Shringaraprakasha 6.p1.15

6.p1.15

However, we do not recognize a fixed essential nature handed down through a chain of its own causes. If [it is argued that] capacity is an excellence of word-meaning arising from qualities of the cause, its classification into eternal and non-eternal is inapplicable; for its being co-extensive with the substance, it is eternal or non-eternal just like the substance, and the production of an effect does not occur at all times because capacity awakens only at the time of action. And unseen fate, specific accessories, and the like are causes for the awakening of capacity, which even we do not reject. But since in the rule of a material cause positive and negative concomitance are rooted solely in a capacity to be inferred from observing effects even throughout a hundred usages of the elders—because positive and negative concomitance are stated even by the elders—the alternative that there is destruction or obstruction [of capacity] by mantras and the like is indeed ruled out once the essential nature is established as capacity. Operation, however, being expressible only by a verbal root, is supersensible and not real; therefore, through both of them, causality is understood in that very manner. Capacity, postulated from the impossibility otherwise of observing the effect, is far more reasonable as supersensible. 6.9. The meaning of an integrated grammatical form is threefold: not a word-meaning, a single word-meaning, and multiple word-meanings. Among them, [the meaning which is] not a word-meaning is threefold: pertaining to the meaning of a verbal root and an affix, pertaining to the meaning of an affix and an affix, and pertaining to the meaning of a nominal stem and an affix. Among those, that pertaining to the meaning of a verbal root and an affix is of two kinds: having the form of an action, and having the form of a syntactic role. Between the two, that having the form of an action is, for example: kartum icchati (‘desires to do’) -> cikīrṣati; kurvantaṃ prayuṅkte (‘causes someone doing [it] to act’) -> kārayati; atyarthaṃ punaḥ punar vā pacati (‘cooks excessively or again and again’) -> pāpacyate. That having the form of a syntactic role is, for example: pākaṃ karoti (‘does cooking’) -> pacati; pākena kriyate (‘is done by cooking’) -> pacyate; pācakaḥ (‘cook’); paktavyam (‘to be cooked’). That pertaining to the meaning of an affix and an affix is of two kinds: permanent and based on the speaker's intention. Between the two, the permanent is, for example: kṛtrimaṃ, sāṃrāviṇam, vyāvakrośī, bhidā, ābhijityaḥ, kauñjāyanyaḥ. That based on the speaker's intention is, for example: cikīrṣuḥ, kāraṇā, gārgyāyaṇaḥ, kalyāṇineyaḥ, mālāyāḥ, kumāryāḥ. That pertaining to the meaning of a nominal stem and an affix is of two kinds: having the form of an individual entity, and having the form of a capacity.