Shringaraprakasha 5.p2.19

5.p2.19

[Objection:] Well, words such as 'tree', which take up an occasion for application such as a universal, express existent entities. The opposite words, such as 'ca' and others, are said to not express existent entities. And indeed, a universal is not an object of valid cognition to be apprehended by perception and the like. For this is so: it is not perceived, because perception has for its object a unique particular unconnected with what precedes and what follows, whereas a universal has a form connected with what precedes and what follows. As has been said: / 'How could a cognition arising from the senses without relation, / touch the common occurrence of a universal as distinguished from particulars, which requires relation?' (5.35) / But conceptual constructions that arise after it cannot establish a universal, because their nature is to have non-real entities as their object. Nor does inference or verbal testimony establish a universal, because both are incapable of determining real entities since their domain is conceptual construction. The attainment of a real entity, however, will occur through the determination of an entity whose ground is the non-determination of difference. And for this reason too, a universal is not distinct from an individual: because it is not apprehended as distinct like a jujube, a myrobalan, and a wood-apple, and because difference of location is not grasped as between a pot and a cloth; and because when an individual is not apprehended, it is not perceived, just as in the case of a pot and a cloth. If it is said that its non-perception when an individual is ungrasped is due to the universal's inherence in the individual, no; for that inherence is impossible. Does the universal reside in each body entirely or partially? / 'If the universal is in one body, like the nature of a cow, it is nowhere [else]; / if it is complete [there], how could the cognition of a cow arise in each body?' / Nor does it possess parts, since it is without parts. Nor is any occurrence perceived whereby, existing completely in one body, it also exists completely in another body. Nor is this occurrence of the nature of inherence; for that occurs between things that are inseparably established. But to say that things are inseparably established and yet in a relation is contradictory. If it is argued that this is not so because a relation is seen between substance and quality even though they are not established separately, no; for there too the possessor of quality is not established as distinct from the quality. Nor is there a relation between parts and the whole, because separate existence is absent.