[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Studies](https://indike.org/pramana/ins) › [Science, technology and education](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science) › [Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021) › c8.s7 # Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s7: Debates on the Theory of Knowledge Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s7 - **Language:** English ### Debates on the Theory of Knowledge ### [c8.s7.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.1) \*Vyāpti\* is a universal relation to be known only through \*anumāna\*. This proposition of Dharmakīrti poses a problem. If we hold \*vyāpti\* to be known through \*anumāna\* and again, \*anumāna\* to be known through \*vyāpti\* this leads to \*anavasthā\* (infinite regress) — forming an unending chain of \*vyāptis\* and \*anumānas\*. The Naiyāyikas of Gautamīya tradition had an easy solution for avoid this trap — they held \*vyāpti\* as dependent on perception. In Dharmakīrti’s conceptual framework, this is impossible, because of his insistence on the presence of probans in all the similar cases (\*sapakṣas\*) and one cannot observe all the \*sapakṣas\* in a given life. To Dharmakīrti, an inference should result in both positive and negative concomitances (\*anvaya\* and \*vyatireka vyāptis\*). The Naiyāyika does not consider it essential. Dharmakīrti asks the Naiyāyika if there is any \*kevalānvayī hetu\* — the cause that goes only with the positive concomitance. The Naiyāyikas succeeded in breaking the Dharmakīrtian framework of inferential knowledge by devising an instance of \*kevalānvayī hetu\*- \*adṛṣṭa\*; which is perceived by God. In forming the \*vyatireka vyāpti\* of this concomitance, it is not possible to cite an instance, therefore here the \*hetu\* (\*adṛṣṭa\*) does not have a \*vipakṣa\*. ### [c8.s7.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.2) Dharmakīrti begs to differ from his \*paramaguru\* (grand-teacher) Diṅnāga in his concept of \*pratyakṣa\* to an extent. Diṅnāga has accepted the objects appearing in illusion or hallucination as perceived. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, reserves the sphere of perception only for the objects of veridical perception. ### [c8.s7.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.3) The orthodox Naiyāyikas believed that \*pratyakṣa\* is of two types — \*laukika\* (this-worldly) and \*alaukika\* (other-worldly). Both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti naturally stood against the \*alaukika pratyakṣa\* as it does not fit in the theory of \*svalakṣaṇa\* — a \*svalakṣaṇa\* cannot be judged in terms of \*laukika\* (this-worldly) or \*alaukika\* (other-worldly). ### [c8.s7.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.4) Nyāya is opposed to the theory of \*śabdānuvedha\* there can be no cognition without the verbal knowledge. If \*nirvikalpa jñāna\* is accepted, a distinction between perception and the verbalization of perceptual state is maintained. A child has the knowledge of the deep structures of language whereas what he learns later on is its surface structure.⁵⁰ ### [c8.s7.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.5) Dharmakīrti rules out the possibility of accepting other \*pramāṇas\* proposed in Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and rest of the systems. He rejects \*anupalabdhi\* (non-apprehension) as a \*pramāṇa\*. The Mīmāṁsakas believe that \*anupalabdhi\* is a \*pramāṇa\* leading to the cognition of \*abhāva\* (absence). Any \*pravṛtti\* (inclination) is generated by \*buddhi\* (intelligence) after visualization of something that is \*bhāva\* (existent). A non-existent will not lead to \*pravṛtti\*, therefore \*anupalabdhi\* is not a \*pramāṇa\*. For Dharmakīrti \*anupalabdhi\* is just a type of probans. In his brilliant analysis of the apprehension of “non-apprehension” Dharmakīrti has given the concept of \*ekajñānasaṁsarga\* (co-cognizibility). The apprehension of \*abhāva\* (non-existence) in one place involves the apprehension of a co-cognizable object on the same place.⁵¹ In difference to both Mīmāṁsakas and Naiyāyikas again, he denies \*abhāva\* as a separate category. Determination of an object cannot prove the non-existence of another; hence absence cannot be proved by ignorance. ### [c8.s7.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.6) Udayana proposed the reality of negation. Abhāva came to accepted as an additional ontological category in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Out of his concern with making the theory of \*anumāna\* perfectly precise, Dharmakīrti dared to disapprove the postulation of Diṅnāga here also (like in the sphere of \*pratyakṣa\*). Diṅnāga proposed three essential categories for the validity of an \*anumāna\* — \*pakṣa\*, \*sādhya\* and \*hetu\*. But he also allowed \*dṛṣṭānta\* to be included for establishing an \*anumāna\* in a convincing way. Dharmakīrti stood against this practical consideration. \*Dṛṣṭānta\* not being an essential component has to be discarded from the structure of \*anumāna\*. ### [c8.s7.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.7) The orthodox Naiyāyikas tried to solve the problem in a different way — they opined that \*vyāpti\* can be grasped without establishing the causal relation, and since it is impossible to observe all the cases of \*tadutpatti\* in past and presence, Dharmakīrti’s concept of \*tadutpatti\* is not acceptable to them. Similarly they also rejected Dharmakīrti’s idea of \*tādātmya\* (common reference), as the essential condition of \*vyāpti\* can be fulfilled without it. They shifted Dharmakīrti’s frame of inductive reasoning to intuitive reasoning.⁵² ### [c8.s7.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.8) Ratnakīrti introduced the two-truth doctrines as key to the nature of the discussion as inference is trafficking with illusory universals (\*sāmanya\*), the proof of the mind-streams of others, whilst empirically valid in relative truth (\*saṁvṛti-satya\*), does not hold ultimate metaphysical certainty in absolute truth (\*paramārtha satya\*). --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7) · Pramāṇa