have been completely/incompletely pointed out.
• *Kathāparyavasānasaṁvittiḥ* — regulating the debate for winding up.

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On the other hand, some of the theorists have accepted four divisions. They are — two types of *vādiprativādiniyama* (rules for the opponent and respondent) and two types of *sadasi anuvidheyasaṃvaraṇa* (codes of conduct for the juries).

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*Kathaka* is a person participating in a *kathā*.

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Rajeshwar Shastri says that when a *kathā* is being conducted in the form of a debate, both the participants should be of equal stature in erudition, otherwise the very purpose of *kathā* — dissemination of knowledge in a particular field — will be lost, and due to inequality of the debators, the juries may take a decision without the debate.

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The orthodox tradition of Nyāya philosophy regards *vāda* as something sacred. As a *vāda* was supposed invariably to culminate in an understanding of *tattva* (reality), only the teacher and his disciple as well as those engaged in the pursuit of knowledge are entitled to participate in a *vāda*. Organizing an assembly for a *vāda* was supposed to yield merit equal to performance of a *yajña*. The understanding of *tattva* (reality) is said to be of three types — (i) that which imparts the knowledge of the unknown, (ii) that which substantiates the knowledge of the known, and (iii) that which eradicates the doubts.²⁵

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Gautama has defined five *hetvābhāsas* (fallacies) — *savyabhicāra*, *viruddha* (contrary), *prakaraṇasama*, *sādhyasama* and *atītakāla*. The first occurs when the probans leads to other probandums also. The probans leading to the opposite probandum is *viruddha*. Making probans identical with the probandum is *prakaraṇasama*. Unproved probans is *sādhyasama*.

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Mistimed statement on the probans is *atītakāla* or *kālātīta*.²⁶ Other authors in the field of Nyāya have redefined these *hetvābhāsas* as *asiddha* (unproven), *viruddha* (contrary), *anaikāntika* (inconclusive), *satpratipakṣa* (counter-balanced) and *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* or *bādhita* (contradicted).

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Assumption of alternate meaning in the proposition of an opponent is *chala* (cheating). It is of three types — *vāk-chala*, *sāmānya-chala* and *upacāra-chala*. On the basis of the ambiguous use by a speaker, the opponent misconstrues his statement — this is *vāk-chala*. Imagining an impossible situation from a statement describing a possibility is *sāmānya-chala*. *Upacāra-chala* consists of deriving the metaphorical meaning.

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An attack or denial of a proposition on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity is *jāti*,²⁷ so named because it is generated or born instantly. As per *bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, *jāti* involves objections on *hetu* (cause). When *hetu* is intended to prove a proposition through the similarity of the example cited, *jāti* proceeds to counter it by producing an example based on dissimilarity and vice versa. Udyotakara however disagrees with the definitions of Gautama and Vātsyāyana with regard to restricting *jāti* to opposing a hypothesis on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity of the example alone. It is like positioning a *wazīr* against a *wazīr* in the game of chess. *Jāti* thus forms a counter-argument exhibiting the futility of the arguments already presented, right argument against the right one and a futile argument against the equally futile one, showing flaws in opponent's argument. Gautama has described twenty-four *jātis* based on:
• Homogeneity (*sādṛśyasama*)
• Heterogeneity (*vaidharmyasama*)
• Addition (*utkarṣasama*)
• Deficiency (*apakarṣasama*)
• Uncertainty (*varṇyasama*)
• Certainty (*avarṇyasama*)
• Alternative (*vikalpasama*)
• Probandum (*sādhyasama*)
• Co-presence (*prāptisama*)
• Mutual absence (*aprāptisama*)
• Infinite regress (*prasaṅgasama*)
• Counter-instance (*pratidṛṣṭāntasama*)

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• Non-production (*anutpattisama*)
• Doubt (*saṃśayasama*)
• Issue under reference (*prakaraṇasama*)
• Cause (*hetusama*)
• Implication (*arthāpattisama*)
• Non-difference (*aviśeṣasama*)
• Proof (*upapattisama*)
• Apprehension (*upalabdhisama*)
• Non-apprehension (*anupalabdhisama*)
• Evanescence (*anityasama*)
• Eternity (*nityasama*)
• Effect (*kāryasama*).²⁸

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The knowledge of *jātis* makes a debater to expose the futility of the arguments made by his opponent.

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When a refutation of the hypothesis of *vādī* is equally defective, then this yields *ṣatpakṣī* (six options). Of the six ways employed in this *ṣatpakṣī*, *vādī* and *prativādī* both get three chances each to prove the infallibility of their position. *Vādī* makes a statement, the opponent gives futile rejoinder and the proponent is unable to point out the flaw in this rejoinder. According to Udayana, the debate can be put to an end by the jury here itself, so that there are only three ways. But the respondent is allowed again to point out that the proponent has not been able to point out his flaw, failing which the proponent again will get one more chance, and then the opponent will be asked to give his view. This makes six presentations all in all. Of these, the first, third and fifth belong to *vādī*, and the second, fourth and sixth belong to *prativādī*.²⁹

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The concept of *nigrahasthāna* (clincher) is very crucial in the theory and practice of debate. It occurs when one of the debaters gets himself trapped due to his own deficiency.³⁰ Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* has used the term *pratidvandīgraha* for the situation when a *vādī* overlooking the defect in his own thesis, starts displaying the same defect in the discourse of his opponent.³¹

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In *Gautamīya Nyāya* the following twenty-two *nigrahasthānas* are accepted:

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(a) *nigrahasthānas* based on defect in the statement or probans (5):
• *pratijñāhāni* (loss of thesis)
• *pratijñāntara* (change of thesis)
• *pratijñāvirodha* (contradicting one's own thesis)
• *pratijñāsaṁnyāsa* (abandonment of thesis)
• *hetvantara* (shifting the reason)

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(b) *nigrahasthānas* based on defective syntax and semantics (4):
• *arthāntara* (digression)
• *nirarthaka* (gibberish)
• *avijñātārtha* (incomprehensible speech)
• *apārthaka* (nonsensical)

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(c) *nigrahasthānas* based on wrong formulation of thesis (3):
• *aprāptakāla* (reversal of order of five-member syllogism)
• *nyūna* (omission of one or more steps)
• *adhika* (addition of steps not required)

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(d) *nigrahasthāna* based on repetition (1):
• *punarukta* (repetition)

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(e) *nigrahasthānas* arising out of inconsistency (4):
• *anuvāda* (reiterating )
• *arthapunarukta* (repetition of contents)
• *ananubhāṣaṇa* (silence)
• *ajñāta* (lack of intelligence)

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(f) *nigrahasthānas* with acceptance of one's own defective proposition (3):
• *apratibhā* (incapability to respond)
• *vikṣepa* (dispension, making excuses)
• *matānujñā* (allowance to the view of the opponent by saying that this defect lies in your statement also)

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(g) *nigrahasthānas* based on inner contradiction (2):
• *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa* (neglecting the one's own defeat or objections raised on it)
• *niranuyojyānuyoga* (inadvertent proclamation of the defeat of the opponent by the disputant himself).

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