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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c7.s4: Debate on the Debate: Buddhist Critique of the Naiyāyika

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c7.s4

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English

Debate on the Debate: Buddhist Critique of the Naiyāyika

c7.s4.1

The concept of triple probans prevailed since the time of Gautama. Afterwards, the orthodox Naiyāyikas adopted the idea of sixfold probans adding additional three categories. This model of the probans was rejected by the Buddhists. Dharmakīrti has given considerable space to the refutation of the concept of six types of probans. As a result of his criticism, the later Naiyāyikas readjusted the concept of sixfold probans and accepted five categories of *hetu*.⁶⁵

c7.s4.2

The orthodox Naiyāyikas gave the concept of *pañcāvayava-vākya* — the sentence stating the five steps of inference, as elaborated earlier. Both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti rejected the concept of *pañcāvayava-vākya*. They emphatically stated that without using the five-member syllogism a *vādī* can prove *sādhya* and all the argument should invariably lead to it and not to any other attribute. For drawing an inference, *pakṣa* and *dṛṣṭānta* these two premises only are sufficient and they make *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance). *Pratijñā* (statement of proposition) and *nigamana* (conclusion) are redundant.⁶⁶ Having rejected the structure of *pañcāvayava-* *vākya*, he also demolishes the sequential order of the five categories there, proposing to abolish the restriction that the probans should be stated first and the instance in the last. He finds any such sequence absurd, because argument can be employed both ways and the aim of causing authentic cognition should be realized, rather than maintenance of an order in the statement of categories.⁶⁷ He also holds the use of two *vyāptis* (*anvaya* and *vyatireka* — the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance) as redundant, because one of them naturally implies the other.⁶⁸

c7.s4.3

The idea that the invariable concomitance can be understood without reliance on examples was elaborated first by the Jainas. It was taken over by Buddhists and became known as Antarvyāptivāda (theory of intrinsic implication of invariable concomitance). Dharmakīrti argues in support of Antarvyāptivāda. He redevelops it through his idea of *sāmarthya*, i.e. the invariable concomitance in itself is capable of leading to the conclusion and out of two types of *vyāptis* one is capable of leading to the other.

c7.s4.4

The concept of *āpta* (reliable person) has been a contentious issue between the orthodox Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists. Even the system of grammar so scientifically and meticulously cultivated under Pāṇinian tradition relied on *āptas* or *śiṣṭas*. Patañjali states that the usage of *śiṣṭa* (learned) should be accepted as the standard norm. He identifies *śiṣṭas* as “those brāhmaṇas who live in Āryāvarta (the home of *āryas*), whose daily intake of food is the grain only in one little earthen pot, who are not greedy, do not seize upon a cause and are well versed in all the Śāstras (knowledge systems)”.

c7.s4.5

Buddhist logicians like Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti do not agree with the theory of *parārthānumāna* as postulated by Gautama and his followers. *Parārthānumāna* was also named as *sādhana* by Diṅnāga. *Pakṣa* (thesis), *hetu* (cause or signifying analogy) and *dṛṣṭānta* (instance) — these are the three constituents of *parārthānumāna* according to Diṅnāga. The unsound nature of these three makes three fallacies, called *sādhanābhāsas* by Diṅnāga — *pakṣābhāsa*, *hetvābhāsa* and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*.

c7.s4.6

Diṅnāga believed that *parārthānumāna* will not be possible if any one of the three elements, i.e. *pakṣa*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*, is defective. In the same way he also holds that all of three elements — *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* — also form the essential requisites for the inference. Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* agrees with Diṅnāga and criticizes the orthodox Naiyāyikas.⁶⁹

c7.s4.7

The Buddhist logicians differ from orthodox Naiyāyikas as *vāda* to them is not a means for winning the arguments, it is meant to help the opponent in seeing the truth. The conceptual framework for the theory of debate was further substantiated in the discussions on *anumāna* (inference).

c7.s4.8

Again there is a basic difference between Gautamīya Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers with regard to the concept of *nigrahasthāna*. In the former *nigrahasthāna* is defined as a *parājayavastu* (a point of defeat), whereas Dharmakīrti views *nigrahasthāna* as a *parājayādhikaraṇa* (forfeiture of the right to continue debate).

c7.s4.9

Dharmakīrti has divided *nigrahasthānas* into two categories — *asādhanāṅga-vacana* (non-statement of a constituent proof) and *adoṣodbhāvana* (failure to point out the fault of the opponent). The former belongs to *vādī* (disputant) and the latter to *prativādī* (opponent or defendant). In the former, the digression by the opponent leads to disruption in the debate. Dharmakīrti advises the juries that if the opponent starts employing this malpractice, the debate should be adjourned. *Asādhanāṅga-vacana* would become an occasion of defeat of the disputant only when the opponent points it out, otherwise none of them can be held victorious or defeated just on the basis of the use of *asādhanāṅga-vacana* by the disputant. Dharmakīrti prescribes a gap between the occurrence of *nigrahasthāna* and actual declaration of defeat and in this way has avoided a paradoxical situation which occurs in the framework of Gautamīya Nyāya, viz. if the disputant commits the fault of using a *hetvābhāsa* and the opponent at the same time is guilty of *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa* — by the way of not pointing out this fault of the disputant, then both of them are to be declared defeated! But this kind of peculiar situation has an occurrence in Dharmakīrti’s concept of *adoṣodbhāvana* as well. The inability to point out the defect in presenting *sādhana* (proof) of the disputant is naturally an occasion of defeat of the opponent. This is the first *nigrahasthāna* for the opponent called *adoṣodbhāvana*. But what happens if the disputant points out or fails to point out his opponent’s inability to point out his (disputant’s) defect? Dharmakīrti says that in either case neither the disputant nor the opponent loses a point, and the debate should be taken up again.

c7.s4.10

Dharmakīrti rejects *chala* (cheating) and *jātis* as parts of *vāda*, as well as the whole framework of *nigrahasthāna* proposed by Gautama.

c7.s4.11

Like the parliaments, judicial courts have also functioned as platforms for very lively debates on social, moral and ethical issues. These courts also initiated new techniques and methodologies for discussions and debates. Smṛti texts furnish in depth analysis of these techniques. *Bṛhaspatismṛti* (1.17) lays down four steps of the judicial process involving debate — *pūrva-pakṣa* (petitioners view), (ii) *uttara* (reply by the respondent), (iii) *kriyāpāda* (specifying the action to be taken), and (iv) *nirṇaya* (judgment). Reply under no. (ii) is divided by *Śukrasmṛti* into four categories — *satya* (factual), *mithyā* (false), *pratyavaskandana* and *pūrvavyavahāravidhi*. The first is also named as *pratipatti*. It is the acceptance of the points raised by the petitioner. The second is negation of the points raised by the petitioner. *Pratyavaskandana* is partial acceptance with a view to denounce the case as presented by the petitioner. This is done by adding rejoinders. The fourth involves citations of previous arguments and victory acquired by the respondent in the same or similar cases.

c7.s4.12

Kauṭilya specifies the arrangements to be made for proper recording of *vāda* or *vyavahāra* (case) brought up in *dharma-sthāna* (court of law). The questions and objections of *vādī* and *prativādī* should be written in proper order.⁷⁰

c7.s4.13

Kātyāyana (16-40), Bṛhaspati (2.8-9) and Śukra also describe certain defects in the language. Śukra defines these defects as under:
• *anyārthaṁ* (carrying a different meaning)
• *arthahīnaṁ* (without meaning)
• *pramāṇāgamavarjitaṁ* (without proper evidence)
• *hīnāṁ* (laconic)
• *adhikaṁ* (excessive)
• *bhraṣṭaṁ* (corrupt).

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