Shringaraprakasha 5.p2.22

5.p2.22

For what means of comprehension is there for those things in which its recurrence [occurs]? / And what means of comprehension is there for those from which its exclusion [occurs]? / Now, if merely the entity itself is grasped, / independently of recurrence and exclusion, then by all means let it be stated what it is like. / At the time of indeterminate perception, that cannot be designated; / but the ascertainments arising from it bear witness in both directions. / And as for the refutation stated there regarding occurrence, conceptual options, and so forth, / all of that would be contradicted by the very power of perception itself. / 5.37. As for what was said—that it does not appear like a blue lotus, a myrobalan, etc.—a difference in cognition has indeed been shown there. And as for [the objection] that it is not grasped in a different place, and that without grasping the [individual] there is no cognition of it, the reason there is the universal's dependence on that [individual], not its non-existence. As for what was also said—that its occurrence is untenable—to that too it is replied: the universal exists entirely in each individual, and its apprehension in another individual is certainly present. Fractional parts of a universal simply do not exist. / If you ask, “Where else has this been seen?”, oh, what cleverness of yours! / You who demand of perceived things [an example] just as in inference! / 5.38. If it is asked: “What is the name of this occurrence?”, we do not know its name; we simply state that the universal is inherent in the individual. Objection: Inherence is the relation of two inseparably existent entities, and that has been refuted by mutual contradiction alone. [Reply:] It cannot be refuted: / Let there be difference because of the difference in cognition, but spatial difference is not accepted; / by that, occurrence is tenable, and it is called inherence. / And this very occurrence belongs to part and whole, and to quality and the possessor of quality. And the distinctness of these two is established indeed by reasoning equal to that of the universal. And there is no spatial difference between them; hence their inseparable existence is clear. As for what is said: “There is no relation for that which is not yet produced; upon production, there is separable existence”—that too has been resolved by the teachers who state that the connection with the universal and [the individual’s] birth occur at one and the same time. / And the occurrence here in threads, necklaces, and so forth, / since universals and the like are not auxiliary factors, is an occurrence distinct from those two.