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Shringaraprakasha 4

English (machine translation) 4

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English

Contents

4.p1.1

Fourth: Illumination of the group of four meanings such as action. / There, the objects signified by words such as morphological base and affix have twelve divisions, consisting of action, grammatical tense, syntactic role, person, qualifying attribute, primary meaning, supplement, nominal-stem meaning, integrated compound meaning, word-meaning, and sentence-meaning. / Among these, action is a particular operation of syntactic roles; they teach that it is the meaning of a verbal root. / And verbal roots are of three kinds: those signifying existence (asti), those signifying becoming (bhavati), and those signifying action (karoti). / Among them, those whose agents remain passive are verbs of existence; as in: asti ('is'), vidyate ('exists'), dhriyate ('survives'), tiṣṭhati ('stands'), āste ('sits'), vartate ('continues'), and so forth. / Those whose [agents] undergo transformation are verbs of becoming; as in: bhavati ('becomes'), saṃjāyate ('is born'), vardhate ('grows'), dhriyate ('is held'), tiṣṭhati ('stands'), āste ('sits'), vartate ('persists'), and so forth. / Those whose [agents] produce an effect are verbs of action; as in: karoti ('does'), vidhatte ('performs'), janayati ('begets'), nirvartayati ('accomplishes'), sādhayati ('effects'), utpādayati ('produces'). / There, from the state of equilibrium of the [roots] asti, karoti, and bhavati, they proclaim the unchanging, beginningless, and endless Śabdabrahman. / Likewise, when speaking of multiple meanings of this kind, they refer to it by the verb bhavati alone as 'Om'. / When its first modification arises, namely asti ('is'), which is the cause of being, based on nescience, and in the form of non-transformation— / then, because asti ('is') has nāsti ('is not') as its counterpart, this single entity alone expands in both ways as 'it is'. / And when there is the expectation, 'What is not, may I become that,' from its becoming, the second modification called bhavati ('becomes') overflows. / Then, regarding whatever becomes, out of false attachment to one becoming different from another, one imagines mutual relations of the prompter and the prompted; that third modification is termed karoti ('does'). / And thus, when nescience has spread far through egoity, desire, and attachment, even for these roots, vidyā, vidyati, and roots such as jan and pac appear, each distinguished as a specific variation from which vidyā has been removed. / Thus it is said: 'The roots kṛ, bhū, and as express action in general; roots such as pac express specific actions.' / All these various meanings of verbal roots, though blending together, transcend mutual confusion, but never transcend their nature as kṛ, bhū, and as.

4.p1.2

[Objection:] But surely, the meaning of a verbal root is action, and that is a specific operation of the syntactic roles; and among syntactic roles, the agent is independent, the object is what the agent most desires to reach, the instrument is the most effective means, the locus is the substrate, the recipient is whom one aims at through the object, the point of departure is the fixed point in separation, and the remainder is what is distinct from these or what the speaker does not intend to express [as such], while the instigator of the agent is the cause—thus, apart from the agent and the others, no other entity is apprehended that could be perceived as 'action'. [4.3] [Reply:] We say: action does exist, but it cannot be designated separately from the agent and other [syntactic roles], because it has not assumed the state of a substantial entity. Just as a fetus that has not assumed distinct form in the state of an embryo cannot be designated separately from the womb, so too action, in its state of being accomplished, cannot [be designated separately] from the means of accomplishment. For example: 'the light shines', 'the sound resounds'. How then is its existence known? Even in the presence of the syntactic roles, [it is known] from the presence or absence of the perception and expression 'he cooks'. In this world, indeed, when the presence or absence of something occurs in the presence of something else, that [first thing] is seen to depend on a cause distinct from it. Just as the presence and absence of products of baking, in the presence of the fire and the pot, depend on their conjunction, and in the presence of the agent and other [syntactic roles] sometimes this occurs—'he cooks'—and sometimes it is seen that 'he does not cook'. Therefore we consider: there definitely exists an attribute, a capacity, distinct from the possessors of the capacity, through whose presence these two—perception and expression—proceed, and through whose absence they do not proceed; thus the existence of action is established. Furthermore, action exists because the means of accomplishment are inexplicable without an end to be accomplished; and that which is to be accomplished is action. Therefore it is said: 'That single entity which is brought into being by the syntactic roles working together is the action; the syntactic role is the cause of the action'.

4.p1.3

And likewise, that which employs the syntactic roles and so forth in actions according to its own will, but is not employed by them, is the agent; that which is reached by another action of the agent is the object; that which, as the most effective means in accomplishing the action, operates immediately is the instrument; the substrate of the action, mediated by the agent or by the object, is the locus; that which, determined as an effect of the action, experiences connection with the object is the recipient; that which, as a fixed point, experiences division caused solely by the action through the agent or through the object is the point of departure; the specific relation of syntactic and non-syntactic roles brought about by aiding the action denoted by the heard verb is the remainder; and he who, by giving an order or the like, directs one who is already acting toward the action is its instigator, the cause, and is an agent. And in this way, just as pieces of wood, only when depending on lac and so forth, experience the capacity to be conjoined with one another, so otherwise mutual conjunction and disjunction would not occur. As it has been said: 'That by which Devadatta, having been here, comes to be in Pāṭaliputra—that indeed is action.' Granted that action exists, but how is it distinct from the syntactic roles? And surely you too do not deny the distinction between action and syntactic role, as in: 'it pains the thief', 'it sickens the thief'. [Reply:] We say: action is indeed distinct from the syntactic roles, because it is the cause of a single designation for multiple entities. In this world, whatever is the cause of a single designation for multiple entities is distinct from them, as the universal is from the individual; and action is the cause of this single designation 'syntactic role' for multiple entities such as the agent and the others; therefore it is distinct from them. Because it is followed [by them]: in this world, whatever is followed by entities is distinct from them, as a king is approached and followed by men; action is followed by the syntactic roles, therefore it is distinct from them. Because it is perceived as an effect: whatever is perceived as produced [by something] is distinct from it, as a son is perceived as distinct from the father; action is perceived as produced by the syntactic roles, therefore it is distinct from them. Because of non-perception when there is perception [of the other];

4.p1.4

Here, that whose non-apprehension occurs upon the apprehension of something else is different from it; like taste from form. And there is apprehension of the sun's motion, while from that [sun] it is otherwise. And it belongs to this because of reaching another place; and that too is observed just so, because of being seen upon turning back after not seeing [it]. Because of being graspable by another means of knowledge: here, whatever is grasped from something by another means of knowledge is different from it, as the self from the body. And motion is graspable by another means of knowledge in constant movement; therefore, it is different from it. Because of being designated as distinct from many: here, whatever is designated as one, distinct from many, is different from them, as cloth from threads. Action, though residing in many, is designated as one in distinction, as in: ‘It is sat by the brāhmaṇas’; therefore, it is different from them. Because of repetition when there is no repetition: here, when one thing does not repeat, that which repeats is different from it, as the universal from an utterance of ‘elephant’. And action is the cause of designating manifold syntactic roles such as the agent as one; therefore, it is different from them, because of being followed. Here, that which is followed by others is different from them, just as a king is approached and followed by men. Action is [followed] by syntactic roles; therefore, it is different from them, because of being perceived as produced. Whatever is perceived through having been produced is different from it, as a son from a father. Action is perceived as produced by syntactic roles; therefore, it is different from them. Because of non-apprehension upon apprehension: here, that whose non-apprehension occurs upon the apprehension of something else is different from it, like taste from form. And there is apprehension of the sun's motion, while from that it is otherwise. And it belongs to this because of reaching another place; and that too is observed just so, because of being seen upon turning back after not seeing [it]. Because of being graspable by another means of knowledge: here, whatever is grasped from something by another means of knowledge is different from it, as the self from the body. And motion is graspable by another means of knowledge in constant movement; therefore, it is different from it. Because of being designated as distinct from many: here, whatever is designated as one, distinct from many, is different from them, as cloth from threads.

4.p1.5

Action, though residing in many, is designated as one in distinction, as in: ‘It is sat by the brāhmaṇas’; therefore, it is different from them. Because of repetition when there is no repetition: here, when one thing does not repeat, that which repeats is different from it, as a mosquito from an elephant. And while the agent does not repeat, action repeats in: ‘He cooks five times’; therefore, it is different from it. Because both are the causes of doubt and determination: here, when there is doubt about both, that which is the cause of determination—such as the action of moving of a person—is different from it. Because of being designated after designating [something else]: here, that which is designated after designating [something], without intending another meaning, is different from it, as: ‘A cow, a horse.’ And action is designated after designating a syntactic role, as in: ‘The reader reads; the goer goes’; therefore, it is different from it. Because of the absence of recognized synonymy: here, only those that are recognized as synonyms have no difference from one another, as *nirvartiḥ* and *kriyā*. And there is no synonymy between *pacan* (‘cooking’) and *pacati* (‘cooks’) in ‘cooking, he reads’ and ‘he cooks, he reads’. Moreover, in ‘cooking, he reads’, there is fitness of synonymy for the agent, and in ‘cooks’, for action; therefore, this is different from that. Because of the difference of gender and number in qualifiers even when designated by an identical word: here indeed, even if the action and the agent were designated by an identical word, a difference of gender and number is seen in their qualifiers, as in: ‘*śobhanaṃ pacati*’ (‘he cooks nicely’), ‘*śobhanaṃ pacataḥ*’ (‘they two cook nicely’), ‘*śobhanaṃ pacanti*’ (‘they cook nicely’). And that is seen only when different words are employed where there is a difference of meaning, in the case of qualifiers such as: ‘*taṭaḥ*’ (masculine bank), ‘*taṭī*’ (feminine bank), ‘*taṭam*’ (neuter bank); ‘*puṣyaḥ*’ (masculine star), ‘*tārakā*’ (feminine star), ‘*nakṣatram*’ (neuter star); ‘*rasaḥ*’ (masculine water), ‘*āpaḥ*’ (feminine water), ‘*jalam*’ (neuter water); ‘*dārāḥ*’ (masculine plural wife), ‘*kalatram*’ (neuter wife), ‘*bhāryā*’ (feminine wife); but not in cases resembling the examples adduced; therefore, action is different from the agent. Because of the difference in cognition upon the difference in repetition of words: here indeed, upon a difference in the repetition of words for action and syntactic role, a difference in cognition is seen: ‘the reader reads, reads; the goer, goer goes’—in the former pair there is pervading repetition (*vīpsā*), in the latter pair there is frequency (*ābhīkṣṇya*).

4.p1.6

And that from which there is a difference in cognition is distinct from it, as the sound of a cloud from the sound of a drum, or cloth and the like from pots and the like; such is the distinctness of action from syntactic roles. And when this is established, the view of non-difference and the non-distinction of difference are to be regarded as arising from non-discrimination alone, and it is seen to be so. The body of words, flowing conversely, operates as an undifferentiated cognition among distinct things like mental impressions, cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, and physical forms; in these, the corresponding designation occurs precisely through non-difference. But in ‘*corasya rujati*’ (‘it pains the thief’), because there is no agent who accomplishes the disease, the verbal ending conveys the agent, expressing that very pain. The meaning of this is: ‘pain arises for the thief.’ Whence, then, is this distinction between syntactic role and action? That in one case there is pervading repetition, and in the other, frequency, because pervading repetition is not apprehended due to the oneness of action. For pervading repetition is the speaker's desire to encompass many things simultaneously through actions, qualities, and substances; but that does not apply when an action is one. [Objection:] Now, oneness of action does not hold, because of designations connecting it simultaneously with the three grammatical tenses, which are mutually contradictory. Here indeed, a designation causing connection with the three grammatical tenses is seen for that action at any given time: ‘Devadatta cooks’, ‘Yajñadatta cooked’, ‘Viṣṇumitra will cook’. And that is not possible if it is one; therefore, action is manifold, based on differences. Because of conjunction with comparative affixes like *-tarap*: here indeed, comparative affixes are seen with an action, as in ‘*pacatitarām*’ (‘he cooks better’), ‘*pacatitamām*’ (‘he cooks best’). And that is established in the superiority of two or many; therefore, action is manifold. Because of the single simultaneous determination of multiple loci: here, that which at one single time is determined separately as existing in multiple bases is manifold, as nails are determined on fingers. And motion is determined simultaneously by a single [cognizer] in multiple bases, namely in carts; therefore, action is manifold. Because an affix is seen even in past time:

4.p1.7

Here, when two actions have the same agent, the affix *ktvā* is observed to express the earlier time, as in: 'having eaten, he eats' (*bhuktvā bhuṅkte*), 'having cooked, he cooks' (*paktvā pacati*); and duality is opposed to unity, so action is manifold, because of simultaneous association as indicator and indicated (*lakṣyalakṣaṇayoga*). Here, an association as indicator and indicated is observed at the same time for actions: 'he milks even while the cow is being milked' (*gavi duhyamānāyām api dogdhi*); this would be impossible if it were one, so action is manifold, also because the affix is seen in the earlier time. Here, when two actions have the same agent, the affix *ktvā* is seen in the earlier time, as in: 'having eaten, he eats', 'having cooked, he cooks', because of the absence of an effect possessing a cause within it. For here a difference between cause and effect is well known, and it is seen in actions: 'he cooks porridge' (*odanaṃ pacati*), 'he cooks vegetables' (*śākaṃ pacati*), 'eating, he eats porridge' (*bhuñjāna odanaṃ bhuṅkte*); and difference is opposed to unity, so action is manifold; [and also] because affixes like *tumun* are produced when an action undertaken for the sake of another action is a subordinate member (*upapada*). Here, those [affixes] such as *tumun* which are prescribed when [an action] serving as the purpose of an action is a subordinate member are seen even when expressed by different verbal roots, as in: 'he goes to eat' (*bhoktuṃ gacchati*), 'he goes to cook' (*pākāya vrajati*), 'he cooks, thinking: I will eat' (*bhokṣyāmīti pacati*), and so forth; [or] as in: 'he goes to go' (*gantuṃ gacchati*), 'he eats to dine' (*bhojanāya bhuṅkte*), 'he cooks, thinking: I will cook' (*pakṣyāmīti pacati*). And this is intelligible only where there is oneness by way of the condition of being the purpose and result of that; thus action has multiple purposes, because it is the cause of the manifestation of capacities that are expressed and unexpressed. Here, from the observation of the affix and inflection in: 'he suckles the foster-mother' (*dhātrīṃ dhayati*), 'he cuts with a sickle' (*dātreṇa dāti*), 'he serves for a slave' (*dāśāya dāśate*), 'he fears the fierce' (*bhīmād bibheti*), 'he sits in a seat' (*āsane 'ste*), 'he lies in a bed' (*śayane śete*), 'he stands in a place' (*sthāne tiṣṭhati*), 'he is pleased in a palace' (*prāsāde prasīdati*), the manifestation of capacities expressed and unexpressed is perceived. And this cannot be coherent without a difference of action caused by non-oneness; so action is manifold. Even when expressing state (*bhāva*), there is perception of the dual and plural [affixes] after [verbal roots meaning] driving, etc. Here, indeed, even in the case of pure state, the dual and plural are perceived after driving, etc.: 'two cookings' (*pākau*), 'many cookings' (*pākāḥ*), 'camel-sittings are sat' (*uṣṭrāsikā āsyante*), 'dead-lyings are lain' (*hataśāyikāḥ śayyante*).

4.p1.8

And that is not proper if action is one, so action is manifold. Action expressed by primary nominal derivatives (*kṛt*) and finite verb-forms (*ākhyāta*) has grammatical agreement with number-words in all numbers and plurals; and that is not proper if action is one, so action is manifold, because action expressed by primary nominal derivatives and finite verb-forms has grammatical agreement with all numbers. Here, grammatical agreement is observed between action expressed by primary nominal derivatives and by finite verb-forms, and number-words expressing different meanings, as in: 'one cooking' (*ekaḥ pākaḥ*), 'two cookings' (*dvau pākau*), 'many cookings' (*bahavaḥ pākāḥ*); 'one camel-sitting is sat' (*ekā uṣṭrāsikā āsyate*), 'two are sat' (*dve āsyete*), 'many are sat' (*bahvya āsyante*). And that is not proper if action is one, so action is manifold. Here, in the case of *bhavati*, etc., because there is the fulfillment of an effect residing in a vibration whose difference has been ascertained: here, with regard to those actions whose multiplicity is undisputed owing to a difference in the limitation of the root-meaning that delimits them, those properties which reside in difference are well established. Thus: 'he wishes to eat' (*bhoktum icchati*), 'he is cooking' (*bhavati pacati*), 'he will be cooking' (*bhavati pakṣyati*), 'he was cooking' (*bhavaty apākṣīt*), 'I invite to an assembly, I invite to a festival' (*āmantraye samājam, utsavām āmantraye*); it is observed even when expressed by the same verbal root: 'he wishes to wish' (*eṣitum icchati*), 'it might be, it would be' (*bhaved api bhavet*), 'it could be, it would be' (*syād api syāt*), 'I invite for an invitation, I summon for a summoning' (*nimantraye nimantraṇārtham, āmantraye āmantraṇārtham*). Therefore, there must be a relation to an effect residing in difference. Multiplicity by means of multiple verbal roots everywhere [implies] difference; hence action is manifold, because of the relation of that which is to be accomplished and the accomplishing factor (*sādhyasādhanabhāva*). Here, the difference between what is to be accomplished and the accomplishing factor is well known and is observed: the relation of what is to be accomplished and the accomplishing factor in actions, as in: 'he nourished these nourishings' (*sa imān poṣān apuṣat*), 'the ascetic undergoes penance' (*tapyate tapas tāpasaḥ*). And that is not possible if there is oneness; so action is manifold. All this [is stated] if action is manifold; but if it is one, where difference is merely superimposed through the difference of accomplishing factors, it is also coherent, because even for undivided entities, through differences of substratum and so forth, there is seen an appearance of distinct forms and designation of perceived location; just as [one sees] the moon in waters, moonlight in lattices, the directions in cloud-horizons, distinctness in things, cognition in objects, lightning in clouds;

4.p1.9

and just as barley is abundant among barleys, white among Turks, ruined among Saurāṣṭrans, handsome among the Stanendasenas, the two eyes among the Kaliṅgas; 'you are clever, you were clever, he is cleverer'; 'a well was on the road, a well will be'; 'your wrath is dear, we are not dear'; 'Maithilī is Rāma's wife'; 'ah! the pure city of the Varaṇās, the Śirīṣas'; 'Rāma, the Pāñcālas are countries'—thus, even for an undivided distinct meaning such as a universal, there is designation in terms of difference; in the same way, the connection of tense and so on will belong to action through the difference of accomplishing factors. And the simultaneous apprehension of [an action] inhering in multiple substrates by a single [cognition] is coherent, just as with a universal. However, because pure states expressed by primary nominal derivatives have a different character from actions having finite verbs, in that they resemble substances, it is improper to transfer their properties [to finite verbs]. For a state expressed by a primary nominal derivative, appearing like a substance, becomes the locus of capacities such as gender, number, and objecthood; but not that which is expressed by a finite verb, because it cannot be a locus since it is not fully realized. To explain: just as the connection with capacity, number, and so on is seen in primary nominal derivatives—'cooking is occurring' (*pāko vartate*), 'he cooks' (*pacati*)—it is never seen in finite verb-forms. For one never says: 'he cooks occurs' (*pacati vartate*), 'he cooks sees' (*pacati paśyati*). If it is objected: does not one say 'it is, he sees' (*bhavati paśyati*), 'the deer runs' (*mṛgo dhāvati*); 'I see' (*utpaśyāmi*); and duals and plurals are cited for the object, so that actions like 'running' have objecthood with respect to the root *dṛś* ('to see'), and the only thing is that nominal case-endings are not produced because it is not a nominal stem? That is not so; just as, from the very fact that action is being performed, it is intrinsic, and it is seen that: 'it is, he cooks' (*bhavati pacati*), 'he will cook' (*pakṣyati*), 'it was, he cooked' (*bhavaty apākṣīt*). The agency of *pacati*, etc. with respect to *bhavati* is seen; their objecthood with respect to *paśyati* is seen; the objecthood of action-qualifiers is understood sequentially. Then, from the very fact of being produced, agency in motion is likewise intrinsic. In 'the deer runs' and so on, it is the sentence-meaning comprehended by an implicit particle *iti* that has objecthood, not the action.

4.p1.10

Therefore it cannot be suspected [that an action is multiple], because the dissimilarity between an emotion expressed by a primary affix and that expressed by a finite verb is clearly established by connection with the capacity of the agent and by the presence or absence of connection with instruments and so forth. Therefore, because there is no intention of pervasion referring to multiple things, the oneness of action is established. And because the word and the mental cognition are identical, wherever there is an absolute non-difference between designation and cognition, its unity is established—just as with a universal, and severally in the case of distinct individuals, and space and time are undivided, and even when there is differentiation of action, word and cognition are seen [to be one], as in: 'he cooks' [pacati] and 'they cook' [pacanti]. Therefore, being the cause of a single word and cognition, action is one. [4.8] Now, [an objection arises:] In the analogy of the moon reflected in water and so on, there is a doubt regarding the conventional usage of differentiation: do the operations of differentiation—such as connection with the three times, cognitions, and expressions—depend on the differentiation of the instruments of action, or do they depend on differentiation of [action] itself? To this it is replied: even though action is non-different, the arising of the dual and plural number is due to the differentiation of instruments; this doubt should be set aside. Here, since differentiation is preceded by non-difference, one who accepts differentiation must necessarily accept non-difference. For whatever action oneness is accepted, its connection with the dual and plural is seen on account of differentiation of the instruments. For instance: 'he cooks an atom' [paramāṇuṃ pacati], 'they cook an atom' [paramāṇuṃ pacanti]. And if multiplicity were accepted, where the instrument is non-different, only the singular is seen, as in: 'he breaks the granary' [bhinatti kusūlam], where the number differs. Therefore, because action conforms to the differentiation of instruments, and instruments conform to the differentiation of actions, operations of differentiation reside in the instruments; they do not reside in the action itself. [4.9] How then is there a difference of number when the agent differs, as in: 'two bowls of rice are cooked' [pacyete odanau], 'bowls of rice are cooked by Devadatta' [pacyante odanā devadattena]? In whichever instrument the affixes beginning with l- are designated, according to its differentiation the actions are designated, and the instruments according to the differentiation of the action; this is not to be suspected. Because between counter-correlates difference and non-difference are not absolute, and since the same holds for cognition and designation, there is no irregularity caused by them.

4.p1.11

And for this reason also action is not multiple: because repetition is absent. For in counting the repetition of an action having a plural number, the affixes kṛtvasuc and so on are prescribed, as in: 'he eats five times' [pañcakṛtvaḥ], 'he cooks four times' [catuṣpacati]; and that is possible only when there is non-difference. For when Devadatta has gone and Yajñadatta has arrived, the expression 'he has returned' is never seen. But there, precisely because he has arrived, it is one action, owing to the absence of combination. Here, combination is seen when distinct things fall upon a single scope: 'Devadatta's cow and horse and man,' 'the cow belongs to Devadatta, Yajñadatta, and Viṣṇumitra.' Nor, even though the speaker is one, when there is differentiation of the action through differentiation of the sentence regarding jaggery, sesame, rice, and so forth, is combination of action seen: 'Devadatta recites and cooks.' Therefore, when single actions attain the state of being an entity, distinction occurs because of their designation as one. Here, when action enters into the condition of an entity and is distinguished from its instruments, there is no connection with the dual number and so on, as in: 'it is sat by the brahmins' [brāhmaṇair āsyate]; therefore it is one. [4.9] But surely this is observed even in the condition of an entity, as in: 'the cooking of jaggery, sesame, and rice,' 'red color arose among the palāśa trees'—no, that is not so, because of its invariable character: 'Just as for kings, various coquettish gestures became foremost messengers of love.' [4.10] If it is asked: What is the cause of this irregularity? It is simply designation by a primary affix: 'An emotion expressed by a primary affix appears like a substance.' And although substance is manifold, since differentiation is apprehended solely through differentiation of related items, non-differentiation is designated in some places, as in: 'With those ear-ornament flowers, whose gaze roved over the roots of their thighs, striking their beloved, these women forthwith made Manmatha's name "flower-weaponed" literal,' and as in the Vedic passage: 'Whatever victim has its thighs unbroken or is struck by feet.' In other places, however, when such intention exists, it is expressed purely by differentiation, as in: 'The intermediate spaces were filled by the faces of those [women], filled with the fragrance of liquor and dense with curiosity.' [4.11] 'It is sat by the brahmins' [brāhmaṇair āsyate] always takes only the singular; this is the distinction, because it is something to be accomplished.

4.p1.12

For connection with number is appropriate for an established entity, not for something to be accomplished, since an unaccomplished thing cannot properly serve as a substrate. And the action to be accomplished is designated by us as principal; therefore there is no number of differentiation, and thus it is one. From retention of one [ekaśeṣa]: here, for those denotata of identical words where multiplicity is seen, retention of one is seen for their designations. For instance, in the view of individual entities: 'brahmins' [brāhmaṇāḥ], 'men' [puruṣāḥ]. But no retention of one is seen for designations of action, as in: 'it is sat by the brahmins' [brāhmaṇair āsyate], 'it is sung by the men' [puruṣair gīyate]. And this retention of one, in turning away, turns away even taking along non-pervading multiplicity; therefore action is one. [4.12] But why is there an absence of retention of one? Finite verbal forms do not cause retention of one; what then is the rationale here? It is the predominance of action in finite verbs; that very point is considered. Here indeed, through the state of being principal and subordinate in the integration of a compound, the course of action and syntactic role is fourfold: either action becomes subordinate to action, as in: 'one who cooks' [pācakaḥ], 'that which is to be cooked' [pacanīyam], or the syntactic role becomes subordinate to action, as in: 'he desires a son' [putrīyati], 'he praises in verse' [upaślokayati]. And in finite verbs, there is no other manner for these; for there, even the action to be accomplished, being of the nature of the verbal base, dependent on instruments, having active instruments, and incomplete, is expressed by roots such as pac; and the accomplished instruments are designated by affixes beginning with tip; thus neither has primacy. Or rather, the base and the affix express the affix-meaning together with primacy, and so the affix-meaning would have primacy. [4.13] And in this way both the dual and the plural number would be justified based on that; but that is not so: the accomplished is taken up for the sake of that which is to be accomplished. And the instruments are accomplished; being taken up for the sake of another, they obtain subordinacy. But that which is to be accomplished, unable to help another, expecting another entity for its own accomplishment, experiences the state of being principal because of its dissimilarity to that. Surely in this way the absence of retention of one would not be established;

4.p1.13

for in the condition of retention of a single form, nothing is resorted to on the basis of predominance or subordination. For roots such as 'to cook' express action; one single [verb] among them will express the action intended to be expressed as plural because it inheres in multiple means of accomplishment. That is not so: even if a single verbal root expresses the action as stated, nonetheless, because the verbal termination has multiple objects or agents as its scope, multiplicity would result as it applies to each means of accomplishment. And conforming to that, the meanings, which are primary, would turn away from the affixes, so that the formulation of retention of a single form would become necessary. Due to the primacy of the action there is a single word, but due to the division among the means of accomplishment there is the application of the dual and plural numbers. [4.14] Others, however, say: even if distinct forms were to apply when there is a difference in the means of accomplishment of a single morphological base, still, just as in the place of one there is the singular, in the place of two there is the dual, and in the place of many [the plural] will occur. For this alone is the nature of the dual and plural: that a single word-form, like a word resulting from retention of a single form, is explained as capable of denoting multiple meanings. For this reason also, the finite verb has action as its principal element, because it serves as the determination in answer to a question with the verb 'to do'. When the question is 'What does Devadatta do?', the answer is 'He cooks', 'He sits', but not 'A sitter', 'A cook'. Nor is this a question about the agent—'What is Devadatta?'—because the specific distinction is already included within, and because they have different grammatical genders. Nor is it a question about sequence, because a question about sequence is impossible when the activity is not yet known. Because the questioner's purpose is accomplished when the reply is 'He cooks', 'He reads', without any specification of the agent, and because a finite verb has no syntactic relation with another finite verb, as in 'He cooks, he reads'. If the means of accomplishment were predominant, then just as there is no syntactic relation through grammatical agreement in 'The cook cooks', so it would also be here in 'He cooks, he reads'.

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And this is not so. Therefore, actions indeed predominate in verbs, and from the predominance of action there is no undertaking of an ekaśeṣa compound. From the non-undertaking of that, there is oneness; through oneness, there is an absence of repetition (vīpsā); through the absence of repetition, there is a difference consisting in the repetition of words like “gantā gantā” and “gacchati gacchati”; and from the difference in cognition, action is distinct from the syntactic roles (kārakas). / 4.15. Now, is not this [denoted in forms like] pacati, pacataḥ, pacanti merely the meaning of the verbal root, and not the action? That is not so, because the meaning of the verbal root merely specifies the meaning of the affix; but the distinctness of the action from the meaning of the verbal root is established precisely in its designation as something being brought into being (sādhya) and as primary. / Just as there is non-difference of action even when the kārakas differ, so too let there be only non-difference even when the meanings of verbal roots differ! True. However, an entity's oneness or manyness asserted in an absolute way transgresses all worldly usage based on difference and non-difference. Therefore, by one who accepts difference and non-difference in order to establish worldly usage, non-difference and difference must be admitted, something being primary and something being secondary. For every theorist of difference relies on the oneness, through non-difference, of the cognition “this is that very thing” with respect to differences that are mutually excluded, like the connections of iron needles having no mutual assistance, and so conforms to worldly usage. And the theorist of oneness, considering that all practical functioning of existing things and all usage of distinguishing words in the world is preceded by contact with another property, as if having difference as their basis, in conforming to the world shows what is undivided only through differences. Therefore, an action, even if distinct, is delimited by distinct root-meanings and is indeed distinct. By this, the following is also comprehended: what is determined as distinct through insertion and deletion of the affix-meaning and root-meaning in such forms as vrajati, pacate, and yāti, delimited by the root-meaning;

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delimited by time or delimiting time, refined by prefixes and the like, assisted by the meaning of the affix, assisted by kārakas having unnumbered acts of assistance which are in turn assisted by the condition of number, delineated entirely by inner creative intuition from its inception to its culmination, and determined as to-be-brought-into-being (sādhya); likewise, having arisen externally as that which is supported, having the nature of an aggregate of parts that have assumed a serial form, not dependent on intervening other actions, possessing such parts—[this] human effort is action. Or, it is the root-meaning possessing the aforesaid qualifications; or its part perceived in the moment prior to the production of the fruit to be brought into being; or a particular universal that is the cause of the uniform cognition perceived in the aggregate of parts; or the manifestation of a universal perceived in subsequent parts as assisted by prior parts; or the relation to existence that causes its own designation for the agent and object acting in the root-meaning; or the existence of the agent and object; or the universal of parts of the root-meaning pervaded by their activity; or the particulars of parts of the root-meaning perceived in that very way; or the conceit of a different form distinct from their prior essential nature in the self and other while acting; or, in that very state, their relation to the existence of their own undivided cause of such a kind; or the universal of intellect strung through multiple cognitions whose forms have vanished into the existence of intellect—[any of these] is designated by the word “action”. Moreover: / Whatever is intended to be brought into being, whether accomplished or unaccomplished, / because it assumes a sequential form, is designated as “action”. / 4.16. And some say that it is imperceptible because it is inferable from its effects. For in cognitions such as “he goes”, no additional reality of action beyond the essential nature of Devadatta and others is perceived by perception. / The very self of Devadatta that is the object of cognition while standing, / shines forth in the consciousness “he moves” as well.

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[An objection states:] But the cognition 'it moves' has as its objective basis contact and separation; contact and separation, being produced only at certain times, lead to the inference of a cause beyond the visible essence of the thing, and that cause, consisting of motion, effort, and so on, is human activity, which is imperceptible to the senses, and that is action. 4.17. Others say: That is untenable, because cognitions such as 'it moves' rest upon perception. And thus the cognition 'it moves' does not have contact and separation as its objective basis, because that would lead to non-pervasion and other faults. In that case, there would be no cognition that 'the bird moves in the sky,' because contact and separation [there] are not perceived. Nor are the contact and separation of two spaces perceived, since they exist in that which is other than perceptible, like the contact and separation of wind and a tree. If [you say] that the sky is expansive and spatial, and contact and separation with it are perceptible, that is not so, because there is the cognition of action in a firefly and lightning even in dense darkness. And darkness is not a real positive entity; and in an earthquake there is the cognition that 'the earth trembles.' There is [also] over-extension: contact and separation exist, and even in a continuum of contact and separation, only the present two are apprehended; and they are present in a cow or the like even when it has stopped after walking. In that case as well, the cognition 'it moves' would absurdly apply. And on an immobile execution-stake bearing a succession of incoming and departing hawks, on a riverbank carrying the distinct lines of flowing water, and on the ground of an outer terrace possessing a series of contacts and separations with a dancing horse, the cognition 'it moves' would wrongly apply. If [you argue that] contact and separation are produced by action, so the cognition 'it moves' occurs only there, in the hawk and so on, and not in the actionless stake or the like, then, because it conforms to the presence and absence of action, this cognition has action alone as its objective basis, not contact and separation. 4.18. Furthermore, if action were eternally beyond the senses, even this would not be known:

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Is contact and separation produced by the action of the stake, the riverbank, and the ground, or is it produced by something else, namely the action of water and horse? Hence there is over-extension. And if contact and separation were the objective basis, then from the cognitions 'it is conjoined' and 'it is separated'—and not 'it moves'—the objective basis would belong to the water without an ascertainment of the arising of the cognition according to the object. And the cognition 'it moves,' which has the appearance of the present, cannot occur by being inferable from contact and separation. To explain: action is subsequent contact. But it does not infer an action present in conjunction; separation, because it is something to be developed, indicates a cause as if belonging to a prior time. For the existence of a cause prior in time is what serves the effect, not one simultaneous with it, because at that time the effect is already established. Therefore, one who infers the action that is the cause from the effect infers only a past action, not a present one. Therefore, in the inference of action from contact and separation, the cognition 'it moves' with its appearance of the present cannot occur; hence it is impossible. Nor is the inference of an eternally imperceptible action possible at all, because the apprehension of the invariable relation that 'an effect is preceded by a cause' would be impossible. For an unmixed substance is not the cause; rather, in the inference of action, it is qualified by action, and because action is imperceptible, the apprehension of the desired cause at that time cannot be accomplished; thus the cognition of invariable concomitance is impossible even in a pot and so forth. Therefore, action is not inferable from an effect. Rather, because motion in the form of physical movement having varieties such as throwing upward is apprehended by direct perception, it is entirely perceptible. By this, it is also explained that the cognition 'he cooks' has perceptible action alone as its objective basis. For there, many actions such as cooking are perceived: Devadatta moves, the stove blazes, the pot boils, the friend talks, he covers with the lid, the grains soften, he stirs with the ladle, the boiled rice is ready. 4.19. [Objection:] Surely, what is called 'cooking,' the meaning of the verbal root, must be accepted as distinct from the observed activities of Devadatta and the rest, because without it, the resulting effect would not arise;

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and in its absence, with reference to what would the syntactic roles combine? To this it is replied: That single meaning of the verbal root called 'cooking,' which you consider to be an action distinct from movement and the like—is it an attribute of the thing, or its effect? In that regard, if it were an attribute of the thing, being accepted like color or universal, there would be the absurd consequence that the effect would be produced at all times as long as the thing exists. If it is its effect, is it produced by all the syntactic roles together, or brought about by each single syntactic role? In the first alternative, each single syntactic role would be inactive; but if each is inactive, since the totality is also an effect, assuming an intervening operation leads to infinite regress. In the other alternative, the inactive syntactic roles would produce the effect itself just like the action, so what is the use of an action? [Objection:] A syntactic role is that which 'acts' (karoti). [Reply:] True, it produces the effect without being active. [Objection:] That which you call 'acts' is this very action already mentioned. In 'Caitra makes a mat,' the meaning of 'makes' is simply to be stated as belonging to Caitra and the mat alone. [Reply:] It is answered: The meaning of 'makes' is purely physical activity, namely bodily motion. For we do not deny visible activity consisting of physical motion, because diverse activities such as movement are perceived directly in each syntactic role. But we say there is no imperceptible meaning of 'makes' distinct from that. For if action were imperceptible to the senses, those seeking a result, understanding that being a syntactic role is produced by connection with that [action], would have to grasp it. 4.20. Having ascertained only that much, that is grasped by those seeking [the result]; / and by those grasping that very thing, the result too is attained. // And in this view, there is nothing imperceptible about being a syntactic role; / being a syntactic role is the proximate presence of its own nature with auxiliary causes and the like. // If this [factor] has no operation, what benefit does it derive from auxiliary causes? / Even if it possesses an operation, what benefit does it derive from auxiliary causes? // This very operation is accomplished when all of them combine; / what wrong has the result done? Let that indeed be accomplished by them combining! // Therefore, the result is produced by the collection of syntactic roles in motion.

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Furthermore, no activity other than movement is perceived. // Devadatta and others moving, and immediately after that, the cooked rice— / only this much is seen there, but no other action at all. // Even for the proponent of contact as the cause of action, there are two alternatives: / does contact occur when action exists, or does action occur when contact exists? // Even here, on the first view, what purpose does contact serve? / That being so, the result would be accomplished even from wood alone! // If, on the other hand, action is accomplished from contact, before that each thing was without action; / and that being so, the firewood, joined with the pot, would not burn. // The firewood burns, but joined with the pot, it does not cook; / even when the pot is present, my thought is just that “these are burning”. // Therefore, since there is no other action, let the wood, water, pot, and the like / come together just for the fruit: what is the point of an unseen action? // 4.21. But is the fruit accomplished or to-be-brought-into-being? What follows from this? If it is accomplished, other kārakas too are accomplished, and so there is an absence of contact. If it is to-be-brought-into-being, that itself is the action not distinct from the activity of the kārakas! That is not so, because it is impossible for the fruit to be an action. For cooked rice is the fruit, and it is not an action. Then what is cooking? The denotation of pac; mere emptiness is suitable! We reply: Cooking is simply the vibration of the assembled mass of kārakas—Devadatta and the rest—delimited by a specific result. And that alone is the meaning of pac. For the actions of Devadatta and the others, in the form of moving, burning, and so on, shine forth separately in that very manner; when they are combined, because of the delimitation by a further result, they flash forth and are designated under another form, such as cooking; and when combined, because of the delimitation by a further result, they flash forth and are designated under another form, such as cooking. Likewise, just as one says “Devadatta cooks”, so too the designations “the firewood cooks” and “the pot cooks” occur. But is it not observed that just as “the pot cooks”, “the firewood cooks”, so too “the cooked rice cooks”, “the grains of rice cook”? This is true.

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If it is asked, 'What is the cause that must be stated?' it is precisely that [the root] pac ('to cook') is an intransitive action. / Objection: Either the cooked rice or the grains of rice have agency (kartṛtva), but both cannot possibly have it. / Reply: That is not so; it is also designated as 'he cooks cooked rice from raw grains' (taṇḍulān odanaṃ pacati). Nor is independence suitable for an object (karman); and because of the absence of that [independence], the designation 'he cooks' is not based on agency. Or if there were independence, why does the reflexive agent (karmakartṛ) behave like an object, given the absence of an agentive suffix? / Objection: If so, since there is no independence of cooked rice and grains in their production and transformation, expressions such as 'cooked rice is produced' (sidhyati odanaḥ) or 'the grains soften' (klidyanti taṇḍulāḥ) would also not be possible. / Reply: Not so; having previously experienced independence in production and the like, it subsequently becomes an object in the linguistic usage of other agents. / Objection: Granted, this may somehow apply to already existent grains, but it cannot apply to cooked rice which is yet to be accomplished. / Reply: Not so, because everything has agency with respect to the meaning of the root bhū ('to become/exist'), and the meaning of bhū is 'it is accomplished' (sidhyati); thus there is no fault. / 'If it is cooked rice, it is not to be cooked; and if it is to be cooked, it is not cooked rice' — / just as: 'If it is a cloth, it is not to be woven; and if it is to be woven, it is not a cloth.' / On this it is said: / Both internality and externality are accepted in the accomplishment [of things]: / having placed internality foremost, externality is manifested. / There are two kinds of existence for word-meanings: external and internal; / the internal is for the sake of verbal transaction, but the external is toward causal efficacy. / Otherwise, even 'the sprout is born' would not occur. Therefore it is said: Action is human activity consisting of the determination [of something] as yet to be accomplished, projecting it in its entirety through internal intuitive intellect (pratibhā) from the beginning up to the completion. Nor does human activity being an action entail the absence or metaphorical status of usages such as 'the chariot moves' (ratho gacchati) or 'the riverbank collapses' (kūlaṃ patati); for by the word 'human' (puruṣa) here, agent and object are designated as the entities expressed by the triad of substitute verbal terminations: third, second, and first persons. Nor is it that action belongs only to the activities of these two, because they indicate the syntactic role by denoting the result.

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