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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s6: Debates on Scriptural Authority

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s6

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English

Debates on Scriptural Authority

c8.s6.1

The debates on the specific doctrinal questions as discussed above become more intense as they move to the question of scriptural authority. Even on the nature of the authority of the Veda the so-called Vedic *darśanas* differ one from the other. Kumārila regards Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra and Pāśupata as *avaidika* (non-Vedic) *darśanas*.⁴⁸ Bhīmācārya in his *Nyāyakośa* classifies Sāṁkhya and Advaita Vedānta amongst the *nāstika-darśanas*. Mīmāṁsā would hold the *svataḥ prāmāṇya* — the theory that the knowledge acquired through the *pramāṇas* is valid in itself; whereas the Nyāya upholds the theory of *parataḥ prāmāṇya* (the theory that the knowledge acquired through the *pramāṇas* needs to be validated from an outside agency). This implies that the knowledge acquired even from Śruti or Veda is not valid by itself and it needs to be validated by other means of knowledge.

c8.s6.2

Dharmakīrti proceeds to a detailed attack on the authority of the Vedas, the brāhmaṇas that expound them, the Brāhmanical ideas about the efficacy of *mantras*, and the system of caste in his *Pramāṇavārtika*.

c8.s6.3

The Mīmāṁsaka school established Vedas as eternal, *apauruṣeya* (not created by humans) and hence authoritative being free from any fault or error liable to occur as a result of human influence. Against this, the Buddhists argued that if scriptures were *apauruṣeya*, they would be incomprehensible being devoid of *vivakṣā* (speakers’ intention).

c8.s6.4

Tagged with the question of scriptural authority is the question of validity of the words coming from a reliable person termed as *āpta* by the ancient Indian philosophers. Those who believe in the authority of the Śruti do not uphold, the authority of the reliable persons. With some reservations, Al-Beruni even prefers spoken or written word over the testimony of the *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* (perception). Caraka had given more importance to the authority of *āpta* (see Chap. 3). Al-Biruni clubs both the written and spoken words under his concept of hearsay and his speculations about the validity of “hearsay” are noteworthy:

c8.s6.5

No one will deny that in questions of historic authenticity, hearsay does not equal eye-witness, for in the latter the eye of the observer apprehends the substance of that which is observed, both in the time when and in the place where it exists, whilst hearsay has its peculiar drawbacks. But for these, it would even be preferable to eyewitness; for the subject of eyewitness can only be actual momentary existence, whilst hearsay comprehends alike the present, the past and the future, so as to apply in a certain sense both to that which is and to that which is not (i.e. which either has ceased to exist or has not yet come into existence). Written tradition is one of the species of hearsay — we might almost say — the most preferable.⁴⁹

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