Shringaraprakasha 4.p1.2

4.p1.2

nanu ca dhātvarthaḥ kriyāḥ sa ca kārakāṇāṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ, kārakeṣu ca svatantraḥ kartā, karturīpsitatamaṃ karma, sādhakatamaṃ karaṇaṃ, ādhāro'dhikaraṇaṃ, karmaṇā yamabhipraiti sa saṃpradānaṃ, dhruvamapāye'pādānaṃ, tebhyo'nyastadavivanakṣā vā śeṣaḥ, kakartuḥ prayojako heturiti katrādibhyo vyatiriktamarthāntaraṃ nopalabhyate yat kriyeti pratīyate 4.3. ucyate asti kriyā kintu kartrā kintu kartrādibhyaḥ pṛthāgākhyātumaśakyaṃ, anāpannasatvabhāvāt| anirluṭhitadarbhavat yathā rbho'nāpanna,tvābhavaḥ kalalāvasthaāyāmāśayataḥ pṛthagākhyātuṃ na śakyate, tathā kriyā'pi sādhanebhyassādhyāvasthāyaṃ | tadyatā--jayotiḥ prakāśate, ḷabdo dhavanati iti| khathaṃ tarhi asti jñāyate kārakasannidhāne'pi pacatīti prakhyopākhyayorbhāvābhāvābhyāṃ, iha khalu yatsannidāne yasya bāvābhāvau, tasya tato'nyaniīmittāpekṣitatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ | yathā agnighaṭayossanndhāne bhavatāmabhavatāṃ ca tatsanniyogāpekṣitatvaṃ pākajānāṃ, kartrādi ca sannidhāne ca kadācidbhavatītyetadbhavati, kadācinna pacatīti dṛśyate, tena manyāmahe nūnamasti śaktiśaktimadbhayo'nyaśśaktirdharmo yadbhāāvādime prakhyopākhye pravartate, yadabhāvāñca na pravarteteti siddhamastitveṃ kriyāyāḥ, itaścāstikriyāsādhyamantareṇa sādhanānupapannaḥ | yañaṭhca sādhyaṃ sā kriyā | tadāha-- saṃhṛtya kārakairya eko'rtho|bhinirvartyate sā kriyā| kriyānimittaṃ kārakamiti.

[Objection:] But surely, the meaning of a verbal root is action, and that is a specific operation of the syntactic roles; and among syntactic roles, the agent is independent, the object is what the agent most desires to reach, the instrument is the most effective means, the locus is the substrate, the recipient is whom one aims at through the object, the point of departure is the fixed point in separation, and the remainder is what is distinct from these or what the speaker does not intend to express [as such], while the instigator of the agent is the cause—thus, apart from the agent and the others, no other entity is apprehended that could be perceived as 'action'. [4.3] [Reply:] We say: action does exist, but it cannot be designated separately from the agent and other [syntactic roles], because it has not assumed the state of a substantial entity. Just as a fetus that has not assumed distinct form in the state of an embryo cannot be designated separately from the womb, so too action, in its state of being accomplished, cannot [be designated separately] from the means of accomplishment. For example: 'the light shines', 'the sound resounds'. How then is its existence known? Even in the presence of the syntactic roles, [it is known] from the presence or absence of the perception and expression 'he cooks'. In this world, indeed, when the presence or absence of something occurs in the presence of something else, that [first thing] is seen to depend on a cause distinct from it. Just as the presence and absence of products of baking, in the presence of the fire and the pot, depend on their conjunction, and in the presence of the agent and other [syntactic roles] sometimes this occurs—'he cooks'—and sometimes it is seen that 'he does not cook'. Therefore we consider: there definitely exists an attribute, a capacity, distinct from the possessors of the capacity, through whose presence these two—perception and expression—proceed, and through whose absence they do not proceed; thus the existence of action is established. Furthermore, action exists because the means of accomplishment are inexplicable without an end to be accomplished; and that which is to be accomplished is action. Therefore it is said: 'That single entity which is brought into being by the syntactic roles working together is the action; the syntactic role is the cause of the action'.