Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s4: Critique of Cārvāka Philosophies
Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s4
- Language
- English
Critique of Cārvāka Philosophies
c8.s4.1
Cārvākas are criticized in *Arthaśāstra*, *Tattvaṭīkā*, *Kāmasūtra*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Mahābhārata*²¹ and Purāṇas like *Viṣṇu*²² and *Padma*.²³ *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* and *Śāstrārthavārtāsamuccaya* of Haribhadra, *Tattavasaṁgraha* and *Prabodhacandrodaya*, and several Buddhist works like Samantaphalasutta and Payasisuttanta. Philosophers like Āryadeva, Śāntarakṣita, Śaṅkarācārya, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Kamalaśīla, Vācaspati Miśra, Bhāskarācārya and Varadarāja, present critiques of Cārvāka philosophy. The Cārvāka is referred in several works as a *pūrva-pakṣa* (prima facie view), viz. the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* of *Brahmasūtra*,²⁴ *Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla, *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha*, *Nyāyamañjarī*, chap. I of *Sarvasiddhāntasaṁgraha*, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* and *Naiṣadhacarita* of Śrīharṣa, etc.
c8.s4.2
The Lokāyata view is also described as something unethical leading to sin.²⁵ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa calls Cārvākas as doers of undoable things (*vikarmastha*) or transgressors, hypocrites (*vaidalavratikas*) and logicians (*haitukas*).
c8.s4.3
The ground on which the Cārvākas are vehemently criticized by all other schools of philosophy lies in their view of body as soul or matter as the cause for consciousness. Haribhadra finding *avyāpti* (narrow extension) in this view, says that if body be taken as the material cause of soul or consciousness, then all matters should be imbued with consciousness.²⁶ Cārvāka may say that consciousness is generated in particular type of matters and not in all matters. Haribhadra retorts by saying that it amounts to the acceptance of a soul in a particular substance or body.²⁷ Udayana gives the following reasons for the unacceptability of the theory of identifying body as soul — Just as the objects seen by someone cannot be remembered by some other person, body as soul cannot remember as it is constantly changing, it is not the same body after some time. The Buddhists explain remembrance on the basis of *vāsanāsaṁkrama* (transit of traces); the Cārvāka does not accept the theory of momentariness, so he cannot explain the remembrance on that basis.²⁸
c8.s4.4
Treating body as the soul and philosophy of pleasure are similar to Epicureanism. Epicurus (4th century BCE) also accepted only four elements — earth, air, fire and water — and rejected space.
Linked texts (18)
- Padmapurāṇa — Vyāsa, Sanskrit
- Nyāyamañjarī — Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Sanskrit
- Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra — Kauṭilya, Sanskrit
- Tattvasaṃgraha — Śāntarakṣita, Sanskrit
- Naiṣadhīyacarita — Śrīharṣa, Sanskrit
- དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བསྡུས་པའི་དཀའ་འགྲེལ — Classical Tibetan
- Pāyāsisutta — Pāli
- Sāmaññaphalasutta — Pāli
- Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha — Śaṅkara, Sanskrit
- Brahmasūtra — Bādarāyaṇa, Sanskrit
- Mahābhārata — Vyāsa, Sanskrit
- Kāmasūtra — Vātsyāyana Mallanāga, Sanskrit
- Viṣṇupurāṇa — Vyāsa, Sanskrit
- Vālmīkirāmāyaṇa — Vālmīki, Sanskrit
- Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya — Śrīharṣa, Sanskrit
- Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit
- Prabodhacandrodaya — Kṛṣṇamiśra, Sanskrit
- Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya — Haribhadra Sūri, Sanskrit