Shringaraprakasha 5.p1.7

5.p1.7

avivakṣitapravṛttivirāmo vṛttāvirāmo vṛttāvirataḥ, yathā--iba kumārāḥ krīḍanti |avicchannipravṛttisaṃtāno nityapravṛttaḥ, yathā--tiṣṭhati parvata iti | anāgatātikrāntakriyāsvapi pādantaraprayogāpāditavartamānatvāllaṭo nimittamāvidyāmānānadyatano vartamānādyatanaḥ | sa ṣoḍhā--lipsāviṣayaḥ, āśaṃsāviṣayaḥ, puroyogīyaḥ, snayogīyaḥ, ubhayayogīyaḥ, anubhayayogāya iti | teṣu lipsāviṣayo yathā--yo me bhikṣāṃ dadāti svargaṃ yāti, ko me bhikṣāṃ dadāti lokaṃ yāti, evaṃ kataro me bhikṣāṃ dadāti, katamo me bhikṣāṃ dadāti | āsaṃsāviṣayo yathā--devaścedvarṣati saṃpadyante śālayaḥ | purāyogīyo --vasantīha purā chātrāḥ | smayogīyo yathā--iti smopādhyāyaḥ kathayati | ubhayayogīyo yathā--naḍena smapurādhīyate | anubhayayogīyo yathā--bhāṣate rāghavastadeti | bhūta eva liṅviṣayo'kṣāṇāṃ paraḥ parokṣaḥ | sa ṣoḍhā--svarokṣaḥ, paraparokṣaḥ, svapararokṣaḥ, manaḥparokṣaḥ, pramāṇaḥparokṣaḥ, nirṇayaparokṣaḥ | teṣu svapekṣayā porakṣo yathā--cakāra cakāra, cakāsāñcakāra, uṣuriha purā chātrā iti | parāpekṣayā paraparokṣaḥ, yathā--kaḥ kaliṅgādviveḍhaḥ, ko brāhmaṇāndadarśa, nāhaṃ kaliṅgān jagāmeti | ubhayāpekṣayā svaparaparokṣaḥ, yathā--jaghāna kaṃsaṃ vīsudevaḥ, dadāha tripuraṃ haraḥ, mamātha vṛtraṃ madhaveti | smaraṇāpokṣayā mana-parokṣo yathā--iti cakāra, śaśvaḍhcakāra, iti ha, śaśvañcakāreti | praśne cāsannakāla iti nirṇayaparokṣaḥ, yathā--kiṃ sā jagāma tatpārśvaṃ, kimuvāca yathocitaṃ, sa kiṃ śuśrāva tadvākyamiti, pṛcchāmi kiṃ sakhīti | bhaviṣyadbhūtavartamānakriyātipattiviṣayo lṛṅnimittamatipannaḥ |

That whose cessation of activity is not intended to be spoken of is continuous activity unstopped in progress, as: "here the boys are playing." That whose continuum of activity is uninterrupted is eternally active, as: "the mountain stands." Even in the case of future and past actions, because presentness is brought about by the employment of another word, the non-current non-today, being a cause for the present tense (laṭ), is the current present. It is sixfold: having desire for gain as its domain, having expectation as its domain, connected with purā, connected with sma, connected with both, and connected with neither. Among these, that having desire for gain as its domain is as: "whoever gives me alms goes to heaven", "who gives me alms goes to the [higher] world", likewise "which of the two gives me alms", "which among many gives me alms." That having expectation as its domain is as: "if the god rains, the rice-crops will prosper." That connected with purā is: "formerly students dwell here." That connected with sma is as: "thus the teacher says, indeed." That connected with both is as: "formerly, indeed, study was pursued by Nala." That connected with neither is as: "Rāghava then speaks." The domain of the perfect tense (liṭ) is only the past, beyond the senses, beyond direct perception (parokṣa). It is sixfold: unperceived to oneself, unperceived to another, unperceived to both oneself and another, unperceived to the mind, unperceived to [direct] means of knowledge, and unperceived in determination. Among these, that which is unperceived with respect to oneself is as: "he made, he made", "he shone", "formerly the students dwelt here." That which is unperceived to another with respect to another is as: "who has arrived from Kaliṅga?", "who saw the brahmins?", "I did not go to Kaliṅga." That which is unperceived to both oneself and another with respect to both is as: "Vāsudeva slew Kaṃsa", "Hara burned Tripura", "Mādhava crushed Vṛtra." That which is unperceived to the mind with respect to memory is as: "thus he did", "he continually did", "so indeed he did", "he repeatedly did." Under the rule "in a question when time is near", it is unperceived in determination, as: "did she go to his side?", "did she speak appropriately?", "did he hear her words?", "I ask: did my friend [go]?" That whose domain is the non-occurrence of an action—future, past, or present—is that which has lapsed, being the cause for the conditional tense (lṛṅ).