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Nyayabindutika 35

Dharmottarapradīpa 35

Language
Sanskrit

35.1

nanu vārttikādinaiva samyagjñānasya vyutpādanāt katham asya na vaiyarthyam iti cet saṃkṣiptarucīn prajñān adhikṛtyedaṃ prakaraṇaṃ praṇītam ity adoṣaḥ |

Objection: Since correct cognition is already explained by the Vārttika and other [works], how is this [treatise] not superfluous? If this is asked, [the reply is:] there is no fault, because this treatise was composed with reference to discerning people who prefer brevity.

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35.2

atha kā 'tra vipratipattiḥ yannirākaraṇenedaṃ pratipādyata ity āha -- caturvidheti | co yasmāt | caturvidhā catuḥprakārā | atra samyagjñāne viruddhā pratipattir vipratipattiḥ | kiṃviṣayā sety āha | saṃkhyeti | anena viṣayabhedāc cāturvidhyaṃ vipratipatter darśitam | tathā hi saṃkhyāvipratipattis tāvat pratyakṣam evaikaṃ pramāṇam iti lokāyatikānām | pratyakṣānumānāptavacanāni trīṇy eva pramāṇānīti sāṃkhyānām | ārṣasya jñānasya pratibhāpranāmnaḥ kadācid iha laukikānām utpadyamānasya pratyakṣānumānayor ekatrāpy antarbhāvāpradarśanāt pratyakṣānumānārṣāṇy eveti cirantanavaiśeṣikāṇām | pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdā eveti naiyāyikānām | pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdārthāpattaya eveti prabhākarāṇām iti | pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdārthāpattyabhāvā eveti kaumārilānām |

Now, what is the divergence of opinion here, by whose refutation this is explained? He says: 'caturvidhā' [of four kinds]. 'ca' [means] because. 'caturvidhā' means of four sorts. Here, in regard to correct cognition, contrary understanding is 'divergence of opinion'. Regarding what object is it? He says: 'saṃkhyā' [number, etc.]. By this, the fourfold nature of the divergence of opinion is shown according to the difference in its object. For indeed: first, the divergence of opinion regarding number is that there is only one means of valid cognition, direct perception, according to the Lokāyatikas; there are only three means of valid cognition—direct perception, inference, and authoritative testimony—according to the Sāṃkhyas; because intuitive cognition (pratibhā), which is termed 'cognition of the seers' (ārṣa) and which occasionally arises here among ordinary people, is not shown to be included in either direct perception or inference, there are only direct perception, inference, and [cognition of the] seers, according to the ancient Vaiśeṣikas; there are only direct perception, inference, analogical comparison, and verbal testimony, according to the Naiyāyikas; there are only direct perception, inference, analogical comparison, verbal testimony, and postulation, according to the Prābhākaras; there are only direct perception, inference, analogical comparison, verbal testimony, postulation, and non-apprehension, according to the Kaumārilas.

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35.3

lakṣaṇavipratipattir api -- savikalpakam eva pratyakṣam iti vaiyākaraṇabārhaspatyādīnām | savikalpakaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ ceti naiyāyika[16a]mīmāṃsakādīnām | pītaśaṅkhādijñānaṃ bhrāntam api pratyakṣam ity aṃśavādavādinām | ekalakṣaṇahetujam anumānam ity ahrīkāṇām | ṣaḍlakṣaṇahetujam iti pūrvayaugānām | pañcalakṣaṇahetujaṃ caturlakṣaṇahetujaṃ ce(ve)ti naiyāyikānām |

The divergence of opinion regarding the definition also [is as follows]: direct perception is conceptual alone, according to the Grammarians, Bārhaspatyas, and others; it is conceptual and non-conceptual, according to the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, and others; a cognition of a yellow conch-shell and the like, though erroneous, is direct perception, according to the partialists (aṃśavādavādins); inference is born from a logical reason having a single characteristic, according to the shameless ones (ahrīkas); it is born from a logical reason having six characteristics, according to the early adherents of the Yoga; it is born from a logical reason having five characteristics, and [according to some] born from a logical reason having four characteristics, according to the Naiyāyikas.

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35.4

viṣayavipratipattir api -- sāmānyaviṣaye pratyakṣānumāne iti naiyāyikamīmāsakādīnām |

The divergence of opinion regarding the object also [is as follows]: direct perception and inference have universals as their objects, according to the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, and others.

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35.5

phalavipratipattir api -- sarveṣāṃ pramāṇā(-ṇa)vyatiriktam eva pramāṇarū(pramārū)paṃ phalam iti |

The divergence of opinion regarding the result also [is as follows]: for all of them, the result possessing the nature of valid cognition is distinct from the means of valid cognition itself.

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35.6

tatra tāsu madhye saṃtkhyā tv ajātyā nirdhāryate | tato nirdhāraṇe yuktaṃ dvau vidhau prakārāv asyeti vigṛhṇan vidhaśabdo 'py asti prakāravācīti darśayati | tathā hi prakīrṇavṛttikṛdadharmapālenāpi

There, among those, number is determined through non-universal [kinds]. Therefore, glossing [the compound] properly in the sense of determination as 'two are its forms (vidhā), [that is,] varieties (prakāra),' he shows that the word 'vidha' also expresses variety. For instance, even by the author of the Prakīrṇavṛtti, Dharmapāla—

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35.7

[DhPr p.36]

[DhPr p. 36]

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35.8

dve eva samyagjñānavyaktī iti. vyaktibhede ca pradarśite prativyaktiniyataṃ samyagjñānalakṣaṇam ākhyātuṃ śakyam. apradarśite tu vyaktibhede sakalavyaktyanuyāyisamyagjñānalakṣaṇam ekam na śakyaṃ vaktum. tato lakṣaṇakathanāṅgam eva saṃkhyābhedakathanam. apradarśite tu vyaktibhedātmake saṃkhyābhede lakṣaṇabhedasya darśayitum aśakyatvāt. lakṣaṇanirdeśāṅgatvād eva ca prathamaṃ saṃkhyābhedakathanam.

—[it is stated that] 'there are only two individuals of correct cognition'. And when the distinction between individuals has been shown, it is possible to state the definition of correct cognition restricted to each individual. But when the distinction between individuals has not been shown, it is not possible to state a single definition of correct cognition that conforms to all individuals. Therefore, the statement of the difference in number is indeed an auxiliary to the statement of the definition; for when the difference in number, consisting in the distinction between individuals, has not been shown, it is impossible to show the distinction between definitions. And precisely because it is an auxiliary to the exposition of the definition, the statement of the difference in number comes first.

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35.10

[28] -vyakty-em.: -vyaktaty-DhPr

[28] -vyakty-em.: -vyaktaty-DhPr

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