Shringaraprakasha 6.p1.32

6.p1.32

vyaktigrahaṇe ca dupavyañjanā jātirgrahīṣyati | tadapi na samyak | yadā tāvatpratibimbamudakādiṣu bhāvāntaramevopajāyata iti darśanaṃ, tadā tu rūpabhedānupātinaḥ śabdāḥ kimiti udasādīnupādadīran | yato nodakādastadānīṃ candrādīnāmuvyañjanamapi tu rupajananakāraṇam ; na ca kāryavacanāt śabdāḥ kāraṇasaṃsparśamanubhavanti | yadā tu darśanavilpavaḥ sa dādṛśa iti pratipattiṃ, tadā dūrotsāritāvakāśo vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvaḥ | yadā tarhi jalādyādarśapratighātāt parāvṛtte cakṣuṣi svaktrañjandrādayo'pi dṛśyanta iti darśanaṃ tadaitadupapatsyate | tadāhyudarakādivat sannihitamupavyañjanaṃ rūpabhedena jātimabhivyaktarūpabhedāṃ darśayati | tadeva ca śabdo'bhidhatte | etadapyavyabhicaritopavyañjanāyatdarśanajātayaḥ kathaṃ vinopavyañjanaiḥ pratīyanta iti paryunuyogenāticaturaśraṃ ; candrādīnāmanyathāpi darśanopapatteḥ | evaṃ jātibhedapratipattāvapi yathā darśanādīndriyāyattodayāḥ nīlādyarthāvasāyāḥ kāraṇabhedamanurivartante | naivam ; jātiparicchedāḥ vyaktirūpapratibandhotpādāḥ, yena tadbhedamanuvidadhyuḥ | tataśca gotvādayo'pi parasparato na vyāvarteran | saṃvedyamānabhedaśca padārthaḥ kathamakasmādeka iti śraddhīyate ? vyaktareva pārdathatvaṃ tasmādabhyupagamyatām | tathā ca buddhistatraiva śrutaśabdasya jāyate || yeṣāmartheṃṣu sāmānyaṃ na saṃbhavati taiḥpunaḥ | ucyate kevalā vyaktirākāśādipadairiva || evaṃ ḍitthādiśabdānāṃ saṃjñātvaviditātmānām | abhidheyasya sāmānyaśūnyatvādvyaktivācyatā || yepunaḥ kalpitānekabedavṛttiṃ pracakṣate | vācyaṃ tatrāpi sāmānyamatīva grāhayanti te ||

[Objection:] And when an individual is grasped, the universal will be grasped as a secondary manifestation. [Reply:] That too is not correct. When, first of all, there is the view that a reflection in water or the like arises as an entirely different entity, then why would words, conforming to the differences in form, take in the water and so forth? For water and the like are not at that time secondary manifestors of the moon and so on, but rather causes generating the form; and words denoting an effect do not experience contact with the cause. But when [it is held that] that cognition is an optical illusion of that kind, then any scope for a relation of manifestor and manifested is thrown far away. Then, when there is the view that even the moon and so on, having their own forms, are seen when the eye turns back after rebounding from a mirror, water, or the like, then this might hold. For then the secondary manifestor, being near at hand like water and so forth, reveals the universal whose distinction of forms is manifested by the difference in forms. And the word denotes just that. This too is not very coherent on account of the objection: how are the universals seen in these cases, whose secondary manifestors do not wander, cognized without the secondary manifestors? For the sight of the moon and so on is possible otherwise as well. So too, in the cognition of the difference of universals, just as the determinations of objects such as blue, which arise dependent on the senses like vision, conform to the difference of their causes, it is not so here; the determinations of the universal are produced in dependence on the forms of the individuals, so that they would conform to their difference. And consequently, even 'cowness' and the like would not be differentiated from one another. And how can a word-meaning, whose difference is being experienced, suddenly be believed to be one? Therefore, let it be accepted that the individual alone is the word-meaning. / And likewise, cognition arises in the very individual for someone who has heard the word. // For those objects in which a universal is not possible, / only the solitary individual is spoken of by them, as by words like 'space' and the like. // In this way, of words such as 'Ḍittha', whose nature is known as proper names, / because the denotatum is void of a universal, the individual alone is what is to be expressed. // But those who declare an occurrence in many imagined differences, / even there they merely cause a universal to be grasped as the thing to be expressed.