Rasarnavasudhakara 2.529

English (machine translation) 2.529

Language: English

2.529

From barbarian love, as in:
"When the ploughman fled, abandoning his noble wife who was unconscious with swooning, thinking her dead, / the cotton shrub seemed to laugh, / bent down by the weight of its slightly bursting pods."

2.529.p1

(Gāthāsaptaśatī 4.60)

2.529.p2

[When the ploughman fled, abandoning his noble wife who was happy in the swoon of passion, thinking her dead, / the cotton shrub seemed to laugh, / bent down by the weight of its slightly bursting pods.]

2.529.p3

Here, because of the lack of discrimination between the condition of sleep from the swoon of intercourse and the state of death, the ploughman's status as a barbarian is understood.

2.529.p4

[Objection:] Surely it is not proper that [love] residing in animals and barbarians is a semblance, since determinants and other factors are possible in them, and because one perceives their suitability for being savoured. If this is urged, we say: No. O advocate of barbarian rasa! You have thoroughly bought into [the views of] the poet Vidyādhara, who conformed to the mind of King Narasiṃhadeva, the ruler of Utkala, who prided himself on the erotic sentiment. For thus it was indeed maintained by him in the Ekāvalī:

2.529.p5

"Others declare that the semblance of aesthetic sentiment occurs in animals. That does not withstand scrutiny, because determinants and the like are possible even in them. If it is argued that animals, being devoid of knowledge of determinants and so on, cannot be fit receptacles for aesthetic sentiment, we say: No; for there would follow the consequence that the presence of aesthetic sentiment would be absent in certain human beings also who are like that. The possibility of determinants and the like is indeed the productive condition for aesthetic sentiment, not the knowledge of determinants and the like. Therefore, aesthetic sentiment exists even in animals." (Ekāvalī [p.] 106)

2.529.p6

[Refutation:] First of all, the status of being a determinant does not hold in the case of animals. For in the erotic sentiment, only an object that is bright, clean, and attractive was handed down as a determinant by the Sage. Because animals lack unguents, bathing, the arrangement of ornaments, and the like, the impossibility of their being bright, clean, and attractive is well known.

2.529.p7

Now, if it is argued that by means of properties appropriate to their own kind, male elephants possess determinant-hood with respect to a female elephant (as in the verse "He offered the lotus of the lake..." [Kumārasambhava 3.37] and so on), that is not so. At that level, there is causality with respect to the female elephant's passion for the male elephant, but not determinant-hood.

2.529.p8

Furthermore, an entity does not possess determinant-hood by properties appropriate to its kind, but rather by those qualified by love, which cause the blossoming of the appreciator's mind.

2.529.p9

Furthermore, what is called the knowledge of determinants and the like is discernment of decorum. Being devoid of that, animals do not deserve determinant-hood.

2.529.p10

If it is objected that this entails an semblance of aesthetic sentiment in human beings devoid of knowledge of determinants and the like, this is not a fault; for when the aesthetic sentiment present in barbarians—who typify people devoid of discernment—is an semblance, our own desired conclusion is obtained.

2.529.p11

Furthermore, the statement that "it is the occurrence of determinants and the like that serves as the operative cause for aesthetic sentiment, not the knowledge of determinants and the like" is untenable. To explain: is it the occurrence of a qualified determinant or that of a mere entity that serves as the operative cause for aesthetic sentiment? If you accept the qualified as the operative cause, the entrance of discernment and the like is admitted, and so you have taken refuge in following our very position.

2.529.p12

If it is argued here that being qualified means possessing other particular qualities without discernment, that is not so; for there can be no limitation by definite number of particulars that are intent upon the pursuit of supreme excellence in the subject and are mutually compatible.

2.529.p13

Now, if it is of a mere entity, then even in passages like "Attended by Arundhatī just as the fire is by Svāhā..." [Raghuvaṃśa 1.56], because of the presence of determinants in the form of mere male and female individuals, and because of the occurrence of the consequent characterized by attendance, the erotic sentiment would undesirably be savored. Furthermore:

2.529.p14

"Leaving the ploughman who fled, abandoning the woman / faint with exhaustion from intercourse, / the cotton-shrub seemed to laugh / with its weight bent down by slightly bursting pods."

2.529.p15

Verse number 529 should be consulted.

2.529.p16

In verses such as this, the presence of determinants in the form of mere male and female individuals is entirely obvious. Therefore, make haste to lift up the scent-elephant of the erotic sentiment, which is submerged in the mud of laughter born of indiscretion regarding that; enough of this vehemence in denying the semblance of aesthetic sentiment!

2.529.p17

Objection: The arising of aesthetic sentiment in spectators occurs when they apprehend women in general by means of mere entities as determinants, such as Sītā and others, and not by qualified ones. How then is this? In reply, it is said: Here, setting aside contradictory properties such as being Janaka's daughter and being Rāma's wife, a determinant such as Sītā, being qualified by attributes such as charm, brilliance, purity, and beauty verbally expressed, makes known a woman in general of just that kind, but not the mere category of woman; thus, everything is sound.

Linked texts (1)

Rasārṇavasudhākara — Siṃhabhūpāla, Sanskrit