[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Studies](https://indike.org/pramana/ins) › [Science, technology and education](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science) › [Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021) › c8 # Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8: 4. Vāda in Darśana: Philosophical Debates Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8 - **Language:** English ## Contents - [c8.s1 Tussle between Action, Knowledge and Devotion](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s1) — 7 parts - [c8.s2 Revisionism](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s2) — 1 part - [c8.s3 Debates between Idealism and Materialism](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3) — 17 parts - [c8.s4 Critique of Cārvāka Philosophies](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s4) — 4 parts - [c8.s5 Debates on the Nature of Reality](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5) — 42 parts - [c8.s6 Debates on Scriptural Authority](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s6) — 5 parts - [c8.s7 Debates on the Theory of Knowledge](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7) — 8 parts - [c8.s8 Debates on the Theory of Causality](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s8) — 3 parts - [c8.s9 Debates on the Absolute and God as Creator](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9) — 25 parts - [c8.s10 Debates on the Concept of Mokṣa](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s10) — 66 parts ### 4. Vāda in Darśana: Philosophical Debates ### [c8.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.1) Vāda in Darśana Philosophical Debates ### Tussle between Action, Knowledge and Devotion ### [c8.s1.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s1.1) ONE of the recurring themes for debate is the conflict between \*karma\* (action) and \*jñāna\* (knowledge). The Indian mind has been occupied with the two opposite ways of \*pravṛtti\* (empiricism) and \*nivṛtti\* (renunciation). \*Mahābhārata\* repeatedly discusses such conflicting views and their resolution (see Chap. 2). ### [c8.s1.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s1.2) Even within the fold of Advaitins, Śaṅkara is countered by the theorists who hold the Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda (theory of synthesis between knowledge and action). Śaṅkara at least concedes to it as a possibility in his \*bhāṣya\* on \*Kaṭhopaniṣad\* (1.17). But then he firmly refutes the synthesis between action and knowledge as his final verdict in his \*bhāṣya\* on \*Taittirīya Upaniṣad\* (I.11.4). On the very first aphorism of \*Brahmasūtra\*, Śaṅkarācārya in his \*bhāṣya\* raises the question of the non-essentiality of \*dharma-jijñāsā\* (inquiry in \*dharma\*) and asserts that it is not a prerequisite for pursuing inquiry into the Ultimate Reality or \*Brahman\*. \*Brahma-jijñāsā\* can be acquired even before the acquisition of \*dharma\*; and that nothing remains to be done after the acquisition of the true knowledge of \*Brahman\* is the beauty of the Advaita system.¹ ### [c8.s1.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s1.3) The two divergent views — Kevalajñānavāda and Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda — are linked to the diverse visions of human life. The Kevalajñānavāda upheld by Śaṅkarācārya would lead to the lifestyle of \*aikāśramya\* (absolute asceticism). Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda on the other hand would support \*caturāśramya\* or \*āśramasamuccaya\* (theory of a synthesis of all the four \*āśramas\*). ### [c8.s1.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s1.4) Śaṅkara had to dispute with the authors of Dharmaśāstras like Manu who gave the highest status to \*gṛhasthāśrama\*. Bhāruci, who supported the Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda, flourished two or three centuries before Śaṅkara. G.C. Pande sees an internalization of the conflict between the Brāhmanical and Śramanic traditions in the opposite views of Bhāruci and Śaṅkarācārya.² On the other hand, \*Gītā\* presents a resolution of conflict between \*karma\*, \*jñāna\* and \*bhakti\* before these philosophers. ### [c8.s1.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s1.5) Śaṅkara again stands against Manu, as the latter allows an honourable space for \*kāma\* (desire). Desire leads to motivation, and this motivation subsequently will lead to the inclination for performing religious duties. Bhāruci agrees with Manu in giving the highest status to \*gṛhasthāśrama\*. He permits the option between \*aikāśramya\* and \*caturāśramya\* or \*āśramasamuccaya\*. ### [c8.s1.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s1.6) The Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda also presupposes the combination for intellectual and practical methods like \*upāsanā\* and meditation for liberation. Śaṅkara does not find them absolutely desirable. ### [c8.s1.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s1.7) On the relationship between \*karma\* and \*jñāna\* Maṇḍana also holds a position strikingly different from Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.³ Maṇḍana cites at least seven theories in this connection. Of these, he favours a peculiar variety of \*jñānakarmasamuccaya\*; whereas Śaṅkara and Sureśvara do not regard performance of ritual as compatible with the knowledge of \*Brahman\*. ### Revisionism ### [c8.s2.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s2.1) Sāṁkhya stands as a \*pradhānamalla\* (main combatant) before the Vedāntin of monist system and the Buddhists as well. In sixteenth century, Vijñānabhikṣu reformulates the whole system of Sāṁkhya and brings it closer to Upaniṣadic thought. \*Puruṣa\*, according to him, is the sovereign of the whole world (\*akhileśvara\*) and the agent (\*kartā\*) of this world.⁴ He refers to Seśvara Sāṁkhya.⁵ The terminology of \*Brahman\*, \*ātman\* and \*ānātman\* — which was earlier alien to classical Sāṁkhya, is introduced, the Upaniṣads are cited, and Prakṛti is treated as synonymous to \*avidyā\*, \*ajā śakti\* and \*māyā\*.⁶ Still, Vijñānabhikṣu does not make any compromise with Vedānta and remains unwaveringly offensive for his old rival. He interprets the concept of \*dṛṣyatva\* (the quality of being seen) in a way very much different from that of Advaitites or even Dvaitavādins. The Vedāntin establishes \*ātman\* as the seer and the world as to be seen. Vijñānabhikṣu, on the basis of the Upaniṣadic aphorisms, makes even \*ātman\* as liable to be seen.⁷ ### Debates between Idealism and Materialism ### [c8.s3.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.1) Cārvāka “may possibly be characterized as primitive proto-materialism”.⁸ It is the oldest philosophical school in India. It has been a challenge to rest of all philosophical systems emerged during the past three millennia. The philosophy of materialism is discussed in the Upaniṣads. \*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad\* (IV.12) says: ### [c8.s3.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.2) The consciousness is generated out of matter and dissolves in the matter, there is no life after death. ### [c8.s3.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.3) The Āgama texts of Jaina tradition refer to the Cārvākas as Bhūtavādins or Bhūtacaitanyavādins.⁹ ### [c8.s3.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.4) The Cārvāka system is refuted by all other systems and regarded to be one of the toughest rivals.¹⁰ Of all the Indian philosophical systems, this seems to be the most misunderstood and misrepresented one also. Cārvākas are supposed to be licentious and indulging in vandalism. ### [c8.s3.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.5) In fact, Cārvāka is not a single and unified philosophical school. Various groups of Cārvākas have been flourishing in different periods of the history of Indian philosophy for the past two/three millennia. The materialist is one of them. Kṛṣṇa Miśra in his play \*Prabodhacandrodaya\* presents the materialist Cārvāka's view in a precise way. Accordingly, perception is the only valid means of knowledge; there are four elements — earth, fire, air and water; and consciousness is indivisible with the body. There was another group of Cārvākas that accepted inference also as the second means of knowledge or \*pramāṇa\*. Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika were also categorized as Cārvākas. The Ājīvaka sect formed one of the strongest of Cārvāka groups (see Chap. 2). ### [c8.s3.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.6) The Cārvākas were known for their debating skills and for centuries had been challenging the other systems which had developed very subtle and intricate categorizations and conceptual frameworks and sufficient textual material. This is very much evidenced by Jayarāśi's text on the deconstruction of all philosophies (see Chap. 2). The Cārvākas excelled in disputation and deconstruction of prevalent theories and norms. The methodology developed by them for disputing with others came to be defined as \*vitaṇḍā\*. Buddhaghoṣa described Lokāyata as Vitaṇḍāvādaśāstra. ### [c8.s3.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.7) Bṛhaspati is said to be the first preceptor of this philosophy.¹¹ He is said to have composed the \*sūtras\* (aphorisms). Some of them are quoted in later works. Max Müller calls Bṛhaspati “a perplexing character”.¹² One Bṛhaspati was a Vedic seer. Several hymns in \*Ṛgveda\* are attributed to him.¹³ Bṛhaspati is also a Vedic deity.¹⁴ ### [c8.s3.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.8) In Purāṇic mythology Bṛhaspati is known to be the \*guru\* of the gods. The identity of Bṛhaspati — the author of \*Bārhaspatyasūtra\* — and the mythological Bṛhaspati has been mingled in later texts. \*Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad\* says that Bṛhaspati, the \*devaguru\*, became Śukrācārya and faked a philosophy of materialism to trap the \*asuras\* (demons) and ensure their defeat.¹⁵ Even Haribhadra, a Jaina philosopher, confirms the story of Bṛhaspati’s disguise as Cārvāka. ### [c8.s3.9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.9) Jayarāśi, the author of \*Tattvopaplavasiṁha\*, is a devout Cārvāka, but his voluminous work is only concerned with deconstructing all the systems of philosophy rather then establishing the Cārvāka system. ### [c8.s3.10](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.10) Cārvāka philosophy developed in three stages. The Cārvākas were initially known as debaters, who undauntedly questioned all prevailing norms. They were nihilists. Subsequently, some of them thought of formulating a system of philosophy, which can be termed as Svabhāvavāda (naturalism). This came in the second stage. At the third stage of the development some sort of epistemology and cosmology came to be introduced. It was at this stage that the philosophers like Ajitakeśakambalin, Purāṇakaśyapa and Kambalāśvatara were associated with the system of Lokāyata. Philosophers like Purandara accepted inference also as a valid means of knowledge. In fact, the Cārvāka came to be understood as an umbrella term incorporating various groups of philosophers who opposed all orthodox philosophies and systems that created dogmas and sects. Lokāyatikas (materialists), Svabhāvavādins (naturalists) and Ucchedavādins (nihilists) — these three major schools under the Cārvākas are taken up for refutation by other philosophies. \*Rāmāyaṇa\* of Vālmīki is one of the earliest text that mentions the Lokāyatikas (see Chap. 2) who employed the wisdom from Ānvīkṣikī (logic, probably including Sāṁkhya and Yoga also as per the definition given by Kauṭilya — \[see Chap. 2\]) for misuse. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has used the word \*cārvākamata\* in the sense of atheism in general.¹⁶ ### [c8.s3.11](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.11) In seventh-eighth centuries, the philosophy of Cārvāka was reborn in the form of the Sahajīyā sect. The Sahajīyās regarded love and natural life as the core of the religion. Sarahapā is said to have been the founder of this school. He was born in eastern India at a place called Sarolī in the city of Rājī. He used to listen to the discourses by Amita and developed interest in Buddhist philosophy. There are stories about his having taken wine and the brāhmaṇas in the locality going to the king with a complaint and plea for his banishment. Sarahapā proved his innocence by coming out unscathed in the tests of fire, water, etc. Then onwards he came to be worshipped. Bringing in empiricism in his philosophy of pure bliss, he said: ### [c8.s3.12](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.12) The sprout of mind should be irrigated with the waters of pure bliss revived from the worldly pleasure, otherwise it will not grow as a great tree of \*kalpavṛkṣa\*.¹⁷ ### [c8.s3.13](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.13) This is a critique of all systems which are based on \*aparigraha\* (non-possession) and \*saṁnyāsa\* (renunciation). ### [c8.s3.14](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.14) The Sahajīyās stood against renunciation and deliberately renouncing worldly pleasures. It is the \*rāga\* (attachment to the objects of the world) that binds and it is the \*rāga\* that liberates — says the author of \*Hevajratantra\*.¹⁸ ### [c8.s3.15](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.15) Bengali poet Caṇḍīdāsa was a follower of Sahajīyā school. In his \*Dohākośa\* Sarahapā refuted all the systems of the orthodox philosophy like Vedānta and Sāṁkhya, and also various systems under Jaina and Buddhist philosophy. ### [c8.s3.16](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.16) Chiranjib Bhattacharya in his \*Vidvanmodataraṅgiṇī\* recorded all the views belonging to the schools of non-believers. In twentieth century Dakshina Ranjan Shastri wrote a treatise \*Cārvākaṣaṣṭi\*.¹⁹ ### [c8.s3.17](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s3.17) The texts belonging to the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy cite²⁰ and criticize Cārvāka, but Cārvāka philosophy as such was not included in the curricula in the \*gurukulas\* or \*āśramas\*. The Buddhists took Cārvākas more seriously. Max Müller has referred to a \*Ambaṭṭhasutta\* where Lokāyata is mentioned as a subject for the study of a brāhmaṇa. ### Critique of Cārvāka Philosophies ### [c8.s4.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s4.1) Cārvākas are criticized in \*Arthaśāstra\*, \*Tattvaṭīkā\*, \*Kāmasūtra\*, \*Rāmāyaṇa\*, \*Mahābhārata\*²¹ and Purāṇas like \*Viṣṇu\*²² and \*Padma\*.²³ \*Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya\* and \*Śāstrārthavārtāsamuccaya\* of Haribhadra, \*Tattavasaṁgraha\* and \*Prabodhacandrodaya\*, and several Buddhist works like Samantaphalasutta and Payasisuttanta. Philosophers like Āryadeva, Śāntarakṣita, Śaṅkarācārya, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Kamalaśīla, Vācaspati Miśra, Bhāskarācārya and Varadarāja, present critiques of Cārvāka philosophy. The Cārvāka is referred in several works as a \*pūrva-pakṣa\* (prima facie view), viz. the \*Śaṅkarabhāṣya\* of \*Brahmasūtra\*,²⁴ \*Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā\* of Kamalaśīla, \*Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha\*, \*Nyāyamañjarī\*, chap. I of \*Sarvasiddhāntasaṁgraha\*, \*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya\* and \*Naiṣadhacarita\* of Śrīharṣa, etc. ### [c8.s4.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s4.2) The Lokāyata view is also described as something unethical leading to sin.²⁵ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa calls Cārvākas as doers of undoable things (\*vikarmastha\*) or transgressors, hypocrites (\*vaidalavratikas\*) and logicians (\*haitukas\*). ### [c8.s4.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s4.3) The ground on which the Cārvākas are vehemently criticized by all other schools of philosophy lies in their view of body as soul or matter as the cause for consciousness. Haribhadra finding \*avyāpti\* (narrow extension) in this view, says that if body be taken as the material cause of soul or consciousness, then all matters should be imbued with consciousness.²⁶ Cārvāka may say that consciousness is generated in particular type of matters and not in all matters. Haribhadra retorts by saying that it amounts to the acceptance of a soul in a particular substance or body.²⁷ Udayana gives the following reasons for the unacceptability of the theory of identifying body as soul — Just as the objects seen by someone cannot be remembered by some other person, body as soul cannot remember as it is constantly changing, it is not the same body after some time. The Buddhists explain remembrance on the basis of \*vāsanāsaṁkrama\* (transit of traces); the Cārvāka does not accept the theory of momentariness, so he cannot explain the remembrance on that basis.²⁸ ### [c8.s4.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s4.4) Treating body as the soul and philosophy of pleasure are similar to Epicureanism. Epicurus (4th century BCE) also accepted only four elements — earth, air, fire and water — and rejected space. ### Debates on the Nature of Reality ### [c8.s5.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.1) The four schools of Buddhist philosophies have been mentioned in Chap. 2. The Sautrāntika (Representationism) and the Vaibhāṣika (Direct Realism) are the earliest. The other two schools, the Śūnyavāda and the Vijñānavāda attempt a liberal interpretation of the \*buddha-vacanas\* and they are more inclined towards metaphysical thinking. These two fall under the Mahāyāna (great vehicle), whereas the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika fall under the Hīnayāna (little vehicle). ### [c8.s5.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.2) The difference between the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika lies in their view of cognition of external phenomena. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that all external things are known through perception. The Sautrāntikas argue that external things are known only through \*anumāna\* (inference). The Vaibhāṣika developed as a branch of Sarvāstivādin school under the Hīnayāna. They upheld the simultaneous existence of the past, present and future, the Sautrāntikas differed with them. The Sarvāstivādins also propounded the atomic theory of creation. Accordingly, the \*paramāṇu\* (atom) is the basic unit of the matter. It is imperceptible. A combination of seven \*paramāṇus\* makes an \*aṇu\* and an \*aṇu\* is perceptible. This theory of \*paramāṇu\* is criticized by the other Buddhists — the Vijñānavādins on one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system on the other. The proponents of \*paramāṇu\*-theory as per the tenets of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems hold that \*paramāṇus\* can exclude each other as they possess magnitude and actuality.²⁹ Both of these — the Sarvāsivādins and the theorists of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika — are contested by the Vijñānavādins who ask whether an atom is united with another atom partially or wholly, showing impossibility of both alternatives. An atom being indivisible cannot unite with another. ### [c8.s5.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.3) Udayana utilizes the same logic to refute Vijñānavādin’s theory that the external reality is a manifestation of consciousness only. He asks whether the cognition is related to its contents partially or wholly. Since consciousness and cognition have no parts, partial relation is impossible. Vijñānavādin would challenge Naiyāyikas for the theory of difference between the \*avayavin\* (whole) and the \*avayavas\* (parts). ### [c8.s5.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.4) Regarding the aggregates (\*skandhas\*), bases (\*āyatanas\*) and elements, the Vaibhāṣikas believe that the word \*skandha\* means \*rāśi\*. It is an aggregate of the following: • Past, present and future, • the external and the internal, • the gross or the subtle depending upon its status as resistant (\*sapragraha\*) or non-resistant (\*apratigraha\*), • the inferior or the superior, and also depending upon whether it is sullied (\*kliṣṭa\*) or unsullied (\*akliṣṭa\*) with vices (\*kleśas\*), and • the far or the near — depending upon whether it is past, present or future. ### [c8.s5.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.5) These attributes belong to either the four aggregates, with the difference that gross consciousness is that of the five material sense-organs, whereas subtle consciousness is mind consciousness; or consciousness is gross or subtle, depending upon whether it belongs to the lower or higher stage. ### [c8.s5.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.6) The Sautrāntikas reject the last three attributes; they stipulate that the third category — the gross form aggregate — is one which is perceived by the five material senses-organs, all other forms being subtle, and the fourth category — inferiority or superiority — depends on the form aggregate’s quality of being either pleasant or unpleasant; the last category — distance or proximity — depend on its being either in an invisible or visible place.³⁰ ### [c8.s5.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.7) In Buddhism, an individual existence is regarded as an aggregate, a stream of transient factors.³¹ In its earlier phase, the doctrine of momentariness was essentially a doctrine of the transience of psychic states without any permanent substratum. It did not mean in early phase the unqualified denial of all substances.³² There were debates within Buddhist sects on the concept of momentariness, as recorded in \*Abhidharmakośa\*. Finally, the momentariness came to be accepted at the level of experience. ### [c8.s5.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.8) Nāgārjuna rejected the concept of \*svabhāva\* and emphasized the idea of \*madhyamā pratipad\* (the middle path). He also established the invariable relationship of the philosophy of Śūnyavāda with Buddha’s concept of \*pratītyasamutpāda\* (interdependent origination). \*Nirvāṇa\* and \*saṃsāra\* to him are the forms of one and the same reality. ### [c8.s5.9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.9) The essence of Mādhyamikaśāstra lies in shunning all standpoints. ### [c8.s5.10](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.10) When one accepts any standpoint, one is captured by the cunning poisonous serpent of the impurities. Those, whose mind has shunned any standpoint, are not captured.³³ ### [c8.s5.11](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.11) The idealism in both the Mādhyamika and the Advaita Vedānta ultimately hinges upon some kind of mysticism, indirectly or directly subsisting on the Upaniṣadic philosophy. This becomes a basis for the accusations of indebtedness by the followers of each of these two systems, and this also remains a hidden ground for their affinity and their differences. ### [c8.s5.12](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.12) The externalists attack the theory of momentariness. Haribhadra, who is otherwise keen to agree with his opponents in his \*Śāstrārthavārtāsamuccaya\*, has devoted largest space to the refutation of this theory. He revisits the theory by adding that instead of a substance being dissolved and reborn every moment, it is proper to say that the substance stays, only the \*dharmas\* as born every moment. Also, everything can be said to be momentary to motivate people for renunciation of the mundane world.³⁴ In this way, Haribhadra sends an ontological issue to the domain of ethics. He gives a rebuttal to the Śūnyavādin arguing that if everything is void, then the arguments given for this voidness are also void. The acceptance of Vijñānavāda would put an end to the possibility of liberation, because there is nothing beyond \*vijñāna\* according to it. ### [c8.s5.13](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.13) Haribhadra also revises the Advaitin's position that at the \*pārmārthika\* level everything is \*Brahman\*. This can be said to inculcate the view of equanimity in a subsidiary sense and not in the primary sense. ### [c8.s5.14](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.14) Śaṅkara refutes Vijñānavādin, Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika together on one ground — they are not based on the knowledge of \*Brahman\* as revealed from the Śruti.³⁵ In fact, he corners the Sāṁkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Vijñānavādin and Cārvāka for their realist, dualist and materialistic views. At the very outset of his \*bhāṣya\* on \*Brahmasūtra\*, he gives a resume of various prima-facie views and takes together all of them.³⁶ The Vaiśeṣika's concept of \*ātman\* appears equally absurd to him as he would regard the \*ātman\* as \*acetana\* (inanimate) and \*dravya\* (substance).³⁷ Neither view of \*vijñāna\* is acceptable as it is momentary.³⁸ ### [c8.s5.15](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.15) Sāṁkhya becomes the chief combatant for Śaṅkara because it cites the Śruti (scriptures) and also takes recourse to arguments to support it. For Śaṅkara it is appropriating the scriptures for the categories which are validated by other \*pramāṇas\* (means of knowledge).³⁹ ### [c8.s5.16](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.16) Arguing against the Naiyāyika for his dependence on arguments, Śaṅkara cites the maxim of the Upaniṣad — \*naiṣā tarkeṇa matir āpaneyā\* (the wisdom cannot be acquired through arguments).⁴⁰ He differs with Gauḍapāda on the latter's concept of the physical world as dream. Applying five-member syllogism of inference he shows the inconsistancy in Gauḍapāda's view. He uses the same argument to rebut the Vijñānavādin. The experience of physical world is different from the experience in the state of a dream. The dream is obliterated when a man is awakened; the empirical reality is not cancelled after self-realization. ### [c8.s5.17](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.17) The followers of Rāmānuja refute the Advaitins on the score of their concept of \*ajñāna\*. How can the idea of the ignorance that has neither a subject nor an object be accepted? — they ask.⁴¹ There is no evidence of a cosmic illusion and the Anirvacanīyatāvāda (indescribability of cognition). ### [c8.s5.18](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.18) They maintain the difference between \*jīva\* (individual soul) and \*Paramātman\* (Absolute Being) but also treat \*jīvātman\* at par with \*Paramātman\*. The world to them is of two types — sentient and non-sentient. The non-sentient is of three kinds — \*bhogya\* (object), \*bhogopakaraṇa\* (instrument) and \*bhogāyatana\* (site of fruition). Rāmānuja Darśana also differs from Śāṅkara-Vedānta by the way of holding \*karman\* as necessary. ### [c8.s5.19](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.19) I have already referred to the long history of scathing debates between the Advaitins and the Mādhvas (see Chap. 2). The Advaita Vedānta views world as \*mithyā\* (false) which is \*anirvacanīya\* (indescribable), and is not the locus of being-not-being (\*sadasattva-anadhikaraṇarūpaṁ\*). Here \*sadasattva-anadhikaraṇarūpaṁ\* signifies absolute absence of being and absolute absence of non-being. It is here that the Mādhvas apply their most pricking clinchers for goading the Advaitins by bringing out the impossibilities of the concept of absolute absence of being and absolute absence of non-being. ### [c8.s5.20](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.20) The \*anirvacanīyatākhyāti\* (indescribability of cognition) of the Advaitin has been vehemently opposed by the Mādhva philosophers Vyāsatīrtha and Jayatīrtha. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī not only defends Advaitin’s position, and but also raises fundamental objections on the view of reality in the Mādhva system. Vyāsatīrtha defines reality as that which is not the counter-positive of absolute negation. The question is how the perception of this negative entity is possible. Replying to Madhusūdana, Rāmārya in his \*Taraṅgiṇī\* says that it is not possible to perceive a negation, but it is possible to perceive an entity that has been negated. This rejoinder is further reviewed by the author of \*Laghucandrikā\*. ### [c8.s5.21](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.21) The Naiyāyika also questions the position of the Advaitin with reference to the status of world. He says that the negation of something, which is \*alīka\* (false) in itself, is not possible. The world therefore cannot be regarded as the locus of absolute negation, of non-being-as-characterized by being (\*sattva-viśiṣṭa sattvābhāva\*).⁴² The law of contradiction is also violated — the world cannot be taken as the locus of absolute absence of \*sattva\* (being) and \*asattva\* (non-being) simultaneously. ### [c8.s5.22](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.22) It was Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who could counter Vyāsatīrtha’s terrible triade of arguments against Śaṅkara’s concept of Reality. Vyāsatīrtha had shown fallacies including \*ativyāpti\* (wide extension) and \*avyāpti\* (narrow extension) in Śaṅkara’s concepts of \*ajñāna\* and the world as \*vivarta\* (illusory negation). According to him \*ajñāna\* cannot be the material cause of something that is illusory. A \*bhāva\* cannot create \*abhāva\*. Madhusūdana pointed out that Vyāsatīrtha misunderstood the concepts of \*bhāva\* and \*abhāva\* here. \*Bhāva\* to Śaṅkara is difference from negation and not the state of being. Again to Vyāsatīrtha’s objection that \*ajñāna\* having a different \*jāti\* (generality) that the so-called effect of it — the world — cannot really function as the cause, Madhusūdana gave a rebuttal by pointing out that complete similarity between the cause and effect is not feasible, there has to be some difference between them. With his subtle reasoning Madhusūdana could save the Advaitin’s stand, i.e. that \*avidyā\* can be adjusted as the material cause of illusory negation.⁴³ ### [c8.s5.23](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.23) The Advaitin does not describe \*sattva\* (being) as the negation of \*asattva\* (not being). Therefore there is no contradiction. \*Sattva\* is the quality of not being cancelled (\*abādhitatva\*) and \*asattva\* is the character of not being present in any locus. ### [c8.s5.24](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.24) \*Brahman\* is \*sadrūpa\* (being itself) only and neither \*sat\* or \*asat\*. ### [c8.s5.25](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.25) The concepts of \*pratītyasamutpāda\* (dependent origination) and \*kṣaṇabhaṅga\* (momentariness) stand in a sharp contrast to the absolutism of Vedānta on one hand and the idea of synthetic principles of \*dravya\* (substance) and \*jāti\* (universal) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems on the other. There is no place for a permanent and abiding substance in Buddhist world-view, where only reality is \*svalakṣaṇa\* (point instant). The Buddhists deny the status of reality to \*jāti\* (universal or generality) of Nyāya, for them any universal is a \*vikalpa\* (logical construct) only, comprised in the exclusion of a common counter-correlate. “A universal is in its very essence the exclusion of the other”, says Dharmakīrti in \*Pramāṇavārtika\* (\*sāmānyaṁ anyavyāvṛttilakṣaṇaṁ\* — III.30). Kumārila had attacked the very foundation of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and questioned the validity of grading the truth — \*saṁvṛti satya\* and \*paramārtha-satya\*. But to the Mādhyamika all phenomena remain indeterminate and indefinable. ### [c8.s5.26](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.26) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school advocated realism in the sense that it maintained difference between \*dharma\* (attribute, substrata) and \*dharmin\* (substance). Because of this, it came to be sharply divided not only with idealists like the adherents of the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools of Buddhist philosophy, but with Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta as well. Vedānta holds \*dharmin\* alone as real and all its \*upādhis\* (attributes) as \*vivartas\* (unreal effects). Contrary to this, the Diṅnāga–Dharmakīrti school regards only \*dharmas\* in the form of discrete moments — as real, \*dharmin\* — the substance is just a mental construct and unreal. ### [c8.s5.27](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.27) The categories mentioned by Gautama in his \*Nyāyasūtra\* and by Kaṇāda in his \*Vaiśeṣikasūtra\* form the idea of reality in both these schools. They are not ideal constructs. Vaiśeṣika's conceptual framework for reality is comprised of six categories — \*dravya\* (substance), \*guṇa\* (quality), \*karma\* (action), \*sāmānya\* (generality), \*viśeṣa\* (particularity) and \*samavāya\* (inherence). Later philosophers, i.e. Śivāditya, Śrīdhara, Udayana, etc. accepted the seventh additional category — \*abhāva\* (non-existence) — also. Śivāditya Miśra wrote a treatise — \*Saptapadārthī\* — on seven categories, where he firmly stood for accepting negation as the seventh category. The perception of reality undergoes a change with the introduction of \*abhāva\* as the seventh category, and the reality assumes a pluralistic dimension. Naiyāyika's concept of Reality is comprised in the gamut of sixteen categories mentioned earlier (see Chap. 1). ### [c8.s5.28](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.28) A shift in the concept of categories occurs in Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (CE 1500). In his \*Padārthatattavanirūpaṇa\*, he reduced the number by denying \*abhāva\* as a category. He was criticized by Veṇīdatta in his \*Padārthamaṇḍana\* who accepts only four positive categories.⁴⁴ ### [c8.s5.29](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.29) It was Vātsyāyana who suggested that \*abhāva\* (non-existence) can become a \*prameya\* and can be used as a way to comprehend reality in his \*bhāṣya\* on \*Nyāyasūtra\* II.2.8. From a pile of marked and unmarked clothes, if somebody is asked to bring the clothes that are unmarked, the absence of mark becomes the means to locate the clothes asked for. In Navya-Nyāya, the category of \*abhāva\* assumed special significance, it was utilized to define the reality by positing the category of \*pratiyogin\* (couter-positive) which is invariably conspicuous by its absence. Kumārila stands on the opposite pole from Advaitavādin by viewing non-existence as a reality. But Prabhākara opposed Śabarasvāmin and Kumārila on one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the other by denying \*abhāva\* an entity and a \*pramāṇa\* means of knowledge. For Buddhist also, non-existence is not a reality, it is an inferential judgement. ### [c8.s5.30](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.30) The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṁsā holds \*sādṛśya\* (similarity), \*saṁkhyā\* (number) and \*śakti\* (potency) also as categories. Udayana and other Naiyāyikas had to combat with them for the rejection of these. ### [c8.s5.31](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.31) The Ārambhavāda as proposed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, visualizes the world as created out of the \*paramāṇus\* (atoms) serving as basic building blocks. Their concept of reality lies in its pluralistic view and diversity. In fact, there are two different theories of causation of the world — Ārabhyārambhakavāda (transitive causation) and Ārambhavāda (intransitive causation). Udyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana stand for the transitive causation and sharply criticize the former theory. ### [c8.s5.32](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.32) The Pariṇāmavāda of the Sāṁkhya stands in sharp contrast to both the theories — Ārabhyārambhakavāda (transitive causation) and Ārambhavāda (intransitive causation) and also to the Vivartavāda of the Advaita Vedāntin. It views the physical world as a transformation of one single, unitary and all-pervasive substance, named as \*prakṛti\* (primordial matter). The universe is evolved out of this \*prakṛti\*. The Naiyāyikas like Udayana criticize the Sāṁkhya, questioning the possibility of diversity evolving out of singularity. They also point out the inner contradiction of \*prakṛti\* being \*acetana\* (insentient) but having the power of creation. ### [c8.s5.33](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.33) The idea of multiplicity evolving out of unity is taken up in Vedānta also but with a different view of reality. The Bhāskara school of Vedānta, known as the school of Tridaṇḍins, advocates Brahmapariṇāmavāda, viz. the theory of the \*Brahman\* transforming itself into the multifarious world. He being the material cause, the phenomena are His real \*vikāras\* (modifications). \*Brahman\* in fact is an undifferentiated unitary mass of pure consciousness. ### [c8.s5.34](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.34) On the concept of \*paramāṇus\* (atoms), the Vaiśeṣika is cornered by orthodox schools as well the Buddhist schools. The Vaiśeṣikas propound that the \*paramāṇus\* function as the basic building blocks for creating this world and their coalesceance creates larger and larger forms. Āryadeva and Śāntarakṣita argue that the no \*yoga\* (integration) between \*paramāṇus\* can create the universe. The \*yoga\* of \*paramāṇus\* can be of two types — complete and partial. If there is complete integration (\*sarvātmanā yoga\*) between two \*paramāṇus\*, it would not lead to any increase in the volume or quality nor would it create a larger form. If it is a partial integration, it would be multifarious, and hence will be impermanent. ### [c8.s5.35](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.35) Sāṁkhya is attacked from all corners for its concept of \*puruṣa\* and \*prakṛti\* and the world as \*pariṇāma\* (transformation). Haribhadra objects this postulation by saying that if \*puruṣa\* is \*vibhu\* and \*nitya\* (changeless and eternal), then there is no point in putting him in the stages of bondage and liberation. And if \*prakṛti\* is inanimate and eternal, then also it cannot transform itself to create the world. He then goes on to revise the Sāṁkhya concept of \*prakṛti\*, suggesting that it may be viewed as \*karma-prakṛti\*, which in Jaina ontology, is just a part of \*pudgala-jagat\*. In this way he does not find any problem in accepting the Prakṛtivāda of Sāṁkhya.⁴⁵ ### [c8.s5.36](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.36) The Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda (theory of momentariness) in the Diṅnāga–Dharmakīrti school presents the nominalist view of outer reality where the universe is in a constant flux. It proposes that every point-instant (\*kṣaṇa\*) stays just for a moment and vanishes to be replaced immediately by the other one, and this point-instant is reality. Reality for Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti lies in constant movement or change, it is always becoming and not being. ### [c8.s5.37](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.37) There is no place for \*jāti\* (generality) in this system; the \*svalakṣaṇa\* (unique particular) is only reality. Whatever that is supposed to be \*sāmānya lakṣaṇa\* (universal) is unreal; it can be described linguistically, but then any such description ought to be fictional. The \*svalakṣaṇa\* functions as a reality from moment to moment. It is the \*paramārthasat\* (ultimate reality) and is \*sarvato vyāvṛtta\* (distinguished from everything else). ### [c8.s5.38](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.38) Dharmakīrti employs a series of arguments in refutation of generality (\*sāmānya\* or \*jāti\*). These arguments fall into three categories — intuitive, metaphysical and logistic. Acceptance of the generality is beset with the “one–many” problem, i.e. generality is said to be present in one object and at the same time in many as well, and then it is \*vyabhicāra\* (defect of variance). The universal would share the multiple natures of the various particulars, that too would be at variance, therefore to Dharmakīrti it is a pseudo-entity. Describing \*jāti\* as a fiction, he says: ### [c8.s5.39](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.39) It neither comes from somewhere nor it was there already, nor is it subsequently produced; nor does it have any parts. \[And even when in other places\] it does not leave the previous locus. Oh! It’s just one disaster after another!⁴⁶ ### [c8.s5.40](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.40) Any substance to be real must occupy just one location in time (\*kāla\*) and space (\*deśa\*) and have only a singular nature (\*svabhāva\*). It cannot be present in several distinct objects over different times and places, and possess the many natures of the various particulars. The proponents of \*jāti\* or \*sāmānya\* envisage manifold placements of one and single \*jāti\* once and always. The concept of \*tiryag lakṣaṇa\* (horizontal placements) as well as \*ūrdhvatā lakṣaṇa\* (vertical placements) for the universals is not admissible in a universe that functions as per the theory of \*kṣaṇabhaṅga\* or \*kṣaṇikatva\* (momentariness). ### [c8.s5.41](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.41) In fact, Dharmakīrti utilizes the concept of inference to disapprove the idea of \*jāti\* (universal) as proposed by the orthodox Naiyāyikas on one hand, and to support the concept of \*kṣaṇikatva\* (momentariness) on the other. He devotes a major portion of his \*Hetubindu\* to prove the invariable concomitance \*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam\* (whatever that exists, is momentary) and also to the theory of \*pratītyasamutpāda\* (dependent origination). An effect is produced by a cause and subsequently functions as the cause for another effect, this chain of causality subsists in a series of \*samartha kāraṇas\* (capable causes).⁴⁷ ### [c8.s5.42](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s5.42) \*Jāti\* — the technical term for generality used by the Naiyāyika — also denotes caste and hierarchy in day-to-day language. Dharmakīrti and his followers like Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin attribute a link between \*jāti\* as generality and \*jāti\* as a caste hierarchy. The metaphysical categories in orthodox systems of philosophy were seen as foundations for social organizations and hierarchy under Brāhmanism, and any attempt at the disapproval of these provided impetus to the Buddhists for demolishing the organizational hierarchy of their opponents. ### Debates on Scriptural Authority ### [c8.s6.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s6.1) The debates on the specific doctrinal questions as discussed above become more intense as they move to the question of scriptural authority. Even on the nature of the authority of the Veda the so-called Vedic \*darśanas\* differ one from the other. Kumārila regards Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra and Pāśupata as \*avaidika\* (non-Vedic) \*darśanas\*.⁴⁸ Bhīmācārya in his \*Nyāyakośa\* classifies Sāṁkhya and Advaita Vedānta amongst the \*nāstika-darśanas\*. Mīmāṁsā would hold the \*svataḥ prāmāṇya\* — the theory that the knowledge acquired through the \*pramāṇas\* is valid in itself; whereas the Nyāya upholds the theory of \*parataḥ prāmāṇya\* (the theory that the knowledge acquired through the \*pramāṇas\* needs to be validated from an outside agency). This implies that the knowledge acquired even from Śruti or Veda is not valid by itself and it needs to be validated by other means of knowledge. ### [c8.s6.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s6.2) Dharmakīrti proceeds to a detailed attack on the authority of the Vedas, the brāhmaṇas that expound them, the Brāhmanical ideas about the efficacy of \*mantras\*, and the system of caste in his \*Pramāṇavārtika\*. ### [c8.s6.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s6.3) The Mīmāṁsaka school established Vedas as eternal, \*apauruṣeya\* (not created by humans) and hence authoritative being free from any fault or error liable to occur as a result of human influence. Against this, the Buddhists argued that if scriptures were \*apauruṣeya\*, they would be incomprehensible being devoid of \*vivakṣā\* (speakers’ intention). ### [c8.s6.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s6.4) Tagged with the question of scriptural authority is the question of validity of the words coming from a reliable person termed as \*āpta\* by the ancient Indian philosophers. Those who believe in the authority of the Śruti do not uphold, the authority of the reliable persons. With some reservations, Al-Beruni even prefers spoken or written word over the testimony of the \*pratyakṣa pramāṇa\* (perception). Caraka had given more importance to the authority of \*āpta\* (see Chap. 3). Al-Biruni clubs both the written and spoken words under his concept of hearsay and his speculations about the validity of “hearsay” are noteworthy: ### [c8.s6.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s6.5) No one will deny that in questions of historic authenticity, hearsay does not equal eye-witness, for in the latter the eye of the observer apprehends the substance of that which is observed, both in the time when and in the place where it exists, whilst hearsay has its peculiar drawbacks. But for these, it would even be preferable to eyewitness; for the subject of eyewitness can only be actual momentary existence, whilst hearsay comprehends alike the present, the past and the future, so as to apply in a certain sense both to that which is and to that which is not (i.e. which either has ceased to exist or has not yet come into existence). Written tradition is one of the species of hearsay — we might almost say — the most preferable.⁴⁹ ### Debates on the Theory of Knowledge ### [c8.s7.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.1) \*Vyāpti\* is a universal relation to be known only through \*anumāna\*. This proposition of Dharmakīrti poses a problem. If we hold \*vyāpti\* to be known through \*anumāna\* and again, \*anumāna\* to be known through \*vyāpti\* this leads to \*anavasthā\* (infinite regress) — forming an unending chain of \*vyāptis\* and \*anumānas\*. The Naiyāyikas of Gautamīya tradition had an easy solution for avoid this trap — they held \*vyāpti\* as dependent on perception. In Dharmakīrti’s conceptual framework, this is impossible, because of his insistence on the presence of probans in all the similar cases (\*sapakṣas\*) and one cannot observe all the \*sapakṣas\* in a given life. To Dharmakīrti, an inference should result in both positive and negative concomitances (\*anvaya\* and \*vyatireka vyāptis\*). The Naiyāyika does not consider it essential. Dharmakīrti asks the Naiyāyika if there is any \*kevalānvayī hetu\* — the cause that goes only with the positive concomitance. The Naiyāyikas succeeded in breaking the Dharmakīrtian framework of inferential knowledge by devising an instance of \*kevalānvayī hetu\*- \*adṛṣṭa\*; which is perceived by God. In forming the \*vyatireka vyāpti\* of this concomitance, it is not possible to cite an instance, therefore here the \*hetu\* (\*adṛṣṭa\*) does not have a \*vipakṣa\*. ### [c8.s7.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.2) Dharmakīrti begs to differ from his \*paramaguru\* (grand-teacher) Diṅnāga in his concept of \*pratyakṣa\* to an extent. Diṅnāga has accepted the objects appearing in illusion or hallucination as perceived. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, reserves the sphere of perception only for the objects of veridical perception. ### [c8.s7.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.3) The orthodox Naiyāyikas believed that \*pratyakṣa\* is of two types — \*laukika\* (this-worldly) and \*alaukika\* (other-worldly). Both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti naturally stood against the \*alaukika pratyakṣa\* as it does not fit in the theory of \*svalakṣaṇa\* — a \*svalakṣaṇa\* cannot be judged in terms of \*laukika\* (this-worldly) or \*alaukika\* (other-worldly). ### [c8.s7.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.4) Nyāya is opposed to the theory of \*śabdānuvedha\* there can be no cognition without the verbal knowledge. If \*nirvikalpa jñāna\* is accepted, a distinction between perception and the verbalization of perceptual state is maintained. A child has the knowledge of the deep structures of language whereas what he learns later on is its surface structure.⁵⁰ ### [c8.s7.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.5) Dharmakīrti rules out the possibility of accepting other \*pramāṇas\* proposed in Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and rest of the systems. He rejects \*anupalabdhi\* (non-apprehension) as a \*pramāṇa\*. The Mīmāṁsakas believe that \*anupalabdhi\* is a \*pramāṇa\* leading to the cognition of \*abhāva\* (absence). Any \*pravṛtti\* (inclination) is generated by \*buddhi\* (intelligence) after visualization of something that is \*bhāva\* (existent). A non-existent will not lead to \*pravṛtti\*, therefore \*anupalabdhi\* is not a \*pramāṇa\*. For Dharmakīrti \*anupalabdhi\* is just a type of probans. In his brilliant analysis of the apprehension of “non-apprehension” Dharmakīrti has given the concept of \*ekajñānasaṁsarga\* (co-cognizibility). The apprehension of \*abhāva\* (non-existence) in one place involves the apprehension of a co-cognizable object on the same place.⁵¹ In difference to both Mīmāṁsakas and Naiyāyikas again, he denies \*abhāva\* as a separate category. Determination of an object cannot prove the non-existence of another; hence absence cannot be proved by ignorance. ### [c8.s7.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.6) Udayana proposed the reality of negation. Abhāva came to accepted as an additional ontological category in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Out of his concern with making the theory of \*anumāna\* perfectly precise, Dharmakīrti dared to disapprove the postulation of Diṅnāga here also (like in the sphere of \*pratyakṣa\*). Diṅnāga proposed three essential categories for the validity of an \*anumāna\* — \*pakṣa\*, \*sādhya\* and \*hetu\*. But he also allowed \*dṛṣṭānta\* to be included for establishing an \*anumāna\* in a convincing way. Dharmakīrti stood against this practical consideration. \*Dṛṣṭānta\* not being an essential component has to be discarded from the structure of \*anumāna\*. ### [c8.s7.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.7) The orthodox Naiyāyikas tried to solve the problem in a different way — they opined that \*vyāpti\* can be grasped without establishing the causal relation, and since it is impossible to observe all the cases of \*tadutpatti\* in past and presence, Dharmakīrti’s concept of \*tadutpatti\* is not acceptable to them. Similarly they also rejected Dharmakīrti’s idea of \*tādātmya\* (common reference), as the essential condition of \*vyāpti\* can be fulfilled without it. They shifted Dharmakīrti’s frame of inductive reasoning to intuitive reasoning.⁵² ### [c8.s7.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s7.8) Ratnakīrti introduced the two-truth doctrines as key to the nature of the discussion as inference is trafficking with illusory universals (\*sāmanya\*), the proof of the mind-streams of others, whilst empirically valid in relative truth (\*saṁvṛti-satya\*), does not hold ultimate metaphysical certainty in absolute truth (\*paramārtha satya\*). ### Debates on the Theory of Causality ### [c8.s8.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s8.1) The Vaiśeṣika cosmology was based on speculative physics. It stands in opposition to Vedānta and it was firmly refuted by Bādarāyaṇa in his \*Brahmasūtra\*. It enumerated six basic categories and a theory of causation without any place for a creator. The Vedāntin naturally viewed it as a challenge to spirituality. Bādarāyaṇa therefore attacked the very fundamental theory of atomistic cosmology postulated under the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Vaiśeṣika was equally a challenge for the Sāṁkhya. ### [c8.s8.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s8.2) Dharmakīrti strongly refutes the theories of Satkāryavāda and Pariṇāmavāda advocated by the proponents of Sāṁkhya. The Sāṁkhya theory of causality (Satkāryavāda) holds that the effects live as \*avyakta\* (unmanifest) within the cause. Thus, the curd lies \*avyakta\* in the milk. All effects exist either in \*vyakta\* or in \*avyakta\* forms — there is nothing non-existing. Dharmakīrti argues that in that case, the manifestation itself will have to be termed as existent and non-existent; therefore to hold that nothing is non-existent is impossible, as it will render all negative usages (like this is without that, that is not without this, etc.) impracticable and will create a universe without existences and non-existences (which is again an impossibility).⁵³ With regard to the theory of \*pariṇāma\* (transformation), Dharmakīrti does not overrule the linguistic usages like “the milk has been transformed into curd” — but he would like this transformation to be understood in the light of the Buddhist theory of causality — as a series (\*santāna\*) of cause and effect, rather than its Sāṁkhyaite implication of the unity of the cause and the effect. The Sāṁkhya theorist holds that the substance remains the same, only there is a cessation of some of its property and generation of some different property in it. Dharmakīrti points out the inner contradiction of the Sāṁkhya here, how can the substance remain the same if some of its properties perish and some other properties within it are generated? The Sāṁkhyaite will have to answer the question whether the properties are the same as substance or different from the substance. Both the situations are impossible as per the Sāṁkhya tenets, because if the properties are one and same with the substance, then the change of properties will involve the change of the substance also, and if the properties are different from the substance, then the theory of \*pariṇāma\* will be vindicated, as the substance will not undergo through the transformation, only its properties will be transformed. If the Sāṁkhyaite says that we will hold the transformation of the substance also, then he will have to accept the transformation of consciousness as well. For Dharmakīrti, there is no relation except the relation of the cause and the effect; he will not accept the \*dharma\*–\*dharmī\* relationship. ### [c8.s8.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s8.3) Mīmāṁsā postulates the theory of \*śakti\* (power) in the cause which leads to the genesis of the effect. Udayana and other Naiyāyikas refute their arguments. To them, the cause itself is an aggregate of causal power and the absence of counteracting agents. ### Debates on the Absolute and God as Creator ### [c8.s9.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.1) Īśvaravāda (theory of the existence of God) is one of the most contentious issues that has always provoked vigorous fights not only between the non-believers and the believers, but amongst the theistic schools as well. The proponents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools claimed that unknown can be known with the apparatus of facts that are known. They developed such apparatus through the process of logic based on \*anumāna\* (inference). The followers of Advaita Vedānta vehemently opposed any move to make the Supreme Being a subject of inference. ### [c8.s9.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.2) The whole discourse on \*Īśvarasiddhi\* in the tradition of Nyāya is based on the edifice of the following three aphorisms in Gautama's \*Nyāyasūtra\*: ### [c8.s9.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.3) \*īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṁ, puruṣakarmaphalyadarśanāt |\* \*na puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ |\* \*tatkaritatvād ahetuḥ |\* — IV.1.19-21 God is the cause (of the world), because actions of men (by themselves) do not yield fruits. (The opponent says): This is not so, because there is no fruit without the action by men. It is improper to say so, because, God makes men to take actions. ### [c8.s9.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.4) Following Vātsyāyana's \*bhāṣya\* on these aphorisms, Ganganath Jha in his commentary entitled \*Khadyota\* suggests that these three aphorisms refute certain other systems and approve some systems. The first aphorism (IV.1.19) refutes the prima-facie view of Vedānta which accepts God as the \*upādāna kāraṇa\* (inherent cause) of world. The third aphorism (IV.1.21) again disapproves the Vedāntic view that God is the \*nimitta kāraṇa\* (efficient cause) of the world. Accordingly Vātsyāyana's view of \*Iśvara\* establishes Him as the observer and regulator of this world, and not as the creator. He does not transform himself in the form of this world. If we accept the theory of \*pariṇāma\* (transformation), the question would arise as to whether God transforms Himself partly or fully to create this world. There will objections both ways. If he transforms Himself partly then he would not remain \*akhaṇḍa\* (whole). If he transforms Himself fully then He will not remain eternal. ### [c8.s9.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.5) Even though the Naiyāyika combated with Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta on the issue of Īśvaravāda, it is the Buddhist with whom he had to fight tooth and nail in this field. The Naiyāyikas and the Buddhist philosophers displayed remarkable ingenuity of reasoning here. John Vattanky says: ### [c8.s9.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.6) From the discussions of these arguments and counter- arguments, we can easily see, if we are objective and unprejudiced, that these philosophers manifest an admirable spirit of rigorous thinking and often scale the very heights of human thought. The Buddhist attacks shorn of their ancient form and technical vocabulary have not since been surpassed by any system of human thought that denies the existence of God. And it could be said without exaggeration that the Nyāya arguments in their spirit and intent have gone as far as human spirit has ever gone in search of an answer to these objections and problems. They have established the existence of God with arguments as exact and as sure as it has been so far possible for human thinking. And this should evoke the appreciation and admiration of any objective historian of ideas.⁵⁴ ### [c8.s9.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.7) Vasubandhu was first to attack the idea of God as propounded by Gautama and his \*bhāṣyakāra\* Vātsyāyana. He gave the following arguments: 1. If there is a single cause for all the things, then all the things should originate at one time. 2. If God be accepted as the creator, he must have a purpose for creating this world. If the purpose is His satisfaction, then his very status as God becomes doubtful, as He is not satisfied with Himself. If the purpose is to keep others satisfied, then this world should not have been full of mysery. 3. Acceptance of God as the cause of all results in negation of other causes producing different effects. ### [c8.s9.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.8) Even though these assertions by Vasubandhu were directed against Vātsyāyana's exposition of \*Nyāyasūtra\*, they were taken up for refutation by Sāṁkhya and Mīmāṁsā systems.⁵⁵ ### [c8.s9.9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.9) Udyotakara attempted to resolve the dilemma of commentators on the three aphorism of \*Nyāyasūtra\* (IV.1.19-21) as cited above by establishing God as the \*nimitta kāraṇa\* of the world. The crux of his reasoning lies in the necessity of accepting God as activator of atoms, without being activated, the atoms cannot combine to produce things. ### [c8.s9.10](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8.s9.10) Dharmakīrti devotes a sizeable portion in the first chapter of his \*Pramāṇavārtika\* on refuting the concept of the Absolute. The logic that there is always a creator for a cause would lead to fallacies. If there is a pot, then its creator is a \*kumbhakāra\*. This would make the \*kumbhakāra\* a creator of \*valmīka\* (anthill) also. In this way all the \*hetus\* cited for proving the existence of God are fallacious. The logic proving one substance as the causality of an effect can be employed to prove the non-causality of the same substance for the same effect.⁵⁶ Further acceptance of an eternal God as the cause of the world leads to fallacy, because it is not possible to formulate an invariable concomitance, rendering the inference invalid. When it is said that God is the cause of the world, one will have to accept that God was not the cause of this world when it was not created, and He becomes the cause of the world at the time of creation. This implies a change in the nature of God again rendering Naiyāyika's position untenable. _First 98 of 190 passages. [Read on](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8)_ ## Linked texts (48) - [Nyāyasūtra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.nyaya.nyayasutra.2.2.8) — Akṣapāda Gautama, Sanskrit - [Nyāyakusumāñjali](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.nyaya.nyayakusumanjali.1.15) — Udayana, Sanskrit - [Kaṭhopaniṣad](https://indike.org/pramana/in.veda.upanisad.mukhya.katha.1.17) — Sanskrit - [Maitrāyaṇīyopaniṣad](https://indike.org/pramana/in.veda.upanisad.mukhya.maitri.7.9) — Sanskrit - [Taittirīyopaniṣad](https://indike.org/pramana/in.veda.upanisad.mukhya.taittiriya.1.11.4) — Sanskrit - [Brahmasūtra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.vedanta.brahmasutra.3.3.53) — Bādarāyaṇa, Sanskrit - [Hevajratantra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.tantra.yogini.hevajra.2.2) — Sanskrit - [Ṛgvedasaṃhitā](https://indike.org/pramana/in.veda.samhita.rg.8.96.15) — Sanskrit - [Padmapurāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/in.purana.padma) — Vyāsa, Sanskrit - [Carakasaṃhitā](https://indike.org/pramana/in.med.samhita.caraka) — Agniveśa (Āyurveda) & Caraka, Sanskrit - [Nyāyamañjarī](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.nyaya.nyayamanjari) — Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Sanskrit - [Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.niti.artha.kautilya) — Kauṭilya, Sanskrit - [Tattvasaṃgraha](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.pramana.tattvasamgraha) — Śāntarakṣita, Sanskrit - [Naiṣadhīyacarita](https://indike.org/pramana/in.lit.kavya.mahakavya.bharata.naisadhiyacarita) — Śrīharṣa, Sanskrit - [Mānava Dharmaśāstra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.niti.dharma.manu) — Manu & Bhṛgu, Sanskrit - [Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvadarsanasangraha) — Mādhava, Sanskrit - [Advaitasiddhi](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.vada.advaitasiddhi) — Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 1570, Sanskrit - [དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བསྡུས་པའི་དཀའ་འགྲེལ](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.pramana.tattvasamgraha!panjika*bo) — Classical Tibetan - [Pāyāsisutta](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.theravada.sp.digha.23) — Pāli - [Abhidharmakośa](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.abhidharma.abhidharmakosa) — Vasubandhu, Sanskrit - [Sāmaññaphalasutta](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.theravada.sp.digha.2) — Pāli - [Dohākoṣa (Saraha)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.tantra.siddha.dohakosa-saraha) — Saraha, Apabhraṃśa - [Ambaṭṭhasutta](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.theravada.sp.digha.3) — Pāli - [Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.sarvasiddhantasangraha) — Śaṅkara, Sanskrit - [Sāṃkhyasāra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.samkhya.samkhyasara) — Vijñānabhikṣu 1550, Sanskrit - [Tattvopaplavasiṃha](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.nastika.carvaka.tattvopaplavasimha) — Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, Sanskrit - [تحقيق ما للهند من مقولة مقبولة في العقل أو مرذولة](https://indike.org/pramana/inf.isl.ar.biruni.tahqiq-ma-lil-hind) — Arabic - [Tantravārttika](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.mimamsasutra!sabara!tantravarttika) — Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Sanskrit - [Bārhaspatyasūtra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.nastika.carvaka.brhaspatisutra) — Bṛhaspati, Sanskrit - [Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad](https://indike.org/pramana/in.veda.upanisad.mukhya.brhadaranyaka) — Sanskrit - [Mahābhārata](https://indike.org/pramana/in.lit.mahabharata.vyasa) — Vyāsa, Sanskrit - [Mūlamadhyamakakārikā](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.madhyamaka.mmk) — Nāgārjuna, Sanskrit - [Kāmasūtra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.niti.kama.vatsyayana) — Vātsyāyana Mallanāga, Sanskrit - [Vaiśeṣikasūtra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.vaisesika.vaisesikasutra) — Kaṇāda, Sanskrit - [Viṣṇupurāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/in.purana.visnu) — Vyāsa, Sanskrit - [Vālmīkirāmāyaṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/in.lit.ramayana.valmiki) — Vālmīki, Sanskrit - [Bhagavadgītā](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.gita) — Vyāsa, Sanskrit - [Pramāṇavārttika](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.pramana.pramanavarttika) — Dharmakīrti, Sanskrit - [Hetubindu](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.pramana.hetubindu) — Dharmakīrti, Sanskrit - [Vādanyāya](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.pramana.vadanyaya) — Dharmakīrti, Sanskrit - [Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.vada.khandanakhandakhadya) — Śrīharṣa, Sanskrit - [Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.advaita.sastra.vivaranaprameyasangraha) — Mādhava, Sanskrit - [Vidvanmodataraṅgiṇī](https://indike.org/pramana/in.lit.campu.vidvanmodatarangini) — Cirañjīva Bhaṭṭācārya 1706, Sanskrit - [Prabodhacandrodaya](https://indike.org/pramana/in.lit.plays.allegorical.prabodhacandrodaya) — Kṛṣṇamiśra, Sanskrit - [Caryāgītikoṣa](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.tantra.siddha.caryagiti) — Bengali - [Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.all.saddarsanasamuccaya) — Haribhadra Sūri, Sanskrit - [Padārthamaṇḍana](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.nyaya.navya.later.padarthamandana) — Venīdatta 1695, Sanskrit - [Saptapadārthī](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.vaisesika.saptapadarthi) — Yaśasvatsāgara 1675, Sanskrit --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.science.tripathi-2021.c8) · Pramāṇa