Nyayabindutika 35.2

35.2

atha kā 'tra vipratipattiḥ yannirākaraṇenedaṃ pratipādyata ity āha -- caturvidheti | co yasmāt | caturvidhā catuḥprakārā | atra samyagjñāne viruddhā pratipattir vipratipattiḥ | kiṃviṣayā sety āha | saṃkhyeti | anena viṣayabhedāc cāturvidhyaṃ vipratipatter darśitam | tathā hi saṃkhyāvipratipattis tāvat pratyakṣam evaikaṃ pramāṇam iti lokāyatikānām | pratyakṣānumānāptavacanāni trīṇy eva pramāṇānīti sāṃkhyānām | ārṣasya jñānasya pratibhāpranāmnaḥ kadācid iha laukikānām utpadyamānasya pratyakṣānumānayor ekatrāpy antarbhāvāpradarśanāt pratyakṣānumānārṣāṇy eveti cirantanavaiśeṣikāṇām | pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdā eveti naiyāyikānām | pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdārthāpattaya eveti prabhākarāṇām iti | pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdārthāpattyabhāvā eveti kaumārilānām |

Now, what is the divergence of opinion here, by whose refutation this is explained? He says: 'caturvidhā' [of four kinds]. 'ca' [means] because. 'caturvidhā' means of four sorts. Here, in regard to correct cognition, contrary understanding is 'divergence of opinion'. Regarding what object is it? He says: 'saṃkhyā' [number, etc.]. By this, the fourfold nature of the divergence of opinion is shown according to the difference in its object. For indeed: first, the divergence of opinion regarding number is that there is only one means of valid cognition, direct perception, according to the Lokāyatikas; there are only three means of valid cognition—direct perception, inference, and authoritative testimony—according to the Sāṃkhyas; because intuitive cognition (pratibhā), which is termed 'cognition of the seers' (ārṣa) and which occasionally arises here among ordinary people, is not shown to be included in either direct perception or inference, there are only direct perception, inference, and [cognition of the] seers, according to the ancient Vaiśeṣikas; there are only direct perception, inference, analogical comparison, and verbal testimony, according to the Naiyāyikas; there are only direct perception, inference, analogical comparison, verbal testimony, and postulation, according to the Prābhākaras; there are only direct perception, inference, analogical comparison, verbal testimony, postulation, and non-apprehension, according to the Kaumārilas.