Shringaraprakasha 8.p1.21
English (machine translation) 8.p1.21
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8.p1.21
And it is stated by the author of the Bhāṣya: "And that mutual expectancy does occur toward 'red'." Therefore, mutual expectancy exists there precisely for the sake of establishing the expression of connected meaning; if there is any difference, it is only this: in cases like "the door," the mutual expectancy for the expression of connected meaning belongs to that very word, whereas in "Bring the white cow," it belongs to another word. And it has been said: / 'The inquiry directed toward counter-correlatives, whether for the sake of expressing the connected [meaning] / or for fitting together what has already been expressed, is sung of as mutual expectancy.' / And this mutual expectancy, occurring when there is division, is adopted as an indicative characteristic in comprehension. Why, then, are proximity and appropriateness alone not adopted? Because the expression of connected meaning is not observed with that which lacks mutual expectancy. In "Here comes the king's son; let this man be removed," the "king," having no mutual expectancy due to its connection with "son," is not syntactically connected with "man." But why, when both "son" and "man" have no difference in proximity and appropriateness, does the connection of "king" occur only with "son" and not with "man"? It is answered: because the comprehension of sentence-meaning depends on logical propriety, the king connects only with that which has constant expectancy; therefore, having no expectancy of connection, it experiences no connection with "man." Thus, mutual expectancy also is adopted as an indicative characteristic in comprehension. There is non-connection of an appropriate [word] even when nearby with what is complete; therefore, in comprehension, mutual expectancy is also an indicative characteristic of words. And this mutual expectancy does not arise toward all counter-correlatives all at once simultaneously, but rather in sequence from the onset of causes. To explain: since action is impossible without an agent, when it is understood, the agent is expected first; and that [agent] does not act in a purposeless operation, so it expects an object; and the operation cannot be accomplished without an instrument, so there is expectancy of an instrument. In this manner, location and the like, as well as the qualifiers of action and syntactic roles, must be expected; thus occurs the onset of causes. In the case of actions and the like: / In whatever way inquiry arises in the comprehender regarding relata, / whatever is expected, appropriate, and attains proximity, / connected with that, the word's own meaning is conveyed.
Linked texts (1)
- Śṛṅgāraprakāśa — Bhoja, Sanskrit