Shringaraprakasha 2.p1.16

2.p1.16

Now, since this is already established by the rule, "equal to that" [Pāṇini 5.1.115], for what purpose is the rule, "in that, like that" [Pāṇini 5.1.116] introduced? [The reply is:] An affix would not be obtained when a substance and a quality are equal; as in, "palaces in Pāṭaliputra like [those] in Mathurā: madhurāvat"; "the teeth of a kṣatriya are white like [those] of a brāhmaṇa: brāhmaṇavat." If it is suggested: "The mention of 'action' will not be made in the prior rule, and by association, nominal stems will apply to substance and quality just as to action; and then, by analyzing the expressions as 'Caitra's cows are equal to Maitreya's' or 'the teeth of a kṣatriya are equal to a brāhmaṇa's,' the affix -vati will be established by the prior rule alone." That is incorrect. For in that case, the affix would also improperly apply in: "an ox is equal to a gayal." But when the affix in the sense of iva ('like') is prescribed only after words ending in the locative and genitive cases, there would be no contingency of the affix in: "an ox is like a gayal." For the usage of the word iva occurs with reference to an external relatum for words ending in the locative and genitive cases, and not merely with reference to the sense of iva itself; for the word iva indicates a relation characterized by being the standard of comparison and the object of comparison, but it does not express the nature of the relata. Therefore, in order that there should be no application [of the affix] in: "an ox is equal to a gayal," the mention of action is made in the prior rule. And when that is done, the affix would not occur when a substance and a quality are equal; thus, the affix -vati is prescribed in the sense of iva after words ending in the locative and genitive cases by the rule: "in that, like that" (Pā. 5.1.116). Now, for what purpose is the rule: "it deserves that" (Pā. 5.1.117)? The affix -vati is also desired where there is an agent whose action is deserving; where there is no intention to express a standard of comparison, its prescription is not obtained. // 2.11 The condition of standard and object of comparison may belong to one entity with another, or even to a single entity with itself through a distinction of states. // Among these, with another, as in: "Even though he is not a grammarian, he acts like a grammarian; even though she is a woman, she speaks like a man." With oneself through a distinction of states, as in: "Even though he is a grammarian, out of contempt he sometimes speaks like a non-grammarian;"