Shringaraprakasha 3.p1.9

3.p1.9

tarhi puruṣādibhedapratīteranupapattiḥ tadviśiṣṭabhidhānaṃ ca tadabhidhānuparassarameva nyāyyaṃ ; nāgṛhūtaviśeṣaṇe viśeṣyabuddhirvartata iti nyāyāt| na ca śabdenāsaṃspṛśyamāno'pari kartā sannidhimātreṇa saṃkhyāṃ viśeṣayitumutsahate saṃkhyāyā dharmarūpatvāddharmṇā karturavacchedakatvena saṃsparśā yujyate | karaṇādīnāmapi sānnidhyadharmitvāt tathātvopapatteḥ| kiñca lakāreṇābhihitayorbhāvānasaṃkhyayoruttaraḥ, kālaḥ bhāvanākṣiptaḥ kartā labhyate| tato'sya pūrvabhāvāt bhāvanāsamakālamabhihitāṃ sakhyāyā aviṣeṣāt sarvakārakāṇāmavacchedaḥ prāpnoti| paścāñca kartākṣiptaḥ kathaṃ bhāvanāsamakālamabhihitāṃ saṃkhyāmātmani nirundhyat| atha saṃkhyāvadbhāvanāpratītisamakālameva kartā pratīyate; na tarhyākṣepalabhyaḥ | api tu saṃkhyāvallakoreṇābhidhīyata eveti | kiñcasa devadattadipadena pacatītyāde ssāmāndhikaraṇyadarśanāt | saṃkhyāvāni kartaiva lakāreṇaābhidhīyate| yadi punaḥ kartussaṃkhyānamekatvādikaṃ lakāro brayāt tadā devadattasya pacatītyevaṃ prayogaḥ syāt yatā devadattasyaikatvamiti | atha na saṃkhyānamucyate lakāreṇa, kintu, saṃkhyeya eva devadattādirabhidhīyate| devadattaḥ pacatītyekatvasaṃkhyāvacchinnaḥ pākaṃ karotītyarthaḥ| evaṃ ca, saṃkhyeye'bhidhīyamāne kartaivābhihito bhavati| 3.9. na ca kartrabhudhāne'pi śakteḥ kārakatvāt samānādhikaraṇanupapattiriti vācyam| śaktirhi lakāreṇāpyabhidhīyamānā guṇadravyaparantraivābhidhīyate| yathā--śuklaḥ paṭaḥ, śuklā śāṭīti | apica bhavanto'pi karmasakāravācyatvaṃ manyante | tadanupapannam|

then the apprehension of distinctions such as person would be inexplicable; and the denotation of what is qualified by that is properly preceded by the denotation of that itself, according to the maxim: 'Cognition of a qualificand does not occur when the qualifier is unapprehended.' Nor can the agent, though untouched by the word, distinguish number merely by proximity; since number is of the nature of a property [dharma], its contact with the agent as an owner of the property [dharmin] serving as a delimiting factor is appropriate; because instruments and the like also have proximity and are property-possessors, the same condition would apply to them as well. Furthermore, of the efficient force and number denoted by the l-affix, the agent is obtained at a later time, as implied by the efficient force. Therefore, because of its existing prior to this [implication], the number denoted simultaneously with the efficient force would, due to lack of distinction, delimit all syntactic roles [kārakas]. And how could an agent implied subsequently restrict to itself a number denoted simultaneously with the efficient force? Now, if it is held that the agent is apprehended at the very same time as the apprehension of the efficient force, just like number, then it is not obtained through implication; rather, like number, it is denoted directly by the l-affix. Furthermore, because one observes coreferentiality [sāmānādhikaraṇya] of 'Devadatta' and the like with 'cooks' and the like, it is the agent possessing number that is denoted by the l-affix. If, on the other hand, the l-affix were to express the number of the agent, such as oneness, then the usage would be 'of Devadatta, [he] cooks' [devadattasya pacati], just as one says 'the oneness of Devadatta'. If it is argued that numbering is not expressed by the l-affix, but rather the numbered entity itself, such as Devadatta, is denoted, then the meaning of 'Devadatta cooks' is 'delimited by the number of oneness, he performs cooking.' And thus, when the numbered entity is denoted, the agent alone is denoted. 3.9. Nor should it be said that even when the agent is denoted, coreferentiality is unfeasible because syntactic role is a capacity [śakti]. For capacity, even when denoted by an l-affix, is denoted only as dependent on a quality or substance, just as in: 'white cloth' [śuklaḥ paṭaḥ], 'white garment' [śuklā śāṭī]. Moreover, you too accept that the object is denoted by the affix; that [distinction of yours] is untenable.