Shringaraprakasha 8.p1.13

8.p1.13

Some say that there is neither the denotation of connected [meanings] nor the connection of denoted [meanings]. 8.7. On this point, the proponents of denotation of connected meanings (anvitābhidhānavādin) say this: Linguistic sound causes meaning to be understood indeed through the power of linguistic convention, and linguistic convention [comes] from the usage of elders, and elders communicate only by means of sentences, not by means of isolated words. And when they use an isolated word assisted by other word-meanings accessible through context and the like, that too is just a sentence: / "Even when a single word is observed somewhere fulfilling the required action, / they regard that too as a sentence, like a vocative word and the like. / And when, in response to the question 'What is this?', it is said 'a cow' or 'a horse', / the action mentioned in the question itself, such as 'is obtained', is intended there." / And a sentence is a collection of words aimed at a single meaning that denotes an integrated meaning. They are spoken of as words, and the collection thus has a single meaning; and thus the words together denote the meaning. If each single word operates upon an undivided meaning alone—just as three stones hold up a pot, or four carriers lift a palanquin, or all the syntactic roles bring about cooking—so too all the words bring about the understanding of the sentence-meaning. And the sentence-meaning is of the nature of a conjunction of actions and syntactic roles. There, because syntactic roles are eager for a connection with an action, and because actions cannot endure the absence of syntactic roles, the denotation of connected [meanings] alone takes place by their own words. And this being so, the sentence-meaning's nature as directly conveyed by linguistic sound is established, not indirectly as in the view of the connection of denoted meanings (abhihitānvayapakṣa). The proponents of the connection of denoted meanings (abhihitānvayavādin) do not accept that. For they say this: Because the comprehension of the sentence-meaning is observed to be preceded by the understanding of word-meanings, the comprehension of the sentence-meaning is necessarily preceded by the understanding of word-meanings. And the understanding of word-meanings is possible in this way: if only that much meaning is denoted by a word; but if it were denoted as connected with another word-meaning, the distinction of word-meanings could not be established because of the cognition of meaning in the form of a composite mass.