Shringaraprakasha 6.p1.40

6.p1.40

nanvākhyātavācyatvena bhāvanaiva vidhirityuktaṃ bhavati | kathaṃ ca tatraiva tasya pravartaktavaṃ, svātmani kriyāvirodhāt ? tanna, śabdārthabhedena bhāvanāyā dvaividhyāt | taduktam --- abhidhābāvanāmāhuranyāmeva liṅādayaḥ | arthātmā bhāvanātvanyā sravākhyāteṣu gamyate || tatra śabdabhāvanā preraṇātmikā śabdasyābhidheyā vidheyā ca | taduktam--abhidhatte, karoti ceti | sātvarthabhāvanāṃśadvayaviṣayā vana phalāṃśaviṣayā| taduktam --- phalāṃśe bhāvanāyāśca pratyayo na vidhāyakaḥ | abhidadhyuḥ svaśaktyāhi vidhimātraṃ liṅādayaḥ || tasyāśca kiṃ kena kathamityapekṣāyāmarthabhāvanāviṣayā puruṣapravṛttiḥ, preraṇājñānaṃ karaṇāṃśaḥ, artha vādādaya itikartavyatāṃśa iti tryaṃśaparipūrṇatvam, sā ca phalakaraṇayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvamajñātaṃ gamayantī gamakatvātapramāṇaṃ bhavati | nanu ca vidhilakṣaṇametāvadapravṛttapravartanaṃ, ajñātajñāpanaṃ hyevaṃ sarvo'pi hi vidhirbhavet | tathāhi--- sādhyasādhanasambandhaḥ sarvākhyāteṣu vidyate | sravavākyeṣu cākhyātaṃ tenākāṅkṣā nivartanāt || na ca sādhyasādhanabhāvāvagamamantareṇa pravartakatvaṃ na sidhyatīti sādhyasādhanabāvavagatiravaśyakalpanīyā | preraṇājñānajanakatvenaivāsya pravartakatvāt kimityasau niṣphale vyāpāre pravartata iti cedvidhīta eveti brūmaḥ | sahi saphale niṣphale vā vyāpāre puruṣaṃ pravartayati ; evaṃ yañjapuruṣeṣvapravartamānaṣu aprāmāṇyaṃ tadaparihāryameva | kalpite hi phale vaiṣayikasukhadveṣiṇo vītarāgā na pravartante | pravṛddhatararāgāstu na nivartante iti |

Now, it may be objected: since it is expressed by the finite verb, it amounts to saying that productive operation itself is the injunction; and how could it have impelling power with respect to itself, since an action on itself is contradictory? That is not so, because productive operation is twofold through the distinction between linguistic sound and meaning. Thus it has been said: 'They say that productive operation by designation (abhidhābhāvanā) expressed by the optative and other moods is quite distinct, while productive operation consisting of meaning is understood in all finite verbs.' There, the productive operation of linguistic sound consists of impulsion, which is denotable and to be enjoined by linguistic sound. Thus it has been said: 'It denotes, and it produces.' But it pertains to two factors of the productive operation of meaning, not to the factor of the result. Thus it has been said: 'And the affix is not an enjoiner in the result-factor of productive operation; the optative and other moods denote merely injunction by their own inherent power.' And in its expectation of 'what?', 'by what?', and 'how?', the engagement of a person is the object of the productive operation of meaning; knowledge of the impulsion is the factor of instrument; and explanatory passages and the like are the factor of procedure—thus it has completeness in three factors. And by making known the unknown relationship of means and end between the result and the instrument, it is a valid means of knowledge because it is informative. Now, [an opponent might say:] the definition of an injunction is merely this: the impelling of the unengaged; for if it were the making known of the unknown, every verb would indeed be an injunction! To explain: the connection between end and means exists in all finite verbs, and a finite verb exists in all sentences, because expectation is terminated by it. Nor can it be maintained that impelling power is not established without the cognition of the end-means relation, so that cognition of the end-means relation must necessarily be posited; for it has impelling power merely through producing the knowledge of impulsion. If it is asked: 'Why would he engage in a fruitless activity?', we say: 'Solely because of the injunction.' For it engages a person in an activity whether it has a result or is fruitless; in this way, if men of sacrifice did not engage, unauthoritativeness would be altogether unavoidable. For when a result is imagined, dispassionate persons who detest worldly pleasures do not engage, while those with heightened passions do not desist.