Shringaraprakasha 6.p1.14

6.p1.14

kāryaṃ tvanyatakasmādapi ghaṭamānaṃ nobhayaṃ kalpayituṃ prabhavatītyasaṃbhavaḥ| śakteriti cedatrocyate | svarūpaṃ svarūpamiti yadbrūṣe tatra kimidaṃ svarūpaṃ nāma ? na tāvaddravyaṃ ; dravyasya svarūpamiti bhedenābhidhānāt | kiṃ punastatsajatīyebhyo vijātīyebhyasca bhedako dharma iti nāstarkaḥ | taṃ hi bhavanto'pi arthatattvaṃ bhāvatattvamiti bhāvapratyayena bhāṣayante | sa ca yasya guṇasya bhāvāddravye śabdaniveśastatabhidhāne tvatalāviti guṇābhidhāne smaryate | guṇo dharmasāmarthyamarthakriyākāritvaśayaśśaktiriti caiko'rthaḥ | sa tudravyadvibhinno vā dravyasyātmaiva vā tathā | vyatirekamupāśritya sādhanatvāya kalpate || 6.8. parasparato hi vyāvartamānaśarīrāḥ karaṇādayassādhanabhedāḥ kathamekadravyatmatāmupayanto na saṅkīryeran ? asaṅkare vā kathamamīṣāmekadravyatmatā yujyate ? tasmādekadravyādhikaraṇā karaṇātītirevāsyā dravyadbhedamāpādayati | kiñca --- vibhaktryathe'vyayībhāvavacanādavasīyatām | anyo dravyādvibhaktyarthasso'vyayenābhidhīyate || tathā hi | vibhaktyarthe vartamānamavyayamuttarapadena samasyate | yadi ca vibhaktyartha ityenena śaktyāśrayassattvabhūtaṃ dravyamucyate, tadasattvavācināvayayena nābhidhīyeta | tasya cārthasya prātipadikenaivoktatvāt tadabhidhāyyavyayamabhidadhaduttarapadena samāsamanubhavati | tena cāvadhāryate dravyātiriktāṃ śaktimabhidhatte vibhaktiriti | bhavato'pi yuktamevocyate | svarūpādūdbhavācyāt kārakatvāderdravyasvarūpānna śaktimanyāṃ manyante | kintu kāryopajanāyārthavyaktayaḥ kṣamā iti na kṣamante sarvammādapi kāryodayaprasaṅgāt |

Since an effect arising from something else cannot establish both, this is impossible. If it is said, "[It arises] from a capacity," in response it is said: When you repeatedly say "essential nature, essential nature," what indeed is this thing called "essential nature"? First of all, it is not a substance, because of the distinction in the expression "the essential nature of the substance." What then is it? It cannot be denied that it is the property that differentiates it from things of the same class and things of a different class. Indeed, you yourselves express this with an abstract affix, as "reality of the thing" (arthatattva) or "reality of being" (bhāvatattva). And that is remembered in the rule regarding the expression of a quality: "The affixes tva and tal occur in the expression of that quality by the presence of which a word is applied to a substance." "Quality," "property," "capacity," "producing an effect," and "power" mean the same thing. / Whether it is distinct from the substance or the very self of the substance, it is conceived as having the status of an instrument by resorting to difference. // 6.8 // For how could the distinct instruments such as the instrument [proper], whose forms are mutually exclusive, not become confused when arriving at the state of being a single substance? Or, if they are not confused, how is their identity with a single substance appropriate? Therefore, their going beyond being an instrument, while having a single substance as their substratum, produces their difference from the substance. Furthermore: / Let it be determined from the rule on avyayībhāva in the sense of a case-ending: the meaning of the case-ending is different from the substance; it is expressed by an indeclinable. // For an indeclinable that occurs in the sense of a case-ending is compounded with the subsequent word. And if by the phrase "meaning of a case-ending" the substance consisting of being, the locus of the capacity, were meant, it would not be expressed by an indeclinable, which does not express being. And because that meaning is already expressed by the nominal stem alone, an indeclinable expressing that [case-meaning] enters into a compound with the subsequent word. And by this it is determined that the case-ending expresses a capacity that is distinct from the substance. What is appropriate for your position as well is stated: they do not consider capacity to be anything other than the essential nature of the substance, from the expressible nature of the syntactic role, etc., arising from the essential nature. However, individual entities are not capable of producing the effect [on their own], because of the undesirable consequence that an effect would arise from anything at all.