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Shringaraprakasha 6.p1.4

English (machine translation) 6.p1.4

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English

6.p1.4

It is answered: through the necessary connection of the universal [with the individual], the individual indicated [by the base] will, in conjunction with number, have a relation characterized by inherence in a single object. It is not so. Just as morphological bases, being unable due to infinity and deviation to express the individual endowed with difference, express the undivided and non-deviating universal, so too case-endings, being unable due to infinity and deviation to express capacity and number as differentiated by the difference of their substrates, [cannot express them individually]; therefore, because of the absence of a relation between the universal of capacity or number and its substrate, the juxtaposition of morphological base and affix would be entirely invalid. It is not invalid, because it is accounted for by inherence along with inhering in a single object. How, again, can there be a relation between number and substance when both are expressed through the expression of universals? Just as in the case of [two things] directly expressed: just as two meanings expressed by a linguistic sound, turning over in the mind, become mutually connected, so also two meanings apprehended from what is expressed by a linguistic sound will undergo a mutual connection. Does this number or capacity necessarily qualify the universal? He says: no. For the singular number heard in 'he wipes the vessel' does not convey the number of oneness as an auxiliary factor of the action. Nor does the direct hearing of the accusative in 'he offers parched grain' express the objective capacity of the parched grain in the offering action. Rather, just as in 'he plays with dice', it employs the parched grain as the most effective instrument in the sacrificial act, from an objective nature concealed by general relationship. But in some cases, through the direct hearing of the case-ending in its own form, the auxiliary status of capacities such as number and objecthood in actions is understood, as in 'he should sacrifice an animal' or 'he threshes the rice'. Why, then, are number and capacity intended to be conveyed only in some places even though both are directly mentioned by the revealed sound? Regarding number, it is stated: an entity that is fit to be designated as 'this' or 'that', being an existent thing, cannot be expressed by words without number; for words express an existent thing only when endowed with number.

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